Long-term outlook: How does it all end?

What economic path are the US and major allies likely to take over the next decade? Here is my take on how this is likely to pan out.

First, let’s start with a template of what a healthy, growing economy looks like.

A Virtuous Cycle

Growth is dependent on two factors:

  • Demographics — that is a growing, skilled workforce; and
  • Productivity — where output grows at a faster rate than the workforce.

Growth requires not only a growing population but a growing workforce. An ageing population or large population under the age of 25 is unlikely to contribute much to output. What is needed are people of 25 to 55 who hold down productive jobs. We also need to ensure that they have the necessary skills — productivity tends to rise with education levels. Education that is skills-based is worth a lot more than a barista with a bachelors degree.

The most important source of productivity growth, however, is investment. More specifically, private investment — government investment tends to provide a short-term boost to the economy but acts as a long-term drag on growth (Dr Lacy Hunt). Mechanization and automation increase the output per worker, boosting productivity.

The chart below shows US private domestic non-residential investment (blue) at a healthy 13.5% of GDP, while productivity (magenta), calculated as real GDP/total non-farm employees, has grown steadily since the 1950s.

Private Investment/GDP & Real GDP/Total Non-farm Payroll

Savings are needed to fund private investment. Either domestic savings or offshore borrowings. Domestic savings are better than foreign debt, especially if debt is denominated in a second currency which can cause volatile short-term capital flows. Workers tend to consume what they earn, with low rates of savings, while the wealthy tend to have far higher savings rates. High levels of inequality increases the amount of saving but depresses consumption. Low consumption leads to fewer investment opportunities, so it is important to get the balance right. Forcing workers to save (e.g. through compulsory superannuation) is one solution.

Low deficits are essential to ensure that government borrowing does not crowd out private investment. Government investment — as we mentioned earlier — is no substitute for private investment as it leads to low productivity and low growth.

Monetary policy is often used to prime the pump — stimulating consumption and investment through low interest rates. But cheap debt has short-term benefits and long-term costs that are often not carefully considered. First, low interest rates discourage private savings which are the lifeblood of a healthy economy. Second, low interest rates are effected by the Fed (or central bank) growing the supply of money at a faster rate than output (GDP). But that causes inflation after a lag of one to two years, forcing the Fed to contract the supply of money and destabilize growth. Third, cheap debt and high inflation (with negative real interest rates) encourage malinvestment in speculative assets that are expected to grow in price without necessarily growing output. The net result is that productive investment is crowded out by both malinvestment (speculation) and government deficits, harming long-term growth.

There is also a fourth, far more insidious factor, that operates with much greater lags. Home prices tend to grow at a much faster rate than incomes during times of low interest rates, reducing access to homes by younger workers entering the workforce. New household formation slows and so does the birth rate, undermining long-term demographics. This can be remedied to some extent by skilled immigration but often migrants are unskilled and face both language and cultural challenges that lead to poor assimilation and a two-tier economy.

In summary, what is needed is a growing, skilled workforce with rising productivity from healthy private investment. Private investment requires stable growth — to facilitate reliable projections rather than unstable boom-bust cycles — and sufficient funding from private saving. Government deficits need to be kept low and real interest rates reasonably high (say 3%) to ensure low inflation and encourage efficient allocation of capital (to productive private investment).

In the Wilderness

We are a long way from the above ideal.

The chart below shows the decline in 10-year average real GDP growth, since 1960, and rising debt relative to nominal GDP.

Total Debt/GDP & Real GDP Growth

Growth is slowing due to poor demographics, rising government deficits, and malinvestment from negative real interest rates. Geopolitical tensions and the need to secure supply chains and sources of energy mean that government spending is likely to exceed tax revenues by a wide margin for the foreseeable future.

Ballooning government debt is likely to crowd out private investment, ensuring low future growth. The chart below shows CBO projections of debt-to-GDP for the next thirty years.

CBO Projection of Debt/GDP

The Fed will likely have no choice but to suppress long-term interest rates in order to assist government in servicing the massive interest burden on its debt. That is likely to lead to high inflation, negative real interest rates, malinvestment in speculative assets, low growth, and rising instability (Hyman Minsky).

Conclusion

We are likely to face a decade of stagflation, with low growth, high inflation and unstable financial markets.

Hopefully, inflation will boost nominal GDP relative to government debt, increasing serviceability, over time. That would provide an opportunity to reduce fiscal deficits and establish healthy monetary policy.

In the meantime, don’t fight the Fed. When interest rates are low and inflation is high, invest in real assets. Look for value — with stable income streams which can withstand tempestuous cycles — rather than speculative growth.

