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Tag: capital account

Posted on January 24, 2024January 25, 2024

The shell game

An interesting discussion with Prof. Percy Allan from University of Technology, Sydney regarding what caused declining economic growth in recent decades. The chart below shows how real GDP growth in the US declined over the past sixty years — from a 10-year average above 4.0% to a low of 2.2% over the most recent decade.

Real GDP Growth

The primary cause is the decline in capital investment, with 10-year average capital formation declining from between 3.5% and 3.6% in the 1970s and early 1980s to between 2.2% and 2.3% in the past decade. You need new investment in capital equipment in order to improve the efficiency of labor (productivity) — increasing output (GDP) at a faster rate than labor input.

Capital Formation

One possible argument for the decline is that productivity (blue) has grown at a faster rate than average hourly earnings (red) since the mid-1980s. This means that workers receive a smaller share of output (GDP) and are likely to consume less. Lower consumption will in turn lead to lower investment as there is no domestic market for the additional output1.

GDP/Payroll & Average Hourly Earnings

But that argument does not hold true for the US, where personal consumption has grown as a percentage of GDP since the mid-1960s.

Personal Consumption

The increase in consumption was funded by an increase in debt. The ratio of non-financial debt to GDP doubled from 1.32 in 1960 to 2.64 in Q3 of last year.

NonFinancial Debt/GDP

The increase in debt occurred in three steps: 1980-1990; 2000-2009; and 2019 -2020. These steps coincide with three massive surges in the current account deficit below, when Japan, Germany and China (the largest three exporters to the US since the 1980s) exported surplus output to the US by manipulating their capital account.

Current Account/GDP

If China, for example, exports goods to the US and does not import a corresponding amount of goods and services, it will have a current account surplus. The flow of Dollars to China in payment will drive up the Yuan exchange rate, making Chinese goods more expensive and restoring the trade balance. But exporters like Japan, China and Germany manipulate their exchange rate by investing in US Dollar securities and assets. The outflow on their capital account then offsets the inflow on current account2 and prevents their exchange rate from rising to restore the balance in trade.

Conclusion

US workers share of GDP has fallen since the mid-1980s, causing rising inequality and political tensions. But the impact on their standard of living was cushioned by the shell game run by US political leaders and foreign trading partners. Personal consumption climbed despite workers’ smaller share of output, enabled through increased availability of cheap debt — funded by foreign trade partners through a growing current account deficit.

The result was a strong Dollar as foreign capital flowed into the US. Wall Street were big cheerleaders of the policy because it gave them access to huge volumes of cheap debt.

The combination of cheap debt and inflation also exacerbated rising inequality between workers and owners of capital. The wealthy were able to to profit from inflation, using their balance sheets to borrow at cheap rates and buy real assets as a hedge against inflation. Workers — with weak balance sheets and no access to leverage — bore the brunt of rising prices.

The downside to the strong Dollar policy is that it made US manufacturers uncompetitive, both in export markets and against imports in domestic markets. The result was an erosion of US  manufacturing jobs (below) and increased reliance on foreign imports which both the Trump and Biden administrations have tried to reverse.

Manufacturing Jobs

Efforts to weaken the US Dollar and reduce the current account deficit are laudable. They may well spur an increase in capital investment over time which could revive economic growth. But the days of cheap debt, funded by US trading partners, are likely over.

Long-term interest rates are expected to rise in 2025. So are wage rates. Workers — emboldened by a tight labor market and facing higher interest rates — are expected to demand a larger share of productivity gains than in the past. Inflation is likely to prove persistent.

Acknowledgements

  • Prof. Percy Allan, The Conversation: There are 4 economic scenarios for the rest of the decade – I’ve reluctantly picked one

Notes

    1. The growth model used by Japan, Germany and China is an exception to this, where additional output is exported via a surplus on current account.
    2. The sum of flows on capital account and current account is always equal to zero, with inflows on one account offset by outflows on the other.
Colin Twiggs

Colin Twiggs is a former investment banker with almost 40 years of experience in financial markets. He co-founded Incredible Charts and writes the popular Trading Diary and Patient Investor newsletters.

