A Growth Pact for America by Glenn Hubbard | Project Syndicate

Glenn Hubbard, former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President George W. Bush, and Dean of Columbia Business School proposes:

….two policies are particularly promising for such a “Pact for America”: federal infrastructure spending and corporate-tax reform. Enactment of these reforms would generate a win for each side – and for both.

But such a bipartisan consensus requires removing both the left and the right’s ideological blinders, at least temporarily. On the left, a preoccupation with Keynesian stimulus reflects a misunderstanding of both the availability of measures shovel-ready projects and their desirability whether they will meaningfully change the expectations of households and businesses. Indeed, to counteract the mindset forged in the recent financial crisis, spending measures will need to be longer-lasting if they are to raise expectations of future growth and thus stimulate current investment and hiring.

The right, for its part, must rethink its obsession with temporary tax cuts for households or businesses. The impact of such cuts on aggregate demand is almost always modest, and they are poorly suited for shifting expectations for recovery and growth in the post-financial-crisis downturn….

Read more at A Growth Pact for America by Glenn Hubbard – Project Syndicate.

Full Employment and the Path to Shared Prosperity | Dissent

Great summary of the current political gridlock by Dean Baker and Jared Bernstein:

There are many policies that can reduce inequality, but there is none as straightforward conceptually and as difficult politically as full employment. The basic point is simple: at low rates of unemployment, the demand for labor allows workers at the middle and bottom of the wage distribution to achieve gains in hourly wages, annual hours of work, and thus income.

Levels of unemployment are not the gift or curse of the gods; they are the result of conscious economic policy. The decision to tolerate high rates of unemployment is a choice. It is one that has enormous implications not just for the millions of people who are needlessly unemployed or underemployed but also for tens of millions of workers in the bottom half of the wage distribution whose bargaining power is undermined by high unemployment.

It is pretty obvious that low unemployment would enhance wage growth amongst middle- and low-income workers. But the policies to create low unemployment are not as clear:

  • Raising inflation to lower real interest rates would not get strong support in many quarters. It would seem that you are manipulating market signals to dupe business investors to act in a fashion that may not be in their long-term best interest.
  • Infrastructure spending is the key to a sound recovery, but beware of raising public debt to fund anything other than productive assets that can generate a market-related return (to service the debt).
  • The trade deficit is a big part of any solution. We need to penalize currency manipulators like China (Japan before them) for buying US Treasurys to suppress their exchange rate and undermine US manufacturers.
  • Job sharing is not a long-term solution, but it does enable unemployed workers to retain skills that would otherwise be lost.
  • Overall, an excellent summary of what needs to be done. But it omits one vital piece of the puzzle. How do we get politicians and interest groups to act in the best interest of the country rather than their own?

    Read more at Full Employment and the Path to Shared Prosperity | Dissent Magazine.

Full Employment and the Path to Shared Prosperity | Dissent

Great summary of the current political gridlock by Dean Baker and Jared Bernstein:

There are many policies that can reduce inequality, but there is none as straightforward conceptually and as difficult politically as full employment. The basic point is simple: at low rates of unemployment, the demand for labor allows workers at the middle and bottom of the wage distribution to achieve gains in hourly wages, annual hours of work, and thus income.

Levels of unemployment are not the gift or curse of the gods; they are the result of conscious economic policy. The decision to tolerate high rates of unemployment is a choice. It is one that has enormous implications not just for the millions of people who are needlessly unemployed or underemployed but also for tens of millions of workers in the bottom half of the wage distribution whose bargaining power is undermined by high unemployment.

