Phoney recovery?

First signs of recovery after a recession are normally rising earnings, initially from corporate cost-cutting but followed up with rising revenues.

With massive central bank pump priming — referred to by Mark Mobius here — this time may be different. Flows of new money from central bank balance sheet expansion are likely to find their way into the stock market — and even the housing market — driving up prices. But consumption is lagging with slow growth in employment and average wages. With lackluster sales growth, earnings are likely to remain sluggish. Which means inflated stock market valuations and high price-earnings ratios as stocks are driven into over-bought territory. Not a solid foundation for a sustained recovery but another rung up the ladder of risk.

How cancelling central banks’ holdings of government debt could be a useful thing | FT Alphaville

FT’s Kate Mackenzie writes: Morgan Stanley cross-asset strategist Gerard Minack says the remarkable thing about developed economy deleveraging is how little of it has happened:

The credit super-cycle ended four years ago, but leverage has hardly fallen in major economies: debt-to-GDP ratios remain historically high.

Debt To GDP Ratio

Minack says the problem is some of that deleveraging (particularly for households) is being tackled by saving more, but that won’t solve the problem, or at least not very quickly. This is because of what the borrowings were used to finance: mostly pre-existing assets (that were forecast to rise in value) rather than expenditure.

There is a simple reason why deleveraging is taking so long: governments are borrowing money (deficit-spending) to offset private sector deleveraging and avert a deflationary spiral. So overall (non-financial) debt to GDP ratios, which include government debt, are almost unchanged.

That is not necessarily a bad thing — unless you would prefer a 1930s-style 50% drop in GDP after a deflationary spiral. What can be destructive is funding government deficits from offshore because you eventually have to pay the money back. Far better to borrow from yourself — in other words your “independent” central bank. That way you never have to pay it back.

As for canceling central bank holdings of government debt. Why bother? Interest payments made on the debt go right back to the Treasury as central bank profit distributions. And why set a precedent? I doubt many would believe government promises that this was a once-off and would never be repeated…….until next time.

via How cancelling central banks’ holdings of government debt could be a useful thing | FT Alphaville.

Fed set to unveil extra asset purchases – FT.com

Robin Harding at FT writes:

The other issue on the agenda is replacing the FOMC’s current forecast that rates will stay low until mid-2015 with a set of preconditions for the economy to reach before it considers raising rates. “I now think a threshold of 6.5 per cent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2.5 per cent . . . would be appropriate,” said Charles Evans, president of the Chicago Fed…..

The problem is that both of these thresholds are moving targets:

  • Unemployment is based on surveys and only includes those who have actively sought a job in recent weeks. It fluctuates with the participation rate.
  • Inflation is also subjective, dependent on the basket of goods measured and estimates of housing inflation that are subject to manipulation.

Targeting nominal GDP growth would be far more accurate.

via Fed set to unveil extra asset purchases – FT.com.

China: Uncertain foundations – FT.com

Simon Rabinovitch at FT writes:

Shadow banking is flourishing in China, helping to make non-bank institutions as big a source of credit as banks themselves since July – something that has never happened before. Chinese bankers, leading rating agencies and the International Monetary Fund have all warned about risks from the surge in loosely regulated lending, with some even pointing to parallels with developed economies before the global financial crisis. But the Chinese government itself has taken a permissive stance.

Highly regulated banks restricted lending to property developers following concerns over a real estate bubble. But regulators turned a blind eye to unregulated shadow lenders who borrow short — normally no more than 3 months — and lend long. They may believe this will sustain economic growth while protecting banks from risky lending. The thinly capitalized sector, however, is at risk from defaults and a consequent liquidity crisis which could spread to the banking sector.

via Uncertain foundations – FT.com.

IMF: Australia's banks need more capital

The IMF identifies risks to Australia’s banking system:

  • Residential mortgages are banks’ single largest asset, and a combination of high household debt and elevated house prices increases the risk in this portfolio.
  • Banks rely on funding from outside the country, and with the crisis in Europe and the global economy suffering, these funding sources are volatile.
  • Four major banks dominate the banking system, and they share many similarities that can be a cause of risk spreading from one to another in the event of a crisis.

……The four major banks are systemically important which means difficulties in any one of them would have severe repercussions for the financial system and the economy. A higher minimum capital requirement would provide a bigger cushion against potential losses.

Capital ratios may under-state capital requirements through risk-weighting assets. Past performance is not always a good predictor of the future. I prefer FDIC director Thomas Hoenig’s unweighted comparison of tangible assets to tangible equity.

via IMF Survey: Australia’s Banks Sturdy, Closely Connected.

The “Export Price Norm” saved Australia from the Great Recession « The Market Monetarist

The Market Monetarist writes how a combination of luck and good policy saved Australia from recession.

Milton Friedman once said never to underestimate the importance of luck of nations. I believe that is very true and I think the same goes for central banks. Some nations came through the shock in 2008-9 much better than other nations and obviously better policy and particularly better monetary policy played a key role. However, luck certainly also played a role…..

via The “Export Price Norm” saved Australia from the Great Recession « The Market Monetarist.

Shadow Banking Grows to $67 Trillion Industry, Regulators Say – Bloomberg

Ben Moshinsky and Jim Brunsden write:

The size [$67 trillion] of the shadow banking system, which includes the activities of money market funds, monoline insurers and off- balance sheet investment vehicles, “can create systemic risks” and “amplify market reactions when market liquidity is scarce,” the Financial Stability Board said in a report, which utilized more data than last year’s probe into the sector……

via Shadow Banking Grows to $67 Trillion Industry, Regulators Say – Bloomberg.

The Foolproof Way

In his 2003 paper Escaping from a Liquidity Trap and Deflation: The Foolproof Way and Others Lars E.O. Svensson describes his Foolproof Way of escaping from a liquidity trap — experienced by countries such as Japan, and lately the US, when central bank interest rates are close to zero.

The Foolproof Way consequently consists of announcing and implementing three measures: 1) an upward-sloping price-level target path, starting above the current price level by a price gap to undo; 2) a depreciation and a crawling peg of the currency; and 3) an exit strategy in the form of the abandonment of the peg in favor of inflation or price-level targeting when the price-level target path has been reached.
As discussed in the previous subsection, a currency depreciation and a crawling peg is unique in providing the central bank with a concrete action that demonstrates the central bank’s commitment to a higher future price level, establishes credibility for the peg, induces private-sector expectations of a higher future price level, and stimulates the economy by reducing the real interest rate. As argued, via a depreciation and a crawling peg with a rate of appreciation approximately equal to the average foreign interest rate, the central bank can actually implement approximately the optimal way to escape from a liquidity trap and strike the optimal balance between current stimulus of the economy and the future price level. Furthermore, as discussed, the exchange rate is unique in providing a relatively direct measure of the private-sector expectations of the future price level.