Latest stats from the RBA show that the sharp contraction in business credit has slowed, but growth of personal credit (mainly mortgage finance) is at its lowest rate since the early 1990s and is trending downwards. Credit growth does not have to fall below zero for it to have a negative impact on the economy. A fall in the rate of credit expansion will slow the rate of economic growth.
The chart shows clearly the build up of debt heading into the bust, and the subsequent deleveraging. Overall public and private debt, by this measure, peaked at 302% of GDP in the first quarter of 2009. Since then, it has fallen to 279% as the economy has grown and some private players have lightened their debt loads.
via What’s Going on With Debt in U.S.? – Real Time Economics – WSJ.
Comment: ~ The Financial sector can be ignored as this merely acts as a conduit for, and mirrors, the other sectors. My concern is that Government debt is growing at a faster rate than the fall in Household and Nonfinancial Corporations debt. That is unsustainable and is likely to reverse after the November elections. At which point the economy will contract.
Given the bearish outlook for US economic growth, the Fed can be expected to engage in another round of quantitative easing. But the Fed also faces political constraints, and will do too little, and move too late, to help the economy significantly. Moreover, a vocal minority on the Fed’s rate-setting Federal Open Market Committee is against further easing. In any case, monetary policy cannot address only liquidity problems – and banks are flush with excess reserves.
Most importantly, the US – and many other advanced economies – remains in the early stages of a deleveraging cycle. A recession caused by too much debt and leverage (first in the private sector, and then on public balance sheets) will require a long period of spending less and saving more. This year will be no different, as public-sector deleveraging has barely started.
via EconoMonitor : Nouriel Roubini’s Global EconoMonitor » The Straits of America.
- The US recovery from the 2007–2009 recession has been particularly disappointing, in part due to the moribund state of the housing market.
- The state of the housing market is in part a symptom of excess leverage, the US’ core concern.
- Excess leverage will continue to weigh on US economic growth, restricting it to a sub-trend pace for the foreseeable future, resulting in a need for further QE.
….. Given the size of the US’ debt stock and the lack of assets set aside to fund future pension liabilities, it is logical to conclude that above-trend growth conditions are a long way off. In the meantime, households and government authorities will remain heavily exposed to any further deterioration in conditions, whether it be domestic or foreign (i.e. Europe) in origin.
QE3 will be needed merely to help protect against a further deterioration in economic conditions. Such a program would have to be large in scale and in coverage, likely covering USTs, mortgage securities and, with time, the existing debt of SLGs.
A final point: the degree of easing required to alleviate the financial stresses the US economy currently faces (and hopefully at least maintain the current level of activity) has not been recognised by markets. Given the precarious state of Europe, the market will likely take its time in coming to terms with the US’ own concerns. But, when the spotlight falls on the US, we expect a greater awareness of US credit risk and the absence of near-term growth prospects will see yields rise and the US dollar fall.
To pay down liabilities like these would require the permanent allocation of an additional 8% of GDP. Where would we find the will to do that? I suspect as a result that we will see real decreases in Medicare benefits — things that won’t be eligible for payment. Hospice care will be indicated at higher frequency when healing an old person would be costly. So just be aware that something has to change, either taxes have to rise, or Medicare benefit levels have to fall.
via 2011 Financial Report Of The U.S. Government – Seeking Alpha.
The debt binge since 1975, fueled by an easy-money policy from the Fed, has landed the US economy in serious difficulties. Wall Street no doubt lobbied hard for debt expansion, because of the boost to interest margins, with little thought as to their own vulnerability. There can be no justification for debt to expand at a faster rate than GDP — a rising Debt to GDP ratio — as this feeds through into the money supply, causing asset (real estate and stocks) and/or consumer prices to balloon. What we see here is clear evidence of financial mismanagement of the US economy over several decades: the graph of debt to GDP should be a flat line.
