Jobs and GDP growth

The view is often promoted that low GDP growth over the past decade is caused by low interest rates and balance sheet expansion (QE) by central banks. That is putting the cart before the horse. Central banks have tried to stimulate their economies, with massive QE and low interest rates, because of low GDP growth. Not the other way around.

The real cause of low GDP growth is low job growth, as the chart below illustrates.

Real GDP and Nonfarm Payroll Growth

[click here for full screen image]

Offshoring jobs means offshoring growth.

The last time that the US had employment growth above 5.0% is 1984 which also the last time that we saw real GDP growth at 7.5%. Since then, job growth has progressively weakened — and GDP with it.

In the last decade, employment growth peaked at 2.27% and GDP at 3.98% in Q1 of 2015.

Real GDP and Nonfarm Payroll Growth

We now expect job growth to fall to -20% in April, four times the -5% trough in 2009, and a sharp GDP contraction.

How long the recession/depression will continue is uncertain. But, in the long-term, it is unlikely that the US can achieve +5% real GDP growth unless employment growth recovers close to +3.0%.

No V-shaped Recovery

Initial jobless claims in the US for the 6 weeks to April 25th exceed 30 million.

Initial Jobless Claims

That will take unemployment above 20%, with total jobs falling to levels last seen in 1997, and more job losses still to come.

Total Employment (Nonfarm Payroll)

Employment is the key to economic recovery. While unemployment is high, consumer spending will stay low and the economy will struggle. Companies may receive bailouts and the Fed will keep financial markets awash with liquidity but that does not help falling sales.

Be prepared. April employment numbers are going to be ugly. Expect some turbulence.

Coronavirus: “We are all Keynesians now”

An economic depression requires a 10% (or more) decline in real GDP or a prolonged recession that lasts two or more years.

The current contraction, sparked by the global coronavirus outbreak, is likely to be severe but its magnitude and duration are still uncertain. After an initial spike in cases, with devastating consequences in many countries — both in terms of the number of deaths and the massive economic impact — the rate of contagion is expected to drop significantly. But we could witness further flare-ups, as with SARS.

Development of a vaccine is the only viable long-term defense against the coronavirus but health experts warn that this is at least 12 to 18 months away — still extremely fast when compared to normal vaccine development programs.

The economic impact may soften after the initial shutdown but some industries such as travel, airlines, hotels, cruise lines, shopping malls, and cinemas are likely to experience lasting changes in consumer behavior. The direct consequences will be with us for some time. So will the indirect consequences: small business and corporate failures, widespread unemployment, collapsing real estate prices, and solvency issues within the financial system. The Fed is going to be busy putting out fires. While it can fix liquidity issues with its printing press, it can’t fix solvency issues.

There are three key factors that are likely to determine whether countries end up with a depression or a recession:

1. Leadership during the crisis

Many countries were caught by surprise and the rapid spread of the virus from its source in Wuhan, China. South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan were best prepared, after dealing with the SARS outbreak in the early 2000s. Extensive testing, tracing and an effective quarantine program helped South Korea to bring the spread under control, after initially being one of the worst-hit.

Daily Increase - South Korea

South Korea: Initial Cases of Coronavirus COVID-19 (JHU)

The World Health Organization (WHO) did little to help, delaying declaration of a pandemic to appease the CCP. Economic and political self-interest has been the root cause of many failures along the way, including China’s failure to alert global authorities of the outbreak (they had already shut down Wuhan Naval College on January 1st). But this was aided by failure of many leaders to heed warnings from infectious disease experts in late January/early February. When they finally did wake up to the threat, many were totally unprepared, resulting in a massive spike in cases across Europe and North America.

Testing is a major bottleneck, with the FDA fast-tracking approval of new tests, but production volumes are still limited. Abbott recently obtained FDA approval for a new 5-minute test kit that can be used in temporary screening locations, outside of a hospital, but production is currently limited to 50,000 per day. A drop in the ocean. It would take 6 months to produce 9 million kits for New York alone.

Daily Increase - USA

USA: Initial Cases of Coronavirus COVID-19 (JHU)

Daily Increase - UK

UK: Initial Cases of Coronavirus COVID-19 (JHU)

Daily Increase - Germany

Germany: Initial Cases of Coronavirus COVID-19 (JHU)

Daily Increase - Italy

Italy: Initial Cases of Coronavirus COVID-19 (JHU)

Widespread testing and tracing, social-distancing, and effective quarantine methods have enabled some countries to flatten the curve. Australia may be succeeding in reducing the number of new cases but inadequate testing and tracing could lead to further flare-ups. One of the biggest dangers is asymptomatic carriers who can infect others. Flattening the curve is the first step, but keeping it flat is essential, and requires widespread testing and tracing.

