The Coronavirus Threat

Spread of the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) is a “global health emergency” according to the World Health Organization (WHO). Restricted travel is already having an impact on the global economy, with Goldman Sachs anticipating a 0.4% fall in U.S. annualized GDP growth in the first quarter.

Imperial College in London estimates a dangerously high transmission rate for the disease:

Self-sustaining human-to-human transmission of the novel coronavirus (2019-nCov) is the only plausible explanation of the scale of the outbreak in Wuhan. We estimate that, on average, each case infected 2.6 (uncertainty range: 1.5-3.5) other people up to 18th January 2020, based on an analysis combining our past estimates of the size of the outbreak in Wuhan with computational modelling of potential epidemic trajectories. This implies that control measures need to block well over 60% of transmission to be effective in controlling the outbreak….

Johns Hopkins University CSSE reports 11,374 confirmed cases with 259 deaths and 252 recoveries as of 7.00 p.m. on January 31, 2020. Growth of the  number of reported cases in Mainland China appears linear, with an increase of 1,700 per day.

JHU CSSE 2019-nCOV spread

That seems highly suspicious when one compares to mathematical modeling and to social media reports from medical staff on the ground. Contagion rates are likely to grow exponentially, rather than in a straight line, and will only peak when authorities are able to bring the transmission rate below 1.0 (compared to the 2.6 posited by Imperial College).

A report in the Epoch Times suggests that Chinese public health authorities have suppressed the reporting of confirmed cases:

“The outbreak of Wuhan coronavirus is far bigger than the official figures released by Chinese public health authorities who cover up the severity by limiting the number of diagnosis kits to Wuhan hospitals, according to an insider and an independent journalist.

The insider and the independent journalist both say that diagnosis kits are only provided to certain ‘qualifying hospitals’ and in very limited quantities. Medical personnel at these hospitals have said that the number of kits they are supplied is less than 10 percent of what they need to test patients.

Now these hospitals claim that their responsibility at present is to provide treatment only, and they will not perform any diagnoses.”

UK researcher Jonathan Read projects that the epidemic in Wuhan will reach 191,529 by February 4 (prediction interval 132,751-273,649). Chart A shows total number of infections in black and new infections per day in red.

2019-nCOV predicted infection rate - Wuhan

2019-nCOV predicted infection rate - Mainland China

Restriction of road, rail and air travel to/from Wuhan is expected to achieve between 12.5% and 25% reduction in cases in the above areas.

2019-nCOV predicted infection rate - World

Importations into other countries may also be slowed by travel restrictions.

Mortalities are not limited to young children and the elderly and infirm as with most influenza viruses. Healthy adults, including health care workers, are dying. Reported recoveries (252) are low and provide an indication as to the severity of the infection.

Modelling suggests that the number of cases will double every seven days until it peaks. The peak number of cases will depend on how long it takes to contain the outbreak. Another four weeks would pose a serious threat to the global economy.

Where Fortune is concerned: she shows her force where there is no organized strength to resist her; and she directs her impact there where she knows that no dikes and embankments are constructed to hold her. ~ Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1532)

S&P 500 in a precarious position

A long-term chart of the S&P 500 highlights the precarious position of the index, having now doubled since its October 2007 high at 1576. Any time that a stock doubles in price, you are likely to get profit-taking, leading to resistance. The same holds true for the index. Probably even more so because individual stocks have the capacity to post higher gains — of even 5 or 10 times — while that isn’t feasible for the index. Even in the Dotcom bubble.

S&P 500

On the one hand we have a massive triple stimulus creating irrational exuberance, while on the other we have concerns over a coronavirus epidemic spreading from China and Donald Trump’s looming impeachment.

CoronaVirus

If you think that Trump is a shoe-in for re-election in November, this analysis of his chances is quite eye-opening.

Trump: Long Shot rather than a Slam Dunk

Expect more erratic behavior in the lead up to November.

Robert Shiller’s warning

Nobel prize-winning economist Robert Shiller warns that cracks are once again surfacing in the US housing market.

