Effect of long-term unemployment on the labor participation rate

Alan B. Krueger is Bendheim Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University and an NBER research associate. Here he discusses the effect of long-term unemployment on the declining labor participation rate:

….The SIPP [Survey of Income and Program Participation] data indicate that, irrespective of the business cycle, the probability that an unemployed worker will be “steadily” employed in a full-time job for at least four consecutive months a year later is strikingly low and declines further as the duration of joblessness rises. Even in the strong job market of the late 1990s, the chance of a long-term unemployed worker finding steady, full-time employment after a year was only around 20 percent. This likelihood did not change very much during the 2001 recession, and it didn’t change substantially during the Great Recession. Conversely, the likelihood that an unemployed worker will leave the labor force a year later increases substantially as the duration of joblessness rises. According to the SIPP, 35 percent of workers who became long-term unemployed during the Great Recession were out of the labor force by 2013.

Why does long-term unemployment have such an adverse effect on workers? There has been a long, unresolved debate in the economics profession about whether the job finding rate is lower for the long-term unemployed because of either unobserved heterogeneity in the characteristics of such workers or something about the nature of unemployment that adversely changes people. Although this is an inherently difficult question to answer, the literature suggests that duration dependence plays a larger role than unobserved heterogeneity in explaining this phenomenon….. Much research suggests that long-term unemployment has a negative impact on both the supply side and the demand side.

On the supply side, an individual’s mental health and self-esteem can be affected by the experience of long-term unemployment. Till von Wachter has done good work showing that one’s physical health and mortality are adversely impacted by joblessness. Andy Mueller and I did a longitudinal study where we asked workers who were receiving unemployment insurance about the intensity of their job searches. We found that job search activity tends to decline the longer people are unemployed. We also found that the long-term unemployed tend to be socially isolated…… Furthermore, long-term unemployment tends to be associated with repeated job loss and lower re-employment earnings. All of these findings point to a decline in human capital and disengagement from the labor market as a result of long-term unemployment.

On the demand side, studies have shown that employers discriminate – at least statistically – against the long-term unemployed. Kory Kroft, Fabian Lange, and Matt Notowidigdo conducted a study in which they sent out resumes with varying gaps of joblessness, and they found that the likelihood of receiving an interview depended upon the duration of unemployment. Rand Ghayad also found similar results.

My take on the evidence is that the experience of being unemployed makes it harder for people to get back on their feet, and that even a strong economy doesn’t solve this problem. In addition, once a person leaves the labor force, he or she is extremely unlikely to return. The labor force flows data from the CPS bear this out (Figure 6). According to CPS data, the monthly rate for transitioning from out of the labor force to back in the labor force is unrelated to the business cycle. We didn’t see a wave of people returning to the labor force either in the late 1990s or earlier in the 2000s, and we’re not seeing one now……

Conclusion
To conclude, I will briefly comment on policies to address the problem of long-term unemployment. One of the overriding lessons that I take away from this body of research is that, if left untreated, long-term unemployment can have hysteresis-type effects on the labor market. A cyclical recovery does not cure the problems created by long-term unemployment. Going forward, I think one of the lasting legacies of the Great Recession is that the labor force participation rate will be about one percentage point lower than it otherwise would have been. This analysis argues in favor of using “overwhelming force” in a deep recession to prevent those who lose their jobs from becoming long-term unemployed in the first place.

Since long-term unemployment has been so widespread throughout sectors of the economy, “industry-specific” policies are insufficient to solve the problem. In 2012, for example, only 10 percent of long-term unemployed workers were from the construction sector, and only 11 percent were from manufacturing, despite the fact that these industries were hit particularly hard by the Great Recession.

Instead, I would prefer more targeted measures geared specifically toward helping the long-term unemployed stay in the labor force and find employment, such as a tax credit for employers who hire the long-term unemployed or direct employment. There also has been some research to support the notion that volunteering can help jobless workers make new connections, learn new skills, and stay engaged in the labor force. In the United States, job search assistance has typically been found to be effective in helping workers regain employment. I also think wage loss insurance might be worth considering, especially for older long-term unemployed workers.

Lastly, given that many of the long-term unemployed have already left the labor force, we should consider policies that address the structural decline in labor force participation. For example, more family-friendly policies might help greater numbers of women either enter or remain in the labor force. Likewise, reforms to the disability insurance system could possibly prevent some workers from permanently exiting the labor force.

Source: NBER Reporter Online

Secular stagnation?

Economic recovery after the Great Recession has been disappointing.

