Jan Hatzius Connects All the Dots | Business Insider

Important insight from Jan Hatzius at Goldman Sachs, reported by Cullen Roche:

The US private sector continues to run a large financial surplus of 5.5% of GDP, more than 3 percentage points above the historical average. This is the flip side of the deleveraging of private sector balance sheet. We expect a normalization in this surplus over the next few years to provide a boost to real GDP growth. This is the key reason why we see US economic growth picking up gradually in the course of 2013 and into 2014, despite the near-term downside risks from the increase in fiscal restraint……..

via Jan Hatzius Connects All the Dots – Business Insider.

Resolving The Crisis And Restoring Healthy Growth: Why Deleveraging Matters? | David Lipton | IMF

David Lipton, IMF First Deputy Managing Director writes that when G20 leaders met at the height of the GFC they had two simple objectives: i) to resolve the crisis; and ii) to make sure it did not happen again……..

Progress has been hard in part because the measures called for under each agenda item to some extent undermine the other agenda item. The first objective, exiting the crisis requires strong enough demand to restore growth and jobs. At the same time, the second objective, ensuring sustainability and laying the foundation for a stronger global economy, requires deleveraging in many advanced economies, which will dampen demand, particularly if it happens simultaneously in many sectors in many countries.

Lipton points out that the actions of all major players impact on each other. He calls for deficit countries to continue fiscal consolidation and private sector deleveraging “in a sustainable way” and for “structural reforms to improve competitiveness”. Surplus countries also need to cut back on “reserve accumulation” and allow “more exchange rate flexibility”.

via Resolving The Crisis And Restoring Healthy Growth: Why Deleveraging Matters? by David Lipton, IMF First Deputy Managing Director.

Japan economy shrinks as China dispute takes toll

Elaine Kurtenbach at USA Today writes:

Japan’s economy contracted in the latest quarter, signaling that like Europe it may already be in recession, further weighing down world growth. On an annualized basis, the world’s No. 3 economy shrank 3.5% in the July-September quarter, the government reported Monday. It was in line with gloomy forecasts after Japan’s territorial dispute with China hammered exports that were already weakened by feeble global demand……

Rajeshni Naidu-Ghelani at CNBC writes that Japan’s recovery depends on global demand:

Izumi Devalier, Japan economist at HSBC in Hong Kong backed that sentiment saying Japan’s economic development over the past decade shows that it’s been extremely dependent on exports and external demand.

“Sad to say, Japan will have to wait for the overseas economies to pick up before it sees its own economy really lifted,” Devalier told CNBC.

UK: Bank break-up an option if ring-fence fails | Vickers

Matt Scuffham and Steve Slater write:

Britain could force banks to fully separate their retail operations from riskier areas if lenders fail to implement a “ring-fence” that sufficiently safeguards taxpayers or improves behavior, the architect of the plan said on Monday.

The Independent Commission on Banking, chaired by Sir John Vickers, recommends that UK banks “ring-fence” their retail operations to protect customers from riskier investment banking activities.

Andy Haldane, the Bank of England’s financial stability director, commented last week that ring-fencing would only work if the retail operations have a separate management, pay structure and balance sheet.

via Bank break-up an option if ring-fence fails: Vickers | Reuters.

Taking the leverage out of economic growth | Reuters

Edward Hadas points out that long-term credit growth has exceeded growth in nominal GDP (real GDP plus inflation) in the US and Europe for some time. Not only does this fuel a credit bubble but it leads to a build up of inflationary pressure within the economy. If not evident in consumer prices it is likely to emerge as an asset bubble.

For the last two decades, accelerating credit has been closely correlated with the change in GDP – both in the United States and the euro zone. GDP growth tended to speed up shortly after the rate of credit growth increased, and slowed down after credit growth started to decrease.

This correlation implies there is an equilibrium rate of credit growth – the rate that corresponds to the long-term pace of nominal GDP growth. Though the pace of credit growth can vary from year to year, over time private debt and nominal GDP have to expand at the same rate for overall leverage to stay constant. That’s not what happened in the past two decades. Since 1990, Deutsche found a significant gap between credit and GDP growth in the United States and the euro zone.

In both, the neutral rate of credit growth – the rate associated with the economy’s long-term growth rate – was 7 percent. Those long-term nominal GDP growth rates were lower: 4.8 percent in the United States and 4 percent in the euro zone. In a single year, the difference of 2-3 percentage points doesn’t have much effect. Over a generation, though, it leads to a massive increase in the ratio of private debt to GDP.