It is pretty obvious that low unemployment would enhance wage growth amongst middle- and low-income workers. But the policies to create low unemployment are not as clear:

  • Raising inflation to lift real interest rates would not get strong support in many quarters. It would seem that you are manipulating market signals to dupe business investors to act in a fashion that may not be in their long-term best interest.
  • Infrastructure spending is the key to a sound recovery, but beware of raising public debt to fund anything other than productive assets that can generate a market-related return (to service the debt).
  • The trade deficit is a big part of any solution. We need to penalize currency manipulators like China (Japan before them) for buying US Treasurys to suppress their exchange rate.
  • Job sharing is not a long-term solution, but it does enable unemployed workers to retain skills that would otherwise be lost.
  • Overall, an excellent summary of what needs to be done. But it omits one vital piece of the puzzle. How do we get politicians and interest groups to act in the best interest of the country rather than their own?

    Read more at Full Employment and the Path to Shared Prosperity | Dissent Magazine.

What is Modern Monetary Theory, or “MMT”? | naked capitalism

Dale Pierce makes this comment when discussing make-work programs in his introduction to Modern Monetary Theory:

Whether the job-guarantee program makes fighter planes or wind turbines makes no economic difference – the workers employed by it will spend their wages on the same things other workers buy.

What he fails to consider is that wind turbines make an on-going contribution to GDP — from the electricity that they generate — while creating jobs at zero cost to the taxpayer to maintain the turbines. Fighter jets when built, on the other hand, make no further contribution to GDP growth and are a continual drain on the taxpayer’s purse for running and maintenance costs. While I support government or public/private infrastructure programs, we have to ensure that the investment is in productive assets that contribute to GDP and enhance future growth. Otherwise we may as well pay people to dig holes in the ground and then pay others to fill them in — at least the on-going maintenance costs would be low.
Read more at What is Modern Monetary Theory, or “MMT”? « naked capitalism.

China: Why the Recovery Has Begun | PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM

A bullish outlook on China from Citi Research:

The key drivers of growth recovery are that de-stocking is near its end, the hard landing risk of the property sector is contained, and investment, consumption and exports had shown signs of improvement in June. In our view, given more policy supports in the near term, 3Q GDP growth will likely be flattish…….the planned Rmb360bn infrastructure investment will be fully implemented.

via China: Why the Recovery Has Begun | PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM.

When Austerity Fails

Austerity decimated Asian economies during their 1997/98 financial crisis and similar measures have failed to rescue the PIIGS in Europe 2012. David Cameron’s austerity measures have also not saved the UK from falling back into recession. So why is Wayne Swan in Australia so proud of his balanced budget? And why does Barack Obama threaten the wealthy with increased taxes while the GOP advocate spending cuts in order to reduce the US deficit? Are we condemned to follow Europe into a deflationary spiral?

How Did We Get Here?

First, let’s examine the causes of the current financial crisis.

Government deficits have been around for centuries. States would borrow in order to finance wars but were then left with the problem of repayment. Countries frequently defaulted, but this created difficulties in accessing further finance; so governments resorted to debasing their currencies. Initially they substituted coins with a lower metal content for the original issue. Then introduction of fiat currencies — with no right of conversion to an underlying gold/silver standard — made debasement a lot easier. Issuing more paper currency simply reduced the value of each note in circulation. Advent of the digital age made debasement still easier, with transfer of balances between electronic accounts largely replacing paper money. Fiscal deficits, previously confined to wars, became regular government policy; employed as a stealth tax and redistributed in the form of welfare benefits to large voting blocks.

Along with fiscal deficits came easy monetary policy — also known as debt expansion. Lower interest rates fueled greater demand for debt, which bankers, with assistance from the central bank, were only too willing to accommodate. I will not go into a lengthy exposition of how banks create money, but banks expand their balance sheets by lending money they do not have, confident in the knowledge that recipients will deposit the proceeds back in the banking system — which is then used to fund the original loan. Expanding bank balance sheets inject new money into the system, debasing the currency as effectively as if they were running a printing press in the basement.

The combination of rising prices and low interest rates is a heady mix investors cannot resist, leading to speculative bubbles in real estate or stocks. So why do governments encourage debt expansion? Because (A) it creates a temporary high — a false sense of well-being before inflation takes hold; and (B) it debases the currency, inflating tax revenues while reducing the real value of government debt.

