Taking the leverage out of economic growth | Reuters

Edward Hadas points out that long-term credit growth has exceeded growth in nominal GDP (real GDP plus inflation) in the US and Europe for some time. Not only does this fuel a credit bubble but it leads to a build up of inflationary pressure within the economy. If not evident in consumer prices it is likely to emerge as an asset bubble.

For the last two decades, accelerating credit has been closely correlated with the change in GDP – both in the United States and the euro zone. GDP growth tended to speed up shortly after the rate of credit growth increased, and slowed down after credit growth started to decrease.

This correlation implies there is an equilibrium rate of credit growth – the rate that corresponds to the long-term pace of nominal GDP growth. Though the pace of credit growth can vary from year to year, over time private debt and nominal GDP have to expand at the same rate for overall leverage to stay constant. That’s not what happened in the past two decades. Since 1990, Deutsche found a significant gap between credit and GDP growth in the United States and the euro zone.

In both, the neutral rate of credit growth – the rate associated with the economy’s long-term growth rate – was 7 percent. Those long-term nominal GDP growth rates were lower: 4.8 percent in the United States and 4 percent in the euro zone. In a single year, the difference of 2-3 percentage points doesn’t have much effect. Over a generation, though, it leads to a massive increase in the ratio of private debt to GDP.

The gap between growth in Domestic Debt and Nominal GDP widened in 2004/5 during the height of the property bubble and has narrowed to near zero since 2010.
Domestic Debt Growth Compared to GDP Growth
Hopefully the Fed have learned their lesson and maintain this course in future.

via Analysis & Opinion | Reuters.

Explain the disease to help US citizens – FT.com

This must-read opinion by Richard Koo explains the impact US private sector saving — a staggering 8 per cent of gross domestic product — has on the US economy.

“….. if left unattended, the economy will continuously lose aggregate demand equivalent to the unborrowed savings. In other words, even though repairing balance sheets is the right and responsible thing to do, if everyone tries to do it at the same time a deflationary spiral will result. It was such a deflationary spiral that cost the US 46 per cent of its GDP from 1929 to 1933.”

via Explain the disease to help US citizens – FT.com.

Australia: Household debt crisis

A few days ago I mentioned that Australia is in a housing bubble. The easiest way to gauge this is to compare Australian household debt/disposable income (DPI) to the US peak before the global financial crisis. After all, household debt is the fuel for a housing bubble.

Housing Finances

Australia’s current ratio of 150% (or 1.5 times DPI) is higher than the US peak of 1.3 times DPI during the housing bubble. And far higher than the current US ratio of 1.1 times DPI.

Credit Growth by Sector

No time to be complacent.

Steve Keen on Post-Keynesian Macroeconomics

Prof Steve Keen’s presentation to the UMKC Post Keynesian conference in 2012.

Paul Krugman would argue that Income = Aggregate Demand when the economy is in equilibrium.
Steve Keen shows that the economy is not in equilibrium when aggregate debt is rising or falling:

Income = Aggregate Demand + Change in Debt

He illustrates (at 13:20) how, while GDP fell from $14.5 to $14.0 trillion, the US economy went from $18.5 to $11.5 trillion because of private debt contraction.

US GDP compared to GDP + Debt Change

This does not seem entirely accurate as my earlier chart of US Debt shows that Domestic (Non-Financial) Debt growth slowed but at no stage contracted during the GFC. I suspect that Steve has omitted Government Debt which acted as an important counter-weight to Private Debt contraction during the GFC.

US Domestic Debt Growth

Australia: Housing credit slows

From the Westpac Bulletin:

Housing credit has lost momentum under the weight of past tight monetary policy and with the sector facing a number of headwinds.

Housing credit grew by just 0.30% in the month of June. This is the weakest monthly result on record (back to 1976), with the exception of a one-off fall of -0.38% for June 1984. Annual housing credit growth has now slowed to 5.1%, moderating from 6.0% a year ago.

Roubini Says 2013 `Storm' May Surpass 2008 Crisis

Nouriel Robini on Bloomberg TV: The Euro summit was a failure… markets were expecting much more. Either you have debt neutralization [EFSF purchases of government bonds] or debt monetization by the ECB or EFSF/ESM be doubled or tripled using leverage ….or you will have a worse crisis in the next few weeks.

The ability of politicians to kick the can down the road will run out of steam in 2013…..next year could be a global perfect storm

Bloomberg TV: Roubini Says 2013 `Storm’ May Surpass 2008 Crisis

When Austerity Fails

Austerity decimated Asian economies during their 1997/98 financial crisis and similar measures have failed to rescue the PIIGS in Europe 2012. David Cameron’s austerity measures have also not saved the UK from falling back into recession. So why is Wayne Swan in Australia so proud of his balanced budget? And why does Barack Obama threaten the wealthy with increased taxes while the GOP advocate spending cuts in order to reduce the US deficit? Are we condemned to follow Europe into a deflationary spiral?

How Did We Get Here?

First, let’s examine the causes of the current financial crisis.

