NAB Archives - the patient investor

November 14, 2019

Australia: Major banks

Summary

Our review of APRA’s June 2019 quarterly report on the four major banks — Commonwealth, Westpac, ANZ and NAB — concludes that they are collectively priced at a 16.5% premium over fair value.

Technically, the ASX 300 Banks Index ($XBAK) is experiencing secondary selling pressure and a correction is likely.

A correction would reduce the premium over fair value and may present buy opportunities.

Valuation

We project:

long-term asset growth at 3.0% p.a. (down from 4.0%);
net interest margins at 1.65% of average total assets (down from 1.70%);
non-interest operating income of 0.5%;
operating expenses at 1.05% (previously 1.10%);
provisions for bad/doubtful debts averaging 0.2%;
additional equity capital required of $12 billion; and
a 30% tax rate.

That delivers a forward PE of 16.9 based on a market cap of $399 billion.

We estimate that the major banks are priced at a 16.5% premium over fair value, based on a 12-year payback period*.

*Note to readers: we have simplified our model by removing the margin of safety and use a lower payback period instead.

Technical Analysis

The ASX 300 Banks index retreated below its rising trendline, warning of a correction. Follow-through below support at 7600 would strengthen the signal, with a target of primary support at 6750.

ASX 300 Banks Index

Book Growth

Total assets are the primary engine of bank revenue. Heady growth of the last two decades ended in 2015, when the ratio of total assets to nominal GDP (right-hand scale) started to decline. Nominal GDP also slowed (5.4% p.a. in June 2019) and is likely to restrict future book growth.

Majors: Total Assets Annual Growth and compared to Nominal GDP

Household debt near saturation level, at close to 200% of disposable income, is another headwind to future book growth.

Australia: Household Debt to Disposable Income

Total asset growth of the major four banks slowed to 1.4% for the twelve months ended June 2019 and we have reduced our long-term projection to 3.0% per year.

Margins

RBA rate cuts are squeezing net interest margins, currently 1.73%, and we expect a long-term average of 1.65% of total assets.

Majors: Income & Expenses

Expenses declined to 1.09% of total assets but non-interest income, at 0.56%, is falling even faster.

Non-Interest Income

Fees and commissions — the major component of non-interest income — have suffered the largest falls. Transaction-based fees are the worst performer, while declining credit growth has reduced lending-based fees. The sharp drop in other fees, to 0.19%, is likely to be permanent as banks shed their wealth management operations.

Majors: Fees

We project non-interest income to average 0.50% of total assets in the long-term.

Expenses

Operating expenses declined to 1.09% of total assets, as the majors attempt to cut costs in line with income, but personnel costs have proven sticky and are falling at a slower rate.

Majors: Operating Expenses

Non-Performing & Past Due Assets

Charges for bad and doubtful debts remain low at 0.09% of total assets but we expect a long-term average of 0.20%.

Majors: Charges for Bad & Doubtful Debts

Impaired loans are falling as a percentage of total loans and advances but past due loans have climbed to 0.6%, reflecting mortgage stress.

Majors: Impaired Assets

Provisions for impaired loans, however, are reasonable at 95.8% of impaired facilities including security held.

Majors: Provisions for Impaired Assets

Capital

Common equity Tier 1 capital (CET1) remains low, with a CET1 capital ratio of 10.8% in June 2019, based on risk-weighted assets. CET1 as a percentage of total assets is a low 4.96%.

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has called for “more skin in the game“, asking the big four Australian banks to increase their capital holdings in New Zealand subsidiaries by $12 billion:

The RBNZ proposal calls for systemically important banks to hold a minimum of 16% Tier 1 capital against risk-weighted assets, of which 6% would be a regulatory minimum and 10% would act as a counter-cyclical buffer to absorb losses without triggering “resolution or failure options”.

