Market Monetarism – The next big idea? | Quartz

Miles Kimball, Professor of Economics and Survey Research at the University of Michigan, gives a clear summary of Market Monetarism — its strengths and its weaknesses — concluding with these remarks:

Despite the differences I have with the market monetarists, I am impressed with what they have gotten right in clarifying the confusing and disheartening economic situation we have faced ever since the financial crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. If market monetarists had been at the helm of central banks around the world at that time, we might have avoided the worst of the worldwide Great Recession. If the Fed and other central banks learn from them, but take what the market monetarists say with a grain of salt, the Fed can not only pull us out of the lingering after-effects of the Great Recession more quickly, but also better avoid or better tame future recessions as well.

May 21, 2013

Carney Warns Europe Faces Decade of Stagnation Without Key Reforms | WSJ

Nirmala Menon at WSJ quotes Mark Carney, incoming governor of the Bank of England:

Mr. Carney, currently Canada’s top central banker, said Europe can draw lessons from Japan on the dangers of taking half measures……..“Deep challenges persist in its financial system. Without sustained and significant reforms, a decade of stagnation threatens,” Mr. Carney said in his final public address as governor of the Bank of Canada.

May 12, 2013

The monetary policy revolution

James Alexander, head of Equity Research at UK-based M&G Equities, sums up the evolution of central bank thinking. He describes the traditional problem of inadequate response by central banks to market shocks like the collapse of Lehman Brothers:

Although wages hold steady when nominal income falls, unemployment tends to rise as companies scramble to cut costs. In the wake of the crash, rising joblessness created a vicious circle of declining consumption and investment that proved very difficult to reverse, particularly as central banks remained preoccupied with inflation.

Failure of both austerity and quantitative easing has left central bankers looking for new alternatives:

…..Economist Michael Woodford presented a paper [at Jackson Hole last August] suggesting that the US Federal Reserve (Fed) should give markets and businesses a bigger steer about where the economy was headed by adopting a nominal economic growth target. In September, the Fed announced its third round of QE, which it has indicated will continue until unemployment falls below 6.5% – the first time US monetary policy has been explicitly tied to an unemployment rate. US stocks have since soared, shrugging off continued inaction surrounding the country’s ongoing debt crisis.

While targeting unemployment is preferable to targeting inflation, it is still a subjective measure that can be influenced by rises or falls in labor participation rates and exclusion of casual workers seeking full-time employment. Market Monetarists such as Scott Sumner and Lars Christensen advocate targeting nominal GDP growth instead — a hard, objective number that can be forecast with greater accuracy. Mark Carney, due to take over as governor of the BOE in July, seems to be on a similar path:

Echoing Michael Woodford’s comments at Jackson Hole, he advocated dropping inflation targets if economies were struggling to grow. He has since proposed easing UK monetary policy, adopting a nominal growth target and boosting recovery by convincing households and businesses that rates will remain low until growth resumes.

While NGDP targeting has been criticized as a “recipe for runaway inflation”, experiences so far have not borne this out. In fact NGDP targeting would have the opposite effect when growth has resumed, curbing inflation and credit growth and preventing a repeat of recent housing and stock bubbles.

April 26, 2013

What Europe could learn from Scandinavia in the 1920s | Lars Christensen

Danish and Norwegian monetary policy failure in 1920s – lessons for today

Reproduced with kind permission from Lars Christensen at The Market Monetarist:

History is fully of examples of massive monetary policy failure and today’s policy makers can learn a lot from studying these events and no one is better to learn from than Swedish monetary guru Gustav Cassel. In the 1920s Cassel tried – unfortunately without luck – to advise Danish and Norwegian policy makers from making a massive monetary policy mistake.

After the First World War policy makers across Europe wanted to return to the gold standard and in many countries it became official policy to return to the pre-war gold parity despite massive inflation during the war. This was also the case in Denmark and Norway where policy makers decided to return the Norwegian and the Danish krone to the pre-war parity.

The decision to bring back the currencies to the pre-war gold-parity brought massive economic and social hardship to Denmark and Norway in the 1920s and probably also killed of the traditionally strong support for laissez faire capitalism in the two countries. Paradoxically one can say that government failure opened the door for a massive expansion of the role of government in both countries’ economies. No one understood the political dangers of monetary policy failure better than Gustav Cassel.

Here you see the impact of the Price Level (Index 1924=100) of the deflation policies in Denmark and Norway. Sweden did not go back to pre-war gold-parity.