Acknowledgements

Professor Percy Allan, University of Technology Sydney: Looking Beyond 2024

Ultra-low interest rates may lead to a ‘debt trap’

The highly-regarded Stephen Bartholomeusz warns that central bank policies may lead to a ‘debt trap’:

“….With the world apparently re-starting the use of unconventional monetary policies even before central banks have extricated themselves from the legacies of a decade of those policies, there is a real risk that the impacts and the threats posed by their side effects will swell and that the world will be caught within what the BIS has previously described as a “debt trap’’ with no exit.

The other disturbing aspect of the [BIS] report is that it repeatedly says it is too early to assess the longer-term implications of the policies the central banks have employed.

Central bankers respond to the latest data – they respond to short-term signals – but the side-effects of their post-crisis policies have already been building for a decade and will continue to build while they maintain ultra-low or negative policy rates and keep buying bonds and other fixed interest securities to depress longer-term interest rates and suppress risk premia.

How those side-effects are unwound and how the banks extricate themselves from their policies and the legacies of those policies won’t be known until they try, but the potential for another crisis has been increased by the big surge in global leverage and the elevated asset prices the policies have encouraged.

Negative rates and quantitative easing and variations on those themes might, as the BIS report says, be useful additions to central bankers’ toolboxes but the past decade has shown they aren’t by themselves a panacea for economic ills and they bring with them potentially unpleasant side effects the longer they are in place.”

Debt traps occur when the interest rate needed to service the government debt is greater than the growth rate of GDP, according to former Fed governor Robert Heller:

“…In such a situation, debt service obligations grow more rapidly than the economy; eventually, the accumulated debt can no longer be serviced properly. In other words, the dynamics of the situation become unsustainable and a death spiral ensues.”

So far, central banks have responded by driving interest rates to record lows but unintended consequences are emerging, with low interest rates leading to low GDP growth. A feedback loop is emerging:

    • Low interest rates

Australia: 10-Year Bond Yield

    • Low bank interest margins

Australia: Bank Net Interest Margins

    • Low credit growth

Australia: Credit & Broad Money Growth

    • Low inflation

Australia: Underlying Inflation

    • And low economic growth

Australia: GDP Growth

We are venturing where angels fear to tread: central banks trialing new policies without empirical evidence as to their long-term consequences.

Monetary policy should be administered judiciously, intervening only when the financial system is in dire straits, outside the realm of the regular business cycle. Instead monetary policy is treated as a panacea, the constant drip-feed building a long-term dependence on further stimulus.

The problem with ‘traps’ is that they are difficult to escape.

“If you find yourself in a hole, the first thing to do is stop digging.”

~ Will Rogers

[NOTE: I should clarify that Australia has relatively low fiscal debt and is not in any immediate danger of a debt trap. But the ‘lucky country’ would suffer severely from fallout if the US or China were caught in a debt trap.]

Is GDP doomed to low growth?

GDP failed to rebound after the 2008 Financial Crisis, sinking into a period of stubborn low growth. Economic commentators have advanced many explanations for the causes, while the consensus seems to be that this is the new normal, with the global economy destined to decades of poor growth.

Real GDP Growth

This is a classic case of recency bias. Where observers attach the most value to recent observations and assume that the current state of affairs will continue for the foreseeable future. The inverse of the Dow 100,000 projections during the Dotcom bubble.

Real GDP for Q1 2018 recorded 2.9% growth over the last 4 quarters. Not exactly shooting the lights out, but is the recent up-trend likely to continue?

Real GDP Growth and estimate based on Private Sector Employment and Average Weekly Hours Worked

Neils Jensen from Absolute Return Partners does a good job of summarizing the arguments for low growth in his latest newsletter:

The bear story

Putting my (very) long-term bearishness on fossil fuels aside for a moment, there is also a bear story with the potential to unfold in the short to medium-term, but that bear story is a very different one. It is a story about GDP growth likely to suffer as a consequence of the oil industry’s insatiable appetite for working capital, which is presumably a function of the low hanging fruit having been picked already.

In the US today, the oil industry ties up 31 times more capital per barrel of oil produced than it did in 1980, when we came out of the second oil crisis. ….Such a hefty capital requirement is a significant tax on economic growth. Think of it the following way. Capital is a major driver of productivity growth, which again is a key driver of economic growth. Capital tied up by the oil industry cannot be used to enhance productivity elsewhere, i.e. overall productivity growth suffers as more and more capital is ‘confiscated’ by the oil industry.

I am tempted to remind you (yet again!) of one of the most important equations in the world of economics:

∆GDP = ∆Workforce + ∆Productivity

We already know that the workforce will decline in many countries in the years to come; hence productivity growth is the only solution to a world drowning in debt, if that debt is to be serviced. Why? Because we need economic growth to be able to service all that debt.

Now, if productivity growth is going to suffer for years to come, all this fancy new stuff that we all count on to save our bacon (advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, etc.) may never be fully taken advantage of, because the money needed to make it happen won’t be there. It is not a given but certainly a risk that shouldn’t be ignored.