A similar move by APRA is unlikely but RBNZ presents a problem for the big four banks as they will have to raise additional equity to capitalize their NZ subsidiaries. One alternative is to raise equity through a separate listing of their NZ subsidiaries but this is still likely to dilute returns on equity.

Return on Equity

Declining return on assets and increased capital requirements are both exerting downward pressure on return on equity (ROE), from a peak of 20.5% in 2007 to 9.7% in March 2019.

Majors: Return on Total Assets & Return on Equity

Management & Culture

Australian regulator APRA is suffering from regulatory capture. A 146-page capability review, stemming from David Murray’s Financial System Inquiry found APRA “slow, opaque, inefficient, and in urgent need of a culture and leadership overhaul.”

Disclosure

Staff of The Patient Investor may directly or indirectly own shares in the above companies.

August 1, 2019August 14, 2019

Australian banks: Still overpriced

Summary

We have just completed a review of Australia’s four major banks — Commonwealth, Westpac, ANZ and NAB — and conclude that they are collectively overpriced by 23.5 percent. Our review is based on APRA’s quarterly reports, where the four banks can be viewed as a collective unit.

The ASX 300 Banks Index ($XBAK) is in a primary down-trend and we expect it to re-test support at 7000.

We estimate forward PE at 17.2. Allowing a 20% margin of safety — for increases in capital and risks associated with under-performing assets — we calculate a combined fair value of $310.7 billion, compared to current market cap of $406.1 bn, based on a 13-year payback period.

Our conclusion is to wait for $XBAK to re-test support at 7000.

Future Growth

Total assets are the base which generates most bank revenue. Heady growth of the last two decades is unlikely to continue. Growth in total assets has lagged GDP since 2015. Private credit growth for Australia slowed to 4.4% in FY18 and 3.3% in FY19.

Majors: Total Assets to Nominal GDP

Private borrowers are near saturation point, with household debt at an eye-watering 190% of disposable income.

Australia: Household Debt to Disposable Income

David Ellis at Morningstar writes:

Many investors are concerned about a potential sharp downturn or crash in the Australian housing market. While Australian housing is expensive and debt/household income ratios are high, we remain comfortable for several reasons despite recent weakness in house prices. Tight underwriting standards, lender’s mortgage insurance, low average loan/valuation ratios, a high incidence of loan prepayment, full recourse lending, a high proportion of variable rate home loans, and the scope for interest-rate cuts by the Reserve Bank of Australia, or RBA, combine to mitigate potential losses from mortgage lending. Average house prices in Australia are falling, with the national average declining 5% during the 12 months to end December 2018 based on CoreLogic data. But investors who readily compare the Australian residential real estate market to that of the U.S. and other markets are ignoring fundamental differences.

The counter-argument is that loose lending policies exposed by the Royal Commission, vulnerable mortgage insurers with concentrated exposure in a single sector and low bank capital ratios have created a banking sector “more likely to act as an accelerant in a down-turn rather than a shock absorber” in the words of FSI Chair David Murray.

Nominal GDP is growing at an annual rate of 5.0% (March 2019) and we expect this to act as a constraint on book growth. We project long-term book growth of 4.0%.

Margins

Net interest margins declined to 1.73% for Q1 2019 and we expect a long-term average of 1.70%.

Majors: Income & Expenses

Expenses declined to 1.10% of average total assets but non-interest income has fallen a lot faster, to 0.60%. The decline in non-interest income is expected to continue and we project a long-term average of 0.50%.

Fees & Commissions

Fees and commissions — the major component of non-interest income — have suffered the largest falls, with transaction-based fees the worst performer. Lending-based fees are likely to be impacted by declining credit growth.

Majors: Fees & Commissions

Expenses

Operating expenses have also fallen but sticky personnel costs are declining at a slower rate.

Majors: Expenses

Non-Performing Assets

Charges for bad and doubtful debts remain low but we expect an up-tick in the next few years and project a long-term average of 0.20%.

