Andreas Dombret: What is going on in Europe? The view from within

From a speech by Dr Andreas Dombret, Member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank, at the New York Stock Exchange, New York, 26 March 2014:

How do we get to the end of the tunnel?

At the European level, the most important project is the banking union. The banking union is most certainly the biggest step since the introduction of the euro. And it is the most logical step to take. A single currency requires integrated financial markets and this includes the supervision of banks.

Consequently, one of the pillars the banking union rests upon is a Single Supervisory Mechanism – that is European bank supervision for the largest banks. Centralising supervisory powers in such a way can foster a comprehensive and unbiased view upon banks. It also enables policy action that is not held hostage by national interests. Thus, it will contribute to more effective supervision and better cross-border cooperation and coordination.

Read more at Andreas Dombret: What is going on in Europe? The view from within.

Is the S&P 500 overvalued?

The daily press appears convinced the S&P 500 is overvalued and due for a crash. Yet the macro-economic and volatility filters that we use at Porter Capital and Research & Investment — to identify market risk so that we can move to cash when risks are elevated — show no signs of stress. So I have been delving into some of the aggregate index data, kindly provided by Standard and Poors, to see whether some of their arguments hold water.

The Price-Earnings ratio for the S&P 500 itself is not excessive when compared to the last decade.

S&P 500 Price-Earnings ratio

The bears argue, however, that earnings are unsustainable. One reason advanced for this is that earnings growth has outstripped sales, with corporations focusing on the bottom line rather than business growth.

Faced with weak domestic demand, large US corporates have actively sought to manage their expenses so as to meet and exceed the market’s expectations. Combined with the unwinding of provisions taken in the GFC, cost management has allowed US corporates to achieve a 124% increase in 12-month trailing earnings off the back of a 25% increase in 12-month trailing sales since October 2009.
~ Elliott Clarke, Westpac

That may be so, but any profit increase would look massive if compared to earnings in 2009. When we plot earnings against sales (per share), it tells a different story. Earnings as a percentage of sales is in the same band (7% – 9%) as 2003 to 2006. A rise above 9% would suggest that earnings may not be sustainable, but not if they continue in their current range.

S&P 500 Earnings/Sales

The second reason advanced is that business investment is falling. Westpac put up a chart that shows US equipment investment growth is close to zero. But we also need to consider that accelerated tax write-offs led to a surge in investment in 2009/2010. The accelerated write-offs expired, but the level of investment merely stopped growing and has not fallen as I had expected.

Westpac: US Equipment Investment Poor

Private (non-residential) fixed investment as a whole is rising as a percentage of GDP, not falling.

S&P 500 Price to Book Value

Lastly, when we compare the S&P 500 to underlying net asset value per share, it shows how frothy the market was before the Dotcom crash, with the index trading at 5 times book value. That kind of premium is clearly unsustainable without double-digit GDP growth, which was never going to happen. But the current ratio of below 2.50 is modest compared to the past decade and quite sustainable.

S&P 500 Price to Book Value

I am not saying that everything is rosy — it never is — but if sales and earnings continue to grow apace, and with private fixed investment rising, the current price-earnings ratio does not look excessive.

Fedex bellwether

Bellwether Transport stock Fedex is headed for another test of primary support at $129/$130 on the monthly chart. Recovery above $145 would offer a target of $170*, but breach of support would warn of a primary down-trend — suggesting a broad economic slow-down. Breach of the (secondary) rising trendline, and support at $120, would strengthen the signal.

Fedex

* Target calculation: 145 + ( 145 – 120 ) = 170

Stability is destabilising – Hyman Minsky

A pretty clear explanation of Hyman Minsky’s key ideas:

Most macroeconomists work with equilibrium models which assume the economy is fundamentally stable and that booms or crises are precipitated by external shocks “whether that be a rise in oil prices, a war or the invention of the internet”.

Minsky disagreed. He thought that the system itself could generate shocks through its own internal dynamics. He believed that during periods of economic stability, banks, firms and other economic agents become complacent.

They assume that the good times will keep on going and begin to take ever greater risks in pursuit of profit. So the seeds of the next crisis are sown in the good time.

Read more at BBC News – Did Hyman Minsky find the secret behind financial crashes?.

Australia’s housing affordability crisis

This private submission by Michael Dromgool to Australia’s Housing Affordability Inquiry identifies supply restrictions as the key cause of the current housing affordability crisis:

Traditionally the flexible forces of demand and supply in the property market self-managed the development of land for housing. Development occurred in locations where and when demand was sufficient to warrant it, with a process that was responsive to demand.