Using a top-down approach, Colin identifies key macro trends in the global economy before evaluating selected opportunities using a combination of fundamental and technical analysis.

Focusing on interest rates and financial market liquidity as primary drivers of the economic cycle, he warned of the 2008/2009 and 2020 bear markets well ahead of actual events.
He founded PVT Capital (AFSL No. 546090) in May 2023, which offers investment strategy and advice to wholesale clients.

Posted on May 14, 2022May 14, 2022

Current turmoil and its impact on Gold

Michael Every from Rabobank is bearish on Gold in his recent video:

“I can’t see the case for Gold while the Fed is hiking — you don’t get a correlation with the Fed hiking aggressively and Gold going up…..If you want to buy into the Gold argument you are buying into the end of the US system. You are implicitly backing a New World Order and Commodity-backed currencies.”

Several readers have written, asking if this changes our view on Gold.

The short answer is NO, for three reasons:

1. The Fed can only hike rates until something breaks

Michael qualifies his view: he is bearish on Gold while the Fed hikes interest rates.

The Fed is expected to tighten — but only until something breaks. Not stocks, which they are unlikely to support, but the bond market. Credit is the lifeblood of the economy. When it stops flowing, the Fed is forced to inject liquidity into financial markets to maintain the flow.

Bank credit still grows at a healthy rate.

Bank Credit & Fed Funds Rate

The ratio of Copper/Gold (orange below), however, is a good indication of the economic cycle. When the economy is growing — and long-term interest rates (blue) are increasing — industrial metals, like Copper, rise faster than Gold and the ratio rises. When the economy contracts, the ratio falls.

Copper/Gold going sideways at present warns that the global economy is stalling. It is highly unlikely that the Fed would continue to tighten if the economy starts to contract — which would be signaled by a falling Copper/Gold ratio.

Copper-Gold Ratio & 10-Year Treasury Yield

Consumer sentiment (blue, inverted scale below) also gives a recession warning, at levels normally associated with high unemployment (red).

Unemployment & Consumer Sentiment (inverted scale)

Investment grade corporate bond issuance (green below) is still within its normal range, albeit on the low side, but high yield (light blue) has slowed to near its March 2020 low, warning that we are close to an economic contraction.

Investment Grade & High Yield Corporate Bond Issuance

A fall of investment grade issuance below $50 billion (the Dec 2020 low) would be cause for concern.

2. A strong Dollar is destroying US industry

The US has been running twin deficits for several decades, supporting the US Dollar as global reserve currency and offering US Treasuries as the global reserve asset.

Foreign Debt & Current Account

This has allowed the Financial sector to grow to a point where it dominates the US economy.

Market Capitalization: Financial/Non-Financial Sector

Wall Street may be reluctant to relinquish their “exorbitant privilege” of cheap debt but it has come at a huge cost to the US economy.

In order to supply international financial markets with sufficient Dollars, the US has to run large trade deficits. But every foreign exchange transaction has to have a buyer and a seller, so the large outflow of Dollars on current account is balanced by an equal and opposite inflow on the capital account.

Trade Deficit

The resulting trade imbalance boosts the Dollar exchange rate to the point that US manufacturers find it difficult to compete against foreign manufacturers in export markets and against foreign imports in domestic markets.

The strong Dollar decimated the manufacturing sector which has shed almost 7 million jobs over the past four decades.

Manufacturing Jobs & Current Account

The inflow of surplus capital also encourages malinvestment in nonproductive areas — dressed up to look attractive through leverage and artificially low interest rates — as in the sub-prime crisis. The ratio of GDP (output) to private non-financial debt has declined by more than 50% since the 1960s.

GDP/Non-financial Debt

Cheap debt also enabled the federal government to run large deficits at low cost, spending more than they raised in taxes and softening the impact of the growing trade imbalance.

