S&P declares Australia a “one trick pony” | macrobusiness.com.au

By Houses and Holes on November 22, 2012

One-Trick Pony

London-based Kyran Curry, the long-time primary credit analyst for Australia at S&P, is back and the news is getting worse. From the AFR:

“The banks are highly indebted, they’re highly leveraged, they are the main vehicle Australia uses to fund its current account deficit…Australia has, as we see it, got some credit metrics that are right off the scale when it comes to assessing Australia’s external position….It’s got high levels of liabilities, it’s got very weak external liquidity and that basically means the banks are highly indebted compared to their peers….They’re benefiting from a safe haven at the moment – nonetheless investor sentiment can turn very quickly…We just worry that at some point, the people who are funding the Australian banks may decide that enough is enough and may begin to lose confidence in the bank’s ability to roll over their debt….That would come through a weakening in Australia’s major trading partners flowing through to a dramatic weakening in Australia’s fiscal position.”

Curry said this could be a two or three year scenario. But he added:

“Anything that weighs on the ability of Australia to bring forward new energy projects and that weighs on its export growth potential, that’s something that would put pressure on the rating. Australia is looking increasingly like a one-trick pony.”

Regular readers will note that S&P has pretty much captured my entire ‘peak Australia’ thesis. It is simultaneously ripping aside the veil of invisopower that regulators have dispersed around the banks and seeing for it is the singularly backward macroeconomic strategy of embracing Dutch disease. My two great fears.

The last line is the worst. I am of the view that LNG will rationalise – the current set of projects that is – not the fictitious pipeline. That means there is a risk that this is not a two or three scenario at all. Which does offer an answer to the question: why is S&P ramping its warnings now?

Canberra must immediately dispatch to Beijing a high level delegation to demand further stimulus. Perhaps a high-speed rail link from Beijing to the Bush Capital? That way, when they’re ready, the Chinese can relax in comfort on the way down to buy our banks.

Reproduced with thanks to Houses and Holes at Macrobusiness.com.au

Australia: Did APRA assume a bailout in its stress test?

Houses and Holes at Macrobusiness.com.au makes an important point regarding the Australian mortgage insurance sector towards the end of this article:

Stress Test

John Laker, head of APRA, is out today with a speech in which he announced the results of a recent APRA stress test of Australian banks. Here is the scenario and the results:

The ‘what if’ scenario was built around a further deterioration of global economic conditions, with a disorderly resolution of the fiscal problems in Europe triggering a dislocation in global debt markets and a sharp downturn in the North Atlantic economies. China is assumed to be unable to fully offset the decline in its exports with domestic spending and, as a result, the rate of growth of the Chinese economy slows sharply. The implied reduction in Chinese demand for minerals lowers commodity prices significantly, with a consequent deterioration in the exchange rate for the Australian dollar. Domestically, households and businesses respond to the external shock by reducing consumption and investment expenditure. As a result, GDP falls and unemployment rises substantially, which feeds back into rising defaults and sharp falls in house prices and commercial property prices.

In this scenario, the key macroeconomic parameters for Australia used as the basis for the stress test were:

  • a sharp (5 per cent) contraction in real GDP in the first year;
  • a rapid rise in the unemployment rate to a peak of 12 per cent;
  • a peak-to-trough fall in house prices of 35 per cent; and
  • a fall in commercial property prices of 40 per cent.

This is a tougher stress test than the one APRA undertook in 2010. The projected economic contraction is deeper and more prolonged, with a weaker recovery and a longer period before return to growth. The rise in unemployment is higher and the impact on the housing market therefore more pronounced; there is a greater peak-to-trough fall in house prices. This time, the stress test also addressed liquidity consequences. The dislocation in global debt markets results in the largest banks being unable to access global funding markets for six months. The consequence is more intense competition for deposit funding and an increase in funding costs, weighing on lending margins and acting as a drag on revenues.

Remember, this is a hypothetical. It is in no way a forecast or a central expectation for the course of the Australian economy. Rather, the stress test was intended to test the boundaries of ‘severe but plausible’, especially given the current relatively strong position of the Australian economy. Benchmarked against recent industry-wide stress tests in other countries, the severity is confirmed by the fact that the GDP shock is more than four standard deviations based on the annual volatility of GDP in Australia since 1960; the shock was one-to-three standard deviations in other major tests. As a test of plausibility, the macroeconomic scenario would be comparable with the actual experience of the United Kingdom, United States and some European countries during the global financial crisis.

Although the macroeconomic scenario was tougher than in the 2010 exercise, the actual mechanics of the stress test were largely the same. The advanced banks were asked to apply the macroeconomic scenario in their own models and provide their assessment, in quite granular detail, of the impact on the ratings migration of assets, default behaviour, profitability and capital. After analysing this information, APRA then determined a common set of portfolio-specific risk measures that were applied to the banks’ loan portfolios.

Reflecting the severity of the scenario, the advanced banks all reported significant losses, driven by much higher bad debt expenses. Credit loss rates in aggregate were comparable with the experience in the early 1990s, although not quite as high as the peaks then reached. As expected, total losses were larger than in the 2010 exercise.

