The Institute For Fiscal Studies – Biggest one-year fall in middle incomes since 1981

“The fall in median income in 2010–11 of 3.1% was the largest
one-year fall since 1981 and returned it to the level last seen in
2004–05,” says Jonathan Cribb, a Research Economist at the IFS. “This was driven largely by a decline in real earnings as the
impact of the late 2000s recession on incomes finally started to become clear. Inequality also fell as those on benefits had their
incomes relatively better protected. Looking ahead, our forecasts
suggest that median incomes will have fallen further in 2011–12
and median incomes will be no higher in 2015–16 than they
were in 2002–03.”

via The Institute For Fiscal Studies – Biggest one-year fall in middle incomes since 1981.

Australia: GDP growth is not real

Mark Graph: Table 5 of the national accounts includes the implicit price deflators (IPD) for each term in the expenditure equation for GDP….the big deflationary item was exports….

So we get to the heart of the anomaly: largely because we exported a touch less in volume terms (in Q1 2012 compared with Q4 2011) but at significantly reduced prices, this contributed significantly to an outcome where real GDP grew significantly while nominal GDP stagnated.

via Understanding our price deflationary boom | Mark Graph.

Comment:~ So real GDP growth is not really real. The major difference between nominal GDP growth (1.2% annualized) and real GDP growth (a far more impressive 5.2% annualized) is a fall in the price of exports!

Fedex threatens support

Bellwether transport stock Fedex completed a double top reversal, with a break of the neckline at $88, and is now consolidating between $85 and $90. Retreat of 63-day Twiggs Momentum below zero warns of a primary down-trend. Failure of support at $85 would confirm, suggesting that economic activity is slowing.

Fedex

* Target calculation: 85 – ( 95 – 85 ) = 75

Stiglitz, Conard Debate Income Inequality

Some sweeping generalizations from Stiglitz and Conard denial that the Fed was architect of the 2007/2008 asset bubble but some interesting insights from both parties.

http://youtu.be/U4T2aqZyM9w

Edward Conard, a former managing director at Bain Capital LLC, and Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, talk about the U.S. economy and income inequality. They speak with Betty Liu on Bloomberg Television’s “In the Loop.”

When Austerity Fails

Austerity decimated Asian economies during their 1997/98 financial crisis and similar measures have failed to rescue the PIIGS in Europe 2012. David Cameron’s austerity measures have also not saved the UK from falling back into recession. So why is Wayne Swan in Australia so proud of his balanced budget? And why does Barack Obama threaten the wealthy with increased taxes while the GOP advocate spending cuts in order to reduce the US deficit? Are we condemned to follow Europe into a deflationary spiral?

How Did We Get Here?

First, let’s examine the causes of the current financial crisis.

Government deficits have been around for centuries. States would borrow in order to finance wars but were then left with the problem of repayment. Countries frequently defaulted, but this created difficulties in accessing further finance; so governments resorted to debasing their currencies. Initially they substituted coins with a lower metal content for the original issue. Then introduction of fiat currencies — with no right of conversion to an underlying gold/silver standard — made debasement a lot easier. Issuing more paper currency simply reduced the value of each note in circulation. Advent of the digital age made debasement still easier, with transfer of balances between electronic accounts largely replacing paper money. Fiscal deficits, previously confined to wars, became regular government policy; employed as a stealth tax and redistributed in the form of welfare benefits to large voting blocks.

Along with fiscal deficits came easy monetary policy — also known as debt expansion. Lower interest rates fueled greater demand for debt, which bankers, with assistance from the central bank, were only too willing to accommodate. I will not go into a lengthy exposition of how banks create money, but banks expand their balance sheets by lending money they do not have, confident in the knowledge that recipients will deposit the proceeds back in the banking system — which is then used to fund the original loan. Expanding bank balance sheets inject new money into the system, debasing the currency as effectively as if they were running a printing press in the basement.

The combination of rising prices and low interest rates is a heady mix investors cannot resist, leading to speculative bubbles in real estate or stocks. So why do governments encourage debt expansion? Because (A) it creates a temporary high — a false sense of well-being before inflation takes hold; and (B) it debases the currency, inflating tax revenues while reducing the real value of government debt.

Continuous government deficits and debt expansion via the financial sector have brought us to the edge of the precipice. The problem is: finding a way back — none of the solutions seem to work.

