What really drives inflation?

Every month, after the FOMC meeting, Fed Chairman Jay Powell fronts the media and tells everyone how the Fed is determined to maintain the fed funds rate in the same 5.25% – 5.50% range in order to contain inflation. But he is well aware that the Fed funds rate has had close to zero impact on inflation.

CPI peaked in June 2022 when the fed funds rate was an eye-watering (sic) 1.25%. CPI then plunged sharply when the Fed was still in the early stages of hiking rates. The lag between rate hikes and the resultant decline in inflation is normally 12 to 18 months. Now the Fed would have us believe that CPI declined in anticipation of rate cuts.

CPI & Fed Funds Rate Target (Minimum)

Financial conditions did tighten when the Fed introduced QT, with the Chicago Fed Financial Conditions Index (FCI) rising to -0.1%. But then FCI started a sharp decline in June 2023, when the Fed was still hiking rates, indicating monetary easing.

Chicago Fed Financial Conditions Index

Rising interest rates and tighter financial conditions had even less than usual impact on consumer spending because of a strong upsurge in personal savings during the pandemic. A large percentage of government transfers were not spent but went to increase bank deposits.

Government Transfers & Commercial Bank Deposits

Energy is driving inflation

The primary cause of the strong upsurge in CPI in ’21/22 was energy prices. The chart below shows how energy CPI (orange) led CPI (red) higher, reaching a peak of 41.5% in June 2022 — the same month that CPI peaked at 9.0%. Energy prices then plunged to a low of -16.7% in June 2023. CPI followed, reaching a low of 3.1% in the same month. Since then, CPI energy has recovered to close to zero, producing a floor in the annual CPI rate.

CPI & Energy CPI

Energy CPI is a relatively small component of CPI — 6.6% of total CPI — but it is a major cost component of most other variables. Food, for example, requires energy for planting, irrigation, harvesting, processing, refrigeration and transport. Cement requires energy for heating limestone in kilns, crushing and transportation. Steel needs energy for extraction and transport of iron ore, smelting and transportation. Even online services. The latest AI data centers require up to 1 GW of electricity capacity — enough to power 300,000 homes.

The most important determinant of energy prices is crude oil. Nymex light crude peaked between March and June 2022 at prices of $100 to $120 per barrel before commencing a prolonged decline to between $70 and $80 by December of the same year.

Nymex WTI Light Crude

Conclusion

Raising the fed funds rate has had little impact on actual inflation. Rate hikes are more about restoring the Fed’s credibility as an inflation hawk after a disastrous performance in 2021. High energy prices and easy monetary policy and were a recipe for inflation.

CPI & Fed Funds Rate Target (Minimum)

The sharp decline in CPI in the 12 months to June ’23 was caused by falling energy prices. Energy CPI fell from an annual increase of 41.5% in June 2022 to a low of -16.7% a year later.

Nymex light crude has now broken resistance at $80 per barrel. Expect retracement to test the new support level but respect is likely and would confirm another advance, with a target of $90 per barrel.

Nymex WTI Light Crude

A sharp rise in crude prices would be likely to cause a significant upsurge in CPI — and long-term interest rates. With bearish consequences for stocks and long-duration bonds.



S&P 500 tunnel vision

Stocks are growing increasingly bullish, after strong earnings results for the last quarter, with the S&P 500 closing above 5000 for the first time.

S&P 500

Even small caps are growing increasingly bullish, with the Russell 2000 ETF (IWM) testing resistance at 200. Breakout would signal that the current narrow advance is broadening.

iShares Russell 2000 Small Caps ETF (IWM)

The Price-to-Sales ratio remains elevated, at 2.56, warning of long-term reversion towards the mean at 1.70.

S&P 500 Price-to-Sales

Sales growth improved slightly to 5.2% for the December quarter, compared to December 2022. But this is before inflation; so real growth remains low.

S&P 500 Sales Growth

Operating margins shrunk to 10.7%, with 75.6% of corporations having reported, from earlier estimates of 11.0%.

S&P 500 Operating Margin

Treasury Market

Ten-year Treasury yields are testing resistance at 4.20%. Breakout would offer a target of 4.60% — a bear signal for stocks.

10-Year Treasury Yield

The 2-year Treasury yield — normally a reliable leading indicator of the Fed funds rate — is currently rising, warning that Fed rate cuts are likely to remain on pause for longer.

Fed Funds Rate & 2-Year Treasury Yield

The long-term challenge facing Treasury is the rising projected budget deficits, with debt likely to grow at a faster pace than GDP. CBO projections vastly understate the likely deficit as Brian Riedl explains below:

CBO Projected Deficits

Revised CBO Projected Deficits

Gold & the Dollar

The Dollar Index retraced to test support at 104 but is greatly influenced by the direction of the Fed funds rate and Treasury yields.

Dollar Index

Gold is ranging between $2000 and $2055 per ounce. The lower close at $2024 suggests another test of support at $2000.

Spot Gold

2023 is the first time that the gold price has kept rising while ETF gold holdings are falling. Cause of the divergence is believed to be strong central bank purchases over the past 12 months.

Gold ETF Tonnage

Conclusion

The S&P 500 is vastly overpriced when we compare the current price-to-sales ratio of 2.56 to its long-term average of 1.70. Sales growth is also falling, while operating margins are shrinking. Investors seem to have tunnel vision, focused on rising prices rather than underlying fundamentals.

Long-term yields are rising, with the Fed expected to postpone rate cuts until mid-year, which is bearish for stocks.

Federal deficits are expected to grow to $3.6 trillion by 2034, warning of rising inflationary pressure and higher Treasury yields. The Fed may suppress long-term yields but that is likely to increase inflationary pressure even more.

The short-term outlook for Gold is bearish — if long-term yields rise — but the long-term outlook is strongly bullish because of expected rising inflation and central bank purchases.