The gap between growth in Domestic Debt and Nominal GDP widened in 2004/5 during the height of the property bubble and has narrowed to near zero since 2010.
Domestic Debt Growth Compared to GDP Growth
Hopefully the Fed have learned their lesson and maintain this course in future.

via Analysis & Opinion | Reuters.

Europe’s Populists at the Gate by Barry Eichengreen – Project Syndicate

Barry Eichengreen writes:

In focusing on summit declarations and promises of far-reaching reforms of EU institutions, investors are missing the real risk: the collapse of public support for, or at least public acquiescence to, the austerity policies required to work down heavy debt burdens – and for the governments pursuing these policies. Mass anti-austerity protests are one warning sign. Another is growing popular support for neo-Nazi movements like Golden Dawn, now the third-largest political party in Greece.

The rise to power of a “rejectionist” European government – that is, one that unilaterally rejects the policy status quo – would immediately bring the crisis to a head…….

via Europe’s Populists at the Gate by Barry Eichengreen – Project Syndicate.

Why Investors Shouldn’t Expect Much Euro Zone Reform | Institutional Investor

David Turner writes:

Most economists think deregulation is, in the long term, good for these countries’ economies, and hence for the sustainability of their sovereign debt markets. The economic case for pressing ahead with liberalization is strong. Can institutional investors therefore look forward to a fast pace of growth across the entire euro zone, boosted by deregulation?

The answer is “no,” for several reasons.

Experience shows that politicians will continue pressing ahead with reform only if the markets take them by the heels to dangle them over the precipice……..­

via Why Investors Shouldn’t Expect Much Euro Zone Reform | Institutional Investor.

Nomura's fresh alert on a Chinese hard landing | Telegraph Blogs

Ambrose Evans Pritchard writes:

Nomura’s early warning signal for the Chinese financial system – the China Stress Index – is flashing amber again…….Its case against China: “overinvestment and excessive credit; a rudimentary monetary policy architecture; too many privileges for state-owned enterprises; unintended consequences of financial liberalisation; the Lewis turning point; and growing pains from worsening demographics and increasing strains on natural resources”……..

via Nomura's fresh alert on a Chinese hard landing – Telegraph Blogs.

Australia: Did APRA assume a bailout in its stress test?

Houses and Holes at Macrobusiness.com.au makes an important point regarding the Australian mortgage insurance sector towards the end of this article:

Stress Test

John Laker, head of APRA, is out today with a speech in which he announced the results of a recent APRA stress test of Australian banks. Here is the scenario and the results:

The ‘what if’ scenario was built around a further deterioration of global economic conditions, with a disorderly resolution of the fiscal problems in Europe triggering a dislocation in global debt markets and a sharp downturn in the North Atlantic economies. China is assumed to be unable to fully offset the decline in its exports with domestic spending and, as a result, the rate of growth of the Chinese economy slows sharply. The implied reduction in Chinese demand for minerals lowers commodity prices significantly, with a consequent deterioration in the exchange rate for the Australian dollar. Domestically, households and businesses respond to the external shock by reducing consumption and investment expenditure. As a result, GDP falls and unemployment rises substantially, which feeds back into rising defaults and sharp falls in house prices and commercial property prices.

In this scenario, the key macroeconomic parameters for Australia used as the basis for the stress test were:

  • a sharp (5 per cent) contraction in real GDP in the first year;
  • a rapid rise in the unemployment rate to a peak of 12 per cent;
  • a peak-to-trough fall in house prices of 35 per cent; and
  • a fall in commercial property prices of 40 per cent.

This is a tougher stress test than the one APRA undertook in 2010. The projected economic contraction is deeper and more prolonged, with a weaker recovery and a longer period before return to growth. The rise in unemployment is higher and the impact on the housing market therefore more pronounced; there is a greater peak-to-trough fall in house prices. This time, the stress test also addressed liquidity consequences. The dislocation in global debt markets results in the largest banks being unable to access global funding markets for six months. The consequence is more intense competition for deposit funding and an increase in funding costs, weighing on lending margins and acting as a drag on revenues.

Remember, this is a hypothetical. It is in no way a forecast or a central expectation for the course of the Australian economy. Rather, the stress test was intended to test the boundaries of ‘severe but plausible’, especially given the current relatively strong position of the Australian economy. Benchmarked against recent industry-wide stress tests in other countries, the severity is confirmed by the fact that the GDP shock is more than four standard deviations based on the annual volatility of GDP in Australia since 1960; the shock was one-to-three standard deviations in other major tests. As a test of plausibility, the macroeconomic scenario would be comparable with the actual experience of the United Kingdom, United States and some European countries during the global financial crisis.

