Prepare for the mining bust – House and Holes | macrobusiness.com.au

By Houses and Holes on September 20, 2012

The grey-beards of Australian economics today unite to deliver one enormous wake-up call to the nation, its government, its interests, its media and its people.

Don’t get me wrong, the bucket of cold water is not deserved in equal measures. For mine, the Australian people have been awake to the dangers facing the country since the GFC, hence the community embrace of saving. But the nation’s media and government have existed in a bubble of hubris, forging ahead with yesterday’s policies and arguments as if Australia is immune to global and historic forces.

I am talking about the end of the mining boom, which is nothing more than the march of the GFC to those that have escaped until now, and the persistence of policy settings that assume that the private sector is immune to deleveraging, as well as the failure to plan beyond the next hole in the ground.

Ross Garnaut and Bob Gregory deliver the bad news today via a string of speeches and articles in the [Australian Financial Review]. For those that don’t know, Garnaut is the architect of the open economy policy settings that have delivered 30 years of prosperity and Gregory is the local pioneer of arguments about the effects of Dutch disease. Both are eminent economists.

So what do they have to say? Nothing good.

Garnaut warns of falling living standards:

“I think we’re going to have a very difficult time adapting to the decline in living standards that’s going to be a necessary part of the adjustment to the end of phase one and two of the boom,” he told a conference on the rise of Asia. Professor Garnaut’s warning that the looming economic adjustment would be more painful because governments had not saved enough of the resources boom in budget surpluses came as international ratings agency Standard & Poor’s reaffirmed Australia’s AAA sovereign rating assuming budget cuts continue.

…Professor Garnaut said Australians would not be so anxious about potential risks if governments had saved more of the resources boom since 2003.

…“The time for careful management of a difficult adjustment is the time that lies ahead,” he said.

Meanwhile, Bob Gregory with Peter Sheehan write an opinion piece that endorses the Garnaut position but goes further with proposed solutions:

As the resources boom unwinds over the next few years, Australia will experience a large deflationary impact, primarily driven by the fall in the terms of trade and in resource investment. The production and export of resource commodities will rise as projects are completed, but this will generate few jobs and limited domestic income to offset the terms of trade decline and the falls in mining investment.

Many have argued productivity growth or labour market reform are central issues to be addressed as the resources boom passes. Productivity growth in the long run is particularly important but the key challenge over the next few years lies in addressing the change in the impact of the resources boom from expansionary to deflationary.

Until recently, theory and practice around the world has given primacy to monetary policy in responding to macroeconomic shocks. But, with many economies in the zero interest rate trap, the limits of monetary policy are being realised. Monetary policy cannot be expected to play the central role in addressing the long-term demand shocks Australia faces. The current de facto policy settings – that monetary policy will support the economy in the short-run while fiscal policy is restrictive – contain risks for the longer term.

They go on to argue that the Federal government will need to spend big on infrastructure to support growth and propose a new fund to finance the spending, in part through guaranteeing state debt.

I agree with every word. But there is little hope that those in power do. Treasury Secretary Martin Parkinson responded:

“Because boom implies there’s a bust,” he said. “Where we will end up at the end of this is with mining being a much larger share of a reshaped economy.”

Ironically, this is the very thinking that all but guarantees a bust.

Reproduced with thanks to Houses and Holes at Macrobusiness.com.au

Japan Eases Monetary Policy in Surprise Move – WSJ.com

By MEGUMI FUJIKAWA And TATSUO ITO

TOKYO—The Bank of Japan took surprisingly strong steps to further ease its monetary policy on Wednesday, following similar steps by the Federal Reserve, as it tries to tackle entrenched deflation, an export-sapping strong yen and the impact of slowing global growth.

The central bank’s policy board decided at the end of a two-day meeting to increase the size of its asset-purchase program—the main tool for monetary easing with near-zero interest rates—to ¥80 trillion ($1.01 trillion) from ¥70 trillion.

via Japan Eases Monetary Policy in Surprise Move – WSJ.com.

Competitive devaluations, started by the ECB and followed by the Fed, PBOC and BOJ. Let the fun begin!

Job Creators in Chief | Global Macro Monitor

By Global Macro Monitor

Let us begin by saying we don’t like the title of this post and believe it is misleading.