Acknowledgements

Hard or Soft Landing?

Almost every recession in history has been preceded by speculation that the economy is in for a “soft landing.” After the early warning signs, nothing much happens. The stock market keeps climbing despite rising interest rates, raising hopes of a “lucky escape”.

The four most expensive words in the English language are: “This time it’s different.” ~ Sir John Templeton

The economy takes time to adjust to changed circumstances and there can be a lag of two years or more between the first rate hikes and the inevitable rise in unemployment. Plenty of time for self-delusion as stocks keep rising and unemployment stays low.

The difference between a hard and soft landing is best measured by unemployment. At 3.5%, the March reading shows no sign yet of an approaching recession.

Unemployment

The lag between an inverted yield curve — caused by Fed rate hikes — and unemployment can vary quite widely between recessions, depending on other influences. The chart below shows how an inverted yield curve in July 2000 was followed by the first sign of rising unemployment in January 2001, and shortly afterwards by a recession in March. The next yield curve inversion started in February 2006, the first sign of rising unemployment in July 2007, and the recession only in December of that year. Red bars below represent the lag between yield curve inversion and the first sign of rising unemployment.

Treasury Yields: 10-Year minus 3-Month & Unemployment

The current yield curve inversion (10-Year minus 3-Month Treasury yield) started in November 2022, so the earliest we are likely to see a rise in unemployment is late-2023.

Treasury Yields: 10-Year minus 3-Month

Why is unemployment expected to rise?

Every yield curve inversion (10-Year minus 3-Month above) since 1960 has been followed by the NBER declaring a recession within two years.

Every time the Conference Board Leading Economic Index declined below the red line at -5.0% has signaled recession.

Conference Board Leading Economic Index

Why do we expect a hard landing?

Every economy runs on credit and the US is no different. The severity of a recession is determined by the extent of the contraction in credit growth, as shown by the red circles below. Note how late the contraction generally is, often occurring after the official recession (gray bar) has ended.

Bank Credit

What determines the size of the credit contraction?

Firstly, bank net interest margins.

Banks tend to borrow short-term and lend long, enhancing their net interest margins in good times. But an inverted yield curve pulls the rug from under them, with short-term rates spiking upwards.

The more that net interest margins of commercial banks are squeezed, the more they avoid risk, restricting lending to only their best clients.

The percentage of domestic banks tightening lending standards on C&I loans climbed to 44.8% in March 2023.

Commercial Bank: Tightening Credit Standards for Commercial & Industrial Loans

Second, is the level of uncertainty facing banks.

The S&P 1500 Regional Banks index plunged after the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), Silvergate Bank and Signature Bank.

Bank Credit

Shocks in the financial system tend to occur in waves. Latest is the threatened collapse of First Republic Bank (FRC) which has lost almost 100% of value in the past few months**.

First Republic Bank (FRC)

The CSBS Community Bank Index of Business Conditions is lower than at the height of the pandemic.

CSBS Community Bank Sentiment

Third is liquidity.

A strong surge in money market assets, warns that money (+/- $450 bn) has flowed out of the banking system and into the relative safety of money market funds.

Money Market Fund Assets

Money market funds are primarily invested in Fed reverse repo and Agency and Treasury securities, bypassing the banking system.

Money Market Fund Investment Allocation

Conclusion

Bank net interest margins are being squeezed, uncertainty is rising following the Silicon Valley Bank collapse, liquidity is being squeezed, and banks are tightening lending margins. The only party who can prevent a severe credit crunch is the Fed. By reversing course and injecting liquidity (QE) into financial markets, the Fed could attempt to create a soft landing for the economy.

But the Fed is bent on taming inflation and restoring their lost credibility after their earlier “transitory” error. The cavalry is likely to arrive late and low on ammunition.

We expect a hard landing.

Latest News**

Reuters: First Republic Bank (FRC)

Acknowledgements

EPB Research for the Conference Board LEI chart.

Economic Outlook, March 2023

Here is a summary of Colin Twiggs’ presentation to investors at Beech Capital on March 30, 2023. The outlook covers seven themes:

  1. Elevated risk
  2. Bank contagion
  3. Underlying causes of instability
  4. Interest rates & inflation
  5. The impact on stocks
  6. Flight to safety
  7. Australian perspective

1. Elevated Risk

We focus on three key indicators that warn of elevated risk in financial markets:

Inverted Yield Curve

The chart below plots the difference between 10-year Treasury yields and 3-month T-Bills. The line is mostly positive as 10-year investments are normally expected to pay a higher rate of investment than 3-month bills. Whenever the spread inverted, however, in the last sixty years — normally due to the Fed tightening monetary policy — the NBER has declared a recession within 12 to 18 months1.

Treasury Yields: 10-Year minus 3-Month

The current value of -1.25% is the strongest inversion in more than forty years — since 1981. This squeezes bank net interest margins and is likely to cause a credit contraction as banks avoid risk wherever possible.

Stock Market Volatility

We find the VIX (CBOE Short-term Implied Volatility on the S&P 500) an unreliable measure of stock market risk and developed our own measure of volatility. Whenever 21-day Twiggs Volatility forms troughs above 1.0% (red arrows below) on the S&P 500, that signals elevated risk.

S&P 500 & Twiggs Volatility (21-Day)

The only time that we have previously seen repeated troughs above 1.0% was in the lead-up to the global financial crisis in 2007-2008.

S&P 500 & Twiggs Volatility (21-Day)

Bond Market Volatility

The bond market has a far better track record of anticipating recessions than the stock market. The MOVE index below measures short-term volatility in the Treasury market. Readings above 150 indicate instability and in the past have coincided with crises like the collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, Enron in 2001, Bear Stearns and Lehman in 2008, and the 2020 pandemic. In the past week, the MOVE exceeded 180, its highest reading since the 2008-2009 financial crisis.