The largest portion of capital inflows was invested in Treasuries. As the Current account balance plunged, federal debt held by foreign investors ballooned to almost $8 trillion.

Foreign Held Federal Debt & Current Account Balance

3. US debt above 120% of GDP would destroy the bond market

Overall federal debt climbed to more than 120% of GDP, well above the sustainable level of 70% to 80% of GDP posited by Dr Cristina Checherita and Dr Philip Rother in their ECB study of highly indebted economies.

Earlier research by Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff (This Time is Different, 2008) suggested that states where sovereign debt exceeds 100% of GDP almost inevitably default.

That doesn’t mean that the US is about to default but it does mean that the federal government is precariously close to the point of no return, where it can no longer service the interest on its debt and is forced to capitalize it, compounding the problem.

Federal Debt/GDP

The only viable alternative is inflation. If the borrower suppresses interest rates below the rate of inflation, then GDP is likely to grow faster than the debt. This is already evident on the chart above, where US debt-to-GDP fell in the past 12 months. Federal debt (yellow) increased, but nominal GDP (blue) grew faster because of inflation.

Federal Debt & GDP growth

Current turmoil

The global financial system — with a US Dollar reserve currency and US Treasuries as the global reserve asset –appears increasingly fragile as global geopolitical conflict escalates.

China & the Dollar

After China’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), it rapidly accumulated foreign reserves — mostly US Dollars — as it built up its industrial base, reaching $4 trillion by 2014.

China: Foreign Reserves

China maintained a strict peg against the Dollar until 2014, only allowing it to gradually rise in response to US pressure. But in 2014, a surging Dollar — in response to falling CPI and a shrinking deficit — started to cause problems.

Trade Weighted Dollar

The peg to a strong Dollar started to hurt Chinese exports; so in 2014 the authorities allowed the yuan to weaken, easing capital controls. Capital outflows and a falling Yuan attracted speculators like Hayman Capital who shorted the currency, forcing the PBOC to step in to support the currency in 2017.

China: Yuan

In 2018, the Yuan again fell when Donald Trump imposed tariffs on China’s exports to the United States, setting off a trade war.

The third major fall, in 2022, is the result of China’s debt crisis. An over-leveraged economy threatens to contract — triggered by rising US interest rates, a strong Dollar, rising energy prices, and an ongoing pandemic — while regulators attempt to shore up the financial system.

The Belt-and-Road initiative

In 2013 the PBOC were unhappy with the Fed’s program of quantitative easing (QE) which could be seen as currency debasement at the expense of foreign creditors (China).

China’s response was the Belt-and-Road initiative (BRI). This loaned US Dollars to emerging market governments in exchange for lucrative construction contracts, secured against the underlying infrastructure assets. Africa was a prime target.

China: Foreign Reserves

The capital inflow was diverted from US Treasuries — funding the federal deficit — and into the BRI. By 2022, BRI loans — denominated in Dollars to maintain the Yuan’s trade advantage over the Dollar — amounted to close to $5 trillion.

Funding the federal deficit

China’s BRI left Treasury with a problem with funding the US deficit, So far, the gap has been filled by Fed QE and, to a lesser extent, commercial banks.

Externally Held US Treasuries - Major Holders

But QE is not a long-term solution. The twin deficits supporting the US Dollar status as global reserve currency are now broken. And US Treasuries are no longer attractive to foreign investors as the global reserve asset.

The US is faced with a difficult choice:

  1. Allow the Fed to continue its easy monetary policy in the hope that inflation will bail Treasury of its serious debt problem, lowering federal debt to between 70% and 80% of GDP. The risk is that foreign investors will increasingly shun Treasuries, threatening its status as the global reserve asset and driving up long-term interest rates in the USA.
  2. Encourage the Fed to adopt a hawkish stance, shrinking its balance sheet (QT) and raising interest rates. Lower inflation and a stronger Dollar would restore investor confidence in Treasuries. But the risk is that the US plunges into recession which would make the debt problem even worse. Tax revenues would fall during a recession, increasing the fiscal deficit.