Continuous government deficits and debt expansion via the financial sector have brought us to the edge of the precipice. The problem is: finding a way back — none of the solutions seem to work.

Austerity

Slashing government spending, cutting back on investment programs, and raising taxes in order to reduce the fiscal deficit may appear a logical response to the crisis. Reversing policies that caused the problem will reduce their eventual impact, but you have to do that before the financial crisis — not after. With bank credit contracting and aggregate demand shrinking, it is too late to throw the engine into reverse — you are already going backwards. The economy is already slowing. Rather than reducing harmful side-effects, austerity applied at the wrong time will simply amplify them.

The 1997 Asian Crisis

We are repeating the mistakes of the 1997/98 Asian crisis. Joseph Stiglitz, at the time chief economist at the World Bank, warned the IMF of the perils of austerity measures imposed on recipients of IMF support. He was politely ignored. By July 1998, 13 months after the start of the crisis, GNP had fallen by 83 percent in Indonesia and between 30 and 40 percent in other recipients of IMF “assistance”. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and the Phillipines reduced government deficits, allowed insolvent banks to fail, and raised interest rates in response to IMF demands. Currency devaluations, waves of bankruptcies, real estate busts, collapse of entire industries and soaring unemployment followed — leading to social unrest. Contracting bank lending without compensatory fiscal deficits led to a deflationary spiral, while raising interest rates failed to protect currencies from devaluation.

The same failed policies are being pursued today, simply because continuing fiscal deficits and ballooning public debt are a frightening alternative.

The Lesser of Two Evils

At some point political leaders are going to realize the futility of further austerity measures and resort to the hair of the dog that bit them. Bond markets are likely to resist further increases in public debt and deficits would have to be funded directly or indirectly by the central bank/Federal Reserve. Inflation would rise. Effectively the government is printing fresh new dollar bills with nothing to back them.

The short-term payoff would be fourfold. Rising inflation increases tax revenues while at the same time decreasing the value of public debt in real terms. Real estate values rise, restoring many underwater mortgages to solvency, and rescuing banks threatened by falling house prices. Finally, inflation would discourage currency manipulation. Asian exporters who keep their currencies at artificially low values, by purchasing $trillions of US treasuries to offset the current account imbalance, will suffer a capital loss on their investments.

The long-term costs — inflation, speculative bubbles and financial crises — are likely to be out-weighed by the short-term benefits when it comes to counting votes. Even rising national debt would to some extent be offset by rising nominal GDP, stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio. And if deficits are used to fund productive infrastructure, rather than squandered on public fountains and bridges-to-nowhere, that will further enhance GDP growth while ensuring that the state has real assets to show for the debt incurred.

Not “If” but “When”

Faced with the failure of austerity measures, governments are likely to abandon them and resort to the printing press — fiscal deficits and quantitative easing. It is more a case of “when” rather than “if”. Successful traders/investors will need to allow for this in their strategies, timing their purchases to take advantage of the shift.

The path to recovery: how to bring the debt binge under control

The debt binge since 1975, fueled by an easy-money policy from the Fed, has landed the US economy in serious difficulties. Wall Street no doubt lobbied hard for debt expansion, because of the boost to interest margins, with little thought as to their own vulnerability. There can be no justification for debt to expand at a faster rate than GDP — a rising Debt to GDP ratio — as this feeds through into the money supply, causing asset (real estate and stocks) and/or consumer prices to balloon. What we see here is clear evidence of financial mismanagement of the US economy over several decades: the graph of debt to GDP should be a flat line.

US Domestic and Private Non-Financial Debt as Percentage of GDP

The difference between domestic and private (non-financial) debt is public debt, comprising federal, state and municipal borrowings. When we look at aggregate debt below, domestic (non-financial) debt is still rising, albeit at a slower pace than the 8.2 percent average of the previous 5 years (2004 to 2008). Public debt is ballooning in an attempt to mitigate the deflationary effect of a private debt contraction. Clearly this is an unsustainable path.

