bank lending Archives - the patient investor

March 2, 2016

China’s problems

China’s problems in a nutshell, From Niels C. Jensen’s Absolute Return newsletter:

China’s problems….. It is faced with a decapitated banking industry, which has been far too willing to lend to all kinds of investment projects – good and bad. At the same time, the Chinese growth model has been driven by investments and exports, whereas the growth in consumer spending has been relatively modest. A few numbers to support that statement: As recently as 10 years ago, exports and investments constituted 34% and 42% respectively of Chinese GDP, i.e. less than a ¼ of Chinese GDP came from the combination of consumer spending and government spending. By comparison, consumer spending accounts for over 70% of U.S. GDP.

By 2014, investments had grown to 46% of GDP, whilst exports had fallen to 23%. The further growth in investments has been funded by rapid credit expansion in China’s banking industry, which has grown from $3 trillion in 2006 to $34 trillion in 2015. That is a shocking amount of credit in a $10 trillion economy. Now, the Chinese leadership face a big challenge. They must restructure the banking industry whilst at the same time seek to change the growth model. I can think of quite a few things that can go wrong in that process…..

The outcome is likely to be similar to Japan in the 1990s: zombie banks.
From FT lexicon:

Beginning in 1990, Japan suffered a collapse in real estate and stock market prices that pushed major banks into insolvency. Rather than follow America’s tough recommendation – and close or recapitalise these banks – Japan kept banks marginally functional through explicit or implicit guarantees and piecemeal government bail-outs. The resulting “zombie banks” – neither alive nor dead – could not support economic growth.

A period of weak economic performance called Japan’s “lost decade” resulted. Scores of companies were cast into an “undead” state – in the sense of being too weak to flourish, but too complex and costly for their lenders to shut down. Hence they remained half-alive, poisoning the corporate world by silently spreading a sense of stagnation and fear.

July 16, 2014

Banks try scare tactics to avoid calls for more capital

ANZ chief executive Mike Smith is the latest banker to warn that the push to increase bank capital ratios will reduce access to bank finance. The AFR reports Smith as saying:

It is not just about banks, it is about the real economy – about corporations, business and individuals… It is one thing for a bank to complain about regulation but it is another thing for a corporation to say we are not getting finance because of this regulation that is being imposed on the banks.

Methinks bank resistance to increased capital requirements is more about protecting bonuses than about protecting shareholders or the broad economy. Shareholders would benefit from lower funding costs and improved stock ratings associated with a stronger balance sheet, while Bank of England’s Andrew Bailey had this to say about the impact of stronger capital ratios on bank lending:

I do however accept that there remains a perception in some quarters that higher capital standards are bad for lending and thus for a sustained economic recovery…… Looking at the broader picture, the post-crisis adjustment of the capital adequacy standard is a welcome and necessary correction of the excessively lax underwriting and pricing of risk which caused the build up of fragility in the banking system and led to the crisis. I do not however accept the view that raising capital standards damages lending. There are few, if any, banks that have been weakened as a result of raising capital.

Analysis by the Bank for International Settlements indicates that in the post crisis period banks with higher capital ratios have experienced higher asset and loan growth. Other work by the BIS also shows a positive relationship between bank capitalisation and lending growth, and that the impact of higher capital levels on lending may be especially significant during a stress period. IMF analysis indicates that banks with stronger core capital are less likely to reduce certain types of lending when impacted by an adverse funding shock. And our own analysis indicates that banks with larger capital buffers tend to reduce lending less when faced with an increase in capital requirements. These banks are less likely to cut lending aggressively in response to a shock. These empirical results are intuitive and accord with our supervisory experience, namely that a weakly capitalised bank is not in a position to expand its lending. Higher quality capital and larger capital buffers are critical to bank resilience – delivering a more stable system both through lower sensitivity of lending behaviour to shocks and reducing the probability of failure and with it the risk of dramatic shifts in lending behaviour.

The BOE and BIS tell us that higher capital ratios will improve bank lending, yet Mr Smith is trying to scare regulators with threats that it will have the opposite effect.

And at ANZ CEO Mike Smith Rebuffs Murray Inquiry Call For More Bank Capital | Business Insider.

March 30, 2013

‘Most of the banks are zombie banks’ | Het Financieele Dagblad

Translation from an interview by Marcel de Boer & Martin Visser with Willem Buiter, chief economist at Citgroup:

Is Europe creating zombie banks?

These already exist. Most of the banks are zombie banks. There is little new lending to businesses and households. Zombie banks will not offer credit even on good projects — that is already evident on a large scale.

Full article (in Dutch) at ‘De meeste banken zijn zombiebanken’ | Het Financieele Dagblad.

February 28, 2013

ECB Says Private Lending Contracted for Ninth Month in January – Bloomberg

Jana Randow at Reuters writes:

Lending to households and companies in the euro area shrank for a ninth month in January as the recession damped demand for credit.

February 5, 2013

Did Securitization Lead to Riskier Corporate Lending? – Liberty Street Economics

João Santos writes:

There’s ample evidence that securitization led mortgage lenders to take more risk, thereby contributing to a large increase in mortgage delinquencies during the financial crisis. In this post, I discuss evidence from a recent research study I undertook with Vitaly Bord suggesting that securitization also led to riskier corporate lending. We show that during the boom years of securitization, corporate loans that banks securitized at loan origination underperformed similar, unsecuritized loans originated by the same banks. Additionally, we report evidence suggesting that the performance gap reflects looser underwriting standards applied by banks to loans they securitize.

