From the Westpac Bulletin:
Housing credit has lost momentum under the weight of past tight monetary policy and with the sector facing a number of headwinds.
Housing credit grew by just 0.30% in the month of June. This is the weakest monthly result on record (back to 1976), with the exception of a one-off fall of -0.38% for June 1984. Annual housing credit growth has now slowed to 5.1%, moderating from 6.0% a year ago.
Nouriel Robini on Bloomberg TV: The Euro summit was a failure… markets were expecting much more. Either you have debt neutralization [EFSF purchases of government bonds] or debt monetization by the ECB or EFSF/ESM be doubled or tripled using leverage ….or you will have a worse crisis in the next few weeks.
The ability of politicians to kick the can down the road will run out of steam in 2013…..next year could be a global perfect storm
Bloomberg TV: Roubini Says 2013 `Storm’ May Surpass 2008 Crisis
Austerity decimated Asian economies during their 1997/98 financial crisis and similar measures have failed to rescue the PIIGS in Europe 2012. David Cameron’s austerity measures have also not saved the UK from falling back into recession. So why is Wayne Swan in Australia so proud of his balanced budget? And why does Barack Obama threaten the wealthy with increased taxes while the GOP advocate spending cuts in order to reduce the US deficit? Are we condemned to follow Europe into a deflationary spiral?
First, let’s examine the causes of the current financial crisis.
Government deficits have been around for centuries. States would borrow in order to finance wars but were then left with the problem of repayment. Countries frequently defaulted, but this created difficulties in accessing further finance; so governments resorted to debasing their currencies. Initially they substituted coins with a lower metal content for the original issue. Then introduction of fiat currencies — with no right of conversion to an underlying gold/silver standard — made debasement a lot easier. Issuing more paper currency simply reduced the value of each note in circulation. Advent of the digital age made debasement still easier, with transfer of balances between electronic accounts largely replacing paper money. Fiscal deficits, previously confined to wars, became regular government policy; employed as a stealth tax and redistributed in the form of welfare benefits to large voting blocks.
Along with fiscal deficits came easy monetary policy — also known as debt expansion. Lower interest rates fueled greater demand for debt, which bankers, with assistance from the central bank, were only too willing to accommodate. I will not go into a lengthy exposition of how banks create money, but banks expand their balance sheets by lending money they do not have, confident in the knowledge that recipients will deposit the proceeds back in the banking system — which is then used to fund the original loan. Expanding bank balance sheets inject new money into the system, debasing the currency as effectively as if they were running a printing press in the basement.
The combination of rising prices and low interest rates is a heady mix investors cannot resist, leading to speculative bubbles in real estate or stocks. So why do governments encourage debt expansion? Because (A) it creates a temporary high — a false sense of well-being before inflation takes hold; and (B) it debases the currency, inflating tax revenues while reducing the real value of government debt.
Continuous government deficits and debt expansion via the financial sector have brought us to the edge of the precipice. The problem is: finding a way back — none of the solutions seem to work.
Slashing government spending, cutting back on investment programs, and raising taxes in order to reduce the fiscal deficit may appear a logical response to the crisis. Reversing policies that caused the problem will reduce their eventual impact, but you have to do that before the financial crisis — not after. With bank credit contracting and aggregate demand shrinking, it is too late to throw the engine into reverse — you are already going backwards. The economy is already slowing. Rather than reducing harmful side-effects, austerity applied at the wrong time will simply amplify them.
We are repeating the mistakes of the 1997/98 Asian crisis. Joseph Stiglitz, at the time chief economist at the World Bank, warned the IMF of the perils of austerity measures imposed on recipients of IMF support. He was politely ignored. By July 1998, 13 months after the start of the crisis, GNP had fallen by 83 percent in Indonesia and between 30 and 40 percent in other recipients of IMF “assistance”. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and the Phillipines reduced government deficits, allowed insolvent banks to fail, and raised interest rates in response to IMF demands. Currency devaluations, waves of bankruptcies, real estate busts, collapse of entire industries and soaring unemployment followed — leading to social unrest. Contracting bank lending without compensatory fiscal deficits led to a deflationary spiral, while raising interest rates failed to protect currencies from devaluation.
