Taking the leverage out of economic growth | Reuters

Edward Hadas points out that long-term credit growth has exceeded growth in nominal GDP (real GDP plus inflation) in the US and Europe for some time. Not only does this fuel a credit bubble but it leads to a build up of inflationary pressure within the economy. If not evident in consumer prices it is likely to emerge as an asset bubble.

For the last two decades, accelerating credit has been closely correlated with the change in GDP – both in the United States and the euro zone. GDP growth tended to speed up shortly after the rate of credit growth increased, and slowed down after credit growth started to decrease.

This correlation implies there is an equilibrium rate of credit growth – the rate that corresponds to the long-term pace of nominal GDP growth. Though the pace of credit growth can vary from year to year, over time private debt and nominal GDP have to expand at the same rate for overall leverage to stay constant. That’s not what happened in the past two decades. Since 1990, Deutsche found a significant gap between credit and GDP growth in the United States and the euro zone.

In both, the neutral rate of credit growth – the rate associated with the economy’s long-term growth rate – was 7 percent. Those long-term nominal GDP growth rates were lower: 4.8 percent in the United States and 4 percent in the euro zone. In a single year, the difference of 2-3 percentage points doesn’t have much effect. Over a generation, though, it leads to a massive increase in the ratio of private debt to GDP.

The gap between growth in Domestic Debt and Nominal GDP widened in 2004/5 during the height of the property bubble and has narrowed to near zero since 2010.
Domestic Debt Growth Compared to GDP Growth
Hopefully the Fed have learned their lesson and maintain this course in future.

via Analysis & Opinion | Reuters.

Europe’s Populists at the Gate by Barry Eichengreen – Project Syndicate

Barry Eichengreen writes:

In focusing on summit declarations and promises of far-reaching reforms of EU institutions, investors are missing the real risk: the collapse of public support for, or at least public acquiescence to, the austerity policies required to work down heavy debt burdens – and for the governments pursuing these policies. Mass anti-austerity protests are one warning sign. Another is growing popular support for neo-Nazi movements like Golden Dawn, now the third-largest political party in Greece.

The rise to power of a “rejectionist” European government – that is, one that unilaterally rejects the policy status quo – would immediately bring the crisis to a head…….

via Europe’s Populists at the Gate by Barry Eichengreen – Project Syndicate.

Why Investors Shouldn’t Expect Much Euro Zone Reform | Institutional Investor

David Turner writes:

Most economists think deregulation is, in the long term, good for these countries’ economies, and hence for the sustainability of their sovereign debt markets. The economic case for pressing ahead with liberalization is strong. Can institutional investors therefore look forward to a fast pace of growth across the entire euro zone, boosted by deregulation?

The answer is “no,” for several reasons.

Experience shows that politicians will continue pressing ahead with reform only if the markets take them by the heels to dangle them over the precipice……..­

via Why Investors Shouldn’t Expect Much Euro Zone Reform | Institutional Investor.

Nomura's fresh alert on a Chinese hard landing | Telegraph Blogs

Ambrose Evans Pritchard writes:

Nomura’s early warning signal for the Chinese financial system – the China Stress Index – is flashing amber again…….Its case against China: “overinvestment and excessive credit; a rudimentary monetary policy architecture; too many privileges for state-owned enterprises; unintended consequences of financial liberalisation; the Lewis turning point; and growing pains from worsening demographics and increasing strains on natural resources”……..

via Nomura's fresh alert on a Chinese hard landing – Telegraph Blogs.

Australia: Did APRA assume a bailout in its stress test?

Houses and Holes at Macrobusiness.com.au makes an important point regarding the Australian mortgage insurance sector towards the end of this article:

Stress Test

John Laker, head of APRA, is out today with a speech in which he announced the results of a recent APRA stress test of Australian banks. Here is the scenario and the results:

The ‘what if’ scenario was built around a further deterioration of global economic conditions, with a disorderly resolution of the fiscal problems in Europe triggering a dislocation in global debt markets and a sharp downturn in the North Atlantic economies. China is assumed to be unable to fully offset the decline in its exports with domestic spending and, as a result, the rate of growth of the Chinese economy slows sharply. The implied reduction in Chinese demand for minerals lowers commodity prices significantly, with a consequent deterioration in the exchange rate for the Australian dollar. Domestically, households and businesses respond to the external shock by reducing consumption and investment expenditure. As a result, GDP falls and unemployment rises substantially, which feeds back into rising defaults and sharp falls in house prices and commercial property prices.