The President cannot, in our opinion, directly create permanent jobs in the private sector. Of course, he can hire federal workers and/or direct taxpayer funds to, say, defense or infrastructure projects, which creates, though temporary, a derived demand for labor. More important, however, is the administration’s policies that incentivize private sector hiring through creating an environment that empowers businesses and entrepreneurs and gives them confidence to expand capacity.

….In the short term, however, quantitative easing and negative real interest rates can generate asset bubbles, which can affect the real economy and hiring. But the experience of the collapse of two major bubbles in just a little over a decade illustrates there is always pay back and the monetary induced artificial boom will eventually turn to bust.

via Global Macro Monitor | Monitoring the Global Economy.

2008 Financial Crisis Cost Americans $12.8 Trillion: BetterMarkets

Better Markets, a pro-financial reform Wall Street watchdog, estimates the total loss of American wealth since Sept. 15, 2008, when Lehman filed for bankruptcy, as $12.8 Trillion dollars — almost one year’s GDP. Better Markets president & CEO Dennis Kelleher calls for effective regulation of systemically important Wall Street firms to prevent a recurrence of the GFC.

[gigya width=”576″ height=”324″ allowFullScreen=”true” src=”http://d.yimg.com/nl/techticker/site/player.swf” type=”application/x-shockwave-flash” flashvars=”show&vid=30617677&”]

Better Markets: Cost of the Crisis (PDF)

Tony Robbins | The National Debt and Federal Budget Deficit Deconstructed

The $15 trillion U.S. national debt — how big is it really? And what can we do about the enormous federal budget deficit?

Australia: Company tax payments down almost 40%

David Uren from The Australian, as quoted by Mark the Graph:

Last week’s national accounts show company tax payments have fallen from an all-time peak of 6.2 per cent of gross domestic product in 2007 as Peter Costello delivered his last budget, to just 3.8 per cent in the June quarter. This is the lowest share since September 1996, when Costello delivered his first budget. It is less than during the global financial crisis and erodes all the gains in corporate taxation tapped by both governments to finance personal tax cuts, increased family benefits, higher pensions, greater education spending and much more during the past 16 years. No wonder the budget is in deficit.

View some great charts from the National Accounts at Mark the Graph: Tax chartacular.

Conversation with Bridgewater Associates' Ray Dalio | Credit Writedowns

The video below is an in-depth full hour-long segment and well worth watching. Notice that Dalio sees the credit accelerator as a key component adding to aggregate demand and the key component that creates instability in that demand. Unlike traditional econometric models that do not use the debt and credit stock as a consideration for a flow variable like spending, yet again we see that someone who anticipated the crisis does.

via Credit Writedowns

Sowell: Obama uses 'tax the rich' rhetoric to hoodwink voters | The Columbian

According to the Internal Revenue Service, more than 2.7 million people earn $250,000 a year or more — and fewer than one-tenth of them earn a million dollars or more. So more than nine-tenths of the people who would be hit with the higher taxes supposedly aimed at “millionaires and billionaires” are neither. “Bait-and-switch” advertising is exactly what President Obama is doing with his proposed tax increases on “millionaires and billionaires.”

It gets worse when you look at the potential economic consequences of the tax rate increases being proposed. The small proportion of the people targeted for Obama’s higher tax rates who are in fact millionaires and billionaires have the least likelihood of actually paying the higher tax rates. People with annual incomes in the millions or billions of dollars can live pretty high on the hog on a fraction of their income, leaving them with plenty of money to invest. And they can invest it in ways that keep it away from the tax collectors.

via Sowell: Obama uses 'tax the rich' rhetoric to hoodwink voters | The Columbian.

Raising taxes: 73% of nothing is nothing

President Francois Hollande recently increased the top income tax rate in France to 75 percent — for incomes in excess of €1 million. This is part of a wider trend with President Obama targeting the wealthy in his election campaign, promising to raise taxes on incomes in excess of $1 million. Shifting the tax burden onto the wealthy might be clever politics, but does it make economic sense? To gauge the effectiveness of this strategy we need to study tax rates and their effect on incomes in the 1920s and 1930s.