MOVE Index

2. Bank Contagion

Regional banks in the US had to be rescued by the Fed after a run on Silicon Valley Bank. Depositors attempted to withdraw $129 billion — more than 80% of the bank’s deposits — in the space of two days. There are no longer queues of customers outside a bank, waiting for hours to withdraw their deposits. Nowadays online transfers are a lot faster and can bring down a bank in a single day.

The S&P Composite 1500 Regional Banks Index ($XPBC) plunged to 90 and continues to test support at that level.

S&P Composite 1500 Regional Banks Index ($XPBC)

Bank borrowings from the Fed and FHLB spiked to $475 billion in a week.

Bank Deposits & Borrowings

Financial markets are likely to remain unsettled for months to come.

European Banks

European banks are not immune to the contagion, with a large number of banking stocks falling dramatically.

European Banks

Credit Suisse (CS) was the obvious dead-man-walking, after reporting a loss of CHF 7.3 billion in February 2023, but Deutsche Bank (DB) and others also have a checkered history.

Credit Suisse (CS) & Deutsche Bank (DB)

3. Underlying Causes of Instability

The root cause of financial instability is cheap debt. Whenever central banks suppress interest rates below the rate of inflation, the resulting negative real interest rates fuel financial instability.

The chart below plots the Fed funds rate adjusted for inflation (using the Fed’s preferred measure of core PCE), with negative real interest rates highlighted in red.

Fed Funds Rate minus Core PCE Inflation

Unproductive Investment

Negative real interest rates cause misallocation of capital into unproductive investments — intended to profit from inflation rather than generate income streams. The best example of an unproductive investment is gold: it may rise in value due to inflation but generates no income. The same is true of art and other collectibles which generate no income and may in fact incur costs to insure or protect them.

Residential real estate is also widely used as a hedge against inflation. While it may generate some income in the form of net rents, the returns are normally negligible when compared to capital appreciation.

Productive investments, by contrast, normally generate both profits and wages which contribute to GDP. If an investor builds a new plant or buys capital equipment, GDP is enhanced not only by the profits made but also by the wages of everyone employed to operate the plant/equipment. Capital investment also has a multiplier effect. Supplies required to operate the plant, or transport required to distribute the output, are both likely to generate further investment and jobs in other parts of the supply chain.

Cheap debt allows unproductive investment to crowd out productive investment, causing GDP growth to slow. These periods of low growth and high inflation are commonly referred to as stagflation.

Debt-to-GDP

The chart below shows the impact of unproductive investment, with private sector debt growing at a faster rate than GDP (income), almost doubling since 1980. This should be a stable relationship (i.e. a horizontal line) with GDP growing as fast as, if not faster than, debt.

Private Sector Debt/GDP

Even more concerning is federal debt. There are two flat sections in the above chart — from 1990 to 2000 and from 2010 to 2020 — when the relationship between private debt and income stabilized after a major recession. That is when government debt spiked upwards.

Federal & State Government Debt/GDP

When the private sector stops borrowing, the government steps in — borrowing and spending in their place — to create a soft landing. Some call this stimulus but we consider it a disaster when unproductive spending drives up the ratio of government debt relative to GDP.

Research by Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff (This Time is Different, 2008) suggests that states where sovereign debt exceeds 100% of GDP (1.0 on the above chart) almost inevitably default. A study by Cristina Checherita and Philip Rother at the ECB posited an even lower sustainable level, of 70% to 80%, above which highly-indebted economies would run into difficulties.

Rising Inflation

Inflationary pressures grow when government deficits are funded from sources outside the private sector. There is no increase in overall spending if the private sector defers spending in order to invest in government bonds. But the situation changes if government deficits are funded by the central bank or external sources.

The chart below shows how the Fed’s balance sheet has expanded over the past two decades, reaching $8.6 trillion at the end of 2022, most of which is invested in Treasuries or mortgage-backed securities (MBS).

Fed Total Assets

Foreign investment in Treasuries also ballooned to $7.3 trillion.

Fed Total Assets

That is just the tip of the iceberg. The US has transformed from the world’s largest creditor (after WWII) to the world’s largest debtor, with a net international investment position of -$16.7 trillion.

Net International Investment Position (NIIP)

4. Interest Rates & Inflation

To keep inflation under control, central bank practice suggests that the Fed should maintain a policy rate at least 1.0% to 2.0% above the rate of inflation. The consequences of failure to do so are best illustrated by the path of inflation under Fed Chairman Arthur Burns in the 1970s. Successive stronger waves of inflation followed after the Fed failed to maintain a positive real funds rate (green circle) on the chart below.

Fed Funds Rate & CPI in the 1970s

CPI reached almost 15.0% and the Fed under Paul Volcker was forced to hike the funds rate to almost 20.0% to tame inflation.

Possible Outcomes

The Fed was late in hiking interest rates in 2022, sticking to its transitory narrative while inflation surged. CPI is now declining but we are likely to face repeated waves of inflation — as in the 1970s — unless the Fed keeps rates higher for longer.

Fed Funds Rate & CPI

There are two possible outcomes:

A. Interest Rate Suppression

The Fed caves to political pressure and cuts interest rates. This reduces debt servicing costs for the federal government but negative real interest rates fuel further inflation. Asset prices are likely to rise as are wage demands and consumer prices.

B. Higher for Longer

The Fed withstands political pressure and keeps interest rates higher for longer. This increases debt servicing costs and adds to government deficits. The inevitable recession and accompanying credit contraction cause a sharp fall in asset asset prices — both stocks and real estate — and rising unemployment. Inflation would be expected to fall and wages growth slow.  The eventual positive outcome would be more productive investment and real GDP growth.

5. The Impact on Stocks

Stocks have been distorted by low interest rates and QE.

