Milton Friedman's Advice

In 1997 Milton Friedman commented on Bank of Japan policy following Japan’s deflationary spiral of the early 1990s:

Defenders of the Bank of Japan will say, “How? The bank has already cut its discount rate to 0.5 percent. What more can it do to increase the quantity of money?”

The answer is straightforward: The Bank of Japan can buy government bonds on the open market, paying for them with either currency or deposits at the Bank of Japan, what economists call high-powered money. Most of the proceeds will end up in commercial banks, adding to their reserves and enabling them to expand their liabilities by loans and open market purchases. But whether they do so or not, the money supply will increase.

There is no limit to the extent to which the Bank of Japan can increase the money supply if it wishes to do so. Higher monetary growth will have the same effect as always. After a year or so, the economy will expand more rapidly; output will grow, and after another delay, inflation will increase moderately. A return to the conditions of the late 1980s would rejuvenate Japan and help shore up the rest of Asia.

Austerity measures adopted in Europe are failing and central banks are likely to attempt Friedman’s option in a number of guises. Already, as Gary Shilling points out “competitive quantitative easing by central banks is now the order of the day.” The Bank of Japan last year expanded its balance sheet by 11 percent, the Federal Reserve by 19 percent, the European Central Bank by 36 percent and the Swiss National Bank by 33 percent. Even countries with relatively strong balance sheets, like Switzerland, are forced to respond to prevent appreciation of their currencies from harming exports.

Inflation will remain moderate only so long as central bank balance sheet expansion is offset by deflationary pressures from private sector deleveraging. That is the difficult task ahead: to maneuver a soft landing by balancing the two opposing forces. Failure to do so could lead to a bumpy ride.

Friedman’s Japanese lessons for the ECB « The Market Monetarist

Milton Friedman, December 1997:

Defenders of the Bank of Japan will say, “How? The bank has already cut its discount rate to 0.5 percent. What more can it do to increase the quantity of money?”

The answer is straightforward: The Bank of Japan can buy government bonds on the open market, paying for them with either currency or deposits at the Bank of Japan, what economists call high-powered money. Most of the proceeds will end up in commercial banks, adding to their reserves and enabling them to expand their liabilities by loans and open market purchases. But whether they do so or not, the money supply will increase.

There is no limit to the extent to which the Bank of Japan can increase the money supply if it wishes to do so. Higher monetary growth will have the same effect as always. After a year or so, the economy will expand more rapidly; output will grow, and after another delay, inflation will increase moderately. A return to the conditions of the late 1980s would rejuvenate Japan and help shore up the rest of Asia.

via Friedman’s Japanese lessons for the ECB « The Market Monetarist.

Friedman was suggesting that the BOJ implement QE to boost the money supply and create inflation. Inflation would rescue the banks and real-estate-owners with underwater mortgages.

Quantitative easing and the (lack of) responses in bond yields

…When the Fed was performing quantitative easing, treasury yields rose as the economy recovered and inflation expectation rose. On the other hand, treasury yields fall when the Fed was not performing quantitative easing as the period without quantitative easing coincided with the weakening of the economy as well as the deterioration of the Euro Crisis.

10-Year Treasury Yields

via Quantitative easing and the (lack of) responses in bond yields.

Comment:~ Quantitative easing (QE) expands the stock of money in the economy as the government, through its agent the Fed, issues new banknotes (or equivalent deposits) in payment of goods and services. The resulting inflation would drive up yields.

U.K. Aims to Mute Impact of Crisis – WSJ.com

Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne and Bank of England Gov. Mervyn King announced plans to flood banks with cheap funds in a dual attempt to jump-start lending to British households and businesses and to fend off potential financial problems at big U.K. lenders. The programs resemble some of the emergency measures enacted by central banks in Europe and the U.S. during peak crisis periods in recent years.

via U.K. Aims to Mute Impact of Crisis – WSJ.com.

When Austerity Fails

Austerity decimated Asian economies during their 1997/98 financial crisis and similar measures have failed to rescue the PIIGS in Europe 2012. David Cameron’s austerity measures have also not saved the UK from falling back into recession. So why is Wayne Swan in Australia so proud of his balanced budget? And why does Barack Obama threaten the wealthy with increased taxes while the GOP advocate spending cuts in order to reduce the US deficit? Are we condemned to follow Europe into a deflationary spiral?

