CCP Archives - the patient investor

July 2, 2019August 27, 2019

The Long Game: Why the West is losing

Autocracies like China, Russia and Iran are challenging the dominance of Western democracies. Much has changed in the last two decades, fueling this emerging threat to the free world.

China & Global Trade

China joined the WTO in 2001 and disrupted global trade. Subsidy of state-owned or state-sponsored industries tilted the playing field. Manipulation of exchange rates, amassing $4 trillion of foreign reserves, helped to depress the yuan, creating a further advantage for Chinese manufacturers.

Manufacturing employment in the US shrank by more than 5.5 million jobs between 2000 and 2010.

Manufacturing Jobs USA

Europe experienced similar losses.

Manufacturing Jobs UK, France & EU

Output recovered, but through a combination of automation and offshoring labor-intensive activities, manufacturing jobs were never restored. Losses of 4 million US manufacturing jobs (23.5% of total) and an equal 4 million (10%) in the European Union appear permanent.

Manufacturing US & EU

The Global Financial Crisis

The global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008 and the recession caused soaring unemployment and further alienated blue collar workers.

Unemployment US & EU

The $700 billion bailout of the banking system (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008), with no prosecutions of key actors, undermined trust in Federal government.

The Rise and Decline of Nations

Mancur Olson, in The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982), argues that interest groups — such as cotton-farmers, steel-producers, labor unions, and banks — tend to unite into pressure groups to influence government policy in their favor. The resulting protectionist policies hurt economic growth but their costs go unnoticed, attracting little resistance, as they are diffused throughout the economy. The benefits, on the other hand, are concentrated in the hands of a few, incentivizing further action. As these pressure groups increase in strength and number, the costs accumulate, and nations burdened by them fall into economic decline.

Olson formulated his theory after studying the rapid rise in industrial power in Germany and Japan after World War II. He concluded that their economies had benefited from the almost complete destruction of interest groups and protectionist policies as a result of the war and were able to pursue optimal strategies to rebuild their economies. The result was that their economies, unfettered by pressure groups and special interests, far outstripped those of the victors, burdened by the same inefficient, protectionist policies as before the war.

Federal government, choked by lobbyists and special interests, failed to prioritize issues facing blue collar workers: global trade, off-shoring jobs and fallout from the GFC. Formation of the Tea Party movement in 2009 created a rallying point for libertarians and conservatives — supporting small government and traditional Judeo-Christian values¹ — but it also opened the door for populists like Donald Trump.

Polarization

Exponential growth of social media, combined with disinformation and fake news, has polarized communities.

In 2017, 93 percent of Americans surveyed said they receive news online, with news organization websites (36%) and social media (35%) the most common sources. Trust and confidence in mass media has declined from 53 percent in 1997 to 32 percent in 2016, according to Gallup Polls.

Politics are increasingly dominated by outrage and division, with populist candidates gaining handsomely.

Many Western governments are now formed of fragile coalitions. Greece, Italy, Germany, even the UK. Others in Eastern Europe — Poland, Hungary, Austria, Turkey — are heading towards autocracy.

The Long Game

China has been quietly playing the long game. Massive investment in infrastructure, subsidy of key industries, controlled access to its markets, upgrading technology through forced partnerships with Western companies in exchange for access to Chinese markets, and industrial espionage have all been used to gain an advantage over competitors.

The CCP exploits divisions within and between Western governments while expanding their influence in universities, think tanks and the media. The stated aim of the CCP’s United Front Work Department is to influence Chinese diasporas in the West to accept CCP rule, endorse its legitimacy, and assist in achieving Party aims. This includes some 50 million who emigrated after 1979 or are PRC students studying abroad. Stepped up surveillance of PRC students, funding of Confucius Institutes on campuses and growing student activism has raised concerns in Australia over academic freedom and promotion of pro-Beijing views³.

Western governments seem unable to present a coordinated response. Absence of a cohesive, long-term strategy and weakened alliances make them an easy target.

Pressure Groups

Governments are also subjected to pressure from within. The latest example is pressure exerted, by US companies, on the White House to lift the ban on sales of US technology to Huawei. From the New York Times a few days ago:

Beijing has also pressured American companies. This month, the Chinese government said it would create an “unreliable entities list” to punish companies and individuals it perceived as damaging Chinese interests. The following week, China’s chief economic planning agency summoned foreign executives, including representatives from Microsoft, Dell and Apple. It warned them that cutting off sales to Chinese companies could lead to punishment and hinted that the companies should lobby the United States government to stop the bans. The stakes are high for some of the American companies, like Apple, which relies on China for many sales and for much of its production.