Stock Market Capitalization-to-GDP

Warren Buffett’s favorite indicator of stock market value compares total market capitalization to GDP. Buffett maintains that a value of 1.0 reflects fair value — less than half the current multiple of 2.1 (Q4, 2022).

Stock Market Capitalization/GDP

Price-to-Sales

The S&P 500 demonstrates a more stable relationship against sales than against earnings because this excludes volatile profit margins. Price-to-Sales has climbed to a 31% premium over 20-year average of 1.68.

S&P 500 Price-to-Sales

6. Flight to Safety

Elevated risk is expected to cause a flight to safety in financial markets.

Cash & Treasuries

The most obvious safe haven is cash and term deposits but recent bank contagion has sparked a run on uninsured bank deposits, in favor of short-term Treasuries and money market funds.

Gold

Gold enjoyed a strong rally in recent weeks, testing resistance at $2,000 per ounce. Breakout above $2,050 would offer a target of $2,400.

Spot Gold

A surge in central bank gold purchases — to a quarterly rate of more than 400 tonnes — is boosting demand for gold. Buying is expected to continue due to concerns over inflation and geopolitical implications of blocked Russian foreign exchange reserves.

Central Bank Quarterly Gold Purchases

Defensive sectors

Defensive sectors normally include Staples, Health Care, and Utilities. But recent performance on the S&P 500 shows operating margins for Utilities and Health Care are being squeezed. Industrials have held up well, and Staples are improving, but Energy and Financials are likely to disappoint in Q1 of 2023.

S&P 500 Operating Margins

Commodities

Commodities show potential because of massive under-investment in Energy and Battery Metals over the past decade. But first we have to negotiate a possible global recession that would be likely to hurt demand.

7. Australian Perspective

Our outlook for Australia is similar to the US, with negative real interest rates and financial markets awash with liquidity.

Team “Transitory”

The RBA is still living in “transitory” land. The chart below compares the RBA cash rate (blue) to trimmed mean inflation (brown) — the RBA’s preferred measure of long-term inflationary pressures. You can seen in 2007/8 that the cash rate peaked at 7.3% compared to the trimmed mean at 4.8% — a positive real interest rate of 2.5%. But since 2013, the real rate was close to zero before falling sharply negative in 2019. The current real rate is -3.3%, based on the current cash rate and the last trimmed mean reading in December.

RBA Cash Rate & Trimmed Mean Inflation

Private Credit

Unproductive investment caused a huge spike in private credit relative to GDP in the ’80s and ’90s. This should be a stable ratio — a horizontal line rather than a steep slope.

Australia: Private Credit/GDP

Government Debt

Private credit to GDP (above) stabilized after the 2008 global financial crisis but was replaced by a sharp surge in government debt — to create a soft landing. Money spent was again mostly unproductive, with debt growing at a much faster rate than income.

Australia: Federal & State Debt/GDP

Liquidity

Money supply (M3) again should reflect a stable (horizontal) relationship, especially at low interest rates. Instead M3 has grown much faster than GDP, signaling that financial markets are awash with liquidity. This makes the task of containing long-term inflation much more difficult unless there is a prolonged recession.

RBA Cash Rate & Trimmed Mean Inflation

Conclusion

We have shown that risk in financial markets is elevated and the recent bank contagion is likely to leave markets unsettled. Long-term causes of financial instability are cheap debt and unproductive investment, resulting in low GDP growth.

Failure to address rising inflation promptly, with positive real interest rates, is likely to cause recurring waves of inflation. There are only two ways for the Fed and RBA to address this:

High Road

The high road requires holding rates higher for longer, maintaining positive real interest rates for an extended period. Investors are likely to suffer from a resulting credit contraction, with both stocks and real estate falling, but the end result would be restoration of real GDP growth.

Low Road

The low road is more seductive as it involves lower interest rates and erosion of government debt (by rapid growth of GDP in nominal terms). But resulting high inflation is likely to deliver an extended period of low real GDP growth and repeated cycles of higher interest rates as the central bank struggles to contain inflation.

Overpriced assets

Vulnerable asset classes include:

  • Growth stocks, trading at high earnings multiples
  • Commercial real estate (especially offices) purchased on low yields
  • Banks, insurers and pension funds heavily invested in fixed income
  • Sectors that make excessive use of leverage to boost returns:
    • Private equity
    • REITs (some, not all)

Relative Safety

  • Cash (insured deposits only)
  • Short-term Treasuries
  • Gold
  • Defensive sectors, especially Staples
  • Commodities are more cyclical but there are long-term opportunities in:
    • Energy
    • Battery metals

Notes

  1. The Dow fell 25% in 1966 after the yield curve inverted. The NBER declared a recession but later changed their mind and airbrushed it from their records.

Questions

1. Which is the most likely path for the Fed and RBA to follow: the High Road or the Low Road?

Answer: As Churchill once said: “You can always depend on the Americans to do the right thing. But only after they have tried everything else.” With rising inflation, the Fed is running out of options but they may still be tempted to kick the can down the road one last time. It seems like a 50/50 probability at present.

2. Comment on RBA housing?

We make no predictions but the rising ratio of housing assets to disposable income is cause for concern.

Australia & USA: Housing Assets/Disposable Income

3. Is Warren Buffett’s indicator still valid with rising offshore earnings of multinational corporations?

Answer: We plotted stock market capitalization against both GDP and GNP (which includes foreign earnings of US multinationals) and the differences are negligible.

Our 2023 Outlook

This is our last newsletter for the year, where we take the opportunity to map out what we see as the major risks and opportunities facing investors in the year ahead.

US Economy

The Fed has been hiking interest rates since March this year, but real retail sales remain well above their pre-pandemic trend (dotted line below) and show no signs of slowing.