It appears that the Fed are attempting to walk a fine line between the two options at present, talking tough but delaying action for as long as possible, but later this year, they will be forced to show their hand.

China

Rising US interest rates and the strong Dollar are a major problem for China. Not only is the strong Dollar undermining Chinese businesses who borrowed in USD at cheap rates, but the strong Dollar also threatens to collapse China’s $5 trillion Belt-and-Road initiative which is funded by USD-denominated loans. Despite official statistics, the country is in a heap of pain. The private sector has never fully-recovered from the initial COVID-19 pandemic and is now being dragged down by Xi Jinping’s zero-Covid policy lockdowns. Ports are in gridlock.

Chinese Ports

Falling natural gas consumption warns of an economic contraction, promising further disruption to commodity producers and supply chains around the world.

Chinese LNG Demand

Team USA

This may be an over-simplification but “team USA” — to use Michael Every’s expression — is primarily split into two camps:

  1. Wall Street and the Federal Reserve, who want to maintain the US Dollar position as the global reserve currency; and
  2. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the manufacturing sector, who recognize the damage done by the Dollar reserve currency, with erosion of the US industrial base and offshoring of critical supply chains.

Weaponizing the Dollar against Russia, by seizing their foreign reserves, was apparently a DOD initiative, with the Fed not even consulted. The outcome is likely to be long-term damage to the Dollar’s reserve currency status, with non-aligned states — including China and India — increasingly reluctant to hold reserve assets in Dollars.

There are no ready alternatives to the Dollar — as Michael Every points out — but other asset classes, including Gold and Commodities, are likely to play an increasingly larger role.

Conclusion

Credit markets are tightening and warn of a recession. The Fed is unlikely to continue its hawkish stance if credit markets dry up or employment falls.

It is not in the US interest to continue running large current account deficits to support the Dollar’s reserve status. The economy has suffered long-term damage from its “exorbitant privilege” with the US Dollar as reserve currency. Support for the Dollar’s reserve status, from Wall Street, faces growing opposition from the DOD and manufacturing sector.

The US faces a tough choice between debt and inflation. A hawkish Fed may lower inflation but is likely to cause a recession, making the debt situation even worse. A dovish Fed, on the other hand, with higher inflation, may alleviate the debt problem but is likely to undermine foreign investor confidence in the Dollar and Treasuries.

The situation is further exacerbated by current market turmoil. The strong Dollar threatens to damage China’s economy and its Belt-and-Road initiative, raising tensions with the US. Weaponization of the Dollar in sanctions against Russia also threatens to undermine the Dollar’s reserve currency status.

Rising interest rates and a strong Dollar are bearish for Gold, but there are a number of developments that suggest the opposite. We remain overweight on Gold.

Acknowledgements

  • Tom Mclellan for the Unemployment/Consumer Sentiment comparison
  • Frankoz for the BRI insight
Colin Twiggs

Colin Twiggs is a former investment banker with almost 40 years of experience in financial markets. He co-founded Incredible Charts and writes the popular Trading Diary and Patient Investor newsletters.

Using a top-down approach, Colin identifies key macro trends in the global economy before evaluating selected opportunities using a combination of fundamental and technical analysis.

Focusing on interest rates and financial market liquidity as primary drivers of the economic cycle, he warned of the 2008/2009 and 2020 bear markets well ahead of actual events.
He founded PVT Capital (AFSL No. 546090) in May 2023, which offers investment strategy and advice to wholesale clients.

Posted on March 27, 2018June 11, 2019

Trump’s Trade War

First, let me correct the implication that this is a trade war started by Donald Trump. It is not. His is only the first significant response by the US in a trade war initiated by China more than a decade ago, in the early 2000s.

