Anat Admati: Regulatory reform effort is an unfocused, complex mess

Telling it like it is. Anat Admati is Finance and Economics Professor at Stanford GSB and coauthor of The Bankers’ New Clothes.

Anat Admati

The financial system is not serving society well right now, certainly not as well as it can. It is a drag on the economy. Finance is fraught with governance problems. Free markets don’t solve these problems. Effective laws and regulation are essential.

……the regulatory reform effort is an unfocused, complex mess, both in design and in implementation. Some regulations end up as wasteful charades. They provide full employment and revolving opportunities for numerous lawyers, consultants, and regulators without producing enough benefits for society to justify the costs. Some of the complaints from the industry about these regulations have merit. In this category I put living wills, stress tests, risk weights, TLACs/cocos/bailinable debt (whatever the term for today), and liquidity coverage ratio. I am also concerned that, as implemented, central clearing of derivatives does not reduce, and may even increase, the concentration of dangerous risk. In all these contexts we see the pretense of action, the illusion of “science,” a false sense of safety, over-optimistic assessments of progress, and counterproductive distortions [emphasis added].

Lost in this mess are simpler, more straightforward regulations that would counter the incentives for recklessness and bring enormous benefits to society by making the system safer and healthier, as well as reducing unnecessary, unproductive risk that is a key source of system fragility, and the many distortions……..

Banks are not acting in society’s interests but their own. Not even primarily in the interests of shareholders but those of senior management. And they are doing their best to frustrate, obfuscate and capture regulators.

Finance is about money and power. Money and power can corrupt. So unlike in the airline business, in finance it is possible for the industry, regulators and politicians, to harm and endanger, to spin narratives and cover up the harm, and to be willfully blind, without any accountability. DoJ and the SEC must do their job, but they can’t deal with nonsense and capture.

So the biggest challenge in regulation is political. The details hardly matter if there is no political will. Unfortunately, most politicians put other objectives ahead of having a stable and healthy financial system. Ordinary people, meanwhile, may not be aware of what is going on or get confused by the spin. Not enough people understand why regulation is essential and what type of regulation makes sense.

What can be done? Here are some concrete ideas. First, increasing the pay of regulators may reduce revolving door incentives. Second, effective regulators might be industry veterans who are not inclined to go back. Third, we must try to reduce the role of money in politics.

To fix this, we need to break the feedback loop between Wall Street and government — the revolving door between regulators and the financial sector and between lobbyists and elected representatives. Otherwise the system will remain hijacked to enrich a few at the expense of the many.

Read more at Making Financial Regulations Work for Society: Comments by Anat Admati | Finance and Society INET Conference

Has democracy failed us or have we failed it?

I came across this opinion piece I wrote for Memorial Day three years ago. How little has changed:

Who kept the faith and fought the fight;
The glory theirs, the duty ours.

I would like to make this quote from Wallace Bruce the theme of today’s newsletter on Memorial Day, May 30th.
We often take for granted the institutions that our ancestors sacrificed so much to secure. Have we fulfilled our duty to preserve the freedoms that they sacrificed so much for? And have we held the members of our institutions to account for the neglect of their duties?

Some legislators only wish vengeance against a particular enemy. Others only look out for themselves. They devote very little time to consideration of any public issue. They think that no harm will come from their neglect. They act as if it is always the business of somebody else to look after this or that. When this selfish notion is entertained by all, the commonwealth slowly begins to decay.

Little seems to have changed since Thucydides made this observation in about 400 BC, a century after the foundation of democracy in ancient Athens. The fundamental weakness of democracy seems to be that those who are elected to office tend to place their own interests ahead of the interests of their electorate — and ahead of the interests of the nation. Not surprising when, as Thucydides pointed out, they believe that little harm will come from their neglect. But if enough legislators place their own interests ahead of those of the country, they will cause irreversible damage.

