The road not taken | Macrobusiness.com.au

By Houses & Holes at Macrobusiness.com.au
The Road Not Taken

So, with our Federal election mostly over, at least enough to get a good sense of where we’re going, I think it’s fair to conclude that we are not going to get out in front of the primary economic issues of our time. On the contrary, we’re going to make things worse for ourselves.

The only issue that this election should be about is the management of Australia’s post China boom adjustment yet it is barely mentioned. Where does this leave us then? First, let’s describe the issue once more.

Following the housing and mining booms in the post-millennium economy, in structural terms Australia finds itself with very high household debt but low public debt, very high asset values and historically low competitiveness in all industries including large swathes of mining and still high but falling terms of trade. In cyclical terms, we face big falls in the terms of trade, very big falls in mining investment, a probable stall and possible fall in national income, a still very high but falling currency and ongoing weak nominal growth as well as fiscal instability.

There have been two sensible policy matrices from our eminent economists aimed at managing the problems ahead. The first is by Warwick McKibbin, who has suggested that we both:

  • lower the currency asap through targeted money printing and
  • support economic growth, incomes and productivity through a large public infrastructure program.

These two make sense together because they simultaneously support weak private sector investment, boost competitiveness through the currency and productivity enhancements and prevent asset bubbles. However, it does risk a widening current account deficit and may leave you still uncompetitive at the end of it.

The second matrix of policy suggestions has come from Ross Garnaut and Peter Johnson who have focused more directly upon the issue of competitiveness. Garnaut argues that a nominal exchange rate adjustment (via the currency) is not enough. He sees our lack of competitiveness as so extreme – and it is hard to argue that it is not – that a real exchange rate adjustment is required. That means not only must the currency fall a lot, but as tradable costs rise, wages must not. He argues:

  • we should slash interest rates to lower the currency as soon as possible;
  • use macroprudential controls if low rates cause credit to rise too fast;
  • contain wages through a national program of burden-sharing and
  • deploy budget discipline as well as launch an unfettered productivity drive.

Johnson sees the same competitiveness issue but argues that monetary policy cannot serve two masters (addressing both currency and inflation) and prefers that we:

  • install capital controls to lower the dollar as soon as possible;
  • use interest rates to prevent asset bubbles;
  • deploy budget discipline as well as launch an unfettered productivity drive and
  • thinks recession is inevitable as a mechanism to lower costs.

My own view is that a combination of the McKibbin and Garnaut approaches is the way to go:

  • undertake a moderate, productivity directed infrastructure public spend to support growth, jobs and income;
  • slash interest rates to lower the dollar;
  • install macroprudential tools to ensure no credit blowoff;
  • undertake a national burden-sharing narrative to ensure wages don’t rise. We may not able to get a new wages accord but I would still bring everyone together and reframe the conversation, and
  • push for productivity anywhere and everywhere.

This approach ensures assets don’t deflate too quickly as we restore competitiveness in real terms. To my mind  it is the basic minimum of policy innovation required, before we even get to tougher questions about Henry Review tax reform, cutting housing speculation incentives and making supply side reforms, increasing savings and taxing resources properly that will help us transition permanently towards a more balanced economy as well as tackle our long term demographic challenges.

Turning to the real world, what do we have from out elite currently?

  • the RBA is slashing interest rates too slowly to bring down the dollar fast enough;
  • it has explicitly repudiated macroprudential tools thus risking an even bigger asset bubble;
  • both political parties are ignoring the adjustment ahead in narrative terms
  • both parties are focused on long term spending but little on medium and short term productivity measures
  • both parties are ignoring probable ongoing fiscal instability and supporting interest groups over national interests

Where will this lead? It means we face a longer and ultimately more debilitating decline. The lack of redress for the dollar and inflated input costs ensures no big rebound in our tradabale sector investment, exposing us all the more to the mining cliff. Credit and asset prices will bubble up more than they should, inhibiting a tradables recovery and ensuring further hollowing out of the industrial base.

The lack of budget discipline ensures ongoing fiscal instability as promises are repeatedly broken, spending is cut and taxes jacked chronically. This will be an ongoing weight upon private sector confidence as policy fails to cope. It will also be a red rag to the rent-seeking bull as each round of cuts and hikes involves public campaigns by those effected, retarding competition and productivity. With no honest narrative of the issues, government will be reduced to stakeholder management.

In sum, it means a longer and far more destructive path at risk of repeated recessions, the entrenching of rentier capitalism, lower than otherwise asset prices, falling standards of living and broad disenchantment. Whocouldanode?