In 2011 I warned of the danger of a trade war in Five Challenges facing President Obama:

…1. Stop importing capital and exporting jobs.
Japan and China have effectively maintained a trade advantage against the US by investing more than $2.3 trillion in US Treasuries. The inflow of funds on capital account acts to suppress their exchange rate, effectively pegging it against the greenback. Imposition of trade penalties would result in tit-for-tat retaliation that could easily escalate into a trade war….

In Mega-trends and their impact in 2012:

Trade wars
In addition to competition for scarce resources, we are also likely to see increased competition for international trade. Resistance to further currency manipulation — initiated by Japan in the 1980s and perpetuated by China in the last decade — is likely to rise. US Treasury holdings by China and Japan currently sit at more than $2.3 Trillion, the inflows on capital account being used to offset outflows on current account and maintain a competitive trade advantage by suppressing their exchange rate.

In China’s Export Dilemma 2014:

…China has been buying US Treasuries as a form of vendor financing, allowing them to export to the US while preventing the RMB from appreciating to its natural, market-clearing level against the Dollar. The fact that they are attempting to disguise this manipulation, using third parties, means that Congress is unlikely to tolerate further suppression of the RMB against the Dollar and will be forced to take action.

And in 2015, Sectoral Imbalances: Where Have All the Jobs Gone?

A second threat is foreign capital inflows… which commenced in earnest with Japanese purchases of US Treasuries in the 1980s but reached a ‘nuclear’ scale when China joined the party in the early 2000s. While it may appear fairly benign, with foreign investors stepping in to lend Uncle Sam a helping hand, the damage is insidious… these capital inflows were intended to undermine the competitiveness of US manufacturers in both domestic and export markets through currency manipulation.

Foreign Direct Investment in US

To understand how currency manipulation works, we need to examine the foreign surplus in more detail. There are two parts to currency flows between nations: the current (income) account and the capital account. The current account comprises the trade surplus or deficit (the net sum of all trade flows between the two nations) and the smaller net income flow from investments.

Current Account Balance

The capital account reflects all capital flows, whether investment or loans, between the two countries. Again, the sum of the two is always zero. If there is a deficit on the current account (money flowing out), there must be a surplus on the capital account (loans and investments flowing in) to restore the balance. If not, and Japan/China had to increase their exports to the US without a reciprocal flow of capital, the value of the dollar would plummet against the yen/yuan until the trade balance was restored.

Think of it this way. If an importer in the US buys goods from China, they must purchase yuan to pay for the goods. If there are more imports than exports, the demand for yuan will be higher than demand for dollars; so the yuan will rise against the dollar until demand matches supply. But what currency manipulators do is invest money via capital account (mainly in US Treasuries), purchasing dollars to soak up the shortfall so that their currency doesn’t appreciate despite the massive trade surplus with the US.

The impact of this is two-fold. First US manufacturers shed jobs as they lose market share in both domestic and export markets. That cuts into the household surplus as unemployment rises and real wages fall. Second, the US government runs bigger deficits to make up for the demand shortfall in order to buoy economic growth. The end result is that US taxpayers grow poorer — as the size of the public debt millstone increases — while currency manipulators grow richer. The debt binge that led to the GFC was largely fueled by foreign capital inflows. The fact that this imbalance has been allowed to continue is a damning indictment of political leadership in Washington. There is no way that they can be unaware of the damage being caused to US manufacturers, households and to public finances. Change is long overdue.

Why has it taken this long to respond?

The last incumbent in the White House refused to confront the rising menace. A risk-averse culture led to micro-management and Obama’s mantra of “Don’t do stupid sh*t” frequently translated into “Don’t do anything”.

On Obama’s watch the US abdicated its global leadership, leaving the door open for scoundrels like Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping to step into the void. His legacy is a series of brewing crises that risk a major global confrontation in the next few decades. Taiwan and the South China Sea, India and Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Ukraine, the Balkans, and the Baltic States. All of these hotspots have the potential to spark a major conflict. It needs just a single miscalculation from an emboldened aggressor accustomed to being able to bully their neighbors into acquiescence.