While most of the world was enjoying relatively high growth in the second half of the 1920s the Danish and the Norwegian authorities brought hardship to their nations through a deliberate policy of deflation. As a result both nations saw a sharp rise in unemployment and a steep decline in economic activity. So when anybody tells you about how a country can go through “internal devaluation” please remind them of the Denmark and Norway in the 1920s. The polices were hardly successful, but despite the clear negative consequences policy makers and many economists in the Denmark and Norway insisted that it was the right policy to return to the pre-war gold-parity.

Here is what happened to unemployment (%).

Nobody listened to Cassel. As a result both the Danish and the Norwegian economies went into depression in the second half of the 1920s and unemployment skyrocketed. At the same time Finland and Sweden – which did not return to the pre-war gold-partiy – enjoyed strong post-war growth and low unemployment.

Gustav Cassel strongly warned against this policy as he today would have warned against the calls for “internal devaluation” in the euro zone. In 1924 Cassel at a speech in the Student Union in Copenhagen strongly advocated a devaluation of the Danish krone. The Danish central bank was not exactly pleased with Cassel’s message. However, the Danish central bank really had little to fear. Cassel’s message was overshadowed by the popular demand for what was called “Our old, honest krone”.

To force the policy of revaluation and return to the old gold-parity the Danish central bank tightened monetary policy dramatically and the bank’s discount rate was hiked to 7% (this is more or less today’s level for Spanish bond yields). From 1924 to 1924 to 1927 both the Norwegian and the Danish krone were basically doubled in value against gold by deliberate actions of the two Scandinavian nation’s central bank.

The gold-insanity was as widespread in Norway as in Denmark and also here Cassel was a lone voice of sanity. In a speech in Christiania (today’s Oslo) Cassel in November 1923 warned against the foolish idea of returning the Norwegian krone to the pre-war parity. The speech deeply upset Norwegian central bank governor Nicolai Rygg who was present at Cassel’s speech.

After Cassel’s speech Rygg rose and told the audience that the Norwegian krone had been brought back to parity a 100 years before and that it could and should be done again. He said: “We must and we will go back and we will not give up”. Next day the Norwegian Prime Minister Abraham Berge in an public interview gave his full support to Rygg’s statement. It was clear the Norwegian central bank and the Norwegian government were determined to return to the pre-war gold-parity.

This is the impact on the real GDP level of the gold-insanity in Denmark and Norway. Sweden did not suffer from gold-insanity and grew nicely in the 1920s.

The lack of reason among Danish and Norwegian central bankers in the 1920s is a reminder what happens once the “project” – whether the euro or the gold standard – becomes more important than economic reason and it shows that countries will suffer dire economic, social and political consequences when they are forced through “internal devaluation”. In both Denmark and Norway the deflation of the 1920s strengthened the Socialists parties and both the Norwegian and the Danish economies as a consequence moved away from the otherwise successful laissez faire model. That should be a reminder to any free market oriented commentators, policy makers and economists that a deliberate attempt of forcing countries through internal devaluation is likely to bring more socialism and less free markets. Gustav Cassel knew that – as do the Market Monetarists today.

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My account of these events is based on Richard Lester’s paper “Gold-Parity Depression in Denmark and Norway, 1925-1928″ (Journal of Political Economy, August 1937)

March 4, 2013

Rate cuts: Short-term benefit, long-term pain

Shane Oliver at AMP recently tweeted:

Why rate cuts help household spending: 1/ Aust hholds have approx $750bn in deposits but $1700bn in debt….

…so a 1% rate cuts makes depositors $7.5bn worse off, but borrowers $17bn better off. The net gain for households is $9.5b !

Reason #2 as to why rate cuts help. Depositors r less likely to change spending on rate changes than borrowers (families with mortgage)

He is right that rate cuts stimulate household spending, but that is not the only consideration. Rate cuts also stimulate borrowing and expansion of the money supply — leading to asset bubbles and inflation. They further force savers/investors to take greater risks in the scramble for yield, leaving them exposed if the bubble collapses. If only we could let market forces of credit supply and demand determine the rate — and resist the urge to tinker.

November 24, 2012

The “Export Price Norm” saved Australia from the Great Recession « The Market Monetarist

The Market Monetarist writes how a combination of luck and good policy saved Australia from recession.

Milton Friedman once said never to underestimate the importance of luck of nations. I believe that is very true and I think the same goes for central banks. Some nations came through the shock in 2008-9 much better than other nations and obviously better policy and particularly better monetary policy played a key role. However, luck certainly also played a role…..

via The “Export Price Norm” saved Australia from the Great Recession « The Market Monetarist.