The same failed policies are being pursued today, simply because continuing fiscal deficits and ballooning public debt are a frightening alternative.
At some point political leaders are going to realize the futility of further austerity measures and resort to the hair of the dog that bit them. Bond markets are likely to resist further increases in public debt and deficits would have to be funded directly or indirectly by the central bank/Federal Reserve. Inflation would rise. Effectively the government is printing fresh new dollar bills with nothing to back them.
The short-term payoff would be fourfold. Rising inflation increases tax revenues while at the same time decreasing the value of public debt in real terms. Real estate values rise, restoring many underwater mortgages to solvency, and rescuing banks threatened by falling house prices. Finally, inflation would discourage currency manipulation. Asian exporters who keep their currencies at artificially low values, by purchasing $trillions of US treasuries to offset the current account imbalance, will suffer a capital loss on their investments.
The long-term costs — inflation, speculative bubbles and financial crises — are likely to be out-weighed by the short-term benefits when it comes to counting votes. Even rising national debt would to some extent be offset by rising nominal GDP, stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio. And if deficits are used to fund productive infrastructure, rather than squandered on public fountains and bridges-to-nowhere, that will further enhance GDP growth while ensuring that the state has real assets to show for the debt incurred.
Faced with the failure of austerity measures, governments are likely to abandon them and resort to the printing press — fiscal deficits and quantitative easing. It is more a case of “when” rather than “if”. Successful traders/investors will need to allow for this in their strategies, timing their purchases to take advantage of the shift.
Nick Gardner: In 2008, private debt in the US grew $4.1 trillion but in 2010 shrunk $2.85 trillion as banks decreased their lending as a result of the housing crash. When subtracted from GDP, this fall in debt equated to a 38 per cent reduction in aggregate demand, leading directly to the “great recession” and unemployment hitting its highest level in almost 30 years. “This is what people find so confusing,” says Keen. “When you look at GDP numbers in the US, they’re not bad. At the beginning of 2008, US GDP was $14.25 trillion and today it has GDP of $14.75 trillion. That’s stagnant growth but doesn’t explain the enormous depths of the US downturn. It only begins to makes sense when you look at the fall in aggregate demand.”
via Keen to be heard.
Former Senator Alan Simpson, Co-Chair of President Obama’s Fiscal Commission, doesn’t believe the national debt can be solved without a financial or political crisis. He speaks with WSJ’s Alan Murray at the latest Wall Street Journal Viewpoints panel.
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NEW YORK -(Dow Jones) – There is a real danger U.S. authorities won’t take the necessary steps to fix the country’s debt and deficit problems between the elections and the end of this year, former Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman Donald Kohn said Monday. “What’s required to put the fiscal deficit on a sustainable path are some difficult decisions having to do with entitlement spending and taxes in the United States,” Kohn said at the Europlace forum……. Kohn added the U.S. political system has become “soap opera-ized” with such a huge gulf between the country’s political parties there is a real risk debt and deficit will continue to grow past the end of this year.
via Ex-Fed Kohn: ‘Huge Risk’ US Won’t Take Steps On Debt, Deficit By Year End.
Floyd Norris: To get some idea of what needs to be done now — and what the result will be — the McKinsey institute points to two incidents in the early 1990s that got little attention at the time in the United States. Those were the bursting of real estate bubbles in Sweden and Finland. Details differ, but in each country there were two distinct phases of deleveraging.
“In the first,” the McKinsey institute said in an analysis published early this year, “households, corporations and financial institutions reduce debt significantly over several years, while economic growth is negative or minimal and government debt rises.” That is certainly what has happened in the United States.
The second phase is the good part, the institute said. “Growth rebounds and government debt is reduced gradually over several years.”
In this country, the deleveraging process has some way to go, with many foreclosures still pending, but it is at least possible that economic growth is beginning to accelerate. It is clear that the United States has made a lot more progress in cutting consumer debt than has been made in either Britain or Spain, two other countries that suffered from falling real estate prices.
via Not Exactly a Miracle, but U.S. Debt Levels Are Falling – Floyd Norris – NYTimes.com.
