Fiona Hill | Putin is pushing our buttons

British-born Fiona Hill is an expert on Russia and Vladimir Putin and served as security adviser to US Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump. Her take on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that Vladimir Putin still thinks he is winning. The Kremlin has a far higher tolerance for troop losses than Western governments and Putin believes that he can grind out a victory of sorts. He thinks he has the upper hand in terms of leverage, through his influence on energy markets and food shortages, and is prepared to wait out the West — waiting for them to lose patience and attempt to force a negotiated settlement.

“Putin is a contingency planner. If one thing doesn’t work, he’ll try another. If things get dire, expect more nuclear sabre-rattling. They already rhetorically deployed nuclear weapons, and used them, on national television.

Bear in mind they take a very careful read of us and how we react. Think about when they moved through the Chernobyl exclusion zone into Ukraine….People said they wouldn’t possibly do that but they did. This scares the heck out of everyone….Same thing with Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. They deliberately shelled it. Think about the timing. It was just when Germany and Japan were considering recommissioning their nuclear power plants. All this happens because Putin knows he can push our buttons. He knows our fears and can play to those fears.”

The West has to get ahead of this. But we always tend to do things too late. Earlier action in Ukraine — in terms of supplying weapons — may have deterred Putin.

“Putin and the Kremlin have a major advantage: continuity. They have been in power for a long time and have no effective opposition.

The West, by contrast, has no continuity. This is the main obstacle to getting ahead of the game. Democracies tend to lose focus over time…..The more domestic problems you have, the more likely you are to lose focus.

….Putin’s business is to find points of leverage.

Political donations. Corruption. Germany’s pact with the devil — it’s economy is built on reliance on cheap Russian gas. We have to wind this all back.

CGEP | The energy transition will be massively disruptive

Jason Bordoff, Founding Director, The Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University:

“We are going to have a severe energy crisis in Europe this winter. That’s almost inevitable.”

Margin debt plunges 30%

Margin debt has fallen more than 30% from its October ’21 peak. That is a similar range to the 2020 contraction, during the pandemic, but far behind the +50% contractions seen during the Dotcom crash (2000-2002) and the global financial crisis (2007-2009).

S&P 500 & Margin Debt

The S&P fell 49% during the Dotcom crash and 57% during the GFC. The low point in June showed a 24% fall, from the January peak, followed by a 7.5% rally.

S&P 500

Conclusion

Plunging margin debt confirms a bear market, in line with the Fed’s plan to force deleveraging in order to shrink aggregate demand and curb inflation.

The current rally on the S&P 500 is typical of a reflexive rally in the middle of a bear market. We expect further contraction in margin debt as interest rates rise and liquidity tightens. Our target is a 50% contraction in margin debt, with a similar fall in the S&P 500, to 2400.

Acknowledgements

  • Hat tip to Advisor Perspectives for the margin debt chart
  • FINRA for the margin debt data

Stan Druckenmiller | The 2022 tech bubble and recession

https://youtu.be/GoD-dIDzzfA

Stanley Druckenmiller, former partner of George Soros, runs his own family office at Duquesne Capital. His record of compounding assets at 30%+ per year for 30 straight years is unmatched.

Ed Morse | Oil will fall to $85 per barrel

Citi’s Ed Morse says that supply is growing faster than expected, while demand is contracting as recession fears grow. His base case is that crude will fall to $85 per barrel.

Global recession warning

Copper broke primary support at $9,000 per metric ton, signaling a bear market. Known as “Dr Copper” because of its prescient ability to predict the direction of the global economy, copper’s sharp fall warns of a global recession dead ahead.

Copper (S1)

The Dow Jones Industrial Metals Index broke support at 175, confirming the above bear signal. A Trend Index peak at zero warns of strong selling pressure across base metals.

DJ Industrial Metals Index (BIM)

Iron ore retreated below $125 per metric ton, warning of another test of $90. Further sign of a slowing global economy.

Iron Ore (TR)

The Australian Dollar is another strong indicator of the commodity cycle. After breaking primary support at 70 US cents, follow-through below support at 68.5 confirms a bear market. A Trend Index peak at zero warns of selling pressure.

Australian Dollar (AUDUSD)

Brent crude remains high, however, propped up by shortages due to sanctions on Russian oil. Penetration of the secondary trendline (lime green) is likely, as signs of a slowing economy accumulate. Breach of support at $100 per barrel is less likely, but would confirm a global recession.

Brent Crude (CB)

Long-term interest rates are falling, with the 10-year Treasury yield reversing below 3.0%, as signs of a US contraction accumulate.

10-Year Treasury Yield

ISM new orders fell to their lowest level since May 2020, in the midst of the pandemic.