All this seems eerily familiar. As Winston Churchill long ago warned:

An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.

But back to Donald Trump.

To his credit Trump correctly identified the need to confront the growing threat.

Unfortunately he is not up to the task.

His confrontational style may have worked well when nailing down contractors on construction contracts, or even negotiating media contracts for his show, but is totally unsuited for the role of a leader of the free world.

Trump’s campaign style has left a fiercely divided political landscape, with little support in the mainstream media and even a large swathe of Republicans shocked and embarrassed by his behavior. He has zero chance of uniting the country behind him in confronting these major challenges. His erratic behavior means the Republican party is likely lose control of the House of Representatives at the upcoming mid-term elections, leaving Trump as a lame duck President.

What he does not seem to realise is that belittling treatment of senior officials in his own administration diminishes him in the eyes of subordinates and demoralises his remaining team. It also makes it exceedingly difficult for him to attract new talent.

Internationally, Trump has managed to offend many of America’s traditional allies and is also unlikely to receive much support or understanding from that quarter.

Fortunately the President has been unable to derail the US economy which I suspect will be able to weather the current storm as it has many others. The political mess will continue while the economy keeps on going.

When it comes to stocks, the S&P 500 index is headed for a test of primary support between 2500 and 2550. Breach would signal a primary down-trend but Twiggs Volatility Index is currently in the amber zone, between 1% and 2%, suggesting that the correction is secondary in nature.

S&P 500

From Market Volatility and the S&P 500 in February 2018:

The key is not to wait for Volatility to spike above 2%. By then it is normally too late. An alternative strategy would be to scale back positions when the market remains in an elevated range, between 1% and 2%, over several months. Many traders would argue that this is too early. But the signal does indicate elevated market risk and I am reasonably certain that investors with large positions would prefer to exit too early rather than too late.

My current policy is to maintain 30% cash in our model portfolio (this may not suit investors with different risk profiles) and I am only likely to increase this for US investments if there is a fall below 2500 or Twiggs Volatility remains elevated (above 1%) for at least 3 months. But I am likely to review our cash position for Australian investments in the weeks ahead.

When liberty exceeds intelligence, it begets chaos, which begets dictatorship.

~ Will Durant

Colin Twiggs

Colin Twiggs is a former investment banker with almost 40 years of experience in financial markets. He co-founded Incredible Charts and writes the popular Trading Diary and Patient Investor newsletters.

Using a top-down approach, Colin identifies key macro trends in the global economy before evaluating selected opportunities using a combination of fundamental and technical analysis.

Focusing on interest rates and financial market liquidity as primary drivers of the economic cycle, he warned of the 2008/2009 and 2020 bear markets well ahead of actual events.
He founded PVT Capital (AFSL No. 546090) in May 2023, which offers investment strategy and advice to wholesale clients.

Posted on June 9, 2015

How much longer can the global trading system last? | Michael Pettis

Michael Pettis quotes a Brazilian economist on the dilemna facing the US:

….As the US becomes a declining share of the globalized world, the costs of imposing stability (and I have no illusions that this is done for charity) rise, and its share of the benefits decline. It is only a matter of arithmetic that at some point the costs will exceed the benefits.

Pettis describes how other countries have gamed the system – notably Germany and France in the 1960s, Japan in the 1980s, and China in the 2000s – and argues that the costs to the US already outweigh the benefits.

….Many economists may disagree with me that the costs of the current role the US plays in the global trade regime exceeds the benefits, but the point of this essay is to show that even if I am wrong, as long as the world grows faster than the US, more of the world is incorporated into the global trading system, and more countries design growth models that suppress domestic consumption in order to subsidize domestic growth, there must of necessity be a point at which it makes sense for the US to opt out of its role as shock absorber, and – by raising tariffs, intervening actively in the currency, restricting foreign purchases of US assets and especially US government bonds, or otherwise reducing capital inflows – become simply one more member of a system with no automatic adjustment process.