Majors: Provisions for Bad & Doubtful Debts

Capital

Common equity Tier 1 capital (CET1) remains low, with a CET1 capital ratio of 10.7% in March 2019, based on risk-weighted assets. If we calculate CET1 as a percentage of total assets, the ratio falls to 4.9%. Leverage ratios, which calculate CET1 against total credit exposure, are even lower because of off-balance sheet exposure.

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has asked the big four Australian banks for “more skin in the game” and to increase their capital holdings in New Zealand subsidiaries by $12 billion:

The RBNZ proposal calls for systemically important banks to hold a minimum of 16% Tier 1 capital against risk-weighted assets, of which 6% would be a regulatory minimum and 10% would act as a counter-cyclical buffer to absorb losses without triggering “resolution or failure options”.

The move by RBNZ has exposed ineffectual supervision of major banks in Australia. A new chairman at APRA could see increased pressure on Australian banks to improve their capital ratios.

Management & Culture

Australian regulator APRA is suffering from regulatory capture. There have been calls in Parliament and the media for APRA chairman, Wayne Byers, to resign after the Royal Commission revealed numerous shortcomings in bank culture and supervision.

A 146-page capability review, stemming from David Murray’s Financial System Inquiry found APRA “slow, opaque, inefficient, and in urgent need of a culture and leadership overhaul.”

Clancy Yeates at SMH weighs in:

A rare public intervention from banking royal commissioner Kenneth Hayne could be aimed at ensuring his recommendations are not watered down by financial sector lobbying, former watchdog Allan Fels says….

“It’s very unusual for a royal commissioner, especially a former High Court judge, to speak after a report, but probably he is concerned about weak implementation of his report due to enormous pressure from the financial institutions, an enormously powerful lobby.”

There have been several recent changes at major banks whose poor conduct was exposed by the Royal Commission. NAB CEO Andrew Thorburn and Chair Ken Henry resigned in the wake of the findings. Earlier, in 2018 Ian Narev resigned as CEO of Commonwealth after an APRA investigation into money-laundering found there was “a complacent culture, dismissive of regulators, [and] an ineffective board that lacked zeal and failed to provide oversight.”

A change at the head of APRA could have even more long-lasting consequences for the banks.

Valuation

We project:

long-term asset growth at 4.0% p.a.;
net interest margins at 1.7% of average total assets;
non-interest operating income of 0.5%;
operating expenses at 1.1%;
provisions for bad/doubtful debts averaging 0.2%; and
a 30% tax rate.

That delivers a forward PE of 17.2. Allowing a 20% margin of safety — for increases in capital and risks associated with under-performing assets — we arrive at a combined fair value of $310.7 billion (current market cap is $406.1 bn) based on a 13-year payback period.

Technical Analysis

The ASX 300 Banks index, dominated by the big four, reflects a primary down-trend. The recent rally is currently testing resistance at the descending trendline. Reversal below 7000 would warn of another decline. The previous false break below 7000 suggests strong support.

ASX 300 Banks Index

Conclusion

Expect another test of support at 7000. Respect of support would provide an entry point at close to fair value.

Valuations are sensitive to assumptions: LT book growth of 5% and a 0.1% increase in net profit (% of average total assets) would increase intrinsic value to $387.4 bn (4.6% below current prices). At present we favor a conservative fair value of $310.7 billion, 23.5% below current market capitalization.

We currently have no exposure to the four major banks in our Australian Growth portfolio.

Disclosure

Staff of The Patient Investor may directly or indirectly own shares in the above companies.

April 16, 2018April 16, 2018

Avoiding the hubris trap

Great example of how even the most professional management teams can fall into the hubris trap.

Michael Chaney describes to The Age how Wesfarmers burnt a billion dollars on the highly successful Bunnings hardware chain’s expansion into the UK market:

S&P 500

Bunnings Warehouse by Bidgee – Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, Link

Chaney was the chairman that signed off and despite everything contends he had never seen a more thorough investment analysis than had been undertaken on Bunnings UK.

