The Chicago Plan (1939)

The 1939 proposal — A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY REFORM — by a group of eminent economists, including Irving Fisher, became known as the “Chicago Plan” after its chief proponent, professor Henry Simons from the University of Chicago. The core proposal is to require banks to hold 100% reserves against demand deposits1, ending the fractional reserve banking system and making the monetary authority (the Fed) solely responsible for creation of new money. This extract describes major features of the plan:

Lending Under the 100% Reserve System
The 100% reserve requirement would, in effect, completely separate from banking the power to issue money. The two are now disastrously interdependent. Banking would become wholly a business of lending and investing pre-existing money. The banks would no longer be concerned with creating the money they lend or invest, though they would still continue to be the chief agencies for handling and clearing checking accounts.

Under the present fractional reserve system, if any actual money is deposited in a checking account, the bank has the right to lend it out as belonging to the bank and not to the depositor. The legal title to the money rests, indeed, in the bank. Under the 100% system, on the other hand, the depositor who had a checking account (i.e., a demand deposit) would own the money which he had on deposit in the bank; the bank would simply hold the money in trust for the depositor who had title to it. As regards time or savings deposits, on the other hand, the situation would, under the 100% system, remain essentially as it is today. Once a depositor had brought his money to the bank to be added to his time deposit or savings account, he could no longer use it as money. It would now belong to the bank, which could lend it out as its own money, while the depositor would hold a claim against the bank. The amount, in fact, ought no longer to be called a “deposit”. Actually it would be a loan to the bank.

Now let us see how, under the 100% system, the banks would be able to make loans, even though they could no longer use their customers’ demand deposits for that purpose.

There would be three sources of loanable funds. The first would be in the repayments to the banks of existing loans of circulating medium largely created by the banks in the past. Such repayments would release to the banks more cash than they would need to maintain 100% reserve behind demand deposits; and this “free” cash they would be able to lend out again. The banks would, therefore, suffer no contraction in their present volume of loans…..

The second sources of loans would be the banks own funds, capital, surplus, and undivided profits which might be increased from time to time by the sale of new bank stock.

The third source of loans would be new savings “deposited” in savings accounts or otherwise borrowed by the banks. That is, the banks would accept as time or savings deposits the savings of the community and lend such funds out again to those who could put them to advantageous use. In this manner, the banks might add without restraint to their savings, or time, deposits, but not to the total of their demand deposits and cash.

However, there would, of course, be a continuous moving of demand deposits from one bank to another, from one depositor to another and from demand deposits into cash and vice versa. To increase the total circulating medium would, nevertheless be the function of the Monetary Authority exclusively.

via A Program For Monetary Reform (pdf)

  1. Demand deposits are bank deposits, such as checking accounts, payable on demand. Savings or time deposits are payable on maturity. An easy way to separate demand from savings/time deposits is to class any deposit that matures within 30 days as a demand deposit.

The Chicago Plan Revisited | IMF Working Paper

There is growing interest in this IMF Working Paper by Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof which discusses removing the role of monetary creation from fractional-reserve banks and assigning it to Treasury. Here is a brief abstract:

At the height of the Great Depression a number of leading U.S. economists advanced a proposal for monetary reform that became known as the Chicago Plan. It envisaged the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. Irving Fisher (1936) claimed the following advantages for this plan: (1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of the supply of bank-created money. (2) Complete elimination of bank runs. (3) Dramatic reduction of the (net) public debt. (4) Dramatic reduction of private debt, as money creation no longer requires simultaneous debt creation. We study these claims by embedding a comprehensive and carefully calibrated model of the banking system in a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We find support for all four of Fisher’s claims. Furthermore, output gains approach 10 percent, and steady state inflation can drop to zero without posing problems for the conduct of monetary policy…..

I believe that Fisher is right in targeting fractional-reserve banks as a major cause of instability in capitalist systems, facilitating rapid expansion of credit during booms, inevitably followed by rapid contraction during the bust. To introduce a system such as the Chicago Plan would risk an abrupt shock to the monetary system, but gradual increase of bank capital, leverage and reserve ratios could achieve the same eventual end without any noticeable side-effects.

via The Chicago Plan Revisited (pdf)

Hat tip to Ambrose Evans-Pritchard at The Telegraph.