Reproduced with permission from Macrobusiness.com.au

Canadian housing bubble looks ripe for popping | Toronto Star

Adam Peterson writes the Canadian housing bubble is headed for a “slow-motion” crash:

My gravest concern is that Canada is fast approaching a 5:1 home-price-to-income ratio, a benchmark achieved by the U.S. at the peak in 2006. Since the correction, the U.S. ratio now hovers at approximately 3:1.

To compound the problem, household debt in Canada has breached 150 per cent of income and continues in the wrong direction; households are not cushioned against a blow.

Australian household debt is also hovering around 150% of disposable income.

Australian household debt to disposable income

While the price-to-income ratio varies between 4 and more than 6 depending on whether you use national averages or median data.
Australian house price-to-income ratio

Read more at Canadian housing bubble looks ripe for popping | Toronto Star.

Australia: Ford is the tip of the crisis

By Houses and Holes — cross-posted from Macrobusiness.com.au

It’s fascinating to watch the exit of Ford shake up commentary alliances and ideology.

The loon pond that dominates Australian business media is out in force with soothing words that Australian car manufacturing needs to be let go gently into that good night.

Bill Scales appears at the AFR to argue:

…..while it will be tempting to see this as a sign of the demise of Australian automotive manufacturing, it’s not. This decision is a direct result of the well-recognised, well-understood and deliberate decisions by Ford in Australia and the US.

However it does have important implications for public policy in Australia. This is a good example why governments should not provide company or industry- specific assistance. Governments and bureaucrats can never understand the strategic or commercial imperatives of individual businesses. So they cannot hope to successfully design company or industry-specific assistance programs that make any fundamental difference to the underlying economics of that company or industry. If the strategic direction or intent of a government policy for any company or any industry is not consistent with the strategic or operational direction of that company or industry, and it rarely is, then money provided to them by governments is likely to be wasted.

High priestess of the pond, Jennifer Hewitt, wants outright liquidation:

The national sympathy and attention given to 1200 Ford workers who will be out of a job in three years’ time shouldn’t obscure economic reality. Car manufacturing in Australia has been living on borrowed time – and permanently borrowed tax-payer money for far too long.

That can never be solved by additional government assistance or new industry plans or emotive rhetoric about how car manufacturing in Australia is so special. This only delays the inevitable.

But the response is part of the national semi-panic about the future of manufacturing in Australia. Both Julia Gillard and Tony Abbott stress the need for Australia to be a place that continues to “make” things. Just what new things should be made remains elusive. What is clear is it is will not be cars long term. That is despite the billions of dollars in government subsidies.

…the end of Ford manufacturing shouldn’t in itself be the sort of national crisis suggested by the massive reaction to the company’s announcement.

The Ford Falcon is an iconic loss rather than an economic one, a dream of the past rather than the future.

The AFR editorial and Judith Sloan at The Australian, card carrying members of the pond, are also happy to see Ford go. However, some of the more sane commentators are as well. Alan Mitchell at the AFR, John Durie at The Australian and Bernard Keane at Business Spectator are all for it.

What is missing, as usual, is the only thing that actually matters to the reader and the nation: context.

In 2009, the US faced an analogous decision about whether to let one of its big three auto-makers go to the wall (there were many differences as well). As the GFC tore its GDP to pieces, the government stepped into the breach and saved Chrysler, bankrupted the company, broke its union contracts, reorganised its cost base, sold much of it to FIAT and the company relaunched. Why did the global home of “free market capitalism” bother?

The cheap answer is to save jobs. But there is more to it than that. It is about productivity and not in the way you might think.

We all know that productivity is the key to national standards of living. Only through productivity growth do we sustainably increase our competitive advantage, capital formation, incomes and employment. But, I hear you ask, propping up dud car companies is bad for productivity, right?

Wrong, or at least, overly simplistic.

The issue is this. Manufacturing accounts for a huge slice of productivity potential in all economies. Without it, any economy will struggle to generate long term high productivity growth. Mechanisation, improved processes, innovation and technical progress are the bread and butter of productivity growth. They simply do not exist to the same extent in services, nor, for the most part, in mining (though the runoff in the boom will be good for the next few years). The following chart from McKinsey makes the point. Manufacturing contributes disproportionately to productivity, innovation and exports:
Productivity
This is the first question that Ford’s departure raises about Australia’s long term economic context. The car industry may or may not survive the shakeout but Australian manufacturing has already declined to only 7% of GDP and is clearly set to plunge further as capex expectations run at levels first seen in the 1980s.

Of the thirty developed economies in the world comprising the OECD, this level of contribution to GDP is last, tied with the tax haven of Luxembourg.