Short-term Outlook

The problem with most Western democracies is that they are stuck in a short-term election cycle, with special interest groups, lobbyists for hire, and populist policies targeted at winning votes in the next election. Frequent changes of government lead to a lack of continuity, ensuring that long-term vision and planning, needed to build a winning global strategy, are woefully neglected.

Autocrats like China, Russia and Iran are able to play the long game because they enjoy continuity of leadership. They do not have to concern themselves with elections and the media cycle. They own the media. And elections, if held, are a mere formality, with pre-selected candidates and pre-ordained results.

Western democracies will have to adapt if they want to remain competetive in the 21st century.

Focus on the Long-term

Switzerland is one of the few Western democracies that is capable of a long-term focus. Their unique, consensus-driven system ensures stability and continuity of government, with buy-in from all major political parties. The largest parties are all represented on the 7-member governing Federal Council, elected by Federal Assembly (a bicameral parliament) for four-year terms on a proportional basis. There has been only one change in party representation on the Federal Council since 1959².

Cohesiveness and stability provide a huge advantage when it comes to long-term planning.

Conclusion

Regulating global trade, limiting the threat of social media, ensuring quality journalism, protecting academic freedom, guarding against influence operations by foreign powers, limiting the power of lobbyists and special interest groups — all of these require a long-term strategy. And buy-in from all sides of the political spectrum.

We need to adapt our current form of democracy, which has served us well for the last century, but is faltering under the challenges of the modern era, or risk losing it all together. Without bipartisan support for, and commitment to, long-term policies, there is little hope for building a winning strategy.

The choice is ours: a highly-regulated, autocratic system where rule of law is the first casualty; a stable form of democracy that ensures long-term continuity and planning; or continuation of the present melee, driven by emotion rather than forethought, populist leaders, frequent changes in government — and subservience to our new autocratic masters.

Footnotes:

Wikipedia: Tea Party movement
Current Federal Council representation is 2 Free Democratic Party (liberals), 2 Social Democratic Party (social democrats), 1 Christian Democratic People’s Party [CVP] (Christian conservatives) and 2 Swiss People’s Party [SVP] (national conservatives), reflecting 76.2% of the popular vote in 2015 Federal elections. The SVP gained one seat from the CVP in 2003.
The Diplomat: China’s United Front work – Propaganda as Policy

May 29, 2019May 29, 2019

Market uncertainty is likely to persist as US-China negotiations stall | Bob Doll

From Bob Doll at Nuveen:

“There have been several risk-off phases this decade, triggered by economic threats due to politically induced setbacks. However, the current sluggish global economy and weak trade, coupled with escalating trade tariffs and non-tariff barriers, is a worrisome combination. This is especially true because once protectionism has gained momentum, it may prove difficult to stop or reverse. While many risk asset prices are only off modestly from April highs, there’s an ominous undercurrent in global financial markets.

We have assumed that the pro-growth bias of both the U.S. and China would lead to a trade truce. That premise looks increasingly questionable, although a deal is always possible. Given that financial markets have not reacted more significantly, investors are still generally expecting the global economic expansion to persist.

Despite the longer-term power struggle, the constructive case for a trade deal between the U. S. and China was predicated on President Trump focusing on the short-term win, while the Chinese look to the longer-term. This difference in political time horizons made a deal possible. Now, the focus for both parties has shifted to long-term strategic objectives, resulting in a stalemate. A financial market downturn may be needed to break the impasse. An extended period of churning could develop if trade talks resume, but without signs of a resolution.

The current market weakness differs from prior periods of economic uncertainty during this decade. There has always been a path to a positive outcome for growth and risk assets, primarily via additional policy stimulus. However, the economic and market outcome this time has become more uncertain, and time will not work towards a positive outcome unless trade negotiations improve. Business sentiment will erode if mounting trade roadblocks and uncertainty do not diminish. Protectionism tops the list of recession catalysts, and a permanent deterioration in U.S./China trade relations could have adverse long-term revenue ramifications for global trade and growth.”

My thoughts:

A trade deal was never going to happen. Long-term objectives of the CCP and the US are in direct conflict and headed for a collision.
Trump deserves credit for confronting the issues rather than kicking the can down the road as Obama did (Paul Krugman highlighted the problem in 2010).
Trump is the least likely President to negotiate a peaceful resolution to this hegemonic struggle. Diplomacy and building trust are not his forte.
Trust is low, eroding any chance of a face-saving public accord.
An agreement would simply be a band-aid, not a long-term solution (see my first point).
The impact on business will not be catastrophic but earnings growth will slow.
The market is unsure how to react. Yet. If it does make up it’s mind that this is bad for business, there won’t be enough room in the lifeboats. A down-turn could be sharp and hard.
Sell down to the sleeping point.