How Did We Get Here?

First, let’s examine the causes of the current financial crisis.

Government deficits have been around for centuries. States would borrow in order to finance wars but were then left with the problem of repayment. Countries frequently defaulted, but this created difficulties in accessing further finance; so governments resorted to debasing their currencies. Initially they substituted coins with a lower metal content for the original issue. Then introduction of fiat currencies — with no right of conversion to an underlying gold/silver standard — made debasement a lot easier. Issuing more paper currency simply reduced the value of each note in circulation. Advent of the digital age made debasement still easier, with transfer of balances between electronic accounts largely replacing paper money. Fiscal deficits, previously confined to wars, became regular government policy; employed as a stealth tax and redistributed in the form of welfare benefits to large voting blocks.

Along with fiscal deficits came easy monetary policy — also known as debt expansion. Lower interest rates fueled greater demand for debt, which bankers, with assistance from the central bank, were only too willing to accommodate. I will not go into a lengthy exposition of how banks create money, but banks expand their balance sheets by lending money they do not have, confident in the knowledge that recipients will deposit the proceeds back in the banking system — which is then used to fund the original loan. Expanding bank balance sheets inject new money into the system, debasing the currency as effectively as if they were running a printing press in the basement.

The combination of rising prices and low interest rates is a heady mix investors cannot resist, leading to speculative bubbles in real estate or stocks. So why do governments encourage debt expansion? Because (A) it creates a temporary high — a false sense of well-being before inflation takes hold; and (B) it debases the currency, inflating tax revenues while reducing the real value of government debt.

Continuous government deficits and debt expansion via the financial sector have brought us to the edge of the precipice. The problem is: finding a way back — none of the solutions seem to work.

Austerity

Slashing government spending, cutting back on investment programs, and raising taxes in order to reduce the fiscal deficit may appear a logical response to the crisis. Reversing policies that caused the problem will reduce their eventual impact, but you have to do that before the financial crisis — not after. With bank credit contracting and aggregate demand shrinking, it is too late to throw the engine into reverse — you are already going backwards. The economy is already slowing. Rather than reducing harmful side-effects, austerity applied at the wrong time will simply amplify them.

The 1997 Asian Crisis

We are repeating the mistakes of the 1997/98 Asian crisis. Joseph Stiglitz, at the time chief economist at the World Bank, warned the IMF of the perils of austerity measures imposed on recipients of IMF support. He was politely ignored. By July 1998, 13 months after the start of the crisis, GNP had fallen by 83 percent in Indonesia and between 30 and 40 percent in other recipients of IMF “assistance”. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and the Phillipines reduced government deficits, allowed insolvent banks to fail, and raised interest rates in response to IMF demands. Currency devaluations, waves of bankruptcies, real estate busts, collapse of entire industries and soaring unemployment followed — leading to social unrest. Contracting bank lending without compensatory fiscal deficits led to a deflationary spiral, while raising interest rates failed to protect currencies from devaluation.

The same failed policies are being pursued today, simply because continuing fiscal deficits and ballooning public debt are a frightening alternative.

The Lesser of Two Evils

At some point political leaders are going to realize the futility of further austerity measures and resort to the hair of the dog that bit them. Bond markets are likely to resist further increases in public debt and deficits would have to be funded directly or indirectly by the central bank/Federal Reserve. Inflation would rise. Effectively the government is printing fresh new dollar bills with nothing to back them.

The short-term payoff would be fourfold. Rising inflation increases tax revenues while at the same time decreasing the value of public debt in real terms. Real estate values rise, restoring many underwater mortgages to solvency, and rescuing banks threatened by falling house prices. Finally, inflation would discourage currency manipulation. Asian exporters who keep their currencies at artificially low values, by purchasing $trillions of US treasuries to offset the current account imbalance, will suffer a capital loss on their investments.

The long-term costs — inflation, speculative bubbles and financial crises — are likely to be out-weighed by the short-term benefits when it comes to counting votes. Even rising national debt would to some extent be offset by rising nominal GDP, stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio. And if deficits are used to fund productive infrastructure, rather than squandered on public fountains and bridges-to-nowhere, that will further enhance GDP growth while ensuring that the state has real assets to show for the debt incurred.