“We have had a strong housing market for pretty much all the time since 2012. Just after the financial crisis, the housing market didn’t recover, maybe because banking was in disarray and people were still expecting declines after the event. After 2012, it started going up at more than 10 per cent a year nationwide in the US, and has been slowing down since.”

Shiller says that a worrying pattern emerging in house prices is reminiscent of the property market in the run-up to the Great Recession.

The bursting of the US housing bubble in 2006-07 was a key trigger of the financial crisis…… “I have seen this happen before, we’re like back in 2005 again when the rate of increase in home prices was slowing down a lot but still going up.

Case Shiller Index

Growth in the Case Shiller National Home Price Index is clearly weakening but we need to be careful of confirmation bias where we “cherry-pick” negative news to reinforce a bearish outlook. I would take the present situation as an “amber” warning and only a drop below zero (when house prices fall) as a red flag.

Shiller has an enviable reputation for predicting recessions, having warned of the Dotcom bubble in tech stocks and the housing bubble ahead of the 2008 global financial crisis. He is correct that narratives (beliefs) can become self-fulfilling prophecies. If the dominant view is that the economy will contract, then it probably will — as corporations stop investing in new capacity and banks restrict lending. Geo-political tensions — US/China, UK/EU Brexit, and Iran/Saudi Arabia — combined with massive uncertainty in global trade and oil markets, could quickly snowball into a full-blown recession.

Tectonic shift threatening the global reserve currency system

As Mark Carney observed at Jackson Hole: the global reserve currency system is broken — it has been since Nixon defaulted on gold backing for the Dollar in 1973 — and there is no fix. We have to find a replacement along the lines of Carney’s suggestion. On Macrovoices, two experts on the EuroDollar system, Jeffrey Snider and Luke Gromen discuss the massive tectonic shift facing the global financial system.

https://www.macrovoices.com/683-macrovoices-184-luke-gromen-jeff-snider

This is a complex topic but it is important that we grasp the implications before a tsunami appears on the horizon.

S&P 500: Upside limited, while downside risks grow

Corporate profits (before tax) ticked up slightly in the second quarter of 2019 but remain below 2006 levels in real terms. The chart below shows corporate profits adjusted for inflation using the GDP implicit price deflator.

Real GDP and Hours Worked

Growth in production of durable consumer goods remains week, reflecting poor consumer confidence.

Durable Goods Production

The chart below shows growth in bank credit and the broad money supply (MZM plus time deposits). Credit growth (blue) remains steady at around 5%, slightly ahead of nominal GDP growth (4.04% for 12 months ending June); a healthy sign. Broad money (green) surged upwards in the first three quarters of this year. Not an encouraging sign when there were similar surges in broad money before the last two recessions.

Broad Money & Credit Growth

The S&P 500 is testing resistance at 3000. Bearish divergence on Twiggs Money Flow warns of secondary selling pressure. Expect a test of support at 2800. Breach would flag a reversal, with a target of 2400.

S&P 500

The cyclical Retailing Index displays a similar pattern, with resistance between 2450 and 2500.

Retail

Our view is that upside is limited, while downside risks are growing.

On the global front, the outlook is still dominated by the prospect of a prolonged US-China trade war. More great insights from Trivium China:

Tariff delays may be aimed at creating warm, fuzzy feelings before the next round of talks in early October, but……These small gestures do nothing to resolve the underlying trade conflict. We’re still pessimistic on prospects for a deal.

Zhou Xiaoming – China’s former top diplomat in Geneva – expressed the same view in a recent interview (Guancha):
“The two sides disagree too much on the objectives of the negotiations……It is almost impossible to reach an agreement in the short term.”

Zhou urged Chinese officials to be clear on the US’s objective:
“Economic and technological decoupling is the objective of the entire US government.”

Zhou said that officials must prepare for that potentiality, even if it is not their desired outcome.

So should we.