Our elite – the government, mining magnates and the media – have decided that manufacturing will be let go and we will instead rely entirely upon highly priced dirt and houses. Australia’s elite policy makers are engaged in a gigantic experiment that flies in the face of economic history.

The second question is more immediate. What our elite forget or ignore is that selling dirt is a highly cyclical business. Put simply, they never expected the current cycle to end. But it is. Right now. And is about to become a MASSIVE drag on the economy:
Mining Investment/GDP
Manufacturing is supposed to be one of those sectors picking up the slack along with other exports and more houses. Obviously the departure of Ford will damage any upside for a manufacturing bounce and it will also put a sizable dent in consumer confidence, making it harder for other sectors to rebound as well.

Short term and long, cyclically and structurally, this is a crisis, a crisis of our elite’s own making.

Australia: Property risk highest in a long time

Posted by Houses and Holes in Australian Property, May 20th 2013:
Index

MB contributor, Rumpletstatskin, wrote an interesting post on the Australia property cycle this morning. In it he mused that:

The crucial lesson in all this is that Australian nominal asset prices have been supported by fiscal policy during the financial crisis, ongoing monetary policy adjustments, and foreign investment (including in mining infrastructure), which all supported employment and incomes.

This support allowed a slow melt adjustment since the financial crisis. Home prices have fallen, mortgage rates are down, and rents have increased. This means that buying a home is more affordable compared to renting than it has been for 15 years.

My message, if it wasn’t clear, is that if you have been holding off purchasing a home because of the risk of capital losses, then these risks are probably lower now than at any time in the past decade. Maybe prices will be a couple of percent lower at the end of next year, but I have a hard time wrapping my mind around downward price movement more severe than a couple more years of the slow melt, or around 3% in nominal terms. The chances of price gains is also now much higher.

Unfortunately this coming 2 year period is also likely to be economically unstable, with low wage growth and a fragile labour market. That is the catch with trying to time the residential property cycle – it is a game for players with lots of capital.

Cameron argues his post well but I vigorously disagree with these conclusions.

Australian property prices are not affordable on any spectrum that looks beyond the current cycle. Indeed, they remain at nose-bleed levels on any historical comparison.

Yet, prices have held at these high levels for over a decade and there is no saying that they won’t continue to do so. Throughout the GFC and afterwards I argued that the time of reckoning for the Australian housing bubble was not yet at hand. This was based largely upon the assumption that the nation had lots of firepower left in monetary and fiscal policy that would protect the downside. And so it turned out to be.

But each successive challenge has sapped these supports and insurance policies. Monetary policy is at 2.75% and probably has, at best, 1% of cuts left before it is exhausted. Fiscal policy too has limits now that the Budget guarantees bank borrowings. Not to mention the political paralysis preventing spending. We will never see another post-GFC stimulus program.

Most importantly, these limitations are apparent as the Australian economy enters a very serious challenge in the form of declining mining investment. In its editorial this morning the AFR wrote:

If Professor Garnaut is right, Chinese steel use per capita – the great driver of Australia’s resources boom – may not grow much further. He believes Australian resource investment will slide from 8 per cent of gross domestic product to just 2 per cent, effectively taking out about two years’ worth of national economic growth. This is already showing up in a string of profit warnings from mining services companies and an emerging slump in profitability in coal.

Think about that a moment. 6% of Australian GDP disappearing over the next three years before we even start to grow. This is the same forecast currently projected by ANZ and Goldman Sachs. It must be taken very seriously.

If this comes to pass, then it will be very difficult for Australia to avoid a recession and property bust of some kind. There will be very big falls in the dollar and they will protect Australian property prices to an extent. The fall will trap Asian investors already in the market but it will also deter future investors as currency risk becomes the new reality.

But the fall in the dollar is also going to hit consumers, much more quickly than it is going to benefit tradable sectors. Consumers will see purchasing power eroded as high inflation in oil and all imported goods overwhelms income growth. This will keep confidence under the cosh.

More to the point, a 6% draw down in business investment will hit the labour market hard and potentially trigger forced selling in property markets. Perth and Darwin especially are going to be at risk of property busts as the many project labourers on our major mining projects flood back into town with nothing to do. Not to mention the trouble we’ll see in the many sundry industries that have benefited from the mining boom. Brisbane is at risk of this dynamic too but has already corrected sharply so has less downside.

These factors, along with a generalised stalling in income growth, have the potential to feed bad loans back into the banking system. The majors can absorb serious losses. But how serious? And how much credit rationing would it take to pop the grossly oversupplied Melbourne and Canberra property markets, the latter afflicted with big job losses from a new government as well? Sydney is strong but only so long as credit keeps flowing.