Despite the deterioration in labour market conditions and the projected stress on the housing market, residential mortgages, which account for nearly half of the advanced banks’ credit exposures, contributed only a fifth of total losses. The mortgage portfolio alone was not the principal driver of losses, a reflection of the structure of the domestic mortgage market as well as the general tightening in lending standards following the crisis. Losses were realised across a range of loan portfolios, particularly corporate, SME and commercial property portfolios. Losses on these business portfolios were more front loaded, materialising earlier in the scenario than losses on residential mortgage portfolios, which tended to lag the increase in unemployment.

The main results of the stress test for the five advanced banks, taken as a group, are as follows:

  • none of the banks would have failed under the downturn macroecnomic scenario;
  • none of the banks would have breached the four per cent minimum Tier 1 capital requirement of the Basel II Framework in any year of the stress test;
  • and the weighted average reduction in Tier 1 capital ratios over the three-year stress period was 3.8 percentage points.

This is a very positive result. It reflects the efforts of the advanced banks to strengthen their Tier 1 capital positions since the crisis began through ordinary equity issues and profit retention. It leaves these banks well positioned to transition to the new Basel III capital regime.

Well…bonza! But just one question. What did the stress test assume about the Lenders Mortgage Insurance sector (LMIs)? They are those hapless gents sitting on wafer thin capital buffers but carrying the risk of all the banks’ riskiest mortgages.

If the APRA stress test assumed a smooth and uninterrupted flow of payouts for losses from the LMIs to the banks then it also assumed their defacto nationalisation. In reality, under extreme stress, there is a very serious risk is that the LMIs will be wiped out and their relationships with the banks will descend into legal chaos as the two parties aim to survive at the cost of one another. You may recall that the biggest losers on Wall St in the GFC were insurers (think AIG), not banks.

In short, in the kind of scenario painted by APRA, it is quite possible that the government would have to step in and the post-nationalised LMIs would continue to pump a river of public cash into the banks via a backdoor bailout (ala AIG in the US).

So, if we are to take this excellent stress test result seriously, we really need to know what APRA assumed about the LMIs. Hmm?

Reproduced with thanks to Houses and Holes at Macrobusiness.com.au

Are Australian banks adequately capitalized?

Basel III Capital Adequacy Ratios (CAR) will require banks to hold a minimum Total Capital of 8% against risk-weighted assets (RWA), the same as under Basel II, but with additional capital buffers of between 2.5% and 5.0% depending on credit market conditions. With an average ratio of 11.5% (September 2011), Australian banks are short of the maximum Basel III requirement of 13.0% for markets in a credit bubble.

The problem, however, lies not only with CAR but with the definition of risk-weighted assets. Under RWA, loans and investments are not taken at face value but adjusted for perceived risk. These adjustments vary widely between banks in different countries. US banks still apply Basel I risk-weightings:

  • zero for cash and government debt (OECD Sovereigns);
  • 20 percent for (OECD) banks;
  • 50 percent for mortgages;
  • 100 percent for corporates.

Their counterparts in Asia and Europe apply Basel II risk-weightings, with more lenient mortgage risk weights, averaging 15 percent and 14 percent respectively.

Australia’s 4 major banks similarly apply risk-weightings (supervised by APRA) for residential mortgages as low as 15%, with an average of 17%. That means the big four hold less than 2% capital against residential mortgages. Even after mortgage insurance, Deep T pointed out earlier this year, leverage is close to 50 times capital.

Basel III introduces a minimum 3% leverage ratio which ignores risk-weighting and compares Tier 1 capital to total exposure — total assets plus derivative exposure and off-balance sheet assets. But this is a catch-all and allows banks with high quality assets to continue leveraging at 33 times capital. Fed guidelines are more conservative, requiring a minimum leverage ratio of 4% (“adequately capitalized“) with a recommended 5% minimum for well-capitalized banks. The ratio, however, excludes off-balance-sheet assets. None of Australia’s four majors appear to meet the Fed’s requirement at September 2011 — ranging between 3.9% and 4.8% of Tier 1 capital to tangible assets.

With household debt at a historic high of 150% of disposable income, 3 times higher than in the early 1990s, Australia shows classic symptoms of a credit bubble and cannot afford to be complacent. There are three areas of the banking system that require attention. Capital adequacy ratios need to be lifted as well as risk-weightings for residential mortgages. Improving these two measures should enable Australia’s four major banks to achieve a minimum (Basel III) leverage ratio of 5%.

Sources:

Click to access bcbs189.pdf

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basel_III
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_requirement

Click to access wp1290.pdf

Click to access wp1225.pdf

Casualties of the externality

Click to access EY%20Reg%20Alert%20Basel%20III%20June%202012.pdf

Australia and the Endgame

John Mauldin: We wrote about Australia in a full chapter of Endgame. Their economy never really suffered in the recent debt crisis, in large part due to their growing housing market and their trade with China. If you talk to the average Aussie, they think that all is right with the world. They acknowledge a few issues but see nothing major like the rest of the world has experienced. Jonathan and I think otherwise. Their housing market is by recent standards in a clear bubble (which I know will get me a lot of email). Their banking system is dominated by foreign deposits (shades of Northern Rock, but not as bad as Iceland). They are vulnerable to a Chinese economic slowdown. I should note that Chinese GDP growth was “down” to 7.6% last quarter. That China might slow down should not come as a surprise. No country can grow at 10% forever. Eventually the laws of large numbers and compounding take over. All that being said, Australian government debt and deficits are under control. Any problems should be of the nature of “normal” business cycle recessions and accompanying issues.