ISM New Orders

The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow forecast for Q2 dropped sharply, to an annualized real GDP growth rate of -2.08%.

Atlanta Fed GDPNow

Conclusion

We would assign probability of a global recession this year as high as 70%.

Oscar Wilde | Price versus value

Nowadays people know the price of everything and the value of nothing.

~ Oscar Wilde

Oscar Wilde | Without order nothing can exist….

Without order nothing can exist — without chaos nothing can evolve.

~ Oscar Wilde

Strong hands or weak hands

“Nowadays people know the price of everything and the value of nothing.”  ~ Oscar Wilde

Strong hands are long-term investors, including most institutional investors, who focus on intrinsic value and are insensitive to price.

Weak hands and leveraged investors are highly sensitive to price. They follow the news cycle in an often unsuccessful attempt to to time purchases and sales according to short-term, often random, fluctuations in price.

Weak hands respond emotionally to price movements — making it difficult to be objective in  their decisions to buy or sell — while strong hands focus on dividends and other measures of long-term value.

Strong hands recognize that the biggest obstacle to sound investing is their own emotional response to rising or falling prices. Weak hands submit to the psychological pressure, make frequent buy and sell decisions, and find it difficult to be objective. Strong hands detach themselves as far as possible from the price cycle and the emotional pressures that accompany it.

At the peak of the investment cycle, weak hands pay way above fair value for stocks, while strong hands resist the urge to buy when price exceeds their own objective view of long-term fair value.

Fair Value

As confidence decays and prices fall, weak hands are shaken out of their positions. Margin calls force some to liquidate while others sell through through fear — failing to recognize that anxiety is the primary cause of falling prices. Some try to hold on to their positions but eventually succumb to the pressure. The mental anguish of watching their stocks fall often drives them to sell at way below fair value — just to end the pain.

Strong hands are patient, independent of the herd, and unmoved by the wild emotional swings of bull and bear markets. They wait for stock prices to fall to below fair value, when opportunity is at its maximum. Stocks that are gradually recovering from a steep sell-off and scarce retail buyers are signs that a bottom has been reached.

Recency bias

One of the key benefits of years of investing, through several stock market cycles, is the ability to recognize the familiar signs of euphoria in a bull market and despondency in a bear market. When it seems that the bull market will never end, that is normally a sign that risk is elevated. Conversely, opportunity is at its maximum when an air of despair and despondency descends on the investing public.

Don’t confuse price with value

Price seldom equates to value.

Short-term investors confuse price with value, making them vulnerable to wild price swings which can weaken the resolve of even the most hardened investors.

Long-term investors hold the majority of their investments through several  investment cycles, pruning only those stocks where long-term revenue growth or profit margins have been permanently affected and are unlikely to recover.

Supply and demand

Many readers are familiar with supply and demand curves from basic economics. For those who are not, here’s a quick refresher:

  • The supply curve, represented by the red line on the chart below, represents the quantity available for sale (bottom axis) at any given price (left axis). The higher the price, the greater the supply.
  • The demand curve, represented by the blue line on the chart below, represents the quantity that buyers are willing to purchase (bottom axis) at any given price (left axis). The lower the price, the greater the demand1.
  • Price is determined by the intersection of the two curves, maximizing the value achieved — at quantity sold (Q1) and price (P1) — giving value of Q1*P1.

Supply & Demand

Bear markets

In a bear market, the supply curve moves to the right as weak hands are influenced by falling prices and a negative media cycle. Note that the bottom end of the curve shifts a lot more than the top — strong hands are relatively unmoved by market sentiment.

Price falls steeply, from P1 to P2, as weak hands increase the quantity available for sale. Volume sold increases from Q1 to Q2.

Bear Market

We need to be careful not to equate the price at P1 or P2 with value. They may reflect the marginal price at which you can acquire new stock (or sell existing holdings) but they do not reflect the price at which strong hands are prepared to sell. That is why takeover offers are normally priced at a substantial premium to the current traded stock price. If you had to increase the quantity that you want to purchase to Q3, you would have to move up the supply curve, to the right, and price increases to P3 in order to attract more sellers2.

Market capitalization, likewise, is simply the number of shares in issue multiplied by the current traded stock price and is not a reflection of the intrinsic value of a company.

Conclusion

Investors need to have a clear idea of their investment time frame and adjust their approach accordingly.

One of the worst possible mistakes is indecision. If undecided, you are likely to be caught between two stools, buying late in an up-trend and selling late in a down-trend.

If you are a weak hand, it is far better to recognize that. Resist buying near the top of the cycle; apply sound money management — position-sizing is vital if you are focused on price; sell early, at the first signs of a bear market; and never, ever trade against the trend.