Real Retail Sales

Retail sales are even rising strongly against disposable personal income, with consumers running up credit and digging into savings.

Retail Sales/ Disposable Personal Income

The Fed wants to reduce demand in order to reduce inflationary pressure on consumer prices but consumers continue to spend. Household net worth has soared — from massive expansion of home and stock prices, fueled by cheap debt, and growing savings boosted by government stimulus during the pandemic. The ratio of household net worth to disposable personal income has climbed more than 40% since the global financial crisis — from 5.5 to 7.7.

Household Net Worth/ Disposable Personal Income

At the same time, unemployment (3.7%) has fallen close to record lows, increasing inflationary pressures as employers compete for scarce labor.

Unemployment

Real Growth

Hours worked contracted by an estimated 0.12% in November (-1.44% annualized).

Real GDP & Hours Worked

But annual growth rates for real GDP growth (1.9%) and hours worked (2.1%) remain positive.

Real GDP & Hours Worked

Heavy truck sales are also a solid 40,700 units per month (seasonally adjusted). Truck sales normally contract ahead of recessions, marked by light gray bars below, providing a reliable indicator of economic growth. Sales below 35,000 units per month would be bearish.

S&P 500

Inflation & Interest Rates

The underlying reason for the economy’s resilience is the massive expansion in the money supply (M2 excluding time deposits) relative to GDP, after the 2008 global financial crisis, doubling from earlier highs at 0.4 to the current ratio of 0.84. Excessive liquidity helped to suppress interest rates and balloon asset prices, with too much money chasing scarce investment opportunities. In the hunt for yield, investors became blind to risk.

S&P 500

Suppression of interest rates caused the yield on lowest investment grade corporate bonds (Baa) to decline below CPI. A dangerous precedent, last witnessed in the 1970s, negative real rates led to a massive spike in inflation. Former Fed Chairman, Paul Volcker, had to hike the Fed funds rate above 19.0%, crashing the economy, in order to tame inflation.

S&P 500

The current Fed chair, Jerome Powell, is doing his best to imitate Volcker, hiking rates steeply after a late start. Treasury yields have inverted, with the 1-year yield (4.65%) above the 2-year (4.23%), reflecting bond market expectations that the Fed will soon be forced to cut rates.

S&P 500

A negative yield curve, indicated by the 10-year/3-month spread below zero, warns that the US economy will go into recession in 2023. Our most reliable indicator, the yield spread has inverted (red rings below) before every recession declared by the NBER since 1960*.

S&P 500

Bear in mind that the yield curve normally inverts 6 to 18 months ahead of a recession and recovers shortly before the recession starts, when the Fed cuts interest rates.

Home Prices

Mortgage rates jumped steeply as the Fed hiked rates and started to withdraw liquidity from financial markets. The sharp rise signals the end of the 40-year bull market fueled by cheap debt. Rising inflation has put the Fed on notice that the honeymoon is over. Deflationary pressures from globalization can no longer be relied on to offset inflationary pressures from expansionary monetary policy.

S&P 500

Home prices have started to decline but have a long way to fall to their 2006 peak (of 184.6) that preceded the global financial crisis.

S&P 500

Stocks

The S&P 500 is edging lower, with negative 100-day Momentum signaling a bear market, but there is little sign of panic, with frequent rallies testing the descending trendline.

S&P 500

Bond market expectations of an early pivot has kept long-term yields low and supported stock prices. 10-Year Treasury yields at 3.44% are almost 100 basis points below the Fed funds target range of 4.25% to 4.50%. Gradual withdrawals of liquidity (QT)  by the Fed have so far failed to dent bond market optimism.

10-Year Treasury Yield & Fed Funds Rate

Treasuries & the Bond Market

Declining GDP is expected to shrink tax receipts, while interest servicing costs on existing fiscal debt are rising, causing the federal deficit to balloon to between $2.5 and $5.0 trillion according to macro/bond specialist Luke Gromen.

Federal Debt/GDP & Federal Deficit/GDP

With foreign demand for Treasuries shrinking, and the Fed running down its balance sheet, the only remaining market  for Treasuries is commercial banks and the private sector. Strong Treasury issuance is likely to increase upward pressure on yields, to attract investors. The inflow into bonds is likely to be funded by an outflow from stocks, accelerating their decline.

Energy

Brent crude prices fell below $80 per barrel, despite slowing releases from the US strategic petroleum reserve (SPR). Demand remains soft despite China’s relaxation of their zero-COVID policy — which some expected to accelerate their economic recovery.

S&P 500

European natural gas inventories are near full, causing a sharp fall in prices. But prices remain high compared to their long-term average, fueling inflation and an economic contraction.

S&P 500

Europe

European GDP growth is slowing, while inflation has soared, causing negative real GDP growth and a likely recession.

S&P 500

Australia, Base Metals & Iron Ore

Base metals rallied on optimism over China’s reopening from lockdowns. Normally a bullish sign for the global economy, breakout above resistance at 175 was short-lived, warning of a bull trap.

S&P 500

Iron ore posted a similar rally, from $80 to $110 per tonne, but is also likely to retreat.

S&P 500

The ASX benefited from the China rally, with the ASX 200 breaking resistance at 7100 to complete a double-bottom reversal. Now the index is retracing to test its new support level. Breach of 7000 would warn of another test of primary support at 6400.S&P 500

China

Optimism over China’s reopening may be premature. Residential property prices continue to fall.

S&P 500

The reopening also risks a massive COVID exit-wave, against an under-prepared population, when restrictions are relaxed.

“In my memory, I have never seen such a challenge to the Chinese health-care system,” Xi Chen, a Yale University global health researcher, told National Public Radio in America this week. With less than four intensive care beds for every 100,000 people and millions of unvaccinated or partially protected older adults, the risks are real.