Employment levels remain low. Official unemployment figures ignore the declining participation rate. Employment levels, in the 25 to 54 age group, for males remain roughly 6%, and females 5%, below their previous peaks. Using the 25 to 54 age group eliminates distortions from student levels and from baby boomers postponing retirement.

Employment levels

Manufacturing earnings, as would be expected, are also weak.

Manufacturing earnings

Sales growth remains poor.

Sales growth

And real GDP growth is slow.

Real GDP

US Headwinds

Stanley Fischer, Vice Chairman at the Fed, in his address to a conference in Sweden, attributed slow recovery in the US to three major aggregate demand headwinds:

The housing sector

The housing sector was at the epicenter of the U.S. financial crisis and recession and it continues to weigh on the recovery. After previous recessions, vigorous rebounds in housing activity have typically helped spur recoveries. In this episode, however, residential construction was held back by a large inventory of foreclosed and distressed properties and by tight credit conditions for construction loans and mortgages. Moreover, the wealth effect from the decline in housing prices, as well as the inability of many underwater households to take advantage of low interest rates to refinance their mortgages, may have reduced household demand for non-housing goods and services. Indeed, some researchers have argued that the failure to deal decisively with the housing problem seriously prolonged and deepened the crisis.

A slow housing recovery is unfortunately the price you pay for protecting the banks. By supporting house prices through artificial low interest rates, you prevent markets from clearing excess inventories.

Fiscal policy

The stance of U.S. fiscal policy in recent years constituted a significant drag on growth as the large budget deficit was reduced. Historically, fiscal policy has been a support during both recessions and recoveries. In part, this reflects the operation of automatic stabilizers, such as declines in tax revenues and increases in unemployment benefits, that tend to accompany a downturn in activity. In addition, discretionary fiscal policy actions typically boost growth in the years just after a recession. In the U.S., as well as in other countries — especially in Europe — fiscal policy was typically expansionary during the recent recession and early in the recovery, but discretionary fiscal policy shifted relatively fast from expansionary to contractionary as the recovery progressed.

Anemic exports

A third headwind slowing the U.S. recovery has been unexpectedly slow global growth, which reduced export demand. Over the past several years, a number of our key trading partners have suffered negative shocks. Some have been relatively short lived, including the collapse in Japanese growth following the tragic earthquake in 2011. Others look to be more structural, such as the stepdown in Chinese growth compared to its double digit pre-crisis pace. Most salient, not least for Sweden, has been the impact of the fiscal and financial situation in the euro area over the past few years.

Supply-side

Fischer also cites the weak labor market, declining investment and disappointing productivity growth as inhibiting aggregate production.

While I agree with his view of the labor market, we should not use the heady days of the Dotcom bubble as a benchmark for investment. Private nonresidential investment is recovering.

ASX 200 Corrections

Productivity is also growing.

Productivity

Other factors

There are two factors, however, that Fischer did not mention which, I believe, go a long way to explaining slow US growth.

Crude oil prices

In the last 4 decades, sharp rises in real crude oil prices have coincided with falling GDP growth and, in most cases, recessions. Crude prices remain elevated since the Great Recession and, I believe, are retarding economic growth. The blue line on the graph below plots crude oil (WTI) over the consumer price index (CPI).

WTI Crude

Currency manipulation

China continues its aggressive purchase of US Treasuries in order to maintain a competitive advantage of the Yuan against the Dollar. Inflows on capital account — not only from China — include roughly $5 trillion of federal debt purchased since 2001. This keeps the US uncompetitive in export markets and places domestic manufacturers at a disadvantage when competing against imports.

Foreign Holdings of US Federal Securities

Recent purchases of federal debt are sufficient to drive 10-Year Treasury yields through support at 2.40%/2.50%.

10-Year Treasury Yields

Glass half empty or half full?

Bears will no doubt seize on the headwinds to support their prediction of another market crash. I am reassured, however, that the economy has recovered as well as it has, given the difficulties it faces. None of the headwinds are likely to disappear any time soon, but progress in addressing these last two issues would go a long way to solving many of them.

Secular stagnation?

Economic recovery after the Great Recession has been disappointing.

Employment levels remain low. Official unemployment figures ignore the declining participation rate. Employment levels, in the 25 to 54 age group, for males remain roughly 6%, and females 5%, below their previous peaks. Using the 25 to 54 age group eliminates distortions from student levels and from baby boomers postponing retirement.

Employment levels

Manufacturing earnings, as would be expected, are also weak.