Comment:~ Before we congratulate ourselves on escaping from the clutches of the Great Recession, let’s not forget that government debt is growing at an unsustainable rate of $1.2 trillion/year. That is likely to slow sharply after November elections, causing a “double-dip” contraction. The deleveraging process has only just begun.
John Mauldin: Lacy Hunt kicks things off with a bang in Hoisington’s Quarterly Review and Outlook, this week’s Outside the Box:
“The standard of living of the average American continues to fall.”
The reason, in a word: debt. Lacy explains what happens:
“Efforts by fiscal and monetary authorities to sustain growth by further debt accumulation may produce some short-term benefit. Sadly, these interludes fade quickly as the debt becomes more destabilizing. The net result of increased indebtedness then becomes the opposite of what policymakers intend when they promote economic growth by either borrowing funds for increased government expenditures or encourage consumers to borrow with artificial and temporary incentives.”
In other words, you can’t get to real, sustained growth of an economy by growing debt after a certain point — one that, sadly, we have already reached.
We often blame Fed monetary policy for the GFC, with interest rates at exceptionally low levels leading to “Greenspan’s bubble.” Treasury was just as culpable, however, with the massive 2004-2005 surge in public debt flooding the market with liquidity. The repeat in 2008-2011 was more justifiable: the spike in public debt was necessary to offset the sharp decline in private (non-financial) debt which would have caused a deflationary spiral. The effect was to smooth out the fall in total domestic debt (public and private) and create a relatively “soft” landing for the economy.
Quick Glossary
- Domestic debt is all local debt, both government and private sector
- Non-financial excludes the financial sector from debt calculations as it largely acts as a conduit for other sectors.
- Government debt includes federal, state and local government borrowing
- Private debt is all Domestic debt other than Government. It includes both Corporate and Household debt.
- Household debt is all debt owed by private households, as opposed to the corporate sector.
- GDP is the market value of all final (excludes intermediate) goods and services produced within a country in a given year/quarter.
- Nominal means before adjustment for inflation.
Public debt growth is slowing but needs to fall further in order to keep the economy on a sustainable path. A rough rule of thumb is that public debt should grow no faster than GDP — so that it does not outgrow the nation’s ability to repay. With public debt growing at 8.6% and GDP at a nominal rate of 4.1%, Treasury’s ability to repay — and its credit rating — is deteriorating. Reduction of public debt growth to a rate of no higher than 4.1% is necessary. Increases in tax collections as a percentage of GDP would alter this basic equation, but are highly unpopular and act as a disincentive to further GDP growth.
It should be evident from the above chart that GDP contracts when the rate of domestic debt growth slows. If domestic debt ever had to contract (below zero growth), you can imagine the impact that it would have on GDP. That is a debt-deflation spiral and should be avoided at all costs. So, although we would all like to see a sharp reduction in debt levels, there are limitations on how quickly this can be achieved — without smashing the economy into a brick wall.
We can also see that GDP growth for the past decade has been largely debt-fueled. Only recently has GDP growth surged above the growth rate of domestic debt, reflecting an increase in productivity. That is what we (not just the US) have to strive for: to widen the positive gap between GDP and domestic debt growth, while bringing public debt growth below the nominal rate of growth in GDP.
Reducing the rate of growth in public debt will not be easy, however, with private debt growing at a miserly 0.8% compared to domestic debt at 3.0%. The difference is made up by government debt, growing at a whopping 8.6%. Private capital expenditure, however, has in many cases been brought-forward to take advantage of accelerated tax write-offs and is likely to slow in the months ahead. Even worse is household debt which is contracting at an annual rate of 0.9%. So the medium-term outlook for private debt may be near-zero growth. And further slowing of public debt growth would court another recession.
Satyajit Das: New lending by Chinese banks in 2009 and 2010 was around 40% of GDP. New bank loans in 2009 and 2010 totalled around $1.1-1.4 trillion, an increase from $740 billion in 2008. Total outstanding loans in the economy have jumped by nearly 50 per cent over the past two years.
Around 90% of this lending was directed towards investment in building, plant, machinery and infrastructure by State Owned Enterprises (“SOE”). In 2010, China allocated over $2.6 trillion to investment expenditure – the highest proportion of GDP of any major economy in the world. According to the World Bank, almost all of China’s growth since 2008 has come from “government influenced expenditure”.