Comment:~ Massive Chinese stimulus saved Australia from the GFC but that is no reason to become complacent. As Steve Keen recently pointed out, Australia is in a similar position to Spain in 2006. Spain was generating a fiscal surplus which it used to reduce government debt below 40% of GDP, but its banks were exposed to a large housing bubble funded by offshore deposits. Australian banks are similarly exposed to offshore funding and are leveraged 50 to 1 on residential mortgages (Macrobusiness May 4, 2012) — even after adjusting for mortgage insurance — leaving them highly vulnerable to a contraction. We also need to recognize that Australia is not exposed to a slowdown in China’s GDP growth, but to a slowdown in Chinese spending on infrastructure and housing. While GDP growth may fall to zero, the Chinese economy will still survive, but what are Australia’s chances if that is accompanied by say a 50 percent fall in new infrastructure and housing projects? The fall in iron ore and coking coal exports would have a far greater impact on the Australian economy.

Has the Chinese government given up on rebalancing already?

Zarathustra: As more and more evidence suggests that the Chinese economy is slowing rapidly, there is also more and more evidence that the Chinese central government has given up on real estate market curbs even though they say they will continue, and they have given up cleaning local government debts even though they said they were cleaning them up. And by giving these up, they have also unofficially given up on rebalancing the economy away from investment driven to consumption driven once more.

via Has the Chinese government given up on rebalancing already?.

Five Largest Banks ‘Should Be Broken Up’: Fed’s Fisher – CNBC

The five biggest banks in the United States are too powerful and should be broken up, Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher said on Wednesday.

The financial crisis has left the five biggest banks even more powerful than before, he said at an event in Mexico City……

“After the crisis, the five largest banks had a higher concentration of deposits than they did before the crisis,” he said. “I am of the belief personally that the power of the five largest banks is too concentrated.”

via Five Largest Banks ‘Should Be Broken Up’: Fed’s Fisher – US Business News – CNBC.

New Economic Perspectives: Banks Weren’t Meant to Be Like This. What Will their Future Be – and What is the Government’s Proper Financial Role?

So we are brought back to the question of what the proper role of banks should be. This issue was discussed exhaustively prior to World War I………

It was above all in Germany that long-term financing found its expression in the Reichsbank and other large industrial banks as part of the “holy trinity” of banking, industry and government planning under Bismarck’s “state socialism.” German banks made a virtue of necessity. British banks “derived the greater part of their funds from the depositors,” and steered these savings and business deposits into mercantile trade financing. This forced domestic firms to finance most new investment out of their own earnings. By contrast, Germany’s “lack of capital … forced industry to turn to the banks for assistance,” noted the financial historian George Edwards. “A considerable proportion of the funds of the German banks came not from the deposits of customers but from the capital subscribed by the proprietors themselves.[3] As a result, German banks “stressed investment operations and were formed not so much for receiving deposits and granting loans but rather for supplying the investment requirements of industry.”

via New Economic Perspectives: Banks Weren’t Meant to Be Like This. What Will their Future Be – and What is the Government’s Proper Financial Role?.

Comment:~ The author contrasts the short-term focus of modern banks with the long-term outlook of the early German banking system which was largely equity-funded, rather than deposit-based. The question is: could we ever successfully return to such a system?

EU to Banks: Raise Capital – WSJ.com

LONDON—European banks must come up with a total of €114.7 billion ($153.8 billion) in new capital by next June, the European Banking Authority said Thursday, as regulators took their latest stab at restoring confidence in the Continent’s beleaguered banking industry.

The capital shortfalls are spread across more than 30 banks in 12 countries. A total of 71 banks were subjected to the EBA’s exam.

via EU to Banks: Raise Capital – WSJ.com.

Spain Weighing a Fast, Costly Cleanup of Banks – WSJ.com

According to analysts at Morgan Stanley, Spain could acquire the entire €176 billion pile of impaired real-estate assets at the 58% discount applied by Ireland’s bad bank, or a cost of €73.9 billion. This could be funded by swapping new government debt for the banks’ soured real-estate assets.

However, the state would have to raise sufficient funds from investors to provide the banks with an estimated €28.5 billion in new capital to absorb losses that the banks would take in selling the assets at a steep discount. In all, the cost of the plan to the Spanish state could be €102.4 billion, or around 10% of Spanish GDP.

via Spain Weighing a Fast, Costly Cleanup of Banks – WSJ.com.

Colin Twiggs: ~ Spain faces the same tough choice as the Irish: rescue its banks, by putting its own finances at risk, or endure a massive recession as the banking system implodes and the flow of credit dries up. The first choice may be the least painful but will mean many years of austerity in order to bring government debt back below 60% of GDP.