War in Europe

If the West thought that the conflict would remain safely contained in Ukraine, they had better think again. There has long been signs that Putin’s ambitions cover more than just Ukraine.

Sweden & Finland

Twitter: Finland

Norway

Undersea fiber-optic cables to Svalbard Island were cut in two places.

Twitter: Norway

The Black Sea & Moldova

Twitter: Black Sea

Rostov, Russia

War is even spreading to within Russia itself, with Ukraine attacking a military airfield in Rostov Oblast (adjacent to the Donbas). Attacks on staging posts in Belarus are also likely.

Twitter: Rostov

NATO Article 5

Francois Heisbourg at the the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) warns that Putin may test NATO directly.

Twitter: Francois Heisbourg

September 18, 2019

Sahm Rule: Sweden tips into recession

Sweden: Sahm rule

What is the Sahm Recession Rule?

Recessions are notoriously difficult to measure (even the NBER occasionally gets it wrong) and an official declaration of a recession may be lagged by more than 6 months. Economist Claudia Sahm uses the following rule as a timely indicator of recessions:

September 26, 2014

How Laissez-Faire Made Sweden Rich | Libertarianism.org

From Johan Norberg:

…But in one century, everything was changed. Sweden had the fastest economic and social development that its people had ever experienced, and one of the fastest the world had ever seen. Between 1850 and 1950 the average Swedish income multiplied eightfold, while population doubled. Infant mortality fell from 15 to 2 per cent, and average life expectancy rose an incredible 28 years. A poor peasant nation had become one of the world’s richest countries.

…And so Sweden—a small country of nine million inhabitants in the north of Europe—became a source of inspiration for people around the world who believe in government-led development and distribution.

But there is something wrong with this interpretation. In 1950, when Sweden was known worldwide as the great success story, taxes in Sweden were lower and the public sector smaller than in the rest of Europe and the United States.

October 9, 2013

A lesson from Sweden

Sweden is one of the leaders in a recent OECD survey of literacy and numeracy levels. Anders Aslund describes how the education system recovered from the ravages of the 1960s and 70s:

The Swedish school system, Palme’s [hardline socialist Olof Palme] original bailiwick, was badly ravaged by left-wing reforms of the 1960s and 1970s. Today, all pupils are entitled to school vouchers of equal value for each child of a certain age. Their parents can allocate this school voucher to any school the child is qualified to enter. As a result, while in the 1970s Sweden had only four private schools, one-fifth of Swedish secondary schools are now private, some for profit, others cooperatives or non-profit foundations…….

April 26, 2013

What Europe could learn from Scandinavia in the 1920s | Lars Christensen

Danish and Norwegian monetary policy failure in 1920s – lessons for today

Reproduced with kind permission from Lars Christensen at The Market Monetarist:

History is fully of examples of massive monetary policy failure and today’s policy makers can learn a lot from studying these events and no one is better to learn from than Swedish monetary guru Gustav Cassel. In the 1920s Cassel tried – unfortunately without luck – to advise Danish and Norwegian policy makers from making a massive monetary policy mistake.

After the First World War policy makers across Europe wanted to return to the gold standard and in many countries it became official policy to return to the pre-war gold parity despite massive inflation during the war. This was also the case in Denmark and Norway where policy makers decided to return the Norwegian and the Danish krone to the pre-war parity.

The decision to bring back the currencies to the pre-war gold-parity brought massive economic and social hardship to Denmark and Norway in the 1920s and probably also killed of the traditionally strong support for laissez faire capitalism in the two countries. Paradoxically one can say that government failure opened the door for a massive expansion of the role of government in both countries’ economies. No one understood the political dangers of monetary policy failure better than Gustav Cassel.

Here you see the impact of the Price Level (Index 1924=100) of the deflation policies in Denmark and Norway. Sweden did not go back to pre-war gold-parity.