Dow Jones – UBS Commodity Index found support at 76 before rallying to 79. Rising troughs on the Trend Index reflect increased support. Consolidation between 76 and 81 is likely but we maintain our bearish long-term outlook for commodities.

DJ-UBS Commodities Index

On the global front, weak crude oil prices flag an anticipated slow-down in the global economy. Trend Index peaks below zero indicate selling pressure. Breach of support at $50/$51 per barrel would be a strong bear signal, warning of a decline to $40 per barrel.

Nymex Light Crude

We maintain our investment in quality growth stocks but have reduced equity exposure to 40% of (International Growth) portfolio value.

The Long Game: Why the West is losing

Autocracies like China, Russia and Iran are challenging the dominance of Western democracies. Much has changed in the last two decades, fueling this emerging threat to the free world.

China & Global Trade

China joined the WTO in 2001 and disrupted global trade. Subsidy of state-owned or state-sponsored industries tilted the playing field. Manipulation of exchange rates, amassing $4 trillion of foreign reserves, helped to depress the yuan, creating a further advantage for Chinese manufacturers.

Manufacturing employment in the US shrank by more than 5.5 million jobs between 2000 and 2010.

Manufacturing Jobs USA

Europe experienced similar losses.

Manufacturing Jobs UK, France & EU

Output recovered, but through a combination of automation and offshoring labor-intensive activities, manufacturing jobs were never restored. Losses of 4 million US manufacturing jobs (23.5% of total) and an equal 4 million (10%) in the European Union appear permanent.

Manufacturing US & EU

The Global Financial Crisis

The global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008 and the recession caused soaring unemployment and further alienated blue collar workers.

Unemployment US & EU

The $700 billion bailout of the banking system (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008), with no prosecutions of key actors, undermined trust in Federal government.

The Rise and Decline of Nations

Mancur Olson, in The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982), argues that interest groups — such as cotton-farmers, steel-producers, labor unions, and banks  — tend to unite into pressure groups to influence government policy in their favor. The resulting protectionist policies hurt economic growth but their costs go unnoticed, attracting little resistance, as they are diffused throughout the economy. The benefits, on the other hand, are concentrated in the hands of a few, incentivizing further action. As these pressure groups increase in strength and number, the costs accumulate, and nations burdened by them fall into economic decline.

Olson formulated his theory after studying the rapid rise in industrial power in Germany and Japan after World War II. He concluded that their economies had benefited from the almost complete destruction of interest groups and protectionist policies as a result of the war and were able to pursue optimal strategies to rebuild their economies. The result was that their economies, unfettered by pressure groups and special interests, far outstripped those of the victors, burdened by the same inefficient, protectionist policies as before the war.

Federal government, choked by lobbyists and special interests, failed to prioritize issues facing blue collar workers: global trade, off-shoring jobs and fallout from the GFC. Formation of the Tea Party movement in 2009 created a rallying point for libertarians and conservatives — supporting small government and traditional Judeo-Christian values1 — but it also opened the door for populists like Donald Trump.

Polarization

Exponential growth of social media, combined with disinformation and fake news, has polarized communities.

In 2017, 93 percent of Americans surveyed said they receive news online, with news organization websites (36%) and social media (35%) the most common sources. Trust and confidence in mass media has declined from 53 percent in 1997 to 32 percent in 2016, according to Gallup Polls.

Politics are increasingly dominated by outrage and division, with populist candidates gaining handsomely.

Many Western governments are now formed of fragile coalitions. Greece, Italy, Germany, even the UK.  Others in Eastern Europe — Poland, Hungary, Austria, Turkey — are heading towards autocracy.

The Long Game

China has been quietly playing the long game. Massive investment in infrastructure, subsidy of key industries, controlled access to its markets, upgrading technology through forced partnerships with Western companies in exchange for access to Chinese markets, and industrial espionage have all been used to gain an advantage over competitors.