By the end of the First World War, Federal government debt had soared to $25.5 billion, from $3 billion in 1915. Income taxes were raised to repay public debt: 60 percent on incomes greater than $100,000 and a top rate of 73 percent on incomes over $1 million. When Andrew Mellon was appointed Treasury Secretary in 1921, he inherited an economy in sharp recession. Falling GDP and declining income tax receipts led Mellon to observe that “73% of nothing is nothing”. He understood that high income taxes discourage entrepreneurs, leading to lower incomes and lower tax receipts — what we now refer to as the Laffer curve. By 1925, under President Coolidge, Mellon had slashed income taxes to a top rate of 25 percent — on incomes greater than $100,000. The economy boomed, tax collections recovered despite lower rates, and Treasury returned budget surpluses throughout the 1920s.

US Income Taxes and GDP 1920 to 1940

Interestingly, Veronique de Rugy points out that taxes paid by those with incomes over $100,000 more than doubled by the end of the decade.

US Income Tax Rates and Tax Receipts in the 1920s

Andrew Mellon was a wealthy banker and investor: in the mid-1920s he was the third highest taxpayer in the US. His strategy of cutting income tax rates may appear self-interested, but showed an understanding of how taxes can stimulate or impede economic growth, and succeeded in rescuing the economy from prolonged recession in the 1920s.

A decade later, President Herbert Hoover spent liberally on infrastructure programs in an attempt to shock the economy out of recession following the 1929 Wall Street crash. By 1932 Hoover and Mellon raised income taxes to rein in the growing deficit. Tax on incomes greater than $100,000 was increased to 56 percent and the top rate lifted to 63 percent — on incomes over $1 million.

The budget deficit continued to grow. Higher tax rates were maintained throughout the 1930s, under FDR, but failed to achieve their stated aim and may have contributed to the severity of the Great Depression.

US Income Taxes and Budget Surplus 1920 to 1940

GDP rose steeply after 1934. Income tax receipts recovered to pre-crash levels but declined again after 1937, when President Roosevelt introduced payroll taxes. Increased taxes reduced the fiscal deficit but caused a double-dip recession: GDP contracted, income tax receipts fell and the deficit grew.

US Income Taxes and GDP 1920 to 1940

Comparing the 1920s to the 1930s it is evident that Barack Obama and Francois Hollande threaten to repeat the mistakes of the 1930s. Increasing taxes in the middle of a recession does not reduce the deficit. It merely prolongs the recession.

Sources:
Cato Institute: 1920s Income Tax Cuts Sparked Economic Growth and Raised Federal Revenues by Veronique de Rugy
National Debt History
Wikipedia: Andrew W Mellon
Wikipedia: Laffer Curve
The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Great Depression and the New Deal by Robert Murphy

Harry S Dent: Why the Fed will fail

Harry Dent is always entertaining to listen to, but is he right about the link between demographics and inflation?

There is simply no way the Fed can win the battle it’s currently waging against deflation, because there are 76 million Baby Boomers who increasingly want to save, not spend. Old people don’t buy houses! At the top of the housing boom in recent years, we had the typical upper-­‐middle-­‐class family living in a 4,000-­‐square-­‐foot McMansion. About ten years from now, what will they do? They’ll downsize to a 2,000-­‐ square-­‐foot townhouse. What do they need all those bedrooms for? The kids are gone. They don’t visit anymore. Ten years after that, where are they? They’re in 200-­‐square-­‐foot nursing home. Ten years later, where are they? They’re in a 20-­‐square-­‐foot grave plot. That’s the future of real estate. That’s why real estate has not bounced in Japan after 21 years. That’s why it won’t bounce here in the US either. For every young couple that gets married, has babies, and buys a house, there’s an older couple moving into a nursing home or dying.

In my opinion there is a clear link between credit growth and inflation: the faster credit grows, the faster the money supply grows, and the higher the rate of inflation. Demographics are one of the factors that drive credit growth, but they are not the only factor. Interest rates are just as important: when interest rates are low we tend to save less and borrow more. And jobs, as the Fed discovered, are also important: if you haven’t got a job, you can’t borrow from the bank even when interest rates are low.

At present I would guess that jobs are the biggest constraint on credit growth. Later, interest rates will rise when employment recovers — as the Fed attempts to take some of the heat out of the economy. Only then may demographics become the major restriction on credit growth, with older households down-sizing outnumbering younger households up-sizing. But that is by no means definite: solving the jobs crisis alone could take decades!

Harry dent quoted from John Mauldin | A Decade of Volatility: Demographics, Debt, and Deflation (application/pdf Object).