Is the high Australian Dollar the real culprit?

Excellent comment from Loonyright at Macrobusiness.com.au on damage to Australian industry caused by the higher dollar:

Australia has been losing investment in research and manufacturing well prior to 2002. The volatility of our currency is of nothing compared to the static, elevated cost of doing business – all resulting from higher wages, unattractive taxation, and unattractive levels of regulation. We are a stable, well educated populace – this should be the ideal home of all kinds of investment. Instead we have slowly and steadily dug ourselves into an entitlement mindset out of proportion to our ability to fund it. If we truly want a competitive, diversified economy that is not reliant on commodity prices and low interest rates to drive activity via the property market, then our uncompetitive wages, taxation and regulation MUST be addressed. It is fantasy to think we can change our fortunes without changing these factors.

via Gotti canvasses the unthinkable | | MacroBusiness.

Are Australian banks adequately capitalized?

Basel III Capital Adequacy Ratios (CAR) will require banks to hold a minimum Total Capital of 8% against risk-weighted assets (RWA), the same as under Basel II, but with additional capital buffers of between 2.5% and 5.0% depending on credit market conditions. With an average ratio of 11.5% (September 2011), Australian banks are short of the maximum Basel III requirement of 13.0% for markets in a credit bubble.

The problem, however, lies not only with CAR but with the definition of risk-weighted assets. Under RWA, loans and investments are not taken at face value but adjusted for perceived risk. These adjustments vary widely between banks in different countries. US banks still apply Basel I risk-weightings:

  • zero for cash and government debt (OECD Sovereigns);
  • 20 percent for (OECD) banks;
  • 50 percent for mortgages;
  • 100 percent for corporates.

Their counterparts in Asia and Europe apply Basel II risk-weightings, with more lenient mortgage risk weights, averaging 15 percent and 14 percent respectively.

Australia’s 4 major banks similarly apply risk-weightings (supervised by APRA) for residential mortgages as low as 15%, with an average of 17%. That means the big four hold less than 2% capital against residential mortgages. Even after mortgage insurance, Deep T pointed out earlier this year, leverage is close to 50 times capital.

Basel III introduces a minimum 3% leverage ratio which ignores risk-weighting and compares Tier 1 capital to total exposure — total assets plus derivative exposure and off-balance sheet assets. But this is a catch-all and allows banks with high quality assets to continue leveraging at 33 times capital. Fed guidelines are more conservative, requiring a minimum leverage ratio of 4% (“adequately capitalized“) with a recommended 5% minimum for well-capitalized banks. The ratio, however, excludes off-balance-sheet assets. None of Australia’s four majors appear to meet the Fed’s requirement at September 2011 — ranging between 3.9% and 4.8% of Tier 1 capital to tangible assets.

With household debt at a historic high of 150% of disposable income, 3 times higher than in the early 1990s, Australia shows classic symptoms of a credit bubble and cannot afford to be complacent. There are three areas of the banking system that require attention. Capital adequacy ratios need to be lifted as well as risk-weightings for residential mortgages. Improving these two measures should enable Australia’s four major banks to achieve a minimum (Basel III) leverage ratio of 5%.

Sources:

Click to access bcbs189.pdf

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basel_III
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_requirement

Click to access wp1290.pdf

Click to access wp1225.pdf

Casualties of the externality

Click to access EY%20Reg%20Alert%20Basel%20III%20June%202012.pdf

Australian data weaken further and further and…. | The Big Picture

By Kiron Sarkar

Australian new home sales declined by -5.3% to the lowest level on record in August, which itself saw a -5.6% drop from July. However, house prices rose by the most in 30 months in September – I’m getting that bubbly feeling, me thinks.

via Australian, Chinese and European data weaken further and further and…. | The Big Picture.

Australia: ASX 200 threatens breakout

The ASX 200 rallied off support at 4350 and is testing long-term resistance at 4450. Rising troughs on 13-week Twiggs Money Flow indicate buying pressure. Breakout above 4450 would signal a primary up-trend, with an initial target of 4900*. Reversal below the rising trendline remains as likely, because of weakness in the US and Asia, and would suggest another correction.

ASX 200 Index

* Target calculation: 4450 + ( 4450 – 4000 ) = 4900

Garnaut’s bitter pill must be swallowed | | MacroBusiness

Interesting quote from Professor Ross Garnaut in the AFR:

He [Professor Garnaut] said Australia’s terms of trade, or income from exports, would be hit by three “mutually reinforcing negatives” under way in China.

The first was a shift in China’s economy away from a focus on heavy industrial investment and exports, which have driven metals and energy demand. The second was a wave of internal reforms including the move towards lower carbon emissions that would cruel demand for Australian thermal coal. The third was the current “cyclical” downturn that was likely to continue.