There are of course arguments about high immigration, underlying demand, under supply and rising rents to support the market. And they will play some part. But none of these will matter in the circumstances I’m describing. If there are not enough jobs then people will move in together. Shortage will turn to surplus.

Cameron’s argument that the property cycle could be approaching a turning point will hold if these turn out to be normal times. A moderate retrenchment in mining investment will allow time to rebalance the economy so long as the dollar falls. Even so, things will seem abnormal. Inflation be high and property prices may rise in nominal terms but not so much in real.

But that is far from certain, indeed, may not even be the base case.

I am not saying any of this will happen. But if the mining investment cliff turns out to be precipitous in the next two years then the risk of a property shakeout is higher than at any time I can remember.

Reproduced with kind permission from Macrobusiness Australia.

Australia: Unsuspecting super investors are being sold a pup

David Potts at the Sydney Morning Herald writes:

Retirees with far less than $2 million in superannuation face extra tax bills…… the new tax will apply to all earnings above $100,000 a year from 2014, no matter the size of the nest egg.

The tax net is far broader than the 16,000, or 0.4 percent of retirees, mentioned in the recent announcement. Treasury estimates cited are based on a projected 5 per cent rate of return on investment and ignore the fact that returns can fluctuate widely, from 30% in a good year to -30% in a really bad year. Super funds with as little as $200,000 or $300,000 are affected if they earn more than $100,000 in any given year.

The problem is further exacerbated by capital gains, especially for self-managed funds that are not widely diversified. If a super fund sells a property or large block of shares, the asset may have been held for many years but the entire capital gain is recognized in the year in which the asset is sold. Despite some phase-in concessions, lumpy capital gains could lift a retiree over the $100,000 income threshold.

This is a deliberate tax grab that affects ordinary Australians while being sold to them under the smokescreen of “taxing the rich”.

Read more at Super plan contains a booby trap | David Potts | SMH.

Hat tip to Ody for bringing this to my attention on Incredible Charts forum.

Mongolia needs better roads, schools and hospitals: so why all this talk about saving for the future? | Making development work for all

Australia could also learn from the Chilean experience of resources boom-bust cycles and adopt similar policies to those being considered by Mongolia. Gregory Smith explains:

Eric Parrado, former head of the Chilean ‘Economic and Social Stabilization Fund’, tells us that “if natural resource booms are well managed they can be a blessing” and that “an important general lesson is that governments should avoid temptation to spend significant temporary surpluses”.

Read more at Mongolia needs better roads, schools and hospitals: so why all this talk about saving for the future? | Making development work for all.

Non-mining Australia “in recession” last quarter | MacroBusiness

Leith van Onselen considers that Australia’s non-mining economy may be in recession based on two consecutive quarters of negative growth in state final demand:

The blanket statement that Australia grew close to trend in 2012 not only obfuscates the fact that the current growth rate is well below trend and declining even further but also hides the fact that the majority of the population are living in regions which are in recession. That paints a totally different picture than the political spin coming from the Government.

Read more at Non-mining Australia “in recession” last quarter | | MacroBusiness.

EconoMonitor » Australia’s Economic Outlook—The Nauru Option?

Satyajit Das writes:

In a 29 November 2010 speech entitled The Challenge of Prosperity, RBA Governor sought to illustrate the combined effects of the gains of the appreciating terms of trade position and the A$ strength in the following terms: “In 2005 a shipload of iron ore was worth the same as around 2,200 flat screen televisions In 2010, the same shipload was worth around 22,000 flat screen TVs”. In a Freudian slip, the RBA Governor identified a fundamental issue with Australia’s economic model.

Australia may have substantially wasted the proceeds of its mineral booms, with the proceeds channelled into consumption. The nations did not channel enough into strategic long term investments or develop a new industrial base. According to one study, the commodity boom increased government revenues between 2002 and 2008 by around A$180 billion of which A$36 billion was used to repay public debt, A$69 billion was placed into the Future Fund (to meet the cost of public sector superannuation liabilities) and $75 billion was transferred to households in the form of tax cuts and payments.

Read more at EconoMonitor : EconoMonitor » Australia’s Economic Outlook—The Nauru Option?.

The “Export Price Norm” saved Australia from the Great Recession « The Market Monetarist

The Market Monetarist writes how a combination of luck and good policy saved Australia from recession.

Milton Friedman once said never to underestimate the importance of luck of nations. I believe that is very true and I think the same goes for central banks. Some nations came through the shock in 2008-9 much better than other nations and obviously better policy and particularly better monetary policy played a key role. However, luck certainly also played a role…..

via The “Export Price Norm” saved Australia from the Great Recession « The Market Monetarist.