The Dismal Outlook for 2012 | The Big Picture

Dr. Peter T Treadway is principal of Historical Analytics LLC: ~

It is a core view that I have elaborated on in prior letters that democracies with universal suffrage have a long run tendency to spend their way into fiscal bankruptcy and degrade their currencies along the way. Investors have to recognize this phenomenon. The so called advanced West has reached that point of bankruptcy now. Politicians pass measures to please the majority that elected them, regardless of whether the country can afford it or not.

via The Dismal Outlook for 2012 | The Big Picture.

Debt and deleveraging: The global credit bubble and its economic consequences | McKinsey Global Institute

Empirically, a long period of deleveraging nearly always follows a major financial crisis. Deleveraging episodes are painful, lasting six to seven years on average and reducing the ratio of debt to GDP by 25 percent. GDP typically contracts during the first several years and then recovers.

via Debt and deleveraging: The global credit bubble and its economic consequences | McKinsey Global Institute | Financial Markets | McKinsey & Company.

Mark Carney: Growth in the age of deleveraging

Today, American aggregate non-financial debt is at levels similar to those last seen in the midst of the Great Depression. At 250 per cent of GDP, that debt burden is equivalent to almost US$120,000 for every American (Chart 1).

US Debt/GDP 1916 - 2011

…..backsliding on financial reform is not a solution to current problems. The challenge for the crisis economies is the paucity of credit demand rather than the scarcity of its supply. Relaxing prudential regulations would run the risk of maintaining dangerously high leverage – the situation that got us into this mess in the first place.

As a result of deleveraging, the global economy risks entering a prolonged period of deficient demand. If mishandled, it could lead to debt deflation and disorderly defaults, potentially triggering large transfers of wealth and social unrest.

Managing the deleveraging process

Austerity is a necessary condition for rebalancing, but it is seldom sufficient. There are really only three options to reduce debt: restructuring, inflation and growth. Whether we like it or not, debt restructuring may happen. If it is to be done, it is best done quickly. Policy-makers need to be careful about delaying the inevitable and merely funding the private exit.

……Some have suggested that higher inflation may be a way out from the burden of excessive debt. This is a siren call. Moving opportunistically to a higher inflation target would risk unmooring inflation expectations and destroying the hard-won gains of price stability.

…..With no easy way out, the basic challenge for central banks is to maintain price stability in order to help sustain nominal aggregate demand during the period of real adjustment. In the Bank’s view, that is best accomplished through a flexible inflation-targeting framework, applied symmetrically, to guard against both higher inflation and the possibility of deflation.

The most palatable strategy to reduce debt is to increase growth. In today’s reality, the hurdles are significant. Once leverage is high in one sector or region, it is very hard to reduce it without at least temporarily increasing it elsewhere.

In recent years, large fiscal expansions in the crisis economies have helped to sustain aggregate demand in the face of private deleveraging. However, the window for such Augustinian policy is rapidly closing. Few except the United States, by dint of its reserve currency status, can maintain it for much longer.

…..The route to restoring competitiveness [in the euro-zone] is through fiscal and structural reforms. These real adjustments are the responsibility of citizens, firms and governments within the affected countries, not central banks. A sustained process of relative wage adjustment will be necessary, implying large declines in living standards for a period in up to one-third of the euro area.

…..With deleveraging economies under pressure, global growth will require global rebalancing. Creditor nations, mainly emerging markets that have benefited from the debt-fuelled demand boom in advanced economies, must now pick up the baton. This will be hard to accomplish without co-operation. Major advanced economies with deficient demand cannot consolidate their fiscal positions and boost household savings without support from increased foreign demand. Meanwhile, emerging markets, seeing their growth decelerate because of sagging demand in advanced countries, are reluctant to abandon a strategy that has served them so well in the past, and are refusing to let their exchange rates materially adjust. Both sides are doubling down on losing strategies. As the Bank has outlined before, relative to a co-operative solution embodied in the G-20’s Action Plan, the foregone output could be enormous: lower world GDP by more than US$7 trillion within five years. Canada has a big stake in avoiding this outcome.

Mark Carney: Growth in the age of deleveraging.

Comment: ~ One of the most important papers I have read this year. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board — established by the G-20 in 2009 to further global economic governance — maps out the hard road to recovery from the current financial crisis.

The Black Swan of Cairo: How suppressing volatility makes the world less predictable and more dangerous

Complex systems that have artificially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting fluctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artificially constrained systems become prone to “Black Swans” — that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers.