The difference between domestic and private (non-financial) debt is public debt, comprising federal, state and municipal borrowings. When we look at aggregate debt below, domestic (non-financial) debt is still rising, albeit at a slower pace than the 8.2 percent average of the previous 5 years (2004 to 2008). Public debt is ballooning in an attempt to mitigate the deflationary effect of a private debt contraction. Clearly this is an unsustainable path.
The economy has grown addicted to debt and any attempt to go “cold turkey” — cutting off further debt expansion — will cause pain. But there are steps that can be taken to alleviate this.
If private debt contracts, you need to expand public debt — by running a deficit — in order to counteract the deflationary effect of the contraction. The present path expands public debt rapidly in an attempt to not only offset the shrinkage in private debt levels but also to continue the expansion of overall (domestic non-financial) debt levels. This is short-sighted. You can’t borrow your way out of trouble. And encouraging the private sector to take on more debt would be asking for a repeat of the GFC. The private sector needs to deleverage but how can this be done without causing a total economic collapse? The answer lies in government spending.
Treasury cannot afford to borrow more money if this is used to meet normal government expenditure. Public debt as a percentage of GDP would sky-rocket, further destabilizing the economy. If the proceeds are invested in infrastructure projects, however, that earn a market-related return on investment — whether they be high-speed rail, toll roads or bridges, automated port facilities, airport upgrades, national broadband networks or oil pipelines — there are at least four benefits. First is the boost to employment during the construction phase, not only on the project itself but in related industries that supply equipment and materials. Second is the saving in unemployment benefits as employment is lifted. Third, the fiscal balance sheet is strengthened by addition of saleable, income-producing assets, reducing the net public debt. Lastly, and most importantly, GDP is boosted by revenues from the completed project — lowering the public debt to GDP ratio.
Public debt would still rise, and bond market funding in the current climate may not be reliable. But this is the one time that Treasury purchases (QE) by the Fed would not cause inflation. Simply because the inflationary effect of asset purchases are offset by the deflationary effect of private debt contraction. Overall (domestic non-financial) debt levels do not rise, so there is no upward pressure on prices.
Infrastructure investment should not be seen as the silver bullet, that will solve all our problems. Over-investment in infrastructure can produce diminishing marginal returns — as in bridges to nowhere — and government projects are prone to political interference, cost overruns, and mismanagement. But these negatives can be minimized through partnership with the private sector.
Projects should also not be viewed as a short-term, band-aid solution. The private sector has to increase hiring and make substantial capital investment in order to support them. All the good work would be undone if the spigot is shut off prematurely. What is needed is a 10 to 20 year program to revamp the national infrastructure, restore competitiveness and lay the foundation for future growth.
There are no quick fixes. But what the public needs is a clear path to recovery, rather than the current climate of indecision.
Empirically, a long period of deleveraging nearly always follows a major financial crisis. Deleveraging episodes are painful, lasting six to seven years on average and reducing the ratio of debt to GDP by 25 percent. GDP typically contracts during the first several years and then recovers.
Today, American aggregate non-financial debt is at levels similar to those last seen in the midst of the Great Depression. At 250 per cent of GDP, that debt burden is equivalent to almost US$120,000 for every American (Chart 1).
…..backsliding on financial reform is not a solution to current problems. The challenge for the crisis economies is the paucity of credit demand rather than the scarcity of its supply. Relaxing prudential regulations would run the risk of maintaining dangerously high leverage – the situation that got us into this mess in the first place.
As a result of deleveraging, the global economy risks entering a prolonged period of deficient demand. If mishandled, it could lead to debt deflation and disorderly defaults, potentially triggering large transfers of wealth and social unrest.
Managing the deleveraging process
Austerity is a necessary condition for rebalancing, but it is seldom sufficient. There are really only three options to reduce debt: restructuring, inflation and growth. Whether we like it or not, debt restructuring may happen. If it is to be done, it is best done quickly. Policy-makers need to be careful about delaying the inevitable and merely funding the private exit.
