Iron ore: Only question now is how rapid the fall | MINING.com

From Frik Els:

According to Platts Mineral Value Service, a Munich-based iron ore and steel research company, domestic iron ore’s contribution to the Chinese steel market has declined from 36% of market share in 2010 to around 22% in 2015.

Domestic iron ore output from an industry plagued by fragmentation, high costs and low grades (only around 20% Fe) has halved since 2013 and may dip below 200 million tonnes Fe 62% equivalent this year…..

Even if more Chinese mines shut down and the shift to seaborne ore continues, the seaborne market is not exactly short of tonnage. All-in-all new seaborne supply set to increase by approximately 245 million tonnes by end of 2018 according to Platts MVS.

The big three – Vale, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton – last week lowered future production guidance, but the aggregate 35 million tonnes in possible lost production hardly changes the oversupply picture and the giants would still hit actual annual output records even at these lowered levels. Citigroup’s analysts expect around an additional 75 million tonnes of iron ore this year to be shipped out of Australia, more than a third of which would come from Roy Hill. The Gina Rinehart mine has brought forward ramp-up plans and now expects to be producing at full annualized capacity of 55 million tonnes by the end of this year. Later this year, Rio’s board is likely to give the go-ahead to build Silvergrass which would add another 20 million tonnes of high-grade, low cost ore to the company’s Pilbara output.

Source: Iron ore price: Only question now is how rapid the fall | MINING.com

The future of Chinese steel | MacroBusiness

Chinese Steel

From Andrew Batson’s interview with Cai Rang, chairman of the China Iron & Steel Research Institute Group:

China’s current steel production capacity is 1.2 billion tons, but domestic demand cannot completely absorb this capacity. In 2015 China exported about 100 million tons of steel products; this was a relief for domestic capacity but a shock to the international market. Already nine European countries have made antidumping complaints, and Japan, Korea and India have also complained. This shows that our country’s current steel production capacity is not sustainable, and must be genuinely reduced.

Now the relevant departments are drafting the 13th five-year plan for the iron and steel industry, and the preliminary plan is to first cut 200 million tons, and eventually stabilize steel capacity around 700 million tons.

How will a 40 percent cut in Chinese steel production impact on Australian iron ore exports? Not well, I suspect.

Source: The future of Chinese steel – MacroBusiness

Sigh…no, iron ore has not bottomed | MacroBusiness

From David Llewellyn-Smith:

…..restocking is the only thing going on here, enhanced by recent Chinese stimulus. It will pass in due course leaving enormous oversupply and far too large Chinese inventories.

….Not only is iron ore going below $30, it’s going below $20 soon enough. This year we’ll see more supply from Minas Rio, Sino, Roy Hill, India and Vale as Chinese demand falls sharply with a swing in the market of 100mt towards greater surplus.

Source: Sigh…no, iron ore has not bottomed – MacroBusiness

China: Cement Production

Lowest cement production in more than 10 years reflects the decline in infrastructure investment. Not good news for Australian resources stocks. Where cement production goes, iron ore and coal are likely to follow.

Goldman describes Australia’s lost decade | Macrobusiness

Posted by Houses and Holes. Reproduced with kind permission from Macrobusiness.

Goldman’s Tim Toohey has quantified the unwinding commodity super-cycle for ‘Straya’:

Lower commodity prices risk $0.5trn in forgone earnings
The outlook for revenues from Australian LNG and bulk commodities shipments – which account for almost half of total export earnings – has deteriorated significantly. To be clear, overall revenues are still forecast to increase substantially over the coming years – underpinned by a broadly unchanged strong outlook for physical shipments (particularly for LNG). However, in a nominal sense, the outlook is far less positive than before. This owes to a structurally weaker price environment, with GS downgrades of 18% to 25% to key long term price forecasts for LNG and bulk commodities suggesting that cumulative earnings over the years to 2025 are on track to be ~$0.5trn lower than previously forecast.