The First Rule of Politics is to Get Re-Elected

By placing their own interests first, I do not necessarily mean that office holders seek to enrich themselves at the expense of the taxpayer — although that does occasionally happen. Rather that they define their primary duty to their country as re-election. The pressure to get re-elected is bound to influence their thoughts and actions on almost every issue.

The Presidential Cycle

The temptation to manipulate the system to maximize your chance of re-election is too great for most politicians to resist. In fact it has become so ingrained that the whole economy, and the stock market particularly, is subject to the political cycle. Jeremy Grantham explains the presidential cycle in his last quarterly newsletter:

In the first seven months of the third year (of the presidential cycle) since 1960, Year 3 has returned 2.5% per month for a total of 20% real (after inflation adjustment)…. Now, 20% is perilously close to the total for the whole 48-month cycle of 21%. This means, of course, that the remaining 41 months collectively return a princely 1%.

It’s the economy, stupid

The third rule of politics is don’t run for re-election during a recession. Ask George H. W. Bush who, despite successful prosecution of the first Iraq war, was beaten by Bill Clinton in 1992 with the slogan “It’s the economy, stupid.” (The second rule, by the way, is: never forget Rule #1)

Successive presidents/governments have failed to find a way to re-schedule elections to a time that bests suits them (despite many examples in the rest of the world). They soon, however, came up with an ingenious alternative: re-schedule the recession.

How to Re-Schedule a Recession

As soon as politicians realized they could spend future taxes as well as current taxes, the demise of the current system became inevitable. Prior to the Great Depression of the 1930s, governments were assessed on their ability to balance the books. Previous disasters with fiat currencies (continental and confederate dollars) were still fresh in the national consciousness. Only during times of war could they justify running a deficit. So much so that Herbert Hoover refused to run a deficit despite the deflationary spiral following the 1929 Wall Street crash.

When FDR lifted that constraint in the 1930s, with the acquiescence of a desperate public who were willing to try almost anything, an immense new power was born. Unfortunately with immense power comes immense responsibility — and successive governments have proved themselves unequal to the task.

Spend Future Taxes and Leave your Successor a Pile of Debt

It has become too easy for whoever is in power to spend future taxes to stimulate the economy and postpone a recession. The result is that their successor inherits a pile of debt, which if they attempt to repay, is likely to lead to a recession. So the game becomes one of pass the parcel, with each elected government adding to the debt and passing it on to the next.

If the ancient Greeks had the same power, the decline of Athens may have been a lot sooner. Their modern counterparts have demonstrated that the game cannot continue indefinitely. At some point the market will begin to question government’s ability to repay, raising interest rates to compensate for the risk of sovereign default. Their fears become a self-fulfilling prophecy, with higher servicing costs increasing the burden on the already-precarious fiscal budget.

Fed Compliance

The second actor in this modern form of Greek tragedy is the Federal Reserve. Without a compliant Fed, government efforts to kick the can down the road would be largely negated. An independent Fed could put the brakes on government efforts to stimulate the economy with borrowed money, merely by acting as a counter-balance to their actions. Unfortunately the Board of Governors are political appointments, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) may be more evenly balanced with the addition of the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and four of the remaining eleven Reserve Bank presidents, who serve one-year terms on a rotating basis, but is still dominated by the seven Board members. You can be sure that very few mavericks are appointed as governors and that most dissenting votes come from the regions.

Washington, Inc.

Elections are an expensive business and no candidate is likely to achieve re-election without financial backers, making them especially vulnerable to outside influence. The finance industry alone made $63 million in campaign contributions to Federal Candidates during the 2010 electoral cycle, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. That will buy you a lot of influence on the Hill, but is merely the tip of the iceberg. Interest groups spent $3.5 billion in that year on lobbying Congress and federal agencies ($473 million from the finance sector). While that money does not flow directly to candidates it acts as an enticing career path/retirement plan for both Representatives and senior staffers.