While most of the world was enjoying relatively high growth in the second half of the 1920s the Danish and the Norwegian authorities brought hardship to their nations through a deliberate policy of deflation. As a result both nations saw a sharp rise in unemployment and a steep decline in economic activity. So when anybody tells you about how a country can go through “internal devaluation” please remind them of the Denmark and Norway in the 1920s. The polices were hardly successful, but despite the clear negative consequences policy makers and many economists in the Denmark and Norway insisted that it was the right policy to return to the pre-war gold-parity.

Here is what happened to unemployment (%).

Nobody listened to Cassel. As a result both the Danish and the Norwegian economies went into depression in the second half of the 1920s and unemployment skyrocketed. At the same time Finland and Sweden – which did not return to the pre-war gold-partiy – enjoyed strong post-war growth and low unemployment.

Gustav Cassel strongly warned against this policy as he today would have warned against the calls for “internal devaluation” in the euro zone. In 1924 Cassel at a speech in the Student Union in Copenhagen strongly advocated a devaluation of the Danish krone. The Danish central bank was not exactly pleased with Cassel’s message. However, the Danish central bank really had little to fear. Cassel’s message was overshadowed by the popular demand for what was called “Our old, honest krone”.

To force the policy of revaluation and return to the old gold-parity the Danish central bank tightened monetary policy dramatically and the bank’s discount rate was hiked to 7% (this is more or less today’s level for Spanish bond yields). From 1924 to 1924 to 1927 both the Norwegian and the Danish krone were basically doubled in value against gold by deliberate actions of the two Scandinavian nation’s central bank.

The gold-insanity was as widespread in Norway as in Denmark and also here Cassel was a lone voice of sanity. In a speech in Christiania (today’s Oslo) Cassel in November 1923 warned against the foolish idea of returning the Norwegian krone to the pre-war parity. The speech deeply upset Norwegian central bank governor Nicolai Rygg who was present at Cassel’s speech.

After Cassel’s speech Rygg rose and told the audience that the Norwegian krone had been brought back to parity a 100 years before and that it could and should be done again. He said: “We must and we will go back and we will not give up”. Next day the Norwegian Prime Minister Abraham Berge in an public interview gave his full support to Rygg’s statement. It was clear the Norwegian central bank and the Norwegian government were determined to return to the pre-war gold-parity.

This is the impact on the real GDP level of the gold-insanity in Denmark and Norway. Sweden did not suffer from gold-insanity and grew nicely in the 1920s.

The lack of reason among Danish and Norwegian central bankers in the 1920s is a reminder what happens once the “project” – whether the euro or the gold standard – becomes more important than economic reason and it shows that countries will suffer dire economic, social and political consequences when they are forced through “internal devaluation”. In both Denmark and Norway the deflation of the 1920s strengthened the Socialists parties and both the Norwegian and the Danish economies as a consequence moved away from the otherwise successful laissez faire model. That should be a reminder to any free market oriented commentators, policy makers and economists that a deliberate attempt of forcing countries through internal devaluation is likely to bring more socialism and less free markets. Gustav Cassel knew that – as do the Market Monetarists today.

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My account of these events is based on Richard Lester’s paper “Gold-Parity Depression in Denmark and Norway, 1925-1928″ (Journal of Political Economy, August 1937)

April 24, 2013

TheMoneyIllusion

TheMoneyIllusion highlights this common mistake by central banks:

Despite the fact that our mainstream textbooks tell us that low rates don’t mean easy money, most central bankers cannot shake the suspicion that low rates do mean easy money, and that the current relatively low rates are a danger to the economy. This irrational bias is driving policy failure in much of the world. Even central banks at the zero bound (like the Fed) are inhibited in their push for unconventional stimulus by this cognitive illusion.