The CCP exploits divisions within and between Western governments while expanding their influence in universities, think tanks and the media. The stated aim of the CCP’s United Front Work Department is to influence Chinese diasporas in the West to accept CCP rule, endorse its legitimacy, and assist in achieving Party aims. This includes some 50 million who emigrated after 1979 or are PRC students studying abroad. Stepped up surveillance of PRC students, funding of Confucius Institutes on campuses and growing student activism has raised concerns in Australia over academic freedom and promotion of pro-Beijing views3.

Western governments seem unable to present a coordinated response. Absence of a cohesive, long-term strategy and weakened alliances make them an easy target.

Pressure Groups

Governments are also subjected to pressure from within. The latest example is pressure exerted, by US companies, on the White House to lift the ban on sales of US technology to Huawei. From the New York Times a few days ago:

Beijing has also pressured American companies. This month, the Chinese government said it would create an “unreliable entities list” to punish companies and individuals it perceived as damaging Chinese interests. The following week, China’s chief economic planning agency summoned foreign executives, including representatives from Microsoft, Dell and Apple. It warned them that cutting off sales to Chinese companies could lead to punishment and hinted that the companies should lobby the United States government to stop the bans. The stakes are high for some of the American companies, like Apple, which relies on China for many sales and for much of its production.

Short-term Outlook

The problem with most Western democracies is that they are stuck in a short-term election cycle, with special interest groups, lobbyists for hire, and populist policies targeted at winning votes in the next election. Frequent changes of government lead to a lack of continuity, ensuring that long-term vision and planning, needed to build a winning global strategy, are woefully neglected.

Autocrats like China, Russia and Iran are able to play the long game because they enjoy continuity of leadership. They do not have to concern themselves with elections and the media cycle. They own the media. And elections, if held, are a mere formality, with pre-selected candidates and pre-ordained results.

Western democracies will have to adapt if they want to remain competetive in the 21st century.

Focus on the Long-term

Switzerland is one of the few Western democracies that is capable of a long-term focus. Their unique, consensus-driven system ensures stability and continuity of government, with buy-in from all major political parties. The largest parties are all represented on the 7-member governing Federal Council, elected by Federal Assembly (a bicameral parliament) for four-year terms on a proportional basis. There has been only one change in party representation on the Federal Council since 19592.

Cohesiveness and stability provide a huge advantage when it comes to long-term planning.

Conclusion

Regulating global trade, limiting the threat of social media, ensuring quality journalism, protecting academic freedom, guarding against influence operations by foreign powers, limiting the power of lobbyists and special interest groups — all of these require a long-term strategy. And buy-in from all sides of the political spectrum.

We need to adapt our current form of democracy, which has served us well for the last century, but is faltering under the challenges of the modern era, or risk losing it all together. Without bipartisan support for, and commitment to, long-term policies, there is little hope for building a winning strategy.

The choice is ours: a highly-regulated, autocratic system where rule of law is the first casualty; a stable form of democracy that ensures long-term continuity and planning; or continuation of the present melee, driven by emotion rather than forethought, populist leaders, frequent changes in government — and subservience to our new autocratic masters.

Footnotes:

  1. Wikipedia: Tea Party movement
  2. Current Federal Council representation is 2 Free Democratic Party (liberals), 2 Social Democratic Party (social democrats), 1 Christian Democratic People’s Party [CVP] (Christian conservatives) and 2 Swiss People’s Party [SVP] (national conservatives), reflecting 76.2% of the popular vote in 2015 Federal elections. The SVP gained one seat from the CVP in 2003.
  3. The Diplomat: China’s United Front work – Propaganda as Policy

“Stocks rebound but sentiment soft”

From Bob Doll at Nuveen Investments. His weekly top themes:

1. We think the odds of a U.S. recession are low, but we also believe growth will remain soft for a couple of quarters. U.S. growth may bottom in the first half of 2019 following a relatively disappointing fourth quarter and the recent government shutdown. We expect growth will improve in the second half of the year.

Agreed, though growth is likely to remain soft for an extended period. The Philadelphia Fed Leading Index is easing but remains healthy at above 1.0% (December 2018).