…Now fast-forward to the present day. The government has shut off the supply of land on the city fringe to limit the city to its present size, abolishing a free market system in favour of a centrally-directed scheme that severely distorts the property market…..Smart growth is a deliberate policy to make land more expensive, to increase the city’s population density and force more people into apartments, not the detached houses that most people actually prefer to live in….

Economists and politicians in Australia confidently attribute the decline in housing affordability to strong demand driven by economic and population growth, conveniently neglecting the supply side of the equation…..

Many cities in the United States, such as Atlanta, still use responsive planning. In 1981 more people lived in Melbourne than Atlanta and in both cities the median house cost less than three years of median income in that city to purchase. Over 30 years demand from economic and population growth in Atlanta was stronger than Melbourne, it grew much faster and Atlanta’s population was nearly 50% greater than Melbourne’s by 2011 and the median house price there was $129,400, 2.3 times the median income of $55,800. Yet in Melbourne the median house price reached $565,000, nine times the median income of $63,100. The government tries to convince us that houses are expensive due to high demand, yet they are actually cheaper in a city where demand is substantially stronger. The state government of Georgia drew no arbitrary boundary around the city of Atlanta and consequently it expanded outwards onto greenfield land. In Australian cities, homes are expensive because the land is expensive.

Income inequality: A big whopper

Hats off to John Mauldin for publishing retired economics professor (North Carolina State University) Dr. John Seater’s rebuttal of the Cynamon and Fazzari article on Income Inequality from last week’s newsletter:

A big whopper, for example, is their assertion that a shift in income from the poor to the rich will reduce total spending. Complete nonsense. What it may do is shift the composition of spending away from consumption a little toward investment. The permanent income/life cycle theory of consumption, developed independently by Modigliani and Friedman in the 1950s questions even that conclusion.

Second, John says most academics accept the view that inequality hinders growth. I don’t know how he knows that. I certainly don’t know that to be true. I am an academic economist, and I am unaware of any such consensus. I also know for sure that few and probably no economists who actually study economic growth (which happens to be my own current field of research) believe such a thing.

Read more at
Income Inequality and Social Mobility | John Mauldin
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Redistribution boosts consumption, not output | Richmond Fed

Abstract from a February 28, 2014 paper by Kartik Athreya, Andrew Owens, and Felipe Schwartzman:

The aftermath of the recent recession has seen numerous calls to use transfers to poorer households as a means to enhance aggregate activity. We show that the key to understanding the direction and size of such interventions lies in labor supply decisions. We study the aggregate impact of short-term redistributive economic policy in a standard incomplete-markets model. We characterize analytically conditions under which redistribution leads to an increase or decrease in effective hours worked, and hence, output. We then show that under the parameterization that matches the wealth distribution in the U.S. economy (Castaneda et al., 2003),wealth redistribution leads to a boom in consumption, but not in output.

Read more at Does Redistribution Increase Output? The Centrality of Labor Supply | The Big Picture.

High public debt impedes recovery

This graph from a FRBSF paper Private Credit and Public Debt in Financial Crises, by Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor, perfectly illustrates how high public debt levels impede the ability of an economy to recover from a financial crisis:

Figure 3……. shows that high levels of public debt can be a considerable drag on the recovery. The figure displays the path of per capita GDP in a typical recession compared with the paths under three scenarios following a financial crisis resulting from excess growth of private credit. Each of the three scenarios corresponds to a specified level of public debt at the start of the recession. The dotted line represents a low level of debt of about 15% as a ratio to GDP; the solid line represents a medium level of debt of about 50% of GDP, which is the historical average; and the dashed line represents a high level of debt of about 85% of GDP.

Recessions and Public Debt Levels

Read more at Federal Reserve Bank San Francisco | Private Credit and Public Debt in Financial Crises.

Hat tip to Barry Ritholz

High credit growth prolongs recessions

Research by the Federal Reserve Board of San Francisco shows how high credit growth prior to a financial crisis can prolong the recession by three or more years. The graph below compares the average recovery time for a normal recession to recessions preceded by low credit growth [blue or red] and recessions preceded by high credit growth [green or orange].

Recession Recovery Time

Differences in public debt growth appear to have little impact, but public debt levels are another matter.

Read more at Federal Reserve Bank San Francisco | Private Credit and Public Debt in Financial Crises.

Hat tip to Barry Ritholz