The current system, in other words, is inherently unstable and will sooner or later force the US economy into a position of choosing either to take on excessive risk or to abdicate its role as shock absorber….

Sustained current and capital account imbalances are unhealthy except for the few rare instances where capital-rich economies invest or loan money to a capital-poor recipient. In most cases capital is used to purchase secure Treasury investments in the US in order to offset a domestic current account surplus. This has a destabilizing effect not only on the US economy, which has shed millions of manufacturing jobs and created a housing bubble of epic proportions, but on the global economy as a whole, destroying any benefit to the perpetrator.

US Manufacturing Employment

Read more at How much longer can the global trading system last? | Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS.

Posted on April 24, 2013

Paul Krugman: Hot Money Blues | NYTimes.com

Paul Krugman argues for a return of capital controls:

In the last decade America, too, experienced a huge housing bubble fed by foreign money, followed by a nasty hangover after the bubble burst. The damage was mitigated by the fact that we borrowed in our own currency, but it’s still our worst crisis since the 1930s.

Japan and China amassed more than $2 trillion in US Treasuries in their attempt to halt, or at least slow, appreciation of their currencies against the Dollar. US manufacturers suffered, both in domestic and export markets, laboring at a huge competitive disadvantage because of the artificial exchange rate.

Trade agreements should cap capital flows between countries, setting a limit on the net capital in/outflow in any one year and offsetting measures to be taken if the cap is exceeded.

Read more at Hot Money Blues – NYTimes.com.

Posted on March 5, 2013

Australia: International capital flows into large caps

Westpac reports that the December quarter saw net inflows of:

  • Debt $10.5bn, up from $7.1bn in Q3 (prev $7.6bn)
  • Equity $5.1bn, more modest than Q3’s $9.7bn (prev $8.8bn), but still almost twice the average pace of the past three years
  • Portfolio investment $4.7bn, significantly above Q3’s $0.8bn
  • Direct investment accelerated to $13.2bn.

The global scramble for yield is driving up the ASX 50. We need to beware that capital inflows are fickle and may bolt at signs of a falling Aussie dollar.

Colin Twiggs

Colin Twiggs is a former investment banker with almost 40 years of experience in financial markets. He co-founded Incredible Charts and writes the popular Trading Diary and Patient Investor newsletters.

Using a top-down approach, Colin identifies key macro trends in the global economy before evaluating selected opportunities using a combination of fundamental and technical analysis.

Focusing on interest rates and financial market liquidity as primary drivers of the economic cycle, he warned of the 2008/2009 and 2020 bear markets well ahead of actual events.
He founded PVT Capital (AFSL No. 546090) in May 2023, which offers investment strategy and advice to wholesale clients.

Posted on November 27, 2012

EconoMonitor » The U.S. is sliding down an investment slope

Thomas Grennes & Andris Strazds highlight the contraction in US private investment since the GFC:

Recent evidence…….suggests that while U.S. GDP growth has surpassed its pre-crisis level, investment has been declining. A comparison with China would not be appropriate due to differences in growth rates and the level of economic development, but even a comparison with the EU-15 is not flattering to the U.S. A look at the Gross Fixed Capital Formation to GDP ratio shows that since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 the U.S. has been lagging behind the EU-15 countries with respect to investment in long-term assets…….

The chances of China successfully switching from an export-driven economy to internal markets are small. And the US is unlikely to materially lift exports. So their conclusion appears unavoidable.

If insufficient investment results in the U.S. having to adjust by lowering consumption rather than increasing output, the rest of the world will also have to adjust in a way that is reducing growth; namely, produce less.

via EconoMonitor : Thoughts From Across the Atlantic » The U.S. Is Sliding Down an Investment Slope.

Colin Twiggs

Colin Twiggs is a former investment banker with almost 40 years of experience in financial markets. He co-founded Incredible Charts and writes the popular Trading Diary and Patient Investor newsletters.