Cyprus: Deposit insurance and moral hazard

The outcry over Cyprus levy on depositors in defaulting banks raises the question: Why were depositors not more wary of where they deposited their funds? Not all banks are created equal. The reason is deposit insurance for deposits under €100,000 implied that the government would stand behind its banks and rescue depositors should the banks ever default. The problem is that no one considered the possibility that all the banks would suffer losses sufficient that the government would be forced to default on both its explicit and implied obligations.

Some time ago I wrote about the moral hazard of deposit insurance:

Deposit Insurance: When too much of a good idea becomes a bad idea

Deposit insurance was introduced in the 1930s and saved the US banking system from extinction. Administered by the FDIC, and funded by a levy on all banking institutions, deposit insurance, however, encourages moral hazard. Depositors need not concern themselves with the solvency of the bank where they deposit their funds so long as deposits are FDIC insured. High-risk institutions are able to compete for deposits on an equal footing with well-run, low-risk competitors. This inevitably leads to higher failure rates, as in the Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980s.

The FDIC does a good job of policing deposit-takers, but no regulator can substitute for market forces. Deposit insurance is critical during times of crisis, but should be scaled back when the crisis has passed. Either limit insured deposits to say $20,000 or only insure deposits to say 90% of value, where the depositor takes the first loss of 10%. That should be sufficient to keep depositors mindful as to where they bank. And restore the competitive advantage to well-run institutions.

Requiring depositors to take the first loss of 10 percent should be standard practice for deposit insurance. The same should hold true for bank creditors. But we need to distinguish between insolvency — where liabilities exceed assets — and a liquidity event where the central bank is only called on to provide temporary respite. If the bank is rescued from insolvency by the regulator, bond holders should be required to take an equivalent haircut — painful yet not life-threatening. No one is entitled to a free ride. And bank shareholders, if a there is a bail-out, should lose everything — similar to the Swedish approach in the 1990s.

September 25, 2012

Fiscal consolidation in Sweden: A role model? | vox

By Martin Flodén, Associate Professor at Stockholm University

Fiscal austerity was effective during the Swedish economic crisis, but that insight is not particularly helpful today. Austerity would have been more complicated both economically and politically if it had not been supported by currency depreciation and strong external demand, and crisis countries today do not benefit from such developments. Attempts to consolidate before growth had resumed failed in Sweden. One possible interpretation of these observations is that prospects to consolidate are bleak until competitiveness has been restored in crisis economies…….

via Fiscal consolidation in Sweden: A role model? | vox.

Hat tip to Delusional Economics

August 28, 2012

Sweden: Failure of the welfare state experiment

…..Sweden has a large welfare state and is successful. This is often seen as a proof that a ‘third way’ policy between socialism and capitalism works well, and that other nations can reach the same favourable social outcomes by simply expanding the size of government. If one studies Swedish history and society in-depth however it quickly becomes evident that this simplistic analysis is flawed. The Swedish experience might as well be used to argue for the benefits of free-market oriented policies, and as a warning of the economic and social problems that can arise when government involvement in society becomes too large…….In the long run….. even the well-functioning societies in Scandinavia have been adversely impacted by welfare dependency and high levels of taxation. The ‘third way’ policy has not persisted – it can be viewed as a short-lived and failed experiment. Throughout most of its modern history Sweden has had a favourable business environment. The period characterised by the most extensive welfare state policies, where Sweden deviated strongly from the western norm, around 1970-1995, is an exception. That period was associated with a stagnant economy.

…….The transition towards an extensive welfare state that occurred in Sweden led….. to an economic cost in terms of reduced entrepreneurship, as taxes and regulation hindered the development of private businesses. It also led to a significant crowding out of private employment. Between 1950 and 2005, the Swedish population grew from seven to nine million, but net job creation in the private sector was zero. Jobs in the public sector expanded rapidly until the end of the 1970s. As it became difficult to further expand the already large public sector, job creation simply stopped (Bjuggren and Johansson, 2009).

Nima Sanandaji, The Institute of Economic Affairs, Sweden Paper August 2012.pdf (application/pdf Object).