US Domestic and Private Non-Financial Debt

The economy has grown addicted to debt and any attempt to go “cold turkey” — cutting off further debt expansion — will cause pain. But there are steps that can be taken to alleviate this.

Public Debt and Infrastructure Investment

If private debt contracts, you need to expand public debt — by running a deficit — in order to counteract the deflationary effect of the contraction. The present path expands public debt rapidly in an attempt to not only offset the shrinkage in private debt levels but also to continue the expansion of overall (domestic non-financial) debt levels. This is short-sighted. You can’t borrow your way out of trouble. And encouraging the private sector to take on more debt would be asking for a repeat of the GFC. The private sector needs to deleverage but how can this be done without causing a total economic collapse? The answer lies in government spending.

Treasury cannot afford to borrow more money if this is used to meet normal government expenditure. Public debt as a percentage of GDP would sky-rocket, further destabilizing the economy. If the proceeds are invested in infrastructure projects, however, that earn a market-related return on investment — whether they be high-speed rail, toll roads or bridges, automated port facilities, airport upgrades, national broadband networks or oil pipelines — there are at least four benefits. First is the boost to employment during the construction phase, not only on the project itself but in related industries that supply equipment and materials. Second is the saving in unemployment benefits as employment is lifted. Third, the fiscal balance sheet is strengthened by addition of saleable, income-producing assets, reducing the net public debt. Lastly, and most importantly, GDP is boosted by revenues from the completed project — lowering the public debt to GDP ratio.

Public debt would still rise, and bond market funding in the current climate may not be reliable. But this is the one time that Treasury purchases (QE) by the Fed would not cause inflation. Simply because the inflationary effect of asset purchases are offset by the deflationary effect of private debt contraction. Overall (domestic non-financial) debt levels do not rise, so there is no upward pressure on prices.

Infrastructure investment should not be seen as the silver bullet, that will solve all our problems. Over-investment in infrastructure can produce diminishing marginal returns — as in bridges to nowhere — and government projects are prone to political interference, cost overruns, and mismanagement. But these negatives can be minimized through partnership with the private sector.

Projects should also not be viewed as a short-term, band-aid solution. The private sector has to increase hiring and make substantial capital investment in order to support them. All the good work would be undone if the spigot is shut off prematurely. What is needed is a 10 to 20 year program to revamp the national infrastructure, restore competitiveness and lay the foundation for future growth.

There are no quick fixes. But what the public needs is a clear path to recovery, rather than the current climate of indecision.

A New New Deal – Truthdig

Decades of experience, in nations across the globe, provide ample evidence that while the private sector plays an important role, it cannot by itself provide employment for all who want to work.

There is a way to do that:  The government could serve as the “employer of last resort” under a job guarantee program modeled on the WPA (the Works Progress Administration, in existence from 1935 to 1943 after being renamed the Work Projects Administration in 1939) and the CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps, 1933-1942). The program would offer a job to any American who was ready and willing to work at the federal minimum wage, plus legislated benefits. No time limits. No means testing. No minimum education or skill requirements.

……To avoid simple “make-work” employment, project proposals could be evaluated on the following criteria: (a) value to the community; (b) value to the participants; (c) likelihood of successful implementation of project; (d) contribution to preparing workers for employment outside the program.

via What the Country Needs Is a New New Deal – Truthdig.

Comment:

Infrastructure projects are one way to get the unemployed back to work and are to some extent offset by savings in unemployment benefits. I would add one qualifier to the selection of infrastructure projects: they must be selected in terms of return on investment (ROI) and not on the number of jobs created. Projects that earn a market-related return on investment—whether toll roads, high-speed rail, new port facilities or national broadband networks—will generate revenues that can be used to repay the debt incurred. At the right time, they can also be sold off to private investors in order to generate funds for further projects. Money invested in schools, libraries, universities and research should be funded out of revenue, and not from increased government borrowing, simply because they do not generate new revenues. Instead they require ongoing expenditure to staff, operate and maintain the new facilities. Read more in my discussion of Austerity and Infrastructure Spending.