Shilling: Big Banks Shift to Lower Gear | The Big Picture

Gary Shilling describes how US regulators are getting tough with big banks:

Break-Up

Like unscrambling an egg, it’s hard to envision how big banks with many, many activities could be split up. But, of course, one of the arguments for doing so is they’re too big and too complicated for one CEO to manage. Still, there is the example of the U.K., which plans to separate deposit-taking business from riskier investment banking activities – in effect, recreating Glass-Steagall.

In any event, among others, Phil Purcell believes that “from a shareholder point of view, it’s crystal clear these enterprises are worth more broken up than they are together.” This argument is supported by the reality that Citigroup, Bank of America and Morgan Stanley stocks are all selling below their book value Chart 5. In contrast, most regional banks sell well above book value.

Bank Price-to-Book Ratios

Push Back
Not surprising, current leaders of major banks have pushed back against proposals to break them up. They maintain that at smaller sizes, they would not be able to provide needed financial services. Also, they state, that would put them at a competitive disadvantage to foreign banks that would move onto their turf.

The basic reality, however, is that the CEOs of big banks don’t want to manage commercial spread lenders that take deposits and make loans and also engage in other traditional banking activities like asset management. They want to run growth companies that use leverage as their route to success. Hence, their zeal for off-balance sheet vehicles, proprietary trading, derivative origination and trading, etc. That’s where the big 20% to 30% returns lie – compared to 10% to 15% for spread lending – but so too do the big risks.

Capital Restoration
….the vast majority of banks, big and small, have restored their capital….Nevertheless, the FDIC and Federal Reserve are planning a new “leverage ratio” schedule that would require the eight largest “Systemically Important Banks” to maintain loss-absorbing capital equal to at least 5% of their assets and their FDIC-insured bank subdivisions would have to keep a minimum leverage ratio of 6%. This compares with 3% under the international Basel III schedule. Six of these eight largest banks would need to tie up more capital. Also, regulators may impose additional capital requirements for these “Systemically Important Banks” and more for banks involved in volatile markets for short-term borrowing and lending. The Fed also wants the stricter capital requirements to be met by 2017, two years earlier than the international agreement deadline….

CEO remuneration is largely driven by bank size rather than profitability, so you can expect strong resistance to any move to break up too-big-to-fail banks. Restricting bank involvement in riskier enterprises — as with UK plans to separate deposit-taking business from riskier investment banking activities — may be an easier path to protect taxpayers. Especially when coupled with increased capital requirements to reduce leverage.

Read more at Shilling: Big Banks Shift to Lower Gear | The Big Picture.

How Wall Street Defanged Dodd-Frank | The Nation

Gary Rivlin gives us an insight into the machinations of Wall street lobbyists on Capitol Hill:

As he prepared to sign the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—the sweeping legislative package designed to prevent another spectacular financial collapse—into law, the president [Obama] first acknowledged the miracle of having a bill to sign at all. “Passing this…was no easy task,” he told the crowd of hundreds. “We had to overcome the furious lobbying of an array of powerful interest groups and a partisan minority determined to block change.”

Indeed, some 3,000 lobbyists had swarmed the Capitol in hopes of killing off pieces of the proposed bill……

That sense of victory barely lasted barely the morning. …..After Dodd-Frank’s passage, lobbyists for the big banks and industry trade groups divided themselves into eighteen working groups, each organized around a different element of the new law. “That’s when the real work began,” Talbott tells me……

Read more at How Wall Street Defanged Dodd-Frank | The Nation.

When You Weren’t Looking, Democrat Bank Stooges Launch Bills to Permit Bailouts, Deregulate Derivatives « naked capitalism

Yves Smith reports on attempts to undermine the Volcker Rule and why the rule is so important:

In the US, depositors have actually been put in a worse position than Cyprus deposit-holders, at least if they are at the big banks that play in the derivatives casino. The regulators have turned a blind eye as banks use their depositaries to fund derivatives exposures. And as bad as that is, the depositors, unlike their Cypriot confreres, aren’t even senior creditors. Remember Lehman? When the investment bank failed, unsecured creditors (and remember, depositors are unsecured creditors) got eight cents on the dollar. One big reason was that derivatives counterparties require collateral for any exposures, meaning they are secured creditors. The 2005 bankruptcy reforms made derivatives counterparties senior to unsecured lenders.

Read more at When You Weren’t Looking, Democrat Bank Stooges Launch Bills to Permit Bailouts, Deregulate Derivatives « naked capitalism.

Volcker: Wall Street Kills Regs By Running Out the Clock

Josh Boak at Fiscal Times writes:

…..So when Volcker declared on Monday that the financial regulation system is broken, it’s time to sound the alarm. The gist of his complaint is that Dodd-Frank was passed in the middle of 2010, yet many of its biggest regulations have not been finalized and there is no end in sight.

“I know it’s a complicated bill. I know the markets are complicated,” Volcker said at a conference for the National Association for Business Economics. “Two-and-a-half years later you can’t have a regulatory apparatus that’s devised by the most important piece of legislation in recent years? That suggests something is rather wrong. Something is dysfunctional.”

Read more at Volcker: Wall Street Kills Regs By Running Out the Clock.

How to keep markets safe in the era of high-speed trading | Chicago Fed

By Carol Clark

With the chance of an order passing though controls at so many levels, how can things go wrong? One possibility Chicago Fed researchers found is that most of the trading firms interviewed that build their own trading systems apply fewer pre-trade checks to some trading strategies than others. Trading firms explained that they do this in order to reduce latency.

Another area of concern is that some firms do not have stringent processes for the development, testing, and deployment of code used in their trading algorithms. For example, a few trading firms interviewed said they deploy new trading strategies quickly by tweaking old code and placing it into production in a matter of minutes. In fact, one firm interviewed had two incidents of out-of-control algorithms. To address the first occurrence, the firm added additional pre-trade risk checks. The second out-of-control algorithm was caused by a software bug that was introduced as a result of someone fixing the error code that caused the first situation.

The study also found that erroneous orders may not be stopped by some clearing BDs/FCMs because they are relying solely on risk controls set by the exchange. As noted earlier, however, risk controls at the exchange may be structured in such a way that they do not stop all erroneous orders.

via Chicago Fed Letter (PDF)

BD = broker-dealer

FCM = futures commission merchant

2008 Financial Crisis Cost Americans $12.8 Trillion: BetterMarkets

Better Markets, a pro-financial reform Wall Street watchdog, estimates the total loss of American wealth since Sept. 15, 2008, when Lehman filed for bankruptcy, as $12.8 Trillion dollars — almost one year’s GDP. Better Markets president & CEO Dennis Kelleher calls for effective regulation of systemically important Wall Street firms to prevent a recurrence of the GFC.

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Better Markets: Cost of the Crisis (PDF)

Dimon may be ‘stupid,’ but he’s right on banks – MarketWatch

David Weidner: A return to Glass-Steagall in the U.S. would effectively force the world to separate traditional banking from casino banking.

That system would be attractive to both sides. The banking system that holds our loans, our deposits, debts and assets would be separate from a Wild West free market unfettered by bank regulators and their constant worries about risk.

So why can’t the big financial institutions get behind this one? Simple. They want to gamble your money in the casino.

via Dimon may be ‘stupid,’ but he’s right on banks – David Weidner’s Writing on the Wall – MarketWatch.