……Some have suggested that higher inflation may be a way out from the burden of excessive debt. This is a siren call. Moving opportunistically to a higher inflation target would risk unmooring inflation expectations and destroying the hard-won gains of price stability.
…..With no easy way out, the basic challenge for central banks is to maintain price stability in order to help sustain nominal aggregate demand during the period of real adjustment. In the Bank’s view, that is best accomplished through a flexible inflation-targeting framework, applied symmetrically, to guard against both higher inflation and the possibility of deflation.
The most palatable strategy to reduce debt is to increase growth. In today’s reality, the hurdles are significant. Once leverage is high in one sector or region, it is very hard to reduce it without at least temporarily increasing it elsewhere.
In recent years, large fiscal expansions in the crisis economies have helped to sustain aggregate demand in the face of private deleveraging. However, the window for such Augustinian policy is rapidly closing. Few except the United States, by dint of its reserve currency status, can maintain it for much longer.
…..The route to restoring competitiveness [in the euro-zone] is through fiscal and structural reforms. These real adjustments are the responsibility of citizens, firms and governments within the affected countries, not central banks. A sustained process of relative wage adjustment will be necessary, implying large declines in living standards for a period in up to one-third of the euro area.
…..With deleveraging economies under pressure, global growth will require global rebalancing. Creditor nations, mainly emerging markets that have benefited from the debt-fuelled demand boom in advanced economies, must now pick up the baton. This will be hard to accomplish without co-operation. Major advanced economies with deficient demand cannot consolidate their fiscal positions and boost household savings without support from increased foreign demand. Meanwhile, emerging markets, seeing their growth decelerate because of sagging demand in advanced countries, are reluctant to abandon a strategy that has served them so well in the past, and are refusing to let their exchange rates materially adjust. Both sides are doubling down on losing strategies. As the Bank has outlined before, relative to a co-operative solution embodied in the G-20’s Action Plan, the foregone output could be enormous: lower world GDP by more than US$7 trillion within five years. Canada has a big stake in avoiding this outcome.
Mark Carney: Growth in the age of deleveraging.
Comment: ~ One of the most important papers I have read this year. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board — established by the G-20 in 2009 to further global economic governance — maps out the hard road to recovery from the current financial crisis.
These three commodities [thermal coal, coking coal and iron ore] make up half of Australia’s terms of trade. The first few months of next year are not going to be kind to the TOT. Not kind at all.
via Bulk trouble – macrobusiness.com.au | macrobusiness.com.au.
Thermal coal:
Coking coal:
Iron ore:
The cause of current anemic GDP growth is evident from the recently-released Z1 Flow of Funds report. GDP recovery from 2008/2009 is accompanied by only a modest rise in Domestic (Non-Financial) Debt — which is now constraining further growth.
Domestic (Non-Financial) Debt is made up of Government Debt and Private (Non-Financial) Debt — which can be further broken down into Household and Corporate debt. The Financial sector is excluded as it mainly acts as a conduit, channeling debt to other sectors of the economy. We can see below that Private (Non-Financial) Debt contraction was far greater than overall Domestic (Non-Financial) Debt. What saved the economy was a sharp spike in Government Debt in 2009, offsetting the fall. The massive fiscal deficit may have left a public debt hangover, but failure to offset the contraction in private borrowing would have had more serious consequences: a GDP collapse similar to the 1930s.
Resumption of corporate borrowing has dragged Private (Non-Financial) Debt growth into positive territory but growth remains anemic and households continue to de-leverage. Cessation of government borrowing would cause a fall in overall Domestic (Non-Financial) Debt growth to near zero and a sharp fall in GDP. The economy needs to be gradually weaned off stimulus spending in order to minimize disruption to growth. And not before Private sector borrowing recovers. We need a clear deficit-reduction plan, over 5 to 10 years, in order to restore corporate sector confidence and encourage new capital investment.
The only alternative is further quantitative easing (QE3), where continuous deficits are funded by borrowing from the Fed. But that poses a whole new set of problems — and could lead us back to square #1.