Although the macroeconomic scenario was tougher than in the 2010 exercise, the actual mechanics of the stress test were largely the same. The advanced banks were asked to apply the macroeconomic scenario in their own models and provide their assessment, in quite granular detail, of the impact on the ratings migration of assets, default behaviour, profitability and capital. After analysing this information, APRA then determined a common set of portfolio-specific risk measures that were applied to the banks’ loan portfolios.

Reflecting the severity of the scenario, the advanced banks all reported significant losses, driven by much higher bad debt expenses. Credit loss rates in aggregate were comparable with the experience in the early 1990s, although not quite as high as the peaks then reached. As expected, total losses were larger than in the 2010 exercise.

Despite the deterioration in labour market conditions and the projected stress on the housing market, residential mortgages, which account for nearly half of the advanced banks’ credit exposures, contributed only a fifth of total losses. The mortgage portfolio alone was not the principal driver of losses, a reflection of the structure of the domestic mortgage market as well as the general tightening in lending standards following the crisis. Losses were realised across a range of loan portfolios, particularly corporate, SME and commercial property portfolios. Losses on these business portfolios were more front loaded, materialising earlier in the scenario than losses on residential mortgage portfolios, which tended to lag the increase in unemployment.

The main results of the stress test for the five advanced banks, taken as a group, are as follows:

  • none of the banks would have failed under the downturn macroecnomic scenario;
  • none of the banks would have breached the four per cent minimum Tier 1 capital requirement of the Basel II Framework in any year of the stress test;
  • and the weighted average reduction in Tier 1 capital ratios over the three-year stress period was 3.8 percentage points.

This is a very positive result. It reflects the efforts of the advanced banks to strengthen their Tier 1 capital positions since the crisis began through ordinary equity issues and profit retention. It leaves these banks well positioned to transition to the new Basel III capital regime.

Well…bonza! But just one question. What did the stress test assume about the Lenders Mortgage Insurance sector (LMIs)? They are those hapless gents sitting on wafer thin capital buffers but carrying the risk of all the banks’ riskiest mortgages.

If the APRA stress test assumed a smooth and uninterrupted flow of payouts for losses from the LMIs to the banks then it also assumed their defacto nationalisation. In reality, under extreme stress, there is a very serious risk is that the LMIs will be wiped out and their relationships with the banks will descend into legal chaos as the two parties aim to survive at the cost of one another. You may recall that the biggest losers on Wall St in the GFC were insurers (think AIG), not banks.

In short, in the kind of scenario painted by APRA, it is quite possible that the government would have to step in and the post-nationalised LMIs would continue to pump a river of public cash into the banks via a backdoor bailout (ala AIG in the US).

So, if we are to take this excellent stress test result seriously, we really need to know what APRA assumed about the LMIs. Hmm?

Reproduced with thanks to Houses and Holes at Macrobusiness.com.au

Markets Worry About Fiscal Cliff

Michael S. Derby writes about the looming fiscal cliff:

The central problem is the lack of change. President Barack Obama was reelected. Democrats retained control of the Senate, while Republicans held on to the House of Representatives. The fiscal cliff can only be resolved if lawmakers work together. “Returning to status quo likely means all sides see the voters as supporting their views, which means reaching compromise is not likely to get any easier,” economists at Bank of America Merrill Lynch warned clients.

Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-Ohio) says “the Republican majority in the House stands ready to work with [the President] to do what’s best for our country.” Republicans appear willing to accept additional tax revenues but their emphasis is on reforming entitlement programs and curbing “special interest loopholes and deductions”.

The Congressional Budget Office summarizes the fiscal cliff as:

Among the policy changes that are due to occur in January under current law, the following will have the largest impact on the budget and the economy:

  • A host of significant provisions of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-312) are set to expire, including provisions that extended reductions in tax rates and expansions of tax credits and deductions originally enacted in 2001, 2003, or 2009. (Provisions designed to limit the reach of the alternative minimum tax, or AMT, expired on December 31, 2011.)
  • Sharp reductions in Medicare’s payment rates for physicians’ services are scheduled to take effect.
  • Automatic enforcement procedures established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 to restrain discretionary and mandatory spending are set to go into effect.
  • Extensions of emergency unemployment benefits and a reduction of 2 percentage points in the payroll tax for Social Security are scheduled to expire.

The CBO estimates that increases in federal taxes and reductions in federal spending, totaling almost
$500 billion, will cause a 0.5 percent drop in GDP in 2013.