They had a base case set of projections and a downside case and it all looked very positive at the time according to Chaney.

But a couple of fundamental mistakes were made subsequently after acquisition of Homebase home improvement network of stores including the removal of 150 senior managers.

“One was moving out the senior management and replacing it with our Australian experts and the second was getting rid of a lot of the products and the franchises because they didn’t suit the Bunnings model,” says Chaney.

By way of example the Australian interlopers jettisoned Laura Ashley from the home decorator product line up – and British women voted with their purses.

It was the success of the Australian model and its management that blinded the higher ups inside Wesfarmers to the fact that these guys didn’t know better what the UK customers wanted. Wesfarmers got caught in the hubris trap.

Some years earlier hardware giant Lowes fell into a similar trap in the US. Number-crunchers at head office worked out that they could save a bundle by replacing senior salespeople with more junior, inexperienced staff. The knowledge base of experienced floor staff was decimated. Customer service and sales plummeted. As one manager described it: “we became find-it-yourself instead of do-it-yourself.” Fortunately Lowes were able to correct their mistake and should have learned a valuable lesson but it seems they did not.

Investors should always be on the lookout for the hubris trap. The more successful the company, the more vulnerable they are. Expanding operations away from the home country or state is often a high risk venture, where management may be blind to cultural differences, regulatory pitfalls and an array of new competitors. Expanding into new product lines or services that are outside management’s traditional core expertise may also present traps for the unwary.

Ask Woolworths (Australia) about their Masters hardware venture, Commonwealth Bank about their expansion into financial advice, NAB about their expansion into UK markets, Centro Properties (now Vicinity) and Westfield about their foray into US shopping centers,….. I could go on. It’s a long list.

December 18, 2015

CBA: big four to raise another $32 billion of equity | afr.com

From Chris Joye at AFR:

On the question of whether the majors are done and dusted on capital raising, investors need go no further than CBA’s chief credit strategist, Scott Rundell, and CBA’s head of fixed-income strategy, Adam Donaldson, who on Thursday published a report arguing the big four are short $32 billion of CET1 capital.

“Capitalisation [is] likely to be a source of credit strength for banks as they build toward meeting APRA’s expected ‘unquestionably strong’ capital requirements,” Rundell and Donaldson said. The authors reiterated previous analysis that suggested the majors’ target CET1 ratios will settle at “around 10 per cent to 10.5 per cent”, which “would put the majors at the bottom of the top quartile” of global competitors.

October 16, 2015

Aussie big four banks overpriced

Australia’s big four banks have raised significant amounts of new capital as the realization finally dawned on regulators that they were highly leveraged and likely to act as “an accelerant rather than a shock-absorber” in the next downturn.

Chris Joye writes in the AFR that the big four have raised $36 billion of new capital in the 2015 financial year:

Before Westpac’s $3.5 billion equity issue this week, the big banks had, through gritted teeth, accumulated $27 billion of extra equity over the 2015 financial year through “surprise” ASX issues, underwritten dividend reinvestment plans, asset sales and organic capital generation via retained earnings. If you add in “additional tier one” (AT1) capital issues (think CBA’s $3 billion “Perls VII”), total equity capital originated rises to about $32 billion, or almost $36 billion after Westpac’s effort this week.

The effect of deleveraging is clearly visible on the ASX 300 Banks Index [XBAK].

ASX 300 Banks Index

Having broken primary support, the index is retracing to test resistance at 84. Bearish divergence on 13-week Twiggs Money Flow, followed by reversal below zero, both warn of a primary down-trend. Respect of resistance at 84 would strengthen the signal, offering a (medium-term) target of 68* for the next decline.

* Target calculation: 76 – ( 84 – 76 ) = 68

Matt Wilson, head of financial research at the $10 billion Australian equities shop JCP Investment Partners, says the bad news for those “long” the oligarchs is that “we are still only halfway through the majors’ capital raising process at best”.

