Forex: Aussie resistance, Yen falls

The Aussie Dollar rallied to $0.955 on the 2-hour chart before encountering selling pressure. Expect a test of the 2011 low at $0.94. Breach would indicate another decline. The next target is $0.90*, with a long-term target of $0.80*. Breakout above $0.955 is unlikely, but would re-test resistance at $0.98.

Aussie Dollar/USD

* Target calculations: 0.94 – ( 0.98 – 0.94 ) = 0.90 and 0.95 – ( 1.10 – 0.95 ) = 0.80

Canada’s Loonie, however, respected support at $0.96, heading for another test of resistance at $0.99 or parity. 13-Week Twiggs Momentum below zero suggests continuation of the down-trend. Respect of resistance would indicate another decline, with a target of $0.94*.

Canadian Loonie

* Target calculation: 0.97 – ( 1.00 – 0.97 ) = 0.94

The euro broke resistance at $1.32 and is headed for $1.37*. Breakout is some way off, but would offer a target of $1.47*.

Euro/USD

* Target calculation: 1.37 + ( 1.37 – 1.27 ) = 1.47

Pound Sterling broke resistance at $1.56, signaling an advance to $1.63*. Recovery of 13-week Twiggs Momentum above zero would strengthen the bull signal.
Pound Sterling

* Target calculation: 1.56 + ( 1.56 – 1.50 ) = 1.62

The greenback continues a strong correction against the Yen, but this is a secondary movement and the primary up-trend is unaltered. A 13-week Twiggs Momentum trough above zero would strengthen the signal. Recovery above resistance at ¥100 would signal a fresh advance with a target of ¥113*. Long-term target for the advance is the 2007 high at ¥125*.

USD/JPY

* Target calculations: (a) 104 + ( 104 – 95 ) = 113; (b) 100 + ( 100 – 75 ) = 125

Gold and Dollar fall

Gold retreated below support at $1400, indicating the end of the bear rally. Expect a test of primary support at $1320/$1340. Yesterday’s long tail is evidence of short-term buying pressure, so breach of primary support is not a certainty. Respect would suggest another test of $1400.

Spot Gold

* Target calculation: 1350 – ( 1500 – 1350 ) = 1200

Dollar Index

The Dollar Index is retreating after a false break above 84 on the monthly chart. Breach of support at 79 would complete a double top, signaling reversal to a down-trend. Fall of 13-week Twiggs Momentum below zero would strengthen the bear signal. Respect of the rising trendline remains as likely, however, and would signal a long-term advance to 89/90.

Dollar Index

Crude Oil

Crude is consolidating, with Brent likely to continue the down-trend after breaking support at $100/barrel. Respect of resistance at $106 would strengthen the signal. Nymex WTI, however,  is headed for resistance at $98. Breakout would signal an advance, but reversal below $90 is as likely and would test support at $85/barrel. The spread between the two is likely to narrow as the European economy under-performs the US.

Brent Crude and Nymex Crude

Commodities

A weakening Shanghai Composite Index is being followed lower by the Dow Jones/UBS Commodity Index. Breach of medium-term support at 130 would signal a test of  primary support at 125/126. Commodities remain in a primary down-trend and are likely to stay there unless China resumes major infrastructure investment. Not good news for Australian resources stocks.

Dow Jones UBS Commodities Index

S&P500 recovers as bond yields rise, but TSX weakens

10-Year Treasury yields respected support at 2.00%, confirming the primary up-trend. Only breakout above 4.00% would end the 31-year secular bear-trend, but a rise to there would result in an almost 50% loss for bondholders. Rising yields reflect market expectations that the economy will recover and the Fed will curtail further quantitative easing.

10-Year Treasury Yields

The S&P 500 respected support at 1600 and is headed for a test of the upper channel around 1700. Reversal below support at 1600 is now unlikely, but would warn of a correction.