If you are a strong hand, never confuse price with value. Focus on dividends and other long-term measures of value; stay detached from the herd; and have the patience to wait for opportunity when prices are trading at way below fair value.

“The stock market remains an exceptionally efficient mechanism for the transfer of wealth from the impatient to the patient.”

~ Warren Buffett

 

Notes

  1. Discussion of inelastic supply curves and negative-sloping demand curves is beyond the scope of this article.
  2. P3 will shift to P3′ in a bear market.

Acknowledgements

Hat tip to RBC Wealth Management for the investment cycle chart to which we added fair value.

 

Jay Powell is selling but the bond market isn’t buying

Fed Chairman Jerome Powell declared that the Fed’s commitment to taming inflation is “unconditional”:

June 23 (Reuters) – The Federal Reserve’s commitment to reining in 40-year-high inflation is “unconditional,” Powell told lawmakers on Thursday, even as he acknowledged that sharply higher interest rates may push up unemployment.

“We really need to restore price stability … because without that we’re not going to be able to have a sustained period of maximum employment where the benefits are spread very widely,” the Fed Chairman told the U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee.

Under questioning by members of the House panel on Thursday, Powell said there was a risk the Fed’s actions could lead to a rise in unemployment. “We don’t have precision tools,” he said, “so there is a risk that unemployment would move up, from what is historically a low level though. A labor market with 4.1% or 4.3% unemployment is still a very strong labor market.”

He also dismissed cutting interest rates if unemployment were to rise while inflation remained high. “We can’t fail on this: we really have to get inflation down to 2%,” he said.

The Fed chief was also asked about the central bank’s balance sheet, which was built up to around $9 trillion during the pandemic in an effort to ease financial conditions and is now being pared. The Fed aims to get it “roughly in the range of $2.5 or $3 trillion smaller than it is now,” Powell said.

But the bond market isn’t buying it. Treasury yields from 2-year to 30-year are compressed in a narrow band above 3%, indicating a flat yield curve. Expectations are that the Fed can’t go much higher than 3.0% to 3.5%.

Treasury Yield Curve

The dot plot from the last FOMC meeting similarly projects a 3.4% fed funds rate by the end of 2022, 3.8% by 2023, and lower at 3.4% by the end of 2024.

FOMC Dot Plot

You cannot cure inflation with a Fed funds rate (FFR) of 3.5%.

CPI is growing at 8.6% YoY, while the FFR target maximum is 1.75%. Another 1.75% just won’t cut it. You have to hike rates above inflation. Positive real interest rates are the best antidote for inflation but the economy, in its current precarious state, could not withstand this.

Fed Funds Rate & CPI

Taming inflation in the 1980s

Paul Volcker killed inflation by hiking the fed funds rate to 20% in 1980, but we live in a different world.

In 1980, federal debt to GDP was less than 50% of GDP. Today it’s 118%.

Federal Debt/GDP

The Federal deficit was 2.5% of GDP. Now it’s 12%.

Federal Deficit/GDP

Private debt (excluding the financial sector) was 1.35 times GDP in 1980. Now it’s more than double.

Private Non-Financial Debt/GDP

Powell can’t hike rates like Volcker. If he tried, he would collapse the economy and the US Treasury would be forced to default on its debt. Collapse of the global reserve asset is about as close as you can get to financial Armageddon.

Pricking the bubble

Instead, the Fed plans to use QT to deflate the asset bubbles in stocks and housing, in the hope that a reverse wealth effect — as households feel poorer — will slow consumer spending and reduce inflation.

So far, the S&P 500 has dropped by 25% and the housing market is likely to follow. The 30-year mortgage rate has climbed to 5.81%, more than double the rate in August last year.

30-Year Fixed Mortgage Rate

Housing starts and permits are both declining.

Housing Starts & Permits

Powell talks of a $2.5 to $3.0 trillion reduction in the Fed’s balance sheet. That would increase the supply of Treasuries and MBS in financial markets by an equivalent amount which would be sucked out of the stock market, causing a fall in prices.

The two largest foreign investors in US Treasuries — Japan and China — have also both become net sellers to support their currencies against the rising Dollar. That will further increase the supply of Treasuries, causing an outflow from stocks.

Since 2009, stock market capitalization increased by $47.4 trillion, from $16.9T to $64.3T at the end of Q1. At the same time, the Fed’s balance sheet increased by $7.9 trillion, from $0.9T to $8.8T. Market cap increased by $6T for every $1T increase in the Fed’s balance sheet (QE). The multiplier effect is 6 times (47.4/7.9).