Leading Index

2. Inflation remains low, but upward pressure is mounting. With unemployment under 4% and average hourly earnings rising to an annual 3.6% level, we may start to see prices rise. So far, better productivity growth has kept the lid on prices, but this trend bears watching.

Agreed. Average hourly earnings are rising and inflation may follow.

Hourly Earnings Growth

3. Trade issues remain a wildcard. The U.S./China trade dispute appears to be making progress, but the timeline is slipping and significant disagreement remains over tariff levels and intellectual property protections.

This is the dominant issue facing global markets. Call me skeptical but I don’t see a happy resolution. There is too much at stake for both parties. Expect a drawn out conflict over the next two decades.

4. We do not expect Brexit to cause widespread market issues. We think the risk of a hard Brexit is low, since no one wants to see that outcome. Some sort of soft separation or even a Brexit vote redo appears more likely.

Agreed. Hard Brexit is unlikely. Soft separation is likely, while no Brexit is most unlikely.

5. The health care sector may remain under pressure due to political rhetoric. Health care stocks in general, and managed care companies in particular, have struggled in light of talk about ending private health care coverage. We think Congress lacks the votes to enact such legislation. But this issue, as well as drug pricing policies, are likely to remain at the center of the political dialogue through the 2020 elections.

Health care is a political football and may take longer to resolve than the trade war with China.

6. Downward earnings revisions may present the largest risk for stocks. As recently as September 30, expectations for first quarter earnings growth were +7%. That slipped to +4% by January 1 and has since fallen to -3%.

A sharp fall in earnings would most likely spring from a steep rise in interest rates if the Fed had to combat rising inflation. That doesn’t seem imminent despite rising average hourly earnings. The Fed is maintaining money supply growth at close to 5.0%, around the same level as nominal GDP, keeping a lid on inflationary pressures.

Money Supply & Nominal GDP growth

7. Equity returns may be modest over the next decade compared to the last. Since the bull market began 10 years ago, U.S. stocks have appreciated over 400%. It’s nearly impossible to imagine that pace will be met again, but we feel confident that stocks will outperform Treasuries and cash over the next 10 years.

Expect modest returns on stocks, low interest rates, and low returns on bonds and cash.

Theresa May: How to herd cats

Theresa May

Theresa May has a task of Herculean proportions: to negotiate a Brexit deal that will gain approval from a divided British parliament and an obstinate EU. Securing a deal would make herding cats look easy.

But Mohamed El Erian argues in Bloomberg that the British prime minister is close to a deal with which everyone is “equally unhappy”. And it is “possible that May has managed to corner both her internal position and the EU, opening a wider window for the government to secure support for her deal in the coming weeks. To understand this, consider how the bargaining positions are changing not just because of the pending March 28 deadline but also, and more importantly, because of the European elections scheduled for May 23-26.

More than the March 28 deadline, the European elections could well constitute a binding practical constraint on both the UK and EU, thereby significantly raising the probability of forcing the clarity and sufficient unity and cooperation needed for a workable proposal…..

With many European officials likely to oppose UK participation in the elections, the prospects of a disorderly hard Brexit essentially imposing itself will prove very threatening to British politicians on both sides of the argument. In other words, a May-proposed deal that includes some further EU concessions will certainly still not be optimal for them but will be better than being widely blamed for the alternative. And Brussels would go ahead, also fearing the alternative.

Here’s how this likely, though not yet overwhelmingly probable scenario would proceed: The May government would get agreement from parliament on a short-term extension to the March 28 deadline. This would be accepted by Brussels and allow for negotiations on some further concessions. Parliament would consider the revised deal and, after lots of noise and jockeying, agree to it before the European elections in which the UK would not participate.”

With an extension beyond April out of the question, parliament faces a clear choice: accept Theresa May’s deal or face a no-deal, hard Brexit. Securing approval of a negotiated deal would be a massive win for May, Britain and the EU.

Hat tip to Greg McKenna.