Chris calculates the remaining shortfall to be at least $35 billion:

Accounting for future asset growth, I calculated the big banks will need another $35 billion of tier one capital if the regulator pushes them towards a leverage ratio of, say, 5.5 per cent by 2019, which is still well below the 75th percentile peer.

One of the big four’s most attractive features is their high dividend-yield and attached franking credits, but Chris compares this to the far lower dividend payout ratios of international competitors and quotes several sources who believe the present ratios are unsustainable.

JCP’s Wilson does not think payout ratios are sustainable and accuses the big banks of “over-earning”. “Bad debts of 0.15 per cent are running at a 63 per cent discount to the through-the-cycle trend of 0.40 per cent,” he says. “Should we see a normal credit cycle unfold, then payouts will be cut significantly due to the pro-cyclicality of risk-weighted assets calculations and bad debts jumping above trend.”

He concludes:

Aboud [Stephen Aboud, head of LHC Capital Fund] reckons artificially high yields also explain why the big banks’ “2.5 times price-to-book valuations are miles above the 1-1.5 times benchmark of global peers”, which he describes as “a joke”.

Plenty of food for thought.

Read more from Chris Joye at Hedge funds that shorted the big banks | AFR

July 16, 2014

Australia: UBS eyes $23b capital hit to big banks

Chris Joye at AFR reports on a recent study by UBS banking analysts Jonathon Mott and Adam Lee. The two believe that David Murray’s financial system inquiry is likely to recommend an increase of 2 to 3% in major banks tier 1 capital ratios.

Based on an extra 3 per cent capital buffer for too-big-to-fail banks, UBS finds that the major banks would have to “increase common equity tier one capital by circa $23 billion above current forecasts by the 2016 financial year end”.

…This automatically lowers the major banks’ average return on equity at the end of the 2016 financial year from 15.4 per cent to 14.3 per cent, or by about 116 basis points across the sector. Commonwealth Bank and Westpac come off best according to the analysis, with ANZ and National Australia Bank hit much harder.

Readers should bear in mind that capital ratios are calculated on risk-weighted assets and not all banks employ the same risk-weightings, with CBA more highly leveraged than ANZ. As I pointed out earlier this week, regulators need to monitor both risk-weighted capital ratios and un-weighted leverage ratios to prevent abuse of the system.

Bear in mind, also, that a fall in return on equity does not necessarily mean shareholders will be worse off. Strengthening bank balance sheets will lower their relative risk, improve their cost of funding, and enhance valuations.

November 11, 2013

NAB Convertible Pref issue | FIIG

From FIIG Newswire:

National Australia Bank Limited (ASX:NAB) has announced to the ASX the issue of a listed, floating rate convertible preference share (\”CPS II\”) with an indicative dividend of 325 to 340 bps over the bank bill swap rate. NAB is seeking to raise $750,000,000 for general corporate purposes. APRA has confirmed that the CPS II will count as additional Tier 1 Capital, supporting the NAB\’s regulatory capital requirements.

A welcome move to see the big four banks raising more Tier 1 capital. My view is that TBTF banks should have a minimum leverage ratio of 10 percent — more than double the current 4 to 5 percent.

Basel takes aim at Mega Bank | | MacroBusiness

Deep T: As the research previously posted here on MB shows, Mega Bank [the big four Australian banks: NAB, CBA, WBC and ANZ] carries a level of capital against residential mortgages that is less than 2% even with mortgage insurance. Mega Bank uses internal risk based models to determine the amount of capital which are primarily based on the historical default rate of Australian mortgages relative to loan to value ratios. The period over which Mega Bank assesses the historical default rate is primarily over a period of rising house prices fueled by the expansion of mortgage credit by Mega Bank. Thereby masking probable default levels over a more benign period…..

via Basel takes aim at Mega Bank | | MacroBusiness.