With official data highly unreliable, it is hard to track exactly what impact China’s U-turn is having. Authorities on Friday reported the first Covid-19 deaths since most restrictions were lifted in early December, but there have been reports that funeral homes in Beijing are struggling to handle the number of bodies being brought in.

“The risk factors are there: eight million people are essentially not vaccinated,” said Huang Yanzhong, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations.

“Unless this variant has evolved in a way that makes it harmless, China can’t avoid what happened in Taiwan or in Hong Kong,” he added, referring to significant “exit waves” in both places.

The scale of the surge is unlikely to be apparent for months, but modelling suggests it could be grim. A report from the University of Hong Kong released on Thursday warned that a best case scenario is 700,000 fatalities – forecasts from a UK-based analytics firm put deaths at between 1.3 and 2.1 million.

“We’re still at a very early stage in this particular exit wave,” said Prof Ben Cowling, an epidemiologist at the University of Hong Kong. (The Telegraph)

China relied on infrastructure spending to get them out of past economic contractions but debt levels are now too high for stimulus on a similar scale to 2008. Expansion of credit to local government and real estate developers is likely to cause further stagnation, with the rise of zombie banking and real estate sectors — as Japan experienced for more than three decades — suffocating future growth.

S&P 500

Conclusion

Resilient consumer spending, high household net worth, and a tight labor market all make the Fed’s job difficult. If the current trend continues, the Fed will be forced to hike interest rates higher than the bond market expects, in order to curb demand and tame inflation.

Expected contraction of European and Chinese economies, combined with rate hikes in the US, are likely to cause a global recession.

There are two possible exits. First, if central banks stick to their guns and hold interest rates higher for longer, a major and extended economic contraction is almost inevitable. While inflation may be tamed, the global economy is likely to take years to recover.

The second option is for central banks to raise inflation targets and suppress long-term interest rates in order to create a soft landing. High inflation and negative real interest rates may prolong the period of low growth but negative real rates would rescue the G7 from precarious debt levels that have ensnared them over the past decade. A similar strategy was successfully employed after WWII to extricate governments from high debt levels relative to GDP.

As to which option will be chosen is a matter of political will. The easier second option is therefore more likely, as politicians tend to follow the line of least resistance.

We have refrained from weighing in on the likely outcome of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Ukraine presently has the upper hand but the conflict is a wild card that could cause a spike in energy prices if it escalates or a positive boost to the European economy in the unlikely event that peace breaks out.

Our strategy is to remain overweight in gold, critical materials, defensive stocks and cash, while underweight bonds and high-multiple technology stocks. In the longer term, we will seek to invest cash in real assets when the opportunity presents itself.

Acknowledgements

  • Hat tip to Macrobusiness for the Pantheon Macroeconomics (China Residential) and Goldman Sachs (China Local Government Funding & Excavator Hours) charts.

Notes

* The yield curve inverted ahead of a 25% fall in the Dow in 1966. The NBER declared a recession but later changed their minds and airbrushed it out of their records.

Fed hikes now, pain comes later

Fed Chairman Jerome Powell announced a 75 basis point increase in the Fed funds target rate at his post-FOMC press conference today:

“Today, the FOMC raised our policy interest rate by 75 basis points, and we continue to anticipate that ongoing increases will be appropriate. We are moving our policy stance purposefully to a level that will be sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent. In addition, we are continuing the process of significantly reducing the size of our balance sheet. Restoring price stability will likely require maintaining a restrictive stance of policy for some time.”

The target range is now 3.75% to 4.0%.

Fed Funds Rate

Commenting on today’s announcement, Michael Contopoulos from Richard Bernstein says little has changed:

“Nothing really changed today, the Fed has been hawkish since Jackson Hole. It doesn’t matter how high rates go, what matters is that the Fed is going to be restrictive and they’re going to bring down long-term growth…..The end game is not cutting rates, at least any time soon, the end game is to slow growth and slow the economy.” (CNBC)

Chris Brightman from Research Affiliates, co-manager several PIMCO funds, offers a useful rule-of-thumb as to how far the Fed will need to hike. The unemployment rate has to rise by 1.0% for every 1.0% intended drop in core inflation.

Core inflation is close to 6.0% at present, if we take the average of core CPI (purple), growth in average hourly earnings (pink), and core PCE index (gray). To achieve the Fed’s 2.0% inflation target, using the above rule-of-thumb, would require a 4.0% increase in the unemployment rate.

Unemployment

That means an unemployment rate of 7.5% (red line below), making a recession almost certain.

Unemployment Rate

The recent 10-year/3-month Treasury yield inversion also warns of a recession in 2023.

Treasury 10-Year minus 3-Month Yield

Conclusion

We expect the Fed to hike the funds rate to between 5.0% and 6.0% — the futures market reflects a peak of 5.1% in May ’23 — then a pause to assess the impact on the labor market. Employment tends to lag monetary policy by 6 to 12 months, so the results of recent rate hikes are only likely to show in 2023. The recent inversion of 10-year and 3-month Treasury yields also warns of a recession next year.

The unemployment rate will most likely need to rise to 7.5% to bring inflation back within the Fed’s target range. That would cause a deep recession, especially if the Fed holds rates high for an extended period as they have indicated.

Uncertainty still surrounds whether the Fed will be able to execute its stated plan. A sharp rise in unemployment or bond market collapse could cause an early Fed pivot as the Treasury yield curve and Fed fund futures still expect.

Treasury Yield Curve & Fed Funds Rate Futures

Jay Powell is selling but the bond market isn’t buying

Fed Chairman Jerome Powell declared that the Fed’s commitment to taming inflation is “unconditional”:

June 23 (Reuters) – The Federal Reserve’s commitment to reining in 40-year-high inflation is “unconditional,” Powell told lawmakers on Thursday, even as he acknowledged that sharply higher interest rates may push up unemployment.