In this scenario, the key macroeconomic parameters for Australia used as the basis for the stress test were:

  • a sharp (5 per cent) contraction in real GDP in the first year;
  • a rapid rise in the unemployment rate to a peak of 12 per cent;
  • a peak-to-trough fall in house prices of 35 per cent; and
  • a fall in commercial property prices of 40 per cent.

This is a tougher stress test than the one APRA undertook in 2010. The projected economic contraction is deeper and more prolonged, with a weaker recovery and a longer period before return to growth. The rise in unemployment is higher and the impact on the housing market therefore more pronounced; there is a greater peak-to-trough fall in house prices. This time, the stress test also addressed liquidity consequences. The dislocation in global debt markets results in the largest banks being unable to access global funding markets for six months. The consequence is more intense competition for deposit funding and an increase in funding costs, weighing on lending margins and acting as a drag on revenues.

Remember, this is a hypothetical. It is in no way a forecast or a central expectation for the course of the Australian economy. Rather, the stress test was intended to test the boundaries of ‘severe but plausible’, especially given the current relatively strong position of the Australian economy. Benchmarked against recent industry-wide stress tests in other countries, the severity is confirmed by the fact that the GDP shock is more than four standard deviations based on the annual volatility of GDP in Australia since 1960; the shock was one-to-three standard deviations in other major tests. As a test of plausibility, the macroeconomic scenario would be comparable with the actual experience of the United Kingdom, United States and some European countries during the global financial crisis.

Although the macroeconomic scenario was tougher than in the 2010 exercise, the actual mechanics of the stress test were largely the same. The advanced banks were asked to apply the macroeconomic scenario in their own models and provide their assessment, in quite granular detail, of the impact on the ratings migration of assets, default behaviour, profitability and capital. After analysing this information, APRA then determined a common set of portfolio-specific risk measures that were applied to the banks’ loan portfolios.

Reflecting the severity of the scenario, the advanced banks all reported significant losses, driven by much higher bad debt expenses. Credit loss rates in aggregate were comparable with the experience in the early 1990s, although not quite as high as the peaks then reached. As expected, total losses were larger than in the 2010 exercise.

Despite the deterioration in labour market conditions and the projected stress on the housing market, residential mortgages, which account for nearly half of the advanced banks’ credit exposures, contributed only a fifth of total losses. The mortgage portfolio alone was not the principal driver of losses, a reflection of the structure of the domestic mortgage market as well as the general tightening in lending standards following the crisis. Losses were realised across a range of loan portfolios, particularly corporate, SME and commercial property portfolios. Losses on these business portfolios were more front loaded, materialising earlier in the scenario than losses on residential mortgage portfolios, which tended to lag the increase in unemployment.

The main results of the stress test for the five advanced banks, taken as a group, are as follows:

  • none of the banks would have failed under the downturn macroecnomic scenario;
  • none of the banks would have breached the four per cent minimum Tier 1 capital requirement of the Basel II Framework in any year of the stress test;
  • and the weighted average reduction in Tier 1 capital ratios over the three-year stress period was 3.8 percentage points.

This is a very positive result. It reflects the efforts of the advanced banks to strengthen their Tier 1 capital positions since the crisis began through ordinary equity issues and profit retention. It leaves these banks well positioned to transition to the new Basel III capital regime.

Well…bonza! But just one question. What did the stress test assume about the Lenders Mortgage Insurance sector (LMIs)? They are those hapless gents sitting on wafer thin capital buffers but carrying the risk of all the banks’ riskiest mortgages.

If the APRA stress test assumed a smooth and uninterrupted flow of payouts for losses from the LMIs to the banks then it also assumed their defacto nationalisation. In reality, under extreme stress, there is a very serious risk is that the LMIs will be wiped out and their relationships with the banks will descend into legal chaos as the two parties aim to survive at the cost of one another. You may recall that the biggest losers on Wall St in the GFC were insurers (think AIG), not banks.

In short, in the kind of scenario painted by APRA, it is quite possible that the government would have to step in and the post-nationalised LMIs would continue to pump a river of public cash into the banks via a backdoor bailout (ala AIG in the US).

So, if we are to take this excellent stress test result seriously, we really need to know what APRA assumed about the LMIs. Hmm?

Reproduced with thanks to Houses and Holes at Macrobusiness.com.au

Markets Worry About Fiscal Cliff

Michael S. Derby writes about the looming fiscal cliff:

The central problem is the lack of change. President Barack Obama was reelected. Democrats retained control of the Senate, while Republicans held on to the House of Representatives. The fiscal cliff can only be resolved if lawmakers work together. “Returning to status quo likely means all sides see the voters as supporting their views, which means reaching compromise is not likely to get any easier,” economists at Bank of America Merrill Lynch warned clients.

Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-Ohio) says “the Republican majority in the House stands ready to work with [the President] to do what’s best for our country.” Republicans appear willing to accept additional tax revenues but their emphasis is on reforming entitlement programs and curbing “special interest loopholes and deductions”.

The Congressional Budget Office summarizes the fiscal cliff as:

Among the policy changes that are due to occur in January under current law, the following will have the largest impact on the budget and the economy:

  • A host of significant provisions of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-312) are set to expire, including provisions that extended reductions in tax rates and expansions of tax credits and deductions originally enacted in 2001, 2003, or 2009. (Provisions designed to limit the reach of the alternative minimum tax, or AMT, expired on December 31, 2011.)
  • Sharp reductions in Medicare’s payment rates for physicians’ services are scheduled to take effect.
  • Automatic enforcement procedures established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 to restrain discretionary and mandatory spending are set to go into effect.
  • Extensions of emergency unemployment benefits and a reduction of 2 percentage points in the payroll tax for Social Security are scheduled to expire.

The CBO estimates that increases in federal taxes and reductions in federal spending, totaling almost
$500 billion, will cause a 0.5 percent drop in GDP in 2013.

Australia: Hard or soft landing?

Browsing the latest charts from the RBA.

Despite record low 10-year bond yields…..

Housing Finances

Credit growth is subdued and likely to remain so for some time.

Credit Growth by Sector

After a massive credit bubble lasting more than a decade.

Housing Finances

Households are saving close to 10 percent of Disposable Income in anticipation of a contraction.

Housing Finances

While banks are reluctant to lend when their margins are being squeezed.

Housing Finances

Borrowing offshore is not an option. That is how we got into such a fix in the first place.

Housing Finances

Makes me believe we are unlikely to see another housing boom for some time.

There are two possible outcomes: a soft landing and a hard landing.

It all depends on whether Wayne Swan and the RBA know their jobs.

Is the Fed finally listening to Scott Sumner?

Brendan Greely writes of Scott Sumner.

Sumner who holds a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, made a suggestion in the late 1980s to the New York Federal Reserve. He proposed that the Fed set a target for nominal GDP—real growth in GDP plus the rate of inflation. He felt that this would induce the correct level of business investment better than targeting either inflation or growth in real GDP by themselves. The response at the New York Fed, says Sumner, was, “Thanks, but no thanks.”

Targeting nominal GDP (NGDP) growth eliminates reliance on inexact measures of inflation which can mis-direct monetary policy. The advantage is that NGDP can be accurately measured. NGDP targeting would help to eliminate bubbles in the long term by restricting debt growth. And in the short-term would encourage the Fed to expand money supply in response to private sector deleveraging, avoiding deflationary pressure.

The announcement by the Fed’s rate-setting committee in mid-September doesn’t contain any mention of targeting nominal GDP. But its open-ended nature and clear goals—pump up the money supply until hiring rises strongly—resembles Sumner’s nominal GDP model, which would have a central bank do all in its power to achieve an agreed-upon nominal rate of growth.

It has taken Sumner almost 3 decades, but in the end he is likely to get there.

via The Blog That Got Bernanke to Go Big – Businessweek.

Bank of England should leave forecasting to Ladbrokes « The Market Monetarist

The Market Monetarist makes a novel suggestion as to how to avoid central banks from making biased forecasts:

“…..even better as I have suggested numerous times that the central bank simply set-up a prediction market. In Britain that would be extremely easy – I don’t think there is a country in the world with so many bookmakers. The Bank of England could simply ask a company like Ladbrokes or a similar company to set-up betting markets for key macro economic variables – such as inflation and nominal GDP. It would be extremely cheap and the forecast created from such prediction market would likely be at least as good as what is presently produced by the otherwise clever staff at the BoE.”

That could work …..until punters learn that the bets they place indirectly influence central bank monetary policy. It might pay market participants to place large bets on low or high inflation if they stand to benefit from the central bank response.

via Bank of England should leave forecasting to Ladbrokes « The Market Monetarist.

Explain the disease to help US citizens – FT.com

This must-read opinion by Richard Koo explains the impact US private sector saving — a staggering 8 per cent of gross domestic product — has on the US economy.

“….. if left unattended, the economy will continuously lose aggregate demand equivalent to the unborrowed savings. In other words, even though repairing balance sheets is the right and responsible thing to do, if everyone tries to do it at the same time a deflationary spiral will result. It was such a deflationary spiral that cost the US 46 per cent of its GDP from 1929 to 1933.”

via Explain the disease to help US citizens – FT.com.