S&P 500 Index
The VIX is rising, but remains in the green zone, below 20.

S&P 500 Index

The TSX Composite reversed below support at 12500, indicating weakness. Follow-through below last week’s low would suggest a test of primary support at 11900/12000. Bearish divergence on 13-week Twiggs Money Flow warns of selling pressure.

Nikkei 225 Index

Forex: Aussie falls but Euro and Yen unfazed

After a weak rally to $0.98, the Aussie Dollar broke primary support at $0.96, signaling a strong down-trend. Long-term target for the decline is $0.80*.

Aussie Dollar/USD

* Target calculation: 0.95 – ( 1.10 – 0.95 ) = 0.80

Canada’s Loonie is also likely to break support at $0.96, offering a long-term target of $0.82*.

Canadian Loonie

* Target calculation: 0.94 – ( 1.06 – 0.94 ) = 0.82

The euro, however, broke resistance at $1.30 and is headed for a test of $1.32. Breach of that level would offer a target of $1.36*. But respect of $1.32 would warn of a head and shoulders reversal — completed if support at $1.27 is broken.

Euro/USD

* Target calculation: 1.32 + ( 1.32 – 1.28 ) = 1.36

The greenback reversed sharply against the Yen in the last week, falling from ¥104 to ¥99. But the scale of the reversal is placed in its proper perspective on a monthly chart. The primary up-trend is unfazed, and recovery above resistance at ¥100 would signal a fresh advance with a target of ¥110*. The 30-year secular bear trend is over. Long-term target for the advance is the 2007 high at ¥125*.

USD/JPY

* Target calculations: (a) 104 + ( 104 – 99 ) = 109; (b) 100 + ( 100 – 75 ) = 125

The U.S. Health Care System Doesn’t Need Price Controls. It Needs Price Signals | Reason.com

Peter Suderman discusses two articles which attack the high cost of health care in the USA:

Both pieces offer essentially the same thesis: The U.S. spends too much on health care because the prices Americans pay for health care services are too high. And both implicitly nod toward more aggressive regulation of medical prices as a solution.

…..most Americans don’t actually know much of anything at all about the prices they pay for health services. That’s because Americans don’t pay those prices themselves. Instead, they pay subsidized premiums for insurance provided through their employers, or they pay taxes and get Medicare or Medicaid……

What that means is that, in an important sense, the “prices” for health care services in America are not really prices at all. A better way to label them might be reimbursements—planned by Medicare bureaucrats and powerful physician advisory groups, negotiated by insurers who keep a watchful eye on the prices that Medicare charges, and only very occasionally paid by individuals, few of whom are shopping based on price and service quality…..

This is the real problem with health care pricing in the U.S.: not the lack of sufficiently aggressive price controls, but the lack of meaningful price signals.

The US spends about two-and-a-half times the OECD average for healthcare, while life expectancy at 79.7 years is lower than the OECD average of 79.8 years, according to PBS News Hour.

The Lombardy region of Italy offers the best health care solution I have come across, using price signals to control cost and quality of service in both state and private medical facilities.

Margherita Stancati at WSJ online writes:

Like other European countries, Italy offers universal health-care coverage backed by the state. Italians can go to a public hospital, for example, without involving an insurance company. The patients are charged a small co-pay, but most of the bill is paid by the government. As a result, the great majority of Italians don’t bother to buy private health insurance unless they want to seek treatment from private doctors or hospitals, which are relatively few.

Offering guaranteed reimbursements to public hospitals, though, took away the hospitals’ incentive to improve service or rein in costs. Inefficiencies were rampant as a result, and the quality of Italy’s public health care suffered for years. Months-long waiting lists became the norm for nonemergency procedures—even heart surgery—in most of the country.

Big changes came in 1997, when Italy’s national government decentralized the country’s health-care system, giving the regions control over the public money that goes to hospitals within their own borders…..