The revolving door between Capitol Hill and the big lobbying firms parachutes former elected officials and staffers into jobs as lobbyists, consultants and strategists — while infiltrating their best and brightest into positions within government; a constant exchange of power, influence and money. More than 75 percent of the 363 former senators or representatives end up employed by lobbying firms, either as lobbyists or advisors.

Can the Present System Evolve?

Are we likely to experience slow decay that Thucydides predicted? The present system is entrenched and likely to resist any attempts at reform. Evolution, however, does not occur in small increments. The norm is quite the opposite, with species enjoying long periods of stability followed by violent change when threatened with extinction. The current GFC presents just such an opportunity for change. The Tea Party movement, for example, is attempting to re-define the way that the system works, while I am sure that there are many Democrats who mistrust the motives of Washington.

If they fail to succeed, there is bound to be a next time. And probably sooner than we think.

The state that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its laws made by cowards,
and its fighting done by fools.

~ Thucydides (c. 460 BC – c. 400 BC).

Trust: Easy to Break, Hard to Repair | WSJ

Excellent interview of renowned short-seller Jim Chanos by Jason Zweig. Chanos list three reasons why the average investor is right not to trust the integrity of the financial markets…

First, in recent years financial fraud has rarely been detected and exposed by the people the public might reasonably expect to do so: accountants, regulators and law-enforcement authorities, whom Chanos calls “the normal guardians of the marketplace.” Instead, frauds more often have been rooted out by whistleblowers, short-sellers and journalists.

Second, prosecutions of financial crimes are essential in the minds of investors, but are discretionary in the eyes of government officials….. the so-called too big to jail rationale.

Third, individual investors will never trust the market until these issues are addressed.

To me the list is too short.

Chanos fails to mention the revolving door between Washington and Wall Street where regulators frequently swap sides — working for government the one day and in high-paying jobs on Wall Street the next — and have one eye on their career path rather than focusing on their current job.

Fifth, the massive financial leverage that Wall Street has on Capitol Hill where Congressmen, dependent on fundraisers sponsored by Wall Street lobbyists, allow same lobbyists to write some of the legislation that passes through the house.

Read more at Trust: Easy to Break, Hard to Repair – Total Return – WSJ.

Two Senators Try to Slam the Door on Bank Bailouts – NYTimes.com

This is a show-down between Wall Street and the voting public. Gretchen Morgenson at NY Times writes:

THERE’S a lot to like, if you’re a taxpayer, in the new bipartisan bill from two concerned senators hoping to end the peril of big bank bailouts. But if you’re a large and powerful financial institution that’s too big to fail, you won’t like this bill one bit.

The legislation, called the Terminating Bailouts for Taxpayer Fairness Act, emerged last Wednesday; its co-sponsors are Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democrat, and David Vitter, a Louisiana Republican. It is a smart, simple and tough piece of work that would protect taxpayers from costly rescues in the future.

This means that the bill will come under fierce attack from the big banks that almost wrecked our economy and stand to lose the most if it becomes law.

For starters, the bill would create an entirely new, transparent and ungameable set of capital rules for the nation’s banks — in other words, a meaningful rainy-day fund. Enormous institutions, like JPMorgan Chase and Citibank, would have to hold common stockholder equity of at least 15 percent of their consolidated assets to protect against large losses. That’s almost double the 8 percent of risk-weighted assets required under the capital rules established by Basel III, the latest version of the byzantine international system created by regulators and central bankers.

This change, by itself, would eliminate a raft of problems posed by the risk-weighted Basel approach……

The outcome is far from clear. The financial muscle of Wall Street can buy a lot of influence on the Hill. But my guess is that they are too smart to incense voters by meeting the bill head-on. Instead they will attempt to delay with amendments and eventually turn it into an unwieldy 1000-page unenforcable monstrosity that no one understands. Much as they did with Dodd-Frank.

If they win, the country as a whole will suffer. Maybe not today, but in the inevitable next financial crisis if this bill does not pass.