….For that reason, we need to retire fossil fuels as quickly as possible. Ageing of society (older workers are less productive than their younger peers) and a global economy drowning in debt (servicing all that debt is immensely expensive, leaving less capital for productivity enhancing purposes) are widely perceived to be the two most important reasons why productivity growth is so pedestrian at present.

I am not about to tell you that those two reasons are not important. They certainly are. However, the adverse impact the oil industry is having on overall productivity should not be underestimated.

I tend to take a simpler view, where I equate changes in GDP to changes in hours worked and in capital investment:

∆GDP = ∆Workforce + ∆Capital

Workers work harder if they are motivated or if there is a more efficient organizational structure, but these are a secondary influence on productivity when compared to capital investment.

The chart below compares net capital formation by the corporate sector (over GDP) to real GDP growth. It is evident that GDP growth rises and falls in line with net capital formation (or investment as it is loosely termed) by corporations.

Net Capital Formation by the corporate sector/GDP compared to Real GDP Growth

A quick primer (with help from Wikipedia):

  • Capital Formation measures net additions to the capital stock of a country.
  • Capital refers to physical (or tangible) assets and includes plant and equipment, computer software, inventories and real estate. Any non-financial asset used in the production of goods or services.
  • Capital does not include financial assets such as bonds and stocks.
  • Net Capital Formation makes allowance for depreciation of the existing capital stock due to wear and tear, obsolescence, etc.

Net Capital Formation peaked at around 5.0% from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, made a brief recovery to 4.0% during the Dotcom bubble and has since struggled to make the bar at 3.0%. Rather like me doing chin-ups.

Net Capital Formation Declining in the Corporate Sector

There are a number of factors contributing to this.

Intangible Assets

Capital formation only measures tangible assets. The last two decades have seen a massive surge in investment in intangible assets. Look no further than the big five on the Nasdaq:

Stock Symbol Price ($) Book Value ($) Times Book Value
Amazon AMZN 1582.26 64.85 24.40
Microsoft MSFT 95.00 10.32 9.21
Facebook FB 173.86 26.83 6.48
Apple AAPL 169.10 27.60 6.12
Alphabet GOOGL 1040.75 235.46 4.42

Currency Manipulation

Capital formation first fell off the cliff in the 1980s. This coincides with the growth of currency manipulation by Japan, purchasing excessive US foreign reserves to suppress the Yen and establish a trade advantage over US manufacturers. China joined the party in the late 1990s, exceeding Japan’s current account surplus by 2006. Currency suppression creates another incentive for corporations to offshore or outsource manufacturing to Asia.

China & Japan Current Account Surpluses

Tax on Offshore Profits

Many large corporations took advantage of low tax rates in offshore havens such as Ireland, avoiding US taxes while the funds were held offshore. This created an incentive for large corporations to invest retained earnings offshore rather than in the USA.

The net effect has been that retained earnings are invested elsewhere, while new capital formation in the USA is almost entirely funded by debt.

Net Capital Formation by the corporate sector/GDP compared to Corporate Debt Growth/GDP

Donald Trump’s tax deal will make a dent in this but will not undo past damage. The horse has already bolted.

Offshore Manufacturing

Apart from tax incentives, lower labor costs (enhanced by currency manipulation) led large corporations to set up or outsource manufacturing to Asia and other developing countries. In effect, offshoring capital formation and — more importantly — GDP growth to foreign destinations.

Offshoring Jobs

Along with manufacturing plants, blue-collar jobs also moved offshore. While this may improve the company bottom-line for a few years, the long-term, macro effects are devastating.

Think of it this way. If you build a manufacturing plant offshore rather than in the USA you may save millions of dollars a year in labor costs. Great for the bottom line and executive bonuses. But one man’s wage is another man/woman’s income (when he/she spends it). So, from a macro perspective, the US loses GDP equal to the entire factory wages bill plus the wage component of any input costs. A far larger figure than the company’s savings. As more companies offshore jobs, sales growth in the USA is affected. In the end this is likely to more than offset the savings that justified the offshore move in the first place.

Stock Buybacks

Stock buybacks accelerate EPS (earnings per share) growth and are great for boosting stock prices and executive bonuses. But they create the illusion of growth while GDP stands still. There is no new capital formation.

Can GDP Growth Recover?

Yes. Restore capital formation and GDP growth will recover.

How to do this:

Trump has already made an important move, revising tax laws to encourage corporations to repatriate offshore funds.

But more needs to be done to create a level playing field.

Stop currency manipulation and theft of technology by developing countries, especially China. Trump has also signaled his intention to tackle this thorny issue.

Repatriating offshore manufacturing and jobs is a much more difficult task. You can’t just pack a factory in a box and ship it home. There is also the matter of lost skills in the local workforce. But manufacturing jobs are being lost globally at an alarming rate to new technology. In the long-term, offshore manufacturing plants will be made obsolete and replaced by new automated, high-tech manufacturing facilities. Incentives need to be created to encourage new capital formation, especially high-tech manufacturing, at home.