November 16, 2012

Fed monetary policy

I read this excerpt from a speech by Ben Bernanke in September (courtesy of Cullen Roche):

The tools we have involve effecting financial asset prices. Those are the tools of monetary policy. There are a number of different channels. Mortgage rates, other interest rates, corporate bond rates. Also the prices of various assets. For example, the prices of homes. To the extent that the prices of homes begin to rise, consumers will feel wealthier, they’ll begin to feel more disposed to spend. If home prices are rising they may feel more may be more willing to buy home because they think they’ll make a better return on that purchase. So house prices is one vehicle. Stock prices – many people own stocks directly or indirectly. The issue here is whether improving asset prices will make people more willing to spend. One of the main concerns that firms have is that there is not enough demand… if people feel their financial position is better… they’ll be more likely to spend, and that’s going to provide the demand firms need in order to be willing to hire and to invest.

It stopped me in my tracks. Here is why:

The Fed Chairman avoids stating the obvious: there is only one aim of monetary policy: to increase or decrease the amount of debt in the economy. Their tools are designed to encourage people to borrow more — or occasionally less, when the results of their earlier policy materialize.
Raising prices to increase demand? Raising home prices is unlikely to clear inventories of unsold homes or stimulate the construction industry.
What Bernanke is referring to is known as the “wealth effect” — raising asset prices by lowering interest rates stimulates spending. The “wealth illusion” would be a more appropriate name.
Rising asset prices make people more willing to spend. He is 100% correct here. But he fails to mention the resulting asset bubble that follows. Low interest rates and rising prices feed speculation….. which lead to higher prices and more speculation….. which lead to a self-reinforcing spiral.

Economics is not a hard science like engineering or physics, where one can accurately gauge outcomes. It is a soft science, like psychology, and many practitioners with competing theories as to how to treat the patient. With spectacular failure rates. Theory after theory is consigned to the waste basket as we struggle to understand the human condition.

November 13, 2012

Richard Fisher | Politicians need to get their act together

Texas Fed President, Richard Fisher believes fiscal authorities need to get their act together. “There is a limit to what we can do. We can’t have a Buzz Lightyear monetary policy: to infinity and beyond.”

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Fisher’s frustration with Washington is hard to miss:

“We have to completely reboot tax policy. We need to completely reboot spending policy……..This is all about job creation…..We have to build confidence in the business community, who are the job creators. And until we give them some clarity, they are just going to hold back. If we have temporary fixes to the fiscal cliff this just pushes out the envelope of indecision…… Just get the job done. Give the business community and those who employ people — the private sector — a sense of direction and confidence. Right now they know nothing. They don’t know what their taxes are going to be. They don’t know what spending patterns are going to be. They don’t know what the costs of these massive regulatory initiatives are going to be…. No business can plan right now…..”

November 6, 2012

Is the Fed finally listening to Scott Sumner?

Brendan Greely writes of Scott Sumner.

Sumner who holds a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, made a suggestion in the late 1980s to the New York Federal Reserve. He proposed that the Fed set a target for nominal GDP—real growth in GDP plus the rate of inflation. He felt that this would induce the correct level of business investment better than targeting either inflation or growth in real GDP by themselves. The response at the New York Fed, says Sumner, was, “Thanks, but no thanks.”

Targeting nominal GDP (NGDP) growth eliminates reliance on inexact measures of inflation which can mis-direct monetary policy. The advantage is that NGDP can be accurately measured. NGDP targeting would help to eliminate bubbles in the long term by restricting debt growth. And in the short-term would encourage the Fed to expand money supply in response to private sector deleveraging, avoiding deflationary pressure.

The announcement by the Fed’s rate-setting committee in mid-September doesn’t contain any mention of targeting nominal GDP. But its open-ended nature and clear goals—pump up the money supply until hiring rises strongly—resembles Sumner’s nominal GDP model, which would have a central bank do all in its power to achieve an agreed-upon nominal rate of growth.

It has taken Sumner almost 3 decades, but in the end he is likely to get there.

via The Blog That Got Bernanke to Go Big – Businessweek.

November 5, 2012

Bank of England should leave forecasting to Ladbrokes « The Market Monetarist

The Market Monetarist makes a novel suggestion as to how to avoid central banks from making biased forecasts:

“…..even better as I have suggested numerous times that the central bank simply set-up a prediction market. In Britain that would be extremely easy – I don’t think there is a country in the world with so many bookmakers. The Bank of England could simply ask a company like Ladbrokes or a similar company to set-up betting markets for key macro economic variables – such as inflation and nominal GDP. It would be extremely cheap and the forecast created from such prediction market would likely be at least as good as what is presently produced by the otherwise clever staff at the BoE.”

That could work …..until punters learn that the bets they place indirectly influence central bank monetary policy. It might pay market participants to place large bets on low or high inflation if they stand to benefit from the central bank response.

via Bank of England should leave forecasting to Ladbrokes « The Market Monetarist.