….Preventing small forest fires can cause large forest fires to become devastating. This property is shared by all complex systems. In the realm of economics, price controls are designed to constrain volatility on the grounds that stable prices are a good thing. But although these controls might work in some rare situations, the long-term effect of any such system is an eventual and costly blowup whose cleanup costs can far exceed the benefits accrued.

….Humans simultaneously inhabit two systems: the linear and the complex. The linear domain is characterized by its predictability and the low degree of interaction among its components which allows the use of mathematical methods that make forecasts reliable. In complex systems, there is an absence of visible causal links between the elements, masking a high degree of interdependence and extremely low predictability. Nonlinear elements are also present, such as those commonly known, and generally misunderstood, as “tipping points.” Imagine someone who keeps adding sand to a sand pile without any visible consequence, until suddenly the entire pile crumbles. It would be foolish to blame the collapse on the last grain of sand rather than the structure of the pile, but that is what people do consistently, and that is the policy error.

The Black Swan of Cairo: How suppressing volatility makes the world less predictable and more dangerous
By Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Mark Blyth

Colin Twiggs: ~ This is a must read for those who want a deeper understanding of why complex systems fail and why we are continually blind-sided by unforeseen political and economic events.

Quick Overview

Looks like something positive is brewing in Europe, but I don’t want to jump the gun. China looks weak, US probably through its worst, Europe still faces plenty of pain even if fiscal reform and euro-bonds introduced. Game changer would be QE/asset purchases by Fed and ECB.

The scourge of government debt –

A report on a talk by Yanis Varoufakis, author of The Global Minotaur, gives some nice history of how we got here. The Minotaur is a marvelous metaphor for what governments have allowed to occur in the global financial system. Now they, and all of us, are being skewered by its horns:

“In the immediate post-war era, Varoufakis claims, “the Americans begin to take seriously the redemptive mission to save capitalism from itself.”

But in doing so, against its apocalyptic competition with the Soviet Union, America spread itself too thin. Or too thick. By the time it was funding LBJ’s Great Society reform programme, alongside the dire weight of the Vietnam war effort, America stopped being a surplus nation. It went into deficit.

What followed was a worldwide project to balance everyone else’s books in line with the Americans own – what Paul Volcker, American economist and head of the Federal Reserve from 1979-1987, called the “controlled disintegration of the world economy”…..

Towards the end of his speech, Varoufakis claimed: “The Left and Right miss the significance of this current juncture. It is not terminal for capitalism, but it has ended the conglomeration of illusions in how we viewed the world. It ended the illusion we had that we had something called free market capitalism.”

via The scourge of government debt – |

The Weekend Interview with Peter Brabeck-Letmathe: Can the World Still Feed Itself? –

Recent decades have seen “the creation of more than a billion new consumers in the world who have had the opportunity to move from extreme poverty into what we would call today a moderate middle class,” thanks to economic growth in places like China and India. This means a billion people who have “access to meat” for the first time, Mr. Brabeck-Letmathe [Chairman of Nestle] says.

“And the demand for meat,” he says, “has a multiplier effect of 10. You need 10 times as much land, 10 times as much [feed], 10 times as much water to produce one calorie of meat as you do to have one calorie of vegetables or grain.”

via The Weekend Interview with Peter Brabeck-Letmathe: Can the World Still Feed Itself? –

Polish Economy Defies Europe’s Woes –

Poland’s economy expanded robustly in the second quarter despite slowing growth in the euro zone, outpacing Central European peers more dependent on exports to Germany.

……Much of the strength in Poland’s domestic demand was the result of government spending on infrastructure, supported with European Union subsidies, which more than offset a slight slowdown in the rate of growth in private consumption.

via Polish Economy Defies Europe’s Woes –

The way forward

There were plenty of central bankers and economists with glum faces at Jackson Hole, Wyoming this week as speakers reviewed the challenges ahead. So far the global economy has not responded to various rescue plans, with GDP slowing and national debt rising across a whole slew of economies.

Before we look at the daunting challenges ahead,we should review what has already been achieved. We avoided a global banking collapse, an accompanying deflationary spiral and a depression similar to the 1930s. There have been a few side-effects, but do not underestimate the importance of avoiding a deflationary spiral.

Deflationary Spiral

In times of uncertainty, households and corporates save at higher than normal rates. Savings contribute to economic growth when channeled through the financial system into new investment, but in a financial crisis they are applied to pay down debt, causing a savings-investment mismatch. Any amount saved that is not re-invested in the economy, whether it used to pay down debt or buried in a tin at the bottom of the garden, causes a fall in national income.