In much of the country, regions have continued to use the standards of care and reimbursement rates recommended by Rome. Some also give preferential treatment to public hospitals, making it more difficult for private hospitals to qualify for public funds.

Lombardy, by contrast, has increased its quality standards, set its own reimbursement rates and, most important, put public and private hospitals on an equal footing by making each equally eligible for public funds. If a hospital meets the quality standards and charges the accepted reimbursement rate, it qualifies. Patients are free to choose between state-run and publicly funded private hospitals at no extra cost. Their co-pay is the same in either case. As a result, public and many private hospitals in Lombardy compete directly for patients and funds.

…..Around 30% of hospital care in Lombardy is private now—more than anywhere else in Italy. And service in both the private and public sector has improved.

Read more at The U.S. Health Care System Doesn’t Need Price Controls. It Needs Price Signals. – Hit & Run : Reason.com.

Bearish signs for stocks

10-Year Treasury yields respected support at 2.05/2.10% with a key reversal (or outside reversal) on Friday, signaling a primary up-trend and possible test of 4.00% in the next few years. The tall shadow on Friday’s candle, however, warns of another test of the new support level before the trend gets under way. Only breakout above 4.00% would end the 31-year secular bear-trend.

10-Year Treasury Yields

The S&P 500 is headed for a test of the lower trend channel at 1600,  declining 21-day Twiggs Money Flow indicating medium-term selling pressure. Breach of support at 1600 would warn of a correction.

S&P 500 Index
The VIX is rising, but only breakout above 20 would indicate something is amiss.

S&P 500 Index

Japan’s Nikkei 225 Index ran into huge selling pressure, falling to 13400 by midday Monday. Expect a test of support at 11500, but the primary trend remains upward. Rising industrial production indicates that Abenomics is starting to take effect.

Nikkei 225 Index

The UK’s FTSE 100 also ran into selling pressure — at its 2007 high of 6750 — with bearish divergence on 13-week Twiggs Money Flow. Expect a correction to test 6000, but the primary trend remains upward.
FTSE 100 Index

Bearish divergence on the Shanghai Composite Index (21-day Twiggs Money Flow) indicates medium-term selling pressure. Expect another test of primary support at 2170. Penetration of the rising trendline would confirm. Breakout above 2460 would complete an inverted head and shoulders reversal (as indicated by orange + green arrows), signaling a primary up-trend, but that appears some way off.

Shanghai Composite Index

Impact of QE (or lack thereof) is reflected by excess reserves

JKH at Monetary Realism writes:

….there is a systematic tendency in the blogosphere and elsewhere to misrepresent the impact of QE in a particular way in terms of the related macroeconomic flow of funds…… Most descriptions will erroneously treat the macro flow as if banks were the original portfolio source of the bonds that are being sold to the Fed, obtaining reserves in exchange. This is not the case. A cursory scan of Fed flow of funds statistics will confirm that commercial banks are relatively small holders of bonds in their portfolios, especially Treasury bonds. The vast proportion of bonds that are sold to the Fed in QE originate from non-bank portfolios……. Many descriptions of QE instead erroneously suggest the strong presence of a bank principal function in which bonds from bank portfolios are simply exchanged for reserves. In fact, for the most part, while the banking system has received reserve credit for bonds sold to the Fed, it has also passed on credits to the accounts of non-bank customers who have sold their bonds to the banks. This is integral to the overall QE flow of bonds.

There is a simpler explanation of what happens when the Fed purchases bonds under QE. Bank balance sheets expand as sellers deposit the sale proceeds with their bank. In addition to the deposit liability the bank also receives an asset, being a credit to its account with the Fed. Unless the bank is able to make better use of its asset by making loans to credit-worthy borrowers, the funds are likely to remain on deposit at the Fed as excess reserves — earning interest at 0.25% per year. Excess reserves on deposit at the Fed currently stand at close to $1.8 trillion, reflecting the dearth of (reasonably secure) lending/investment opportunities in the broader economy.