” I am carrying so much cotton that I can’t sleep thinking about it. It is wearing me out. What can I do?”
“Sell down to the sleeping point,” answered the friend.

~ Edwin Lefevre: Reminiscences of a Stock Operator (1923)

May 25, 2019May 25, 2019

S&P 500 and the trade war

We are now headed for a full-blown trade war. Donald Trump may have highlighted the issue but this is not a conflict between him and Xi — it should have been addressed years ago — nor even between China and the West. Accusations of racism are misguided. This is a conflict between totalitarianism and the rule of law. Between the CCP (with Putin, Erdogan, and the Ayatollahs in their corner) and Western democracy.

Australia will be forced to take sides. China may be Australia’s largest trading partner but the US & UK are it’s ideological partners. I cannot see the remotest possibility of Australia selling out its principles for profits, no matter how tempting the short-term rewards (or threatened hardships). We have a proud history of standing up against oppression and exploitation.

Disruptions to supply chains and supply contracts in the US (and China) are going to be significant and are likely to impact on earnings. The S&P 500 reaction is so far muted, with retracement testing medium-term support at 2800. There is also no indication of selling pressure on the Trend Index. Nevertheless, a breach of 2800 is likely and would warn of a test of primary support at 2400.

S&P 500

Falling Treasury yields highlight the outflow from equities and into bonds. Stock buybacks are becoming the primary inflow into stocks.

10-Year Treasury Yields

However, corporate bond spreads — lowest investment grade (Baa) yields minus the equivalent Treasury yield — are still well below the 3.0% level associated with elevated risk.

S&P 500

Profits may fall due to supply disruption (similar to 2015 on the chart below) but the Fed is unlikely to cut interest rates unless employment follows (as in 2007). Inflation is likely to rise as supply chains are disrupted but chances of a rate rise are negligible. Fed Chairman Jay Powell’s eyes are going to be firmly fixed on Total Non-farm Payrolls. If annual growth falls below 1.0% (RHS), expect a rate cut.

S&P 500

This excerpt from a newsletter I wrote in April 2018 (Playing hardball with China) is illuminating: “In 2010, Paul Krugman wrote:

Some still argue that we must reason gently with China, not confront it. But we’ve been reasoning with China for years, as its surplus ballooned, and gotten nowhere: on Sunday Wen Jiabao, the Chinese prime minister, declared — absurdly — that his nation’s currency is not undervalued. (The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that the renminbi is undervalued by between 20 and 40 percent.) And Mr. Wen accused other nations of doing what China actually does, seeking to weaken their currencies “just for the purposes of increasing their own exports.”

But if sweet reason won’t work, what’s the alternative? In 1971 the United States dealt with a similar but much less severe problem of foreign undervaluation by imposing a temporary 10 percent surcharge on imports, which was removed a few months later after Germany, Japan and other nations raised the dollar value of their currencies. At this point, it’s hard to see China changing its policies unless faced with the threat of similar action — except that this time the surcharge would have to be much larger, say 25 percent.

I don’t propose this turn to policy hardball lightly. But Chinese currency policy is adding materially to the world’s economic problems at a time when those problems are already very severe. It’s time to take a stand.

Krugman (no surprise) now seems more opposed to trade tariffs but observes:

….I think it’s worth noting that even if we are headed for a full-scale trade war, conventional estimates of the costs of such a war don’t come anywhere near to 10 percent of GDP, or even 6 percent. In fact, it’s one of the dirty little secrets of international economics that standard estimates of the cost of protectionism, while not trivial, aren’t usually earthshaking either.”

Trump has to show that he is prepared to endure the hardships of a trade war and not kowtow to Beijing. But the chances of a reasonable response are unlikely.

Men naturally despise those who court them, but respect those who do not give way to them.

~ Thucydides (circa 400 BC)

May 6, 2013

Beware China’s civilian-military relationship | The Japan Times

Masahiro Matsumura, professor of international politics at St. Andrew’s University (Momoyama Gakuin Daigaku) in Osaka, writes

…….the Chinese state apparatus is largely detached from the military, while the party’s top civilian leaders have only a loose grip on the generals.

Worse still, the current fifth generation of civilian leaders is made up of veritable dwarfs in military affairs. By contrast, the PLA’s leaders have become increasingly professionalized, but without the tempering influence of effective civilian control, which might well collapse entirely if China’s leaders continue to accept unauthorized military actions, particularly in the East or South China Sea, as faits accomplis. Line commanders could take advantage of the equivocality of civilian policy, particularly given the military’s growing political clout and the CCP’s dependence on popular nationalist sentiment.