If 2% of every trillion dollars earned, for example, is used to repay debt, then people who would have supplied 1 trillion dollars worth of goods and services will only receive $980 billion in income. That doesn’t seem so bad, but if 2% of the reduced income is similarly applied to repay debt, then income available contracts to $960.4 billion. And keeps contracting each time income is recycled. In extreme cases the above scenario could be replayed many times over before the behavior ends, causing a sharp fall in national income. Repetition of the above cycle twenty times, for example, would reduce available income by a third. That is a deflationary spiral. Something to be avoided at all costs.


The proven antidote to deflation is to run a fiscal deficit: government expenditure in excess of revenue helps to offset the savings-investment shortfall. Stimulus programs, however, have been badly managed, with no thought as to how the burgeoning national debt would be repaid. Mountains of national debt were incurred to head off the deflationary spiral, but there is very little to show for it. Deficits spent on school halls, public fountains, checks in the mail and tax cuts offer no means of repayment. Investment in infrastructure projects that offer a market-related return on investment — that can be used to repay the debt over time — have so far been scarce.

The result of a weak fiscal balance sheet is instability. High unemployment, low consumer spending, restricted consumer credit, and a falling housing market are all consequences of increased uncertainty.

Also, private capital investment remains scarce despite super-low interest rates and cashed up corporate balance sheets. For the same reason that cashed up banks are not lending to small business: uncertainty. Both banks and business face an unpredictable environment, with the possibility of further falls in employment and consumer spending, restricted consumer credit, a falling housing market, unsustainably low interest rates, and the threat of increased taxes. Uncertainty equals risk, and any CEO worth his/her salt would scale back on expansion plans until they have a clearer picture of what the future holds.

Unemployment will remain high and GDP growth low until capital investment is restored. The problem is: how?

Possible solutions

The answer may sound simplistic, but we need to reduce uncertainty to provide business with a stable foundation on which to plan future investment. There are four possible solutions, but none of them are pretty.

The first is austerity: cutting government expenditure to match revenues. Austerity is important but on its own is likely to deliver even lower growth than at present — and risks a deflationary spiral. Cutting government expenditure while private savings are being used to pay down debt, without an equivalent cut in tax revenues, would court disaster.

Raising taxes is another popular option: getting everyone to pay their fair share. Though the notion of fair share varies widely depending on who the speaker is — and who pays their campaign contributions. Revising the tax code to achieve a more equitable distribution of the tax burden may contribute to long-term stability — a fair tax system is more likely to stand the test of time — but increasing tax revenues to repay national debt would also risk a deflationary spiral.

A third solution is massive public works programs similar to those undertaken by China during the GFC. Infrastructure projects directly stimulate local business and increase employment while also delivering savings in unemployment benefits. Government infrastructure investment, however, has a checkered history. Cost overruns and failure to meet revenue projections make private sector funding difficult to obtain. And government funding would further increase the national debt.

The fourth option, a soft default on existing debt, through inflation, is obviously tempting. Debasing the currency by selling Treasurys directly to the Fed, for example, would:

  • Reduce national debt in real terms;
  • Create a surge in investment demand for real assets as a protection against inflation — lifting stock prices and the housing market;
  • Bail out the banks, who are threatened by shrinking housing prices; and
  • Give currency manipulators a sizable haircut on their existing Treasury investments and discourage further “pegging” against the dollar. China and Japan collectively hold more than $2 trillion in US Treasurys (Washington Post), accumulated to suppress appreciation of their currencies against the greenback and create a trade advantage.

An unwelcome result, however, would be a massive spike in inflation. At some point the Fed would have to raise interest rates sharply, effectively slamming the economy into reverse, in order to cure inflationary expectations. So we could defer the recession for now, in the hope that the economy is on a sounder footing when it re-visits us later.

The way forward

While each of the options has their downside, a combination of the first three seems to offer the best solution. Funding infrastructure investment through a combination of private sector funding, austerity cuts and increased taxes could avoid the  risk of a deflationary spiral, with minimal increase in the national debt. It would also facilitate direct channeling of private savings into investment, reduce wasteful government expenditure (through an austerity drive) and could be used to justify a more equitable distribution of the tax burden (if we all benefit we should all expect to pay).

The fourth option, a soft default through inflation, should be seen as a last resort. And is probably why QE3 was not put forward at Jackson Hole last week. Once you awaken the (inflation) dragon, he can prove difficult to slay.