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… and will erode Australia’s trade/fiscal positions
The deterioration in the earnings environment naturally has direct implications for Australia’s international trade and fiscal positions. On the former, a return to surplus by CY18 no longer looks feasible, and we now expect a deficit of ~$15bn. On the latter, relative to the 2014 Commonwealth Budget, we estimate that weaker commodity prices will cause a ~$40bn shortfall in tax revenues over the next four years. Given our expectation that Australia’s LNG sector will deliver no additional PRRT revenues over the coming decade, and the ~$18bn downgrade to commodity-related tax in the December MYEFO, we therefore see a risk of further material revenue downgrades at May’s 2015 Budget.

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Resulting in changed GDP, RBA cash rate and FX forecasts
Although the commodity export changes mainly manifest through the nominal economy, there are significant impacts back through to the real economy. Lower export earnings result in lower profits, lower tax receipts, lower investment and lower employment. We continue to expect just 2.0% GDP growth in 2015 but have lowered our 2016 to 2018 real GDP forecasts by an average of 50ppts in each calendar year. As a consequence, we have moved forward the timing of the next RBA rate cut to May 2015, where we see the cash rate remaining at 2.0% until Q416, where we expect a 25bp hike. We now expect just 75bps of hikes in 2017 to 3.0% and rates on hold  in 2018. Despite the recent move in the A$ towards our 75c 12 month target, the reassessment of the medium term forecast outlook argues for a new lower target 12 month target of 72c.

OK, that’s quite a piece of work and congratulations to Tim Toohey for getting so far ahead of pack. I have just two points to add.

The LNG forecasts look good but as gloomy as his iron ore outlook is, it is not gloomy enough. $40 is a more reasonable price projection for 2016-18 and we’ll only climb out of that very slowly. That makes the dollar and interest rate forecasts far too bullish and hawkish.

Second, even after these downgrades, Mr Toohey still has growth of 3.25% GDP penned in for 2016 and 3.5% for 2017. We’ll have strong net exports and is about it. With the capex unwind running right through both years, housing construction to stop adding to growth by next year, the car industry wind-down at the same time, political strife destroying the public infrastructure pipeline, the terms of trade crashing throughout and households battered half to death by all of it, those targets are of the stretch variety, to say the least.

The analysis is exceptional, The conclusions, sadly, overly optimistic.

Correlation Breakdown as Proxies for Risk Boost Aussie, Kiwi – Bloomberg

The strength of the Aussie is increasingly driven by reasons other than raw materials as growth slows for exports to China, its largest trading partner. Prices for iron ore delivered to the port of Tianjin have dropped to the lowest level since December 2009, according to Steel Index Ltd., and contracts for coal used to make steel may fall 11 percent to the lowest price in two years, according to a Bloomberg survey of seven analysts and industry officials.

via Correlation Breakdown as Proxies for Risk Boost Aussie, Kiwi – Bloomberg.

The China-driven commodities super-cycle debate: Nomura edition

Nomura: We have performed a detailed analysis of metal intensity of GDP for steel, copper and aluminium in the following pages, which we believe clearly outlines our view that China’s economy is not large enough (in GDP terms) to support a continuation of the rapid growth in metal consumption seen in 2000-11.

Our conclusions are based on an analysis of China’s metal intensity of GDP rather than metal consumption per capita, and reflect a simple premise that while a country’s population size may be an important indicator of a country’s potential demand for industrial metals (per capita), the ability to meet potential demand is determined by the quantity of metal consumed in relation to the size of economic output (ie, GDP, not GDP per capita). Hence, in our view, metal intensity of GDP is a more important variable to monitor than per capita metal consumption.

Zarathustra: The reason is that, according to Nomura, the per-capita analysis ignores the composition of China’s GDP growth. China’s investment driven growth is very metal intensive.

via The China-driven commodities super-cycle debate: Nomura edition.