Using a top-down approach, Colin identifies key macro trends in the global economy before evaluating selected opportunities using a combination of fundamental and technical analysis.

Focusing on interest rates and financial market liquidity as primary drivers of the economic cycle, he warned of the 2008/2009 and 2020 bear markets well ahead of actual events.
He founded PVT Capital (AFSL No. 546090) in May 2023, which offers investment strategy and advice to wholesale clients.

Posted on September 22, 2012

As the U.S. Borrows, Who Lends? – NYTimes.com

By Floyd Norris

Estimates by the Treasury Department released this week indicated that over the 12 months through July, China reduced its position in Treasury securities by $165 billion, cutting them to $1.15 trillion despite making a small amount of purchases in July. And the Federal Reserve reported that, as of Wednesday, it owned $1.65 trillion in Treasury securities, $17 billion less than it had owned a year earlier.

…..China’s selling of Treasuries over the 12-month period was offset by the actions of Japan, another country whose trade surplus with the United States remains large. The Japanese are estimated to have increased their holdings by $232 billion over the 12 months, to $1.12 trillion. Those figures include both government and private holders of Treasuries.

via As the U.S. Borrows, Who Lends? – NYTimes.com.

Colin Twiggs

Colin Twiggs is a former investment banker with almost 40 years of experience in financial markets. He co-founded Incredible Charts and writes the popular Trading Diary and Patient Investor newsletters.

Using a top-down approach, Colin identifies key macro trends in the global economy before evaluating selected opportunities using a combination of fundamental and technical analysis.

Focusing on interest rates and financial market liquidity as primary drivers of the economic cycle, he warned of the 2008/2009 and 2020 bear markets well ahead of actual events.
He founded PVT Capital (AFSL No. 546090) in May 2023, which offers investment strategy and advice to wholesale clients.

Posted on September 18, 2012

Europe’s Balance of Payments account shows sizeable portfolio inflow

By Marc Chandler

Look at the turn around in the current account. In the 12-months through July, the euro area recorded a seasonally adjusted cumulative current account surplus of almost 63 bln euros, which is about 0.7% of the region’s GDP. The comparable figure in the 12-months through July 2011 was a deficit of a little more than 22 bln euros….

The weakness of the euro area economies has slowed imports and several countries, including some in the periphery, have seen a pick up in exports. Growth differentials probably is the more significant explanation, but we do recognize that from last November through July, the euro had declined about 10% on a trade-weighted basis……

While the current account is intuitively clear, the financial account is surprising. As the euro was falling in July to multi-year lows, talk circulated of capital flight. Yet, the financial account showed a net inflow of 18 bln euros of combined portfolio and direct investment.

via Europe’s Balance of Payments account shows sizeable portfolio inflow.

Colin Twiggs

Colin Twiggs is a former investment banker with almost 40 years of experience in financial markets. He co-founded Incredible Charts and writes the popular Trading Diary and Patient Investor newsletters.

Using a top-down approach, Colin identifies key macro trends in the global economy before evaluating selected opportunities using a combination of fundamental and technical analysis.

Focusing on interest rates and financial market liquidity as primary drivers of the economic cycle, he warned of the 2008/2009 and 2020 bear markets well ahead of actual events.
He founded PVT Capital (AFSL No. 546090) in May 2023, which offers investment strategy and advice to wholesale clients.

Posted on November 2, 2011

Creditors can huff but they need debtors – FT.com

China already runs its own risk of massive losses on the currency reserves – now worth $3,200bn – it has accumulated. That was a public capital outflow aimed at supporting its trade surpluses. But, in its attempts at managing the currency relationship with the US, it is the latter that controls the central bank. China can huff and puff. But it must either buy the money the US creates, to preserve competitiveness, or stop doing so. If it buys, it throws good money after bad. If it stops buying, it imposes a shock on itself.

via Creditors can huff but they need debtors – FT.com.

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