Read more at The Accounting Quest of Steve Keen | Monetary Realism.

Scott Sumner: “It’s Complicated: The Great Depression in the US” | The Market Monetarist

Lars Christensen writes of a 2010 lecture by Scott Sumner did at Oxford Hayek Society on the causes of the Great Depression.

Scott does a great job showing that policy failure – both in the terms of monetary policy and labour market regulation – caused and prolonged the Great Depression. Hence, the Great Depression was not a result of an inherent instability of the capitalist system.

Unfortunately policy makers today seems to have learned little from history and as a result they are repeating many of the mistakes of the 1930s. Luckily we have not seen the same kind of mistakes on the supply side of the economy as in the 1930s, but in terms of monetary policy many policy makers seems to have learned very little.

Scott Sumner - Click to play Video

Click to open video on separate page 1:06:12

Read more at Scott Sumner: “It’s Complicated: The Great Depression in the US” | The Market Monetarist.

Too-big-to-fail Q&A. Get the facts | Sober Look

Interesting pro-bank piece by Sober Look. I have added my comments in italics.

The debate around “too big to fail” of the US banking system is often infused with political rhetoric and media hype. Let’s go through some Q&A on the subject and discuss the facts.

Q: Did large banks take disproportionate amounts of real-estate related risk vs. smaller banks prior to the crisis?

A: No. That’s a myth. Smaller banks were much more exposed to real estate (see discussion).

The issue is not real estate lending, but risky lending.

Q: Who had their snouts in the sub-prime trough, big banks or small banks?

A: Big banks.

Q: Which “too big to fail” banks were directly bailed out by the US federal authorities during the 2008 crisis?

A: While hundreds of banks were forced to take TARP funds, only Citigroup (among US banks) received an explicit bailout to keep it afloat. Note that Bear Stearns (and Lehman), AIG, GM/GMAC, Chrysler, Fannie and Freddie were not banks. Neither was GE Capital and other corporations who relied on commercial paper funding and needed the Fed’s help to keep them afloat. Wachovia may have become the second such large bank if it wasn’t purchased by Wells.

Q: Which “too big to fail” banks were indirectly bailed out by the US federal authorities during the 2008 crisis?

A: All of them

Q: Why did Citi fail in 2008?

A: Citi ran into trouble because of a massive off-balance-sheet portfolio the firm funded with commercial paper. In late 2007, when the commercial paper market dried up, Citi was forced to take these assets onto its balance sheet. The bank was not sufficiently capitalized to absorb the losses resulting from these assets being written down.

Citi was not the only TBTF bank that was inadequately capitalized to deal with losses.

Q: What were the assets Citi was “warehousing” off-balance-sheet?

A: A great deal of that portfolio was the “AAA” and other senior tranches of CDOs that Citi often helped originate (including mortgage related assets). Rating agencies were instrumental in helping banks like Citi structure these assets and keep them off balance sheet in CP conduits.

Q: Who paid the rating agencies?

A: The TBTF banks.

Q: Why did Citi (as well as many other banks) hold so much off-balance sheet?

A: Because they received a significantly more favorable capital treatment by doing so (the so-called “regulatory capital arbitrage” – see discussion from 2009).

Q: Did Citi break any state or federal laws by doing what it did?

A: No. All of this was perfectly legal and federal authorities were aware of these structures.

We need to fix the law so this cannot happen again.

Q: Did derivatives positions play a major role in Citi’s failure? Were other large US banks at risk of failure due to derivatives positions?

A: No. That’s a myth. The bulk of structured credit positions (tranches) that brought down Citi were not derivatives (just to be clear, CDOs are not derivatives).

Q: What has been done since 2008 to make sure the Citi situation doesn’t happen again?

A: The US regulators now have the ability to take over and manage an orderly unwind of any large US chartered bank. Banks are required to create a “living will” to guide the regulators in the unwind process. The goal is to force losses on creditors in an orderly fashion without significant disruptions to the financial system and without utilizing taxpayer money.