January 16, 2013

The China Beige Book Has Some 'Shocking' Data | CNBC

Ansuya Harjani writes:

“In the fourth quarter, we’re seeing corporate loans decline significantly, very shockingly most of our bankers say less than 20 percent of their lending goes to new loans. Most of its going to debt rollovers or increases, they are not funding expansion. That indicates that this is not a period of strong expansion,” Leland Miller, president at CBB [China Beige Book] told CNBC on Wednesday.

via The China Beige Book Has Some 'Shocking' Data.

December 11, 2012

The Fed's interest rate policies are damaging rather than restoring confidence and should be reversed

Vince Foster at The Fiscal Times writes about this Wednesday’s FOMC meeting:

With Operation Twist due to expire at the end of the year and because the Fed is essentially out of short-term bonds with which to finance purchases, it is virtually assured that they will opt for outright purchases financed with printed money……….Now, said Ned Davis Research in a report last week, the Fed is likely to replace Operation Twist with purchases of Treasuries, perhaps in the $45 billion a month range, bringing its total monthly purchases to $85 billion.

Outright purchases of long-term Treasuries are far more expansionary than Operation Twist purchases which are off-set by the sale of shorter-term maturities.

Foster discusses Fed motives, considering that previous QE failed to lower interest rates or lift stock market values.

It has been my contention that the main objective is not to reflate asset prices but rather to stimulate credit creation and the velocity of money. According the Fed’s H.8 Release banks are holding over $2.6 trillion in cash that’s sitting idle on their balance sheet in securities portfolios. Bernanke is trying to flush the banking system out of these bloated securities positions and into extending credit by lowering bond yields to levels where banks can no longer afford to hold them.

Foster points out that negative real interest rates may be discouraging banks from lending, inhibiting the recovery. Also that bank balance sheets — bloated with Treasuries and MBS ($2.6 trillion) purchased as an alternative to lending — are vulnerable to capital losses should interest rates rise.

The Fed’s low-interest-rate policies have created a powder keg while being largely ineffectual in stimulating credit creation and consumption. The safest approach would be to reverse these policies and raise interest rates. Raising long-term rates to sustainable levels would reduce uncertainty and help restore confidence. House prices and stocks may initially fall but this would flush any excess inventory out of the system, giving purchasers and banks confidence that the market really has bottomed. With higher rates and stable collateral, banks will be more willing to lend.

At present we are all sheltering under the shadow of the Fed’s low-interest-rate umbrella, but with a nagging fear as to what will happen when the Fed takes the umbrella away. Fed policies are no longer adding confidence but increasing uncertainty. The sooner the umbrella is removed, the sooner the system will return to normality.

QE is likely to continue — Treasury needs to print money in order to fund the fiscal deficit — but this can still occur at higher rates. The fiscal deficit unfortunately will remain with us for some time — until confidence is completely restored and deflationary effects of private sector deleveraging are consigned to the history books.

June 20, 2012

Westpac: China credit supply outstrips demand

Phat Dragon is placing the most value on new information regarding credit demand and supply. It is credit growth that tells us more about the shape of activity later this year than any other macro indicator……the supply side of the credit equation is moving decisively higher (greater policy emphasis, increased willingness to lend) but ……sluggish demand for loans is holding the system back. Indeed, the June quarter observation for “loan demand” (bankers’ assessment) fell to 12% below average, lower even than the Dec-2008 reading, even as the “lending attitude of banks” (corporate assessment) rose for a second straight quarter and the ‘easiness’ of the monetary policy stance (bankers’ assessment) rose to 21% above average.

via Westpac: Phat Dragon – a weekly chronicle of the Chinese economy.

June 3, 2012

US banks face squeeze

Rising short-term interest rates (represented by 3-month Treasury yields on the chart below) caused negative yield differentials in 2006/2007 which led me to warn of an economic down-turn. Yield differentials are calculated by subtracting short-term (3-month) yields from long-term (10-year) yields. Banks borrow mostly at short-term rates and lend at long-term rates, generating a profitable interest margin. But when the yield differential turns negative, bank interest margins are squeezed, forcing them to contract lending. A lending contraction shrinks consumption + investment and sends the economy into a tail-spin.

Ten-Year Treasury Yield and Differential with Three-Month Yields

Negative yield differentials (or yield curves) are normally caused by rising short-term rates as in 2006/2007, but now we are witnessing the opposite phenomenon. Short-term rates are near zero, but falling long-term rates are starting to squeeze the yield differential from the opposite end. The situation is not yet desperate but a further decline in long-term yields would shrink bank interest margins. Fed initiation of QE3, purchasing additional long-term Treasuries, is likely to drive long-term rates lower and exacerbate the problem. The resulting contraction in bank lending would cause another economic down-turn.

January 18, 2012

Banks Point to a Pickup in Lending – WSJ.com

At Citi, retail-banking loans rose 15% from a year ago to $133 billion, as the New York bank lent more to individuals and local businesses. At San Francisco-based Wells, commercial and industrial loans rose 11% from a year earlier to $167 billion at Dec. 31, amid what Chief Financial Officer Tim Sloan called broad-based growth.

All told, loans outstanding at the companies and J.P. Morgan rose by $41 billion from a year ago in the fourth quarter, to $2.14 trillion. That’s the first increase for the three giant lenders since 2008…

via Banks Point to a Pickup in Lending – WSJ.com.

Comment: ~ Private sector deleveraging is slowing and new capital investment improving, but this may prove a temporary respite as purchases were brought forward to take advantage of accelerated tax depreciation in 2011. The 100% write-off of new capital investment (in the year of purchase) will expire in 2012 if not extended by Congress.