“We really need to restore price stability … because without that we’re not going to be able to have a sustained period of maximum employment where the benefits are spread very widely,” the Fed Chairman told the U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee.

Under questioning by members of the House panel on Thursday, Powell said there was a risk the Fed’s actions could lead to a rise in unemployment. “We don’t have precision tools,” he said, “so there is a risk that unemployment would move up, from what is historically a low level though. A labor market with 4.1% or 4.3% unemployment is still a very strong labor market.”

He also dismissed cutting interest rates if unemployment were to rise while inflation remained high. “We can’t fail on this: we really have to get inflation down to 2%,” he said.

The Fed chief was also asked about the central bank’s balance sheet, which was built up to around $9 trillion during the pandemic in an effort to ease financial conditions and is now being pared. The Fed aims to get it “roughly in the range of $2.5 or $3 trillion smaller than it is now,” Powell said.

But the bond market isn’t buying it. Treasury yields from 2-year to 30-year are compressed in a narrow band above 3%, indicating a flat yield curve. Expectations are that the Fed can’t go much higher than 3.0% to 3.5%.

Treasury Yield Curve

The dot plot from the last FOMC meeting similarly projects a 3.4% fed funds rate by the end of 2022, 3.8% by 2023, and lower at 3.4% by the end of 2024.

FOMC Dot Plot

You cannot cure inflation with a Fed funds rate (FFR) of 3.5%.

CPI is growing at 8.6% YoY, while the FFR target maximum is 1.75%. Another 1.75% just won’t cut it. You have to hike rates above inflation. Positive real interest rates are the best antidote for inflation but the economy, in its current precarious state, could not withstand this.

Fed Funds Rate & CPI

Taming inflation in the 1980s

Paul Volcker killed inflation by hiking the fed funds rate to 20% in 1980, but we live in a different world.

In 1980, federal debt to GDP was less than 50% of GDP. Today it’s 118%.

Federal Debt/GDP

The Federal deficit was 2.5% of GDP. Now it’s 12%.

Federal Deficit/GDP

Private debt (excluding the financial sector) was 1.35 times GDP in 1980. Now it’s more than double.

Private Non-Financial Debt/GDP

Powell can’t hike rates like Volcker. If he tried, he would collapse the economy and the US Treasury would be forced to default on its debt. Collapse of the global reserve asset is about as close as you can get to financial Armageddon.

Pricking the bubble

Instead, the Fed plans to use QT to deflate the asset bubbles in stocks and housing, in the hope that a reverse wealth effect — as households feel poorer — will slow consumer spending and reduce inflation.

So far, the S&P 500 has dropped by 25% and the housing market is likely to follow. The 30-year mortgage rate has climbed to 5.81%, more than double the rate in August last year.

30-Year Fixed Mortgage Rate

Housing starts and permits are both declining.

Housing Starts & Permits

Powell talks of a $2.5 to $3.0 trillion reduction in the Fed’s balance sheet. That would increase the supply of Treasuries and MBS in financial markets by an equivalent amount which would be sucked out of the stock market, causing a fall in prices.

The two largest foreign investors in US Treasuries — Japan and China — have also both become net sellers to support their currencies against the rising Dollar. That will further increase the supply of Treasuries, causing an outflow from stocks.

Since 2009, stock market capitalization increased by $47.4 trillion, from $16.9T to $64.3T at the end of Q1. At the same time, the Fed’s balance sheet increased by $7.9 trillion, from $0.9T to $8.8T. Market cap increased by $6T for every $1T increase in the Fed’s balance sheet (QE). The multiplier effect is 6 times (47.4/7.9).

Stock Market Capitalization & Fed Total Assets

If the Fed were to shrink its balance sheet by $2.5 trillion and net foreign sales  of Treasuries amount to another $0.5 trillion, we could expect a similar multiplier effect to cause an $18 trillion fall in market capitalization ($3Tx6). Market cap would fall to $50T or 26.5% from its $68T peak in Q4 of 2021.

That’s just the start.

“Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”

Nobel prize-winner Milton Friedman argued that long-term increases or decreases in the general price level were caused by changes in the supply of money and not by shortages or surpluses of oil, commodities or labor.

The chart below shows the supply of money (M2) as a percentage of GDP. The economy thrived with M2 below 50% throughout the Dotcom boom of the late 1990s but has since grown bloated with liquidity as the Fed tried to revive the economy from the massive supply shock of China’s admission to the World Trade Organization in 2002 — the introduction of hundreds of millions of workers earning roughly 1/30th of Western-level wages.

Money Supply (M2)/GDP

The massive supply shock helped to contain prices over the next two decades, perpetuating the myth of the Great Moderation — that the Fed had finally tamed inflation. Fed hubris led them to pursue easier monetary policy with little fear of  inflationary consequences.

All illusions eventually come to an end, however, and the 2020 pandemic caused the Fed to purchase trillions of Dollars of securities to support massive government stimulus payments. The MMT experiment failed disastrously, causing a $5 trillion spike in M2 without an accompanying rise in GDP. M2 spiked up from an already bloated 70% of GDP to more than 90%, before GDP recovered slightly to reduce it to the current 89%.

Trade tensions with China, coupled with supply chain disruptions from the 2020 pandemic and a sharp rise in natural gas prices — as industry switched from coal to reduce CO2 emissions — triggered price increases. These were aggravated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and resulting sanctions, leading to oil shortages.

Normally, high prices are the cure for high prices. Consumers cut back purchases in response to high prices and demand falls to the point that it matches available supply. Prices then stabilize.

But consumers are sitting on a mountain of cash, as illustrated in the above M2 chart. They continued spending despite higher prices and demand didn’t fall. Investors who have access to cheap debt also, quite rationally, borrow to buy appreciating real assets. Unfortunately cheap leverage is seldom channeled into productive investment and instead fuels expanding asset bubbles in homes and equities.