Large banking institutions are now required to have more punitive capital ratios than smaller banks.

Capital loopholes related to off-balance-sheet positions have been closed.

Stress testing conducted by the Fed takes into account on- and off-balance sheet assets, forcing banks to maintain sufficient capital to be able to take a hit. US banks more than doubled the weighted average tier one common equity ratio since the crisis (see attached).

Dodd-Frank has been “nobbled” by Wall Street lobbyists. Stress tests by captive regulators are not to be trusted. Increase transparency by supporting the Brown-Vitter bill.

Q: Do large US banks have a funding advantage relative to small banks?

A: Not any longer. According to notes from the meeting of the Federal Advisory Council

and the Board of Governors (attached – h/t Colin Wiles ‏@forteology), “Studies point to a significant decrease in any funding advantage that large U.S. financial institutions may have had in the past relative to smaller financial institutions and also relative to nonfinancial institutions at comparable ratings levels. Increased capital and liquidity, in addition to meeting the demands of many regulatory bodies, has largely, if not entirely, eroded any cost-of-funding advantage that large banks may have had.”

And we should believe them?

Q: Why do TBTF banks dominate the financial landscape?

A: Because of their taxpayer-subsidised funding advantage.

Q: What is the downside of breaking up banks like JPMorgan?

A: Large US corporations need large banks to provide credit and capital markets access/services (Boeing is not going to use Queens County Savings Bank). Without large US banks, US companies will turn to foreign banks and will be at the mercy of those institutions’ capital availability and regulatory frameworks. Foreign banks will also begin dominating US capital markets primary activities (bond issuance, IPOs, debt syndications, etc.) And in an event of a credit crisis foreign banks (who are to some extent controlled by foreign governments) will give priority to their domestic corporations, putting US firms at risk.

Agreed. Large corporations need large banks — or at least syndicates of mid-sized banks. Brown-Vitter does not propose breaking up any TBTF banks, merely requires them to clean up their balance sheets and carry adequate capital against risk exposure.

Q: How large are US largest banks relative to the US total economic output? How does it compare to other countries?

A: See chart below (the chart contrasts bank size as percentage of GDP of Swiss and UK banks to US banks)

Swiss and UK banks have global reach so rather compare absolute size rather than relative to GDP where the bank is headquartered.

So before jumping on the “too big to fail” bandwagon, get the facts.

via Sober Look: Too-big-to-fail Q&A. Get the facts.

I had to smile at the From our Sponsors Google ad at the end of the article, suggesting I open a business account with one of the major banks.

Trust: Easy to Break, Hard to Repair | WSJ

Excellent interview of renowned short-seller Jim Chanos by Jason Zweig. Chanos list three reasons why the average investor is right not to trust the integrity of the financial markets…

First, in recent years financial fraud has rarely been detected and exposed by the people the public might reasonably expect to do so: accountants, regulators and law-enforcement authorities, whom Chanos calls “the normal guardians of the marketplace.” Instead, frauds more often have been rooted out by whistleblowers, short-sellers and journalists.

Second, prosecutions of financial crimes are essential in the minds of investors, but are discretionary in the eyes of government officials….. the so-called too big to jail rationale.

Third, individual investors will never trust the market until these issues are addressed.

To me the list is too short.

Chanos fails to mention the revolving door between Washington and Wall Street where regulators frequently swap sides — working for government the one day and in high-paying jobs on Wall Street the next — and have one eye on their career path rather than focusing on their current job.

Fifth, the massive financial leverage that Wall Street has on Capitol Hill where Congressmen, dependent on fundraisers sponsored by Wall Street lobbyists, allow same lobbyists to write some of the legislation that passes through the house.

Read more at Trust: Easy to Break, Hard to Repair – Total Return – WSJ.