Austerity

Slashing government spending, cutting back on investment programs, and raising taxes in order to reduce the fiscal deficit may appear a logical response to the crisis. Reversing policies that caused the problem will reduce their eventual impact, but you have to do that before the financial crisis — not after. With bank credit contracting and aggregate demand shrinking, it is too late to throw the engine into reverse — you are already going backwards. The economy is already slowing. Rather than reducing harmful side-effects, austerity applied at the wrong time will simply amplify them.

The 1997 Asian Crisis

We are repeating the mistakes of the 1997/98 Asian crisis. Joseph Stiglitz, at the time chief economist at the World Bank, warned the IMF of the perils of austerity measures imposed on recipients of IMF support. He was politely ignored. By July 1998, 13 months after the start of the crisis, GNP had fallen by 83 percent in Indonesia and between 30 and 40 percent in other recipients of IMF “assistance”. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and the Phillipines reduced government deficits, allowed insolvent banks to fail, and raised interest rates in response to IMF demands. Currency devaluations, waves of bankruptcies, real estate busts, collapse of entire industries and soaring unemployment followed — leading to social unrest. Contracting bank lending without compensatory fiscal deficits led to a deflationary spiral, while raising interest rates failed to protect currencies from devaluation.

The same failed policies are being pursued today, simply because continuing fiscal deficits and ballooning public debt are a frightening alternative.

The Lesser of Two Evils

At some point political leaders are going to realize the futility of further austerity measures and resort to the hair of the dog that bit them. Bond markets are likely to resist further increases in public debt and deficits would have to be funded directly or indirectly by the central bank/Federal Reserve. Inflation would rise. Effectively the government is printing fresh new dollar bills with nothing to back them.

The short-term payoff would be fourfold. Rising inflation increases tax revenues while at the same time decreasing the value of public debt in real terms. Real estate values rise, restoring many underwater mortgages to solvency, and rescuing banks threatened by falling house prices. Finally, inflation would discourage currency manipulation. Asian exporters who keep their currencies at artificially low values, by purchasing $trillions of US treasuries to offset the current account imbalance, will suffer a capital loss on their investments.

The long-term costs — inflation, speculative bubbles and financial crises — are likely to be out-weighed by the short-term benefits when it comes to counting votes. Even rising national debt would to some extent be offset by rising nominal GDP, stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio. And if deficits are used to fund productive infrastructure, rather than squandered on public fountains and bridges-to-nowhere, that will further enhance GDP growth while ensuring that the state has real assets to show for the debt incurred.

Not “If” but “When”

Faced with the failure of austerity measures, governments are likely to abandon them and resort to the printing press — fiscal deficits and quantitative easing. It is more a case of “when” rather than “if”. Successful traders/investors will need to allow for this in their strategies, timing their purchases to take advantage of the shift.

Richard Koo: Where do we go from here?

How austerity will prolong the recession.

Richard Koo, Chief Economist, Nomura Research Institute at the Closing Panel entitled “Overhangs, Uncertainty and Political Order: Where Do We Go From Here?” at the Institute for New Economic Thinking’s (INET) Paradigm Lost Conference in Berlin. April 14, 2012.

Ron Paul v. Paul Krugman: Austrian v. Keynesian

Aired on Bloomberg TV 4-30-2012 Ron Paul vs Paul Krugman Debate

Paul Krugman is simply wrong about needing the government to set interest rates. The market would do a better job of managing demand and supply. Where government is needed is to regulate the banks and prevent excessive debt growth by the banks.

US banks face squeeze

Rising short-term interest rates (represented by 3-month Treasury yields on the chart below) caused negative yield differentials in 2006/2007 which led me to warn of an economic down-turn. Yield differentials are calculated by subtracting short-term (3-month) yields from long-term (10-year) yields. Banks borrow mostly at short-term rates and lend at long-term rates, generating a profitable interest margin. But when the yield differential turns negative, bank interest margins are squeezed, forcing them to contract lending. A lending contraction shrinks consumption + investment and sends the economy into a tail-spin.

Ten-Year Treasury Yield and Differential with Three-Month Yields

Negative yield differentials (or yield curves) are normally caused by rising short-term rates as in 2006/2007, but now we are witnessing the opposite phenomenon. Short-term rates are near zero, but falling long-term rates are starting to squeeze the yield differential from the opposite end. The situation is not yet desperate but a further decline in long-term yields would shrink bank interest margins. Fed initiation of QE3, purchasing additional long-term Treasuries, is likely to drive long-term rates lower and exacerbate the problem. The resulting contraction in bank lending would cause another economic down-turn.