Read more at Two Senators Try to Slam the Door on Bank Bailouts – NYTimes.com.

Washington Inc.

This extract is from a 2011 opinion I wrote titled Has democracy failed us or have we failed it?

Elections are an expensive business and no candidate is likely to achieve re-election without financial backers, making them especially vulnerable to outside influence. The finance industry alone made $63 million in campaign contributions to Federal Candidates during the 2010 electoral cycle, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. That will buy you a lot of influence on the Hill, but is merely the tip of the iceberg. Interest groups spent $3.5 billion in that year on lobbying Congress and federal agencies ($473 million from the finance sector). While that money does not flow directly to candidates it acts as an enticing career path/retirement plan for both Representatives and senior staffers.

The revolving door between Capitol Hill and the big lobbying firms parachutes former elected officials and staffers into jobs as lobbyists, consultants and strategists — while infiltrating their best and brightest into positions within government; a constant exchange of power, influence and money. More than 75 percent of the 363 former senators or representatives end up employed by lobbying firms, either as lobbyists or advisors.

Revolving doors continue to plague Washington and financial market regulators. Enforcing lengthy “restraint of trade” periods between the two roles would restrict this. Preventing politicians from joining lobbying firms for two to three years — and financial regulators from joining Wall Street for a similar period — would reduce the risk of “captive regulators”.

Five steps to fix Wall Street

Some more thoughts on the five steps former FDIC chair Sheila Bair suggested to reform the financial system.

  1. Break up the “too big to fail” banks

    My take is that breaking up may be difficult to achieve politically, but raising capital ratios for banks above a certain threshold would discourage further growth and encourage splintering over time.

  2. Publicly commit to end bailouts

    Just because the bailouts were profitable isn’t a good reason to give Wall Street an indefinite option to “put” its losses to the Treasury and to taxpayers.

    As Joseph Stiglitz points out: the UK did a far better job of making shareholders and management suffer the consequences of their actions. Sweden in the early 1990s, similarly demanded large equity stakes in return for rescuing banks from the financial, leading some to raise capital through the markets rather than accept onerous bailout conditions.

  3. Cap leverage at large financial institutions

    I support Barry Ritholz’ call for a maximum leverage ratio of 10. That should include off-balance sheet and derivative exposure. Currently the Fed only requires a leverage ratio of 20 (5%) for well-capitalized banks — and that excludes off-balance-sheet assets.

  4. End speculation in the credit derivatives market

    Bair pointed out that we don’t get to buy fire insurance on someone else’s house, for a very good reason. How is speculating using credit derivatives any different?

    Again Ritholz makes a good suggestion: regulate credit default swaps (CDS) as insurance products, where buyers are required to demonstrate an insurable interest.

  5. End the revolving door between regulators and banks

    When regulators are conscious that, with one push of the door, they could end up working for the organizations they are today regulating – or vice versa – “it corrupts the mindset”

    A similar revolving door corrupts the relationship between politicians and lobbyists. Enforcing lengthy “restraint of trade” periods between the two roles would restrict this.

via 5 Steps Obama or Romney Must Take to Fix Wall Street.

5 Steps Obama or Romney Must Take to Fix Wall Street

By SUZANNE MCGEE

In [Sheila Bair’s] view ….. we haven’t yet come to grips with many of the problems that produced the crisis.

Too many regulators fall victim to one of several fatal flaws, Bair suggested in a speech to the National Association for Business Economics yesterday. Some of them over or under-regulate (usually at the wrong point in the cycle); they devise impossibly complex rules; they are “closet free-marketeers” proposing convoluted rules to prove it’s impossible to regulate financial institutions, or they are “captive” regulators who, without any corruption or malfeasance involved, have simply subordinated their judgment to those of the organizations they are charged with overseeing.

The former chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation suggests five steps that presidential candidates should take to fix Wall Street………

via 5 Steps Obama or Romney Must Take to Fix Wall Street.