Not “If” but “When”

Faced with the failure of austerity measures, governments are likely to abandon them and resort to the printing press — fiscal deficits and quantitative easing. It is more a case of “when” rather than “if”. Successful traders/investors will need to allow for this in their strategies, timing their purchases to take advantage of the shift.

Gold falls as the dollar rallies

The Dollar Index rallied to test resistance at 80.00. Breakout would indicate respect of the rising trendline and another primary advance. Recovery above 82 would confirm the target of 86*. Respect of the zero line by 63-day Twiggs Momentum would also strengthen the signal.

US Dollar Index

* Target calculation: 82 + ( 82 – 78 ) = 86

Spot gold responded by testing support at $1600/ounce. Breach of the rising trendline would indicate that the long-term up-trend is weakening. Reversal of 63-day Twiggs Momentum below zero already warns of a primary down-trend. Recovery above $1700 is unlikely but would indicate respect of the rising trendline and continuation of the long-term up-trend.

Spot Gold

* Target calculation: 1550 – ( 1800 – 1550 ) = 1300

The Gold Bugs Index, representing un-hedged gold stocks, is in a clear primary down-trend since breaking support at 500. Peaks below zero on 63-day Twiggs Momentum also signal a strong down-trend. Spot gold is likely to follow unless the Fed changes course and announces further quantitative easing.

Gold Bugs Index

MARC FABER: Beware The Unintended Consequences Of Money Printing

Marc Faber: I do not believe that the central banks around the world will ever, and I repeat ever, reduce their balance sheets. They’ve gone the path of money printing and once you choose that path you’re in it, and you have to print more money.

If you start to print, it has the biggest impact. Then you print more – it has a lesser impact unless you increase the rate of money printing very significantly. And, the third money printing has even less impact. And the problem is like the Fed: they printed money because they wanted to lift the housing market, but the housing market is the only asset that didn’t go up substantially.

In general, I think that the purchasing power of money has diminished very significantly over the last ten, twenty, thirty years, and will continue to do so.

via MARC FABER: Beware The Unintended Consequences Of Money Printing.

Fed Weighs ‘Sterilized’ Bond Buying if It Acts – WSJ.com

JON HILSENRATH: Federal Reserve officials are considering a new type of bond-buying program designed to subdue worries about future inflation if they decide to take new steps to boost the economy in the months ahead. Under the new approach, the Fed would print new money to buy long-term mortgage or Treasury bonds but effectively tie up that money by borrowing it back for short periods at low rates. The aim of such an approach would be to relieve anxieties that money printing could fuel inflation later, a fear widely expressed by critics of the Fed’s previous efforts to aid the recovery.

Transactions like those under the third scenario are called “reverse repos.” A related program called “term deposits” also ties up short-term money held by banks. The effect of this approach is the same as Operation Twist: The Fed would hold more long-term bonds and investors and banks would get more short-term holdings in exchange.

via Fed Weighs ‘Sterilized’ Bond Buying if It Acts – WSJ.com.

Morgan Stanley Still Expects QE3 This Year – WSJ

“For some time, our call has been that the Federal Reserve will undertake additional balance-sheet action in the first half of 2012,” writes Vincent Reinhart, an economist with the bank and a former top-level Fed staffer.

He argues it’s most likely the Fed will act to expand its balance sheet via Treasury and mortgage bond buying — in market parlance, QE3 — at either the April or June Federal Open Market Committee, and that the ultimate size of the program could tack on $500 billion to $700 billion onto what is currently a $2.9 trillion balance sheet. There’s also a chance they will put in place a modified version of the current effort to sell short-dated bonds to buy longer-dated securities.

Why act? Reinhart says the second half of the year will box the Fed in politically. Officials won’t wish to be seen starting a high-profile action in the thick of the presidential campaign. Also, he reckons growth will still be too weak, and inflation will be falling short of the Fed’s 2% target.

via Morgan Stanley Still Expects QE3 This Year – Real Time Economics – WSJ.

QE3 – Wall Street’s biggest fantasy? | WSJ.com

WSJ.com – Mean Street

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Steven Russolillo discusses the prospects of another round of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve based on recent comments by Dallas Fed Chief Richard Fisher.