Stock Market Capitalization & Fed Total Assets

If the Fed were to shrink its balance sheet by $2.5 trillion and net foreign sales  of Treasuries amount to another $0.5 trillion, we could expect a similar multiplier effect to cause an $18 trillion fall in market capitalization ($3Tx6). Market cap would fall to $50T or 26.5% from its $68T peak in Q4 of 2021.

That’s just the start.

“Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”

Nobel prize-winner Milton Friedman argued that long-term increases or decreases in the general price level were caused by changes in the supply of money and not by shortages or surpluses of oil, commodities or labor.

The chart below shows the supply of money (M2) as a percentage of GDP. The economy thrived with M2 below 50% throughout the Dotcom boom of the late 1990s but has since grown bloated with liquidity as the Fed tried to revive the economy from the massive supply shock of China’s admission to the World Trade Organization in 2002 — the introduction of hundreds of millions of workers earning roughly 1/30th of Western-level wages.

Money Supply (M2)/GDP

The massive supply shock helped to contain prices over the next two decades, perpetuating the myth of the Great Moderation — that the Fed had finally tamed inflation. Fed hubris led them to pursue easier monetary policy with little fear of  inflationary consequences.

All illusions eventually come to an end, however, and the 2020 pandemic caused the Fed to purchase trillions of Dollars of securities to support massive government stimulus payments. The MMT experiment failed disastrously, causing a $5 trillion spike in M2 without an accompanying rise in GDP. M2 spiked up from an already bloated 70% of GDP to more than 90%, before GDP recovered slightly to reduce it to the current 89%.

Trade tensions with China, coupled with supply chain disruptions from the 2020 pandemic and a sharp rise in natural gas prices — as industry switched from coal to reduce CO2 emissions — triggered price increases. These were aggravated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and resulting sanctions, leading to oil shortages.

Normally, high prices are the cure for high prices. Consumers cut back purchases in response to high prices and demand falls to the point that it matches available supply. Prices then stabilize.

But consumers are sitting on a mountain of cash, as illustrated in the above M2 chart. They continued spending despite higher prices and demand didn’t fall. Investors who have access to cheap debt also, quite rationally, borrow to buy appreciating real assets. Unfortunately cheap leverage is seldom channeled into productive investment and instead fuels expanding asset bubbles in homes and equities.

The Fed is forced to intervene, employing demand destruction, through rate hikes and QT deflate asset bubbles, to reduce consumer spending.

An unwelcome side-effect of demand destruction is that it also destroys jobs. Unemployment rises and eventually the Fed is forced to relent.

Conclusion

Fed Chairman Jerome Powell says that the Fed’s commitment to reining in inflation is “unconditional” but the bond market is pricing in rate hikes peaking between 3.0% and 3.5%, way below the current rate of inflation. The economy is unlikely to be able to withstand more because of precarious levels of debt to GDP and a massive fiscal deficit.

Instead, the Fed plans to shrink their balance sheet by $2.3 to $3 trillion. QT is expected to deflate asset bubbles in stocks and housing and achieve a reverse wealth effect. Households are likely to curb spending as their net worth falls and they feel poorer.

Unfortunately, demand destruction from rate hikes and QT will also cause unemployment, inevitably leading to a recession. The Fed seems to think that the economy is resilient because unemployment is low and job openings outnumber unemployed workers by almost 2 to 1.

Job Openings & Unemployment (U3)

But elevated debt levels and rapidly rising credit spreads could precipitate a sharp deleveraging, with crumbling asset prices, rising layoffs and credit defaults.

High Yield Spreads

The Fed may also manage to lower prices through demand destruction but inflation is likely to rear its head again when they start easing. Surging inflation is likely to repeat until the Fed addresses the underlying issue: an excessive supply of money.

Milton Friedman was a scholar of the Great Depression of the 1930s which he attributed to mistakes by the Fed:

“The Fed was largely responsible for converting what might have been a garden-variety recession, although perhaps a fairly severe one, into a major catastrophe. Instead of using its powers to offset the depression, it presided over a decline in the quantity of money by one-third from 1929 to 1933 … Far from the depression being a failure of the free-enterprise system, it was a tragic failure of government.”

Ben Bernanke, another scholar of the Great Depression, acknowledged this during his tenure as Fed Chairman:

“Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would like to say to Milton (Friedman) and Anna (Schwarz): Regarding the Great Depression, you’re right. We did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.”

Instead the Fed made the opposite mistake. By almost doubling the quantity of money (M2) relative to GDP (output) they have created an entirely different kind of monster.

Money Supply (M2)/GDP

Slaying the beast of inflation is likely to prove just as difficult as ending the deflationary spiral of the 1930s.