High credit growth prolongs recessions

Research by the Federal Reserve Board of San Francisco shows how high credit growth prior to a financial crisis can prolong the recession by three or more years. The graph below compares the average recovery time for a normal recession to recessions preceded by low credit growth [blue or red] and recessions preceded by high credit growth [green or orange].

Recession Recovery Time

Differences in public debt growth appear to have little impact, but public debt levels are another matter.

Read more at Federal Reserve Bank San Francisco | Private Credit and Public Debt in Financial Crises.

Hat tip to Barry Ritholz

Rude Awakening Awaits Western Economies | WSJ

Michael J. Casey at WSJ interviews HSBC group chief economist Stephen King, author of When the Money Runs Out: The End of Western Affluence:

Mr. King’s thesis….. is that we in the West are in line for a shock when we discover that the high-growth rates to which we’re accustomed aren’t coming back. In the U.S., we’ve been wrongly budgeting for a return to 3.5% average real growth rates that persisted through the second half of the 20th century — an affliction suffered by both policymakers and households that he calls an “optimism bias” — and yet even before the financial crisis destroyed trillions of dollars of wealth the economy was only clocking gains of 2.5% per year. Forget worrying about the post-crisis onset of a Japan-style “lost decade,” Mr. King says. “We have been through a lost decade already. ”Among the reasons for this long-term shift to a slower potential growth rate, he cites the exhaustion of a various one-off productivity gains that boosted growth after World War II: the entry of women into the workforce; the liberalization of world trade; a tripling in rates of consumer credit founded on an unsustainable increase in housing prices; and education. These gains are no longer to be had, he says, but policymakers are blind to that fact and so are burdening the economies of the U.S., Europe and Japan with long-term debts.

While I agree that we are unlikely to see a resumption of the rapid debt growth of the last 3 decades, this should contribute to lower inflation and greater stability, without a credit-fueled boom-bust cycle, that could partially offset the negative effects. I also question whether productivity gains are really exhausted, or if this is a temporary after-effect of low, post-GFC capital investment. There is ample evidence that the global economy is slowing and productivity gains will fall — if one is prepared to ignore evidence to the contrary such as the rise of automation, advances in genetics, nanotechnology, sustainable energy and slowing global population growth — which should alleviate the poverty trap that many countries are still in. The researcher has to beware of confirmation bias, where they gather data to support a preconceived opinion.

Read more at Horror Story: Rude Awakening Awaits Western Economies – Real Time Economics – WSJ.

Taking the leverage out of economic growth | Reuters

Edward Hadas points out that long-term credit growth has exceeded growth in nominal GDP (real GDP plus inflation) in the US and Europe for some time. Not only does this fuel a credit bubble but it leads to a build up of inflationary pressure within the economy. If not evident in consumer prices it is likely to emerge as an asset bubble.

For the last two decades, accelerating credit has been closely correlated with the change in GDP – both in the United States and the euro zone. GDP growth tended to speed up shortly after the rate of credit growth increased, and slowed down after credit growth started to decrease.

This correlation implies there is an equilibrium rate of credit growth – the rate that corresponds to the long-term pace of nominal GDP growth. Though the pace of credit growth can vary from year to year, over time private debt and nominal GDP have to expand at the same rate for overall leverage to stay constant. That’s not what happened in the past two decades. Since 1990, Deutsche found a significant gap between credit and GDP growth in the United States and the euro zone.

In both, the neutral rate of credit growth – the rate associated with the economy’s long-term growth rate – was 7 percent. Those long-term nominal GDP growth rates were lower: 4.8 percent in the United States and 4 percent in the euro zone. In a single year, the difference of 2-3 percentage points doesn’t have much effect. Over a generation, though, it leads to a massive increase in the ratio of private debt to GDP.

The gap between growth in Domestic Debt and Nominal GDP widened in 2004/5 during the height of the property bubble and has narrowed to near zero since 2010.
Domestic Debt Growth Compared to GDP Growth
Hopefully the Fed have learned their lesson and maintain this course in future.

via Analysis & Opinion | Reuters.

Conversation with Bridgewater Associates' Ray Dalio | Credit Writedowns

The video below is an in-depth full hour-long segment and well worth watching. Notice that Dalio sees the credit accelerator as a key component adding to aggregate demand and the key component that creates instability in that demand. Unlike traditional econometric models that do not use the debt and credit stock as a consideration for a flow variable like spending, yet again we see that someone who anticipated the crisis does.

via Credit Writedowns

Australia: Housing market weakens

Housing credit growth is at its lowest level in over 30 years: lower than the dip of the early 1980s and the crash of 1987. The current rate of growth is barely sufficient to match already depressed construction rates for new homes*. The decline should see a gradual softening of housing prices, accelerating if there are any further falls in housing credit growth.

RBA Housing Credit Growth

*Housing finance, for both owner-occupied and investor housing, totaled $59.8 billion for the year ended June 2012 according to the RBA, while residential construction — excluding land — was $44.2 billion according to ABS estimates.

Westpac: China credit supply outstrips demand

Phat Dragon is placing the most value on new information regarding credit demand and supply. It is credit growth that tells us more about the shape of activity later this year than any other macro indicator……the supply side of the credit equation is moving decisively higher (greater policy emphasis, increased willingness to lend) but ……sluggish demand for loans is holding the system back. Indeed, the June quarter observation for “loan demand” (bankers’ assessment) fell to 12% below average, lower even than the Dec-2008 reading, even as the “lending attitude of banks” (corporate assessment) rose for a second straight quarter and the ‘easiness’ of the monetary policy stance (bankers’ assessment) rose to 21% above average.

via Westpac: Phat Dragon – a weekly chronicle of the Chinese economy.

Paul L. Kasriel: Don’t End the Fed, Mend the Fed

Although the return to a gold standard for our monetary system has much appeal, it is unlikely to occur. So, let’s not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Perhaps there is second-best monetary policy approach to the gold standard that might achieve most of the desirable outcomes of a gold standard but might have a greater probability of actually being adopted……. My suggested approach is very similar to one advocated by Milton Friedman at least 60 years ago. The more things change, the more they stay the same, I guess. I am proposing that the Federal Reserve target and control growth in the sum of credit created by private monetary financial institutions (commercial banks, S&Ls and credit unions) and the credit created by the Fed itself. I believe that this approach to monetary policy would reduce the amplitude of business cycles, would prevent sustained rapid increases in the prices of goods/services and would prevent asset-price bubbles of the magnitude of the recent NASDAQ and housing experiences.

econtrarian_043012.pdf (application/pdf Object).