Manufacturing earnings

Sales growth remains poor.

Sales growth

And real GDP growth is slow.

Real GDP

US Headwinds

Stanley Fischer, Vice Chairman at the Fed, in his address to a conference in Sweden, attributed slow recovery in the US to three major aggregate demand headwinds:

The housing sector

The housing sector was at the epicenter of the U.S. financial crisis and recession and it continues to weigh on the recovery. After previous recessions, vigorous rebounds in housing activity have typically helped spur recoveries. In this episode, however, residential construction was held back by a large inventory of foreclosed and distressed properties and by tight credit conditions for construction loans and mortgages. Moreover, the wealth effect from the decline in housing prices, as well as the inability of many underwater households to take advantage of low interest rates to refinance their mortgages, may have reduced household demand for non-housing goods and services. Indeed, some researchers have argued that the failure to deal decisively with the housing problem seriously prolonged and deepened the crisis.

A slow housing recovery is unfortunately the price you pay for protecting the banks. By supporting house prices through artificial low interest rates, you prevent markets from clearing excess inventories.

Fiscal policy

The stance of U.S. fiscal policy in recent years constituted a significant drag on growth as the large budget deficit was reduced. Historically, fiscal policy has been a support during both recessions and recoveries. In part, this reflects the operation of automatic stabilizers, such as declines in tax revenues and increases in unemployment benefits, that tend to accompany a downturn in activity. In addition, discretionary fiscal policy actions typically boost growth in the years just after a recession. In the U.S., as well as in other countries — especially in Europe — fiscal policy was typically expansionary during the recent recession and early in the recovery, but discretionary fiscal policy shifted relatively fast from expansionary to contractionary as the recovery progressed.

Anemic exports

A third headwind slowing the U.S. recovery has been unexpectedly slow global growth, which reduced export demand. Over the past several years, a number of our key trading partners have suffered negative shocks. Some have been relatively short lived, including the collapse in Japanese growth following the tragic earthquake in 2011. Others look to be more structural, such as the stepdown in Chinese growth compared to its double digit pre-crisis pace. Most salient, not least for Sweden, has been the impact of the fiscal and financial situation in the euro area over the past few years.

Supply-side

Fischer also cites the weak labor market, declining investment and disappointing productivity growth as inhibiting aggregate production.

While I agree with his view of the labor market, we should not use the heady days of the Dotcom bubble as a benchmark for investment. Private nonresidential investment is recovering.

ASX 200 Corrections

Productivity is also growing.

Productivity

Other factors

There are two factors, however, that Fischer did not mention which, I believe, go a long way to explaining slow US growth.

Crude oil prices

In the last 4 decades, sharp rises in real crude oil prices have coincided with falling GDP growth and, in most cases, recessions. Crude prices remain elevated since the Great Recession and, I believe, are retarding economic growth. The blue line on the graph below plots crude oil (WTI) over the consumer price index (CPI).

WTI Crude

Currency manipulation

China continues its aggressive purchase of US Treasuries in order to maintain a competitive advantage of the Yuan against the Dollar. Inflows on capital account — not only from China — include roughly $5 trillion of federal debt purchased since 2001. This keeps the US uncompetitive in export markets and places domestic manufacturers at a disadvantage when competing against imports.

Foreign Holdings of US Federal Securities

Recent purchases of federal debt are sufficient to drive 10-Year Treasury yields through support at 2.40%/2.50%.

10-Year Treasury Yields

Glass half empty or half full?

Bears will no doubt seize on the headwinds to support their prediction of another market crash. I am reassured, however, that the economy has recovered as well as it has, given the difficulties it faces. None of the headwinds are likely to disappear any time soon, but progress in addressing these last two issues would go a long way to solving many of them.

Is unemployment really falling?

US unemployment has fallen close to the Fed’s “natural unemployment rate” of close to 5.5%. Does that mean that all is well?

Not if we consider the participation rate, plotted below as the ratio of non-farm employment to total population.

Employment Participation Rate

Participation peaked in 2000 at close to 0.47 (or 47%) after climbing for several decades with increased involvement of women in the workforce. But the ratio fell to 0.42 post-GFC and has only recovered to 0.435. We are still 3.5% below the high from 14 years ago.

When we focus on male employment, ages 25 to 54, we exclude several obscuring factors:

  • the rising participation rate of women;
  • an increasing baby-boomer retiree population; and
  • changes in the student population under 25.

Employment Rate Men 25 to 54

The chart still displays a dramatic long-term fall.