The Fed is forced to intervene, employing demand destruction, through rate hikes and QT deflate asset bubbles, to reduce consumer spending.

An unwelcome side-effect of demand destruction is that it also destroys jobs. Unemployment rises and eventually the Fed is forced to relent.

Conclusion

Fed Chairman Jerome Powell says that the Fed’s commitment to reining in inflation is “unconditional” but the bond market is pricing in rate hikes peaking between 3.0% and 3.5%, way below the current rate of inflation. The economy is unlikely to be able to withstand more because of precarious levels of debt to GDP and a massive fiscal deficit.

Instead, the Fed plans to shrink their balance sheet by $2.3 to $3 trillion. QT is expected to deflate asset bubbles in stocks and housing and achieve a reverse wealth effect. Households are likely to curb spending as their net worth falls and they feel poorer.

Unfortunately, demand destruction from rate hikes and QT will also cause unemployment, inevitably leading to a recession. The Fed seems to think that the economy is resilient because unemployment is low and job openings outnumber unemployed workers by almost 2 to 1.

Job Openings & Unemployment (U3)

But elevated debt levels and rapidly rising credit spreads could precipitate a sharp deleveraging, with crumbling asset prices, rising layoffs and credit defaults.

High Yield Spreads

The Fed may also manage to lower prices through demand destruction but inflation is likely to rear its head again when they start easing. Surging inflation is likely to repeat until the Fed addresses the underlying issue: an excessive supply of money.

Milton Friedman was a scholar of the Great Depression of the 1930s which he attributed to mistakes by the Fed:

“The Fed was largely responsible for converting what might have been a garden-variety recession, although perhaps a fairly severe one, into a major catastrophe. Instead of using its powers to offset the depression, it presided over a decline in the quantity of money by one-third from 1929 to 1933 … Far from the depression being a failure of the free-enterprise system, it was a tragic failure of government.”

Ben Bernanke, another scholar of the Great Depression, acknowledged this during his tenure as Fed Chairman:

“Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would like to say to Milton (Friedman) and Anna (Schwarz): Regarding the Great Depression, you’re right. We did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.”

Instead the Fed made the opposite mistake. By almost doubling the quantity of money (M2) relative to GDP (output) they have created an entirely different kind of monster.

Money Supply (M2)/GDP

Slaying the beast of inflation is likely to prove just as difficult as ending the deflationary spiral of the 1930s.

Stocks: Winter is coming

GDP grew by a solid 10.64% for the 12 months ended March ’22 but that is in nominal terms.

GDP

GDP for the quarter slowed to 1.58%, while real GDP fell to -0.36%. Not only is growth slowing but inflation is taking a bigger bite.

GDP & Real GDP

The implicit price deflator climbed to 1.94% for the quarter — almost 8.0% when annualized.

GDP Implicit Price Deflator

Growth is expected to decline further as long-term interest rates rise.

10-Year Treasury Yield & Moody's Baa Corporate Bond Yield

Conventional monetary policy would be for the Fed to hike the funds rate (gray below) above CPI (red). But, with CPI at 8.56% for the 12 months to March and FFR at 0.20%, the Fed may be tempted to try unconventional methods to ease inflationary pressures.

Fed Funds Rate & CPI

That includes shrinking its $9 trillion balance sheet (QT).

During the pandemic, the Fed purchased almost $5 trillion of securities. The resulting shortage of Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) caused long-terms yields to fall and a migration of investors to equities in search of yield.

The Fed is expected to commence QT in May at the rate of $95 billion per month — $60 billion in Treasuries and $35 billion in MBS — after a phase-in over the first three months. Long-term Treasury yields are likely to rise even faster, accompanied by a reverse flow from equities into bonds.

S&P 500 & Fed Total Assets

S&P 500 breach of support at 4200, signaling a bear market, would anticipate this.

Conclusion

Fed rate hikes combined with QT are expected to drive long-term interest rates higher and cause an outflow from equities into bonds.

A bear market (Winter) is coming.

Irrational Exuberance

I believe this warrants a separate post:

The market is running on more stimulants than a Russian weight-lifter. Unemployment is near record lows but the US Treasury is still running trillion dollar deficits.

Federal Deficit & Unemployment

While the Fed is cutting interest rates.

Fed Funds Rate & Unemployment

And again expanding its balance sheet. More than twelve years after the GFC. The blue line reflects total assets on the Fed’s balance sheet, mainly Treasuries and MBS, while the orange line (right-hand scale) shows how shrinking excess reserves on deposit at the Fed have helped to create a $2 trillion surge in liquidity in financial markets since 2009. Even when the Fed was supposedly tightening, with a shrinking balance sheet, in 2018 to 2019.

Fed Totals Assets & Net of Excess Reserves on Deposit

The triple boost has lifted stock valuations to precarious highs. The chart below compares stock market capitalization to profits after tax over the past 60 years.

Market Cap/Profits After Tax

Ratios above 15 flag that stocks are over-priced and likely to correct. Peaks in 1987 and 2007, shortly before the GFC, are typical of an over-heated market. The Dotcom bubble reflected “irrational exuberance” — a phrase coined by then Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan — and I believe we are entering a second such era.

Recovery of the economy under President Trump is no economic miracle, it is simply the triumph of monetary and fiscal stimulus over rational judgement. Trump knows that he has to keep the party going until November to win the upcoming election, so expect further excess. Whether he succeeds or not is unsure but one thing is certain: the longer the party goes on, the bigger the hangover.

William McChesney Martin Jr., the longest-serving Fed Chairman (1951 to 1970), famously described the role of the Fed as “to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going.” Unfortunately Jerome Powell seems to have been sufficiently cowed by Trump’s threats (to replace him) and failed to follow that precedent. We are all likely to suffer the consequences.