Government deficits have been around for centuries. States would borrow in order to finance wars but were then left with the problem of repayment. Countries frequently defaulted, but this created difficulties in accessing further finance; so governments resorted to debasing their currencies. Initially they substituted coins with a lower metal content for the original issue. Then introduction of fiat currencies — with no right of conversion to an underlying gold/silver standard — made debasement a lot easier. Issuing more paper currency simply reduced the value of each note in circulation. Advent of the digital age made debasement still easier, with transfer of balances between electronic accounts largely replacing paper money. Fiscal deficits, previously confined to wars, became regular government policy; employed as a stealth tax and redistributed in the form of welfare benefits to large voting blocks.

Along with fiscal deficits came easy monetary policy — also known as debt expansion. Lower interest rates fueled greater demand for debt, which bankers, with assistance from the central bank, were only too willing to accommodate. I will not go into a lengthy exposition of how banks create money, but banks expand their balance sheets by lending money they do not have, confident in the knowledge that recipients will deposit the proceeds back in the banking system — which is then used to fund the original loan. Expanding bank balance sheets inject new money into the system, debasing the currency as effectively as if they were running a printing press in the basement.

The combination of rising prices and low interest rates is a heady mix investors cannot resist, leading to speculative bubbles in real estate or stocks. So why do governments encourage debt expansion? Because (A) it creates a temporary high — a false sense of well-being before inflation takes hold; and (B) it debases the currency, inflating tax revenues while reducing the real value of government debt.

Continuous government deficits and debt expansion via the financial sector have brought us to the edge of the precipice. The problem is: finding a way back — none of the solutions seem to work.

Austerity

Slashing government spending, cutting back on investment programs, and raising taxes in order to reduce the fiscal deficit may appear a logical response to the crisis. Reversing policies that caused the problem will reduce their eventual impact, but you have to do that before the financial crisis — not after. With bank credit contracting and aggregate demand shrinking, it is too late to throw the engine into reverse — you are already going backwards. The economy is already slowing. Rather than reducing harmful side-effects, austerity applied at the wrong time will simply amplify them.

The 1997 Asian Crisis

We are repeating the mistakes of the 1997/98 Asian crisis. Joseph Stiglitz, at the time chief economist at the World Bank, warned the IMF of the perils of austerity measures imposed on recipients of IMF support. He was politely ignored. By July 1998, 13 months after the start of the crisis, GNP had fallen by 83 percent in Indonesia and between 30 and 40 percent in other recipients of IMF “assistance”. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and the Phillipines reduced government deficits, allowed insolvent banks to fail, and raised interest rates in response to IMF demands. Currency devaluations, waves of bankruptcies, real estate busts, collapse of entire industries and soaring unemployment followed — leading to social unrest. Contracting bank lending without compensatory fiscal deficits led to a deflationary spiral, while raising interest rates failed to protect currencies from devaluation.

The same failed policies are being pursued today, simply because continuing fiscal deficits and ballooning public debt are a frightening alternative.

The Lesser of Two Evils

At some point political leaders are going to realize the futility of further austerity measures and resort to the hair of the dog that bit them. Bond markets are likely to resist further increases in public debt and deficits would have to be funded directly or indirectly by the central bank/Federal Reserve. Inflation would rise. Effectively the government is printing fresh new dollar bills with nothing to back them.

The short-term payoff would be fourfold. Rising inflation increases tax revenues while at the same time decreasing the value of public debt in real terms. Real estate values rise, restoring many underwater mortgages to solvency, and rescuing banks threatened by falling house prices. Finally, inflation would discourage currency manipulation. Asian exporters who keep their currencies at artificially low values, by purchasing $trillions of US treasuries to offset the current account imbalance, will suffer a capital loss on their investments.

The long-term costs — inflation, speculative bubbles and financial crises — are likely to be out-weighed by the short-term benefits when it comes to counting votes. Even rising national debt would to some extent be offset by rising nominal GDP, stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio. And if deficits are used to fund productive infrastructure, rather than squandered on public fountains and bridges-to-nowhere, that will further enhance GDP growth while ensuring that the state has real assets to show for the debt incurred.

Not “If” but “When”

Faced with the failure of austerity measures, governments are likely to abandon them and resort to the printing press — fiscal deficits and quantitative easing. It is more a case of “when” rather than “if”. Successful traders/investors will need to allow for this in their strategies, timing their purchases to take advantage of the shift.

Keen to be heard | BRW

In 2008, private debt in the US grew $4.1 trillion but in 2010 shrunk $2.85 trillion as banks decreased their lending as a result of the housing crash. When subtracted from GDP, this fall in debt equated to a 38 per cent reduction in aggregate demand, leading directly to the “great recession” and unemployment hitting its highest level in almost 30 years. “This is what people find so confusing,” says Keen. “When you look at GDP numbers in the US, they’re not bad. At the beginning of 2008, US GDP was $14.25 trillion and today it has GDP of $14.75 trillion. That’s stagnant growth but doesn’t explain the enormous depths of the US downturn. It only begins to makes sense when you look at the fall in aggregate demand.”

via Keen to be heard.