Stock buybacks, I suspect, will always be around. But remove the incentive to boost stock prices by targeting the structure of executive bonuses. It would be difficult to isolate benefits from stock buybacks and tax them directly. But removing tax on dividends — in my opinion far simpler and more effective than the dividend imputation system in Australia — would remove the incentive for stock buybacks and make it difficult for management to justify this action to investors.

We already seem to be moving in the right direction. The last two points are relatively easy when compared to the first two. If Donald Trump manages to pull them (the first two) off, he will already move sharply upward in my estimation.

Judge a tree by the fruit it bears.

~ Matthew 7:15–20

Odds of a recession appear low | Bob Doll

Sensible view from Bob Doll:

…The odds of a recession appear low, but so does a significant acceleration in growth. The regulatory environment is loosening, consumer spending appears solid and jobs growth remains strong. As such, we do not expect a recession any time soon. At the same time, however, we see no catalyst to push the economy into a higher gear unless the White House and Congress make progress on their pro-growth agenda.

Progress on tax reform would revive the bulls.

Source: Weekly Investment Commentary from Bob Doll | Nuveen

What Is China’s Biggest Weakness? | Bloomberg

By William Pesek:

China’s debt reckoning is coming. Maybe not this quarter or this year, but Chinese President Xi Jinping’s unbridled effort to keep growth from falling below the official 7.5 percent target is cementing China’s fate…..

Why then, with so many clear examples of financial excess leading to ruin, is Xi continuing down this road? Blame it on the ghosts of Tiananmen Square. In the aftermath of the crackdown on student protesters on June 4, 1989, China’s leaders made a bargain with their people: We will make you richer, as long as you no longer dissent. After the crash of Lehman Brothers, the regime had to go to extraordinary lengths to keep up its end of the bargain, pumping up what was already the world’s highest investment rate. In doing so, China itself became a Lehman economy…

Read more at What Is China's Biggest Weakness? – Bloomberg View.

China Isn’t Just Slowing Down — It’s Contracting | Business Insider

Kyle Bass, founder and principal of Hayman Capital Management, on China’s debt bubble:

China’s banking assets have grown to over 100% of its GDP in the last three years, according to Bass. If the U.S. had engaged in similar policies – which he said would translate to $17 trillion in lending over that time period – it, too, would have achieved more than 7% GDP growth.

China’s banking assets now total approximately $25 trillion, or almost three times the size of its $9 trillion economy. Its low default rate on bank loans – about 1% – is about to rise, according to Bass. Much of that lending is construction-related. Bass said that 55% of China’s GDP growth has been in the construction sector. The marginal return on those loans must be very small, he argued.

“A rolling loan gathers no loss,” Bass said, “and that’s what’s been going on in China for the last few years.” He said it is impossible to believe China could “manipulate” the inputs of its financial system without losing control of the outcomes.

Deflation is also threatening China. Bass said that its GDP deflator is now below zero. He expects the PBoC to engineer a devaluation of the renminbi as a way to stimulate exports and avert further deflation…

China may well attempt to engineer a devaluation of the RMB, but neither the Fed nor the ECB are likely to tolerate China exporting their deflation to the US/Europe.

Read more at Kyle Bass On China And Japan – Business Insider.

Why this is a bad time to win an election | Business Spectator

Prof. Steve Keen writes:

So what could the future hold for Prime Minister Abbott? Here I have a hunch that he’ll end up suffering a similar fate, not to the previous Liberal leader he admires – John Howard – but to ….. Malcolm Fraser.

Fraser, as noted, had the good fortune to take over from Whitlam after the bursting of the debt bubble was largely over, but the bad fortune that the revival in Australia’s bubble was considerably more anaemic than America’s. Abbott could well find himself experiencing a similar double-edged sword of fate. He will take over when the deleveraging that caused the GFC has come to a temporary halt, and demand will be rising in the US….. But this rise could peter out even more quickly than it did for Fraser, leading to anaemic economic performance that will be blamed on the politician rather than the times.

Read more at Why this is a bad time to win an election | Business Spectator.

China ‘hard landing’ could trigger Australia recession: Standard & Poor – The Economic Times

“Australia’s exposure to commodity demand from Asia, and China in particular, was a saving grace during the global recession of 2009. But by the same token it has become Australia’s Achilles’ heel,” the ratings giant [Standard & Poor’s] said.

“Particularly while mining investment remains such a large share of the Australian economy, and other sectors continue to lack growth momentum, Australia remains highly sensitive to a sharp correction in China’s economic growth.”

Read more at China ‘hard landing’ could trigger Australia recession: Standard & Poor – The Economic Times.