“It’s an accident they’re coming all at once, but they are,” Professor Garnaut said

From Leith van Onselen at Garnaut’s bitter pill must be swallowed | | MacroBusiness.

David Murray: Australian government spending on alarming trajectory

David Murray, former Chairman of the Future Fund and former CEO of the Commonwealth Bank warns growing debt-funded entitlement could end with a Europe-style debt crisis.

Hat tip to Unconventional Economist at Macrobusiness.com.au

Obama's economic saviour savaged as Keating lets rip

By Peter Hartcher

In a speech to a closed gathering at the Lowy Institute in Sydney on Thursday, Paul Keating gave a starkly different account of Geithner’s record in handling the Asian crisis: “Tim Geithner was the Treasury line officer who wrote the IMF [International Monetary Fund] program for Indonesia in 1997-98, which was to apply current account solutions to a capital account crisis.” In other words, Geithner fundamentally misdiagnosed the problem. And his misdiagnosis led to a dreadfully wrong prescription.

For the record, Indonesia’s GNP fell 83% by July 1998.

via Obama's economic saviour savaged as Keating lets rip.

Australia: ASX 200 resistance

Last week’s short candle on strong volume indicates the ASX 200 is running into resistance at 4400/4450. Reversal below the rising trendline would suggest another correction.

ASX 200 Index

The hourly chart broke through its rising trendline, and first line of support at 4395/4400, on Monday morning. Retracement that respects resistance at 4400 would  warn of a down-swing to 4250.

ASX 200 Index Hourly

Prepare for the mining bust – House and Holes | macrobusiness.com.au

By Houses and Holes on September 20, 2012

The grey-beards of Australian economics today unite to deliver one enormous wake-up call to the nation, its government, its interests, its media and its people.

Don’t get me wrong, the bucket of cold water is not deserved in equal measures. For mine, the Australian people have been awake to the dangers facing the country since the GFC, hence the community embrace of saving. But the nation’s media and government have existed in a bubble of hubris, forging ahead with yesterday’s policies and arguments as if Australia is immune to global and historic forces.

I am talking about the end of the mining boom, which is nothing more than the march of the GFC to those that have escaped until now, and the persistence of policy settings that assume that the private sector is immune to deleveraging, as well as the failure to plan beyond the next hole in the ground.

Ross Garnaut and Bob Gregory deliver the bad news today via a string of speeches and articles in the [Australian Financial Review]. For those that don’t know, Garnaut is the architect of the open economy policy settings that have delivered 30 years of prosperity and Gregory is the local pioneer of arguments about the effects of Dutch disease. Both are eminent economists.

So what do they have to say? Nothing good.

Garnaut warns of falling living standards:

“I think we’re going to have a very difficult time adapting to the decline in living standards that’s going to be a necessary part of the adjustment to the end of phase one and two of the boom,” he told a conference on the rise of Asia. Professor Garnaut’s warning that the looming economic adjustment would be more painful because governments had not saved enough of the resources boom in budget surpluses came as international ratings agency Standard & Poor’s reaffirmed Australia’s AAA sovereign rating assuming budget cuts continue.

…Professor Garnaut said Australians would not be so anxious about potential risks if governments had saved more of the resources boom since 2003.

…“The time for careful management of a difficult adjustment is the time that lies ahead,” he said.

Meanwhile, Bob Gregory with Peter Sheehan write an opinion piece that endorses the Garnaut position but goes further with proposed solutions:

As the resources boom unwinds over the next few years, Australia will experience a large deflationary impact, primarily driven by the fall in the terms of trade and in resource investment. The production and export of resource commodities will rise as projects are completed, but this will generate few jobs and limited domestic income to offset the terms of trade decline and the falls in mining investment.

Many have argued productivity growth or labour market reform are central issues to be addressed as the resources boom passes. Productivity growth in the long run is particularly important but the key challenge over the next few years lies in addressing the change in the impact of the resources boom from expansionary to deflationary.

Until recently, theory and practice around the world has given primacy to monetary policy in responding to macroeconomic shocks. But, with many economies in the zero interest rate trap, the limits of monetary policy are being realised. Monetary policy cannot be expected to play the central role in addressing the long-term demand shocks Australia faces. The current de facto policy settings – that monetary policy will support the economy in the short-run while fiscal policy is restrictive – contain risks for the longer term.

They go on to argue that the Federal government will need to spend big on infrastructure to support growth and propose a new fund to finance the spending, in part through guaranteeing state debt.

I agree with every word. But there is little hope that those in power do. Treasury Secretary Martin Parkinson responded:

“Because boom implies there’s a bust,” he said. “Where we will end up at the end of this is with mining being a much larger share of a reshaped economy.”

Ironically, this is the very thinking that all but guarantees a bust.

Reproduced with thanks to Houses and Holes at Macrobusiness.com.au