Daily Increase - Australia

Australia: Initial Cases of Coronavirus COVID-19 (JHU)

The curves for North America and Europe remain exponential. They may even spike a lot higher if hospital facilities are overrun. Success in flattening the curve is critical, not just in minimizing the number of deaths but in containing the economic impact.

2. Economic rescue measures during the crisis

Rescue measures amounting to roughly 10% of annual GDP have been introduced in several countries, including the US and Australia, to soften the economic impact of the shutdown. More Keynesian stimulus may be needed if the coronavirus curve is not flattened. Layoffs have spiked and many small businesses will be unable to recover without substantial support.

3. Economic stimulus after the crisis

This is not a time for half-measures and the $2 trillion infrastructure program proposed in the US is also appropriate in the circumstances. Australia is likely to need a similar program (10% of GDP) but it is essential that the money be spent on productive infrastructure assets. Productive assets must generate a market-related return on investment ….or generate an equivalent increase in government tax revenue but this is much more difficult to measure. Investment in unproductive assets would leave the country with a sizable debt and no ready means of repaying it (much like Donald Trump’s 2017 tax cuts).

Conclusion

Social-distancing and effective quarantine measures are necessary to flatten the curve but widespread testing and tracing is essential to prevent further flare-ups. Development of a vaccine could take two years or more. Until then there is likely to be an on-going economic impact, long after the initial shock. This is likely to be compounded by a solvency crisis in small and large businesses, threatening the stability of the financial system. The best we can hope for, in the circumstances, is to escape with a recession — less than 10% contraction in GDP and less than two year duration — but this will require strong leadership, public cooperation and skillful prioritization of resources.

—–

“We are all Keynesians now.” ~ Richard Nixon (after 1971 collapse of the gold standard)

Lessons from the Panic of 1907

I have read The Panic of 1907 (by Robert Bruner & Sean Carr) four or five times — I read it at every market crash.

The crash occurred more than 100 years ago and is one of many banking crises that beset the United States in the 19th and early 20th century. What made 1907 stand out is that the financial system was saved by the leadership of a private individual, John Pierpont Morgan, head of the banking firm that later became known as J.P. Morgan & Co. Without the 70-year old Morgan’s force of will, the entire financial system would have imploded.

John Pierpont Morgan
John Pierpont Morgan – source: Wikipedia

The crisis led to formation of the Federal Reserve Bank in 1913. The US had not had a central bank since President Andrew Jackson withdrew the charter for the second Bank of the United States in 1837. Bank clearing houses prior to 1913 were private arrangements created by syndicates of banks and were poorly-equipped to deal with the challenges of a banking crisis.

The lessons of 1907 are still relevant today. The authors of the book suggest that “financial crises result from a convergence of forces, a ‘perfect storm’ at work in financial markets.”

They identify seven elements that converged to create a perfect storm in 1907:

  1. Complex Financial Architecture makes it “difficult to know what is going on and establishes linkages that enable contagion of the crisis to spread.”
  2. Buoyant Growth. “Economic expansion creates rising demands for capital and liquidity and ….excessive mistakes that eventually must be corrected.”
  3. Inadequate Safety Buffers. “In the late stages of an economic expansion, borrowers and creditors overreach in their use of debt, lowering the margin of safety in the financial system.”
  4. Adverse Leadership. “Prominent people in the public and private spheres implement policies that raise uncertainty, which impairs confidence and elevates risk.”
  5. Real Economic Shock. “Unexpected events hit the economy and financial system, causing a sudden reversal in the outlook of investors and depositors.”
  6. Undue Fear, Greed and other Behavioral Aberrations. “….a shift from optimism to pessimism that creates a self-reinforcing downward spiral. The more bad news, the more behavior (erupts) that generates bad news.”
  7. Failure of Collective Action. “The best-intended responses by people on the scene prove inadequate to the challenge of the crisis.”

Compare these seven elements to the current crisis in March 2020:

Complex Financial Systems

The global financial system is far more complex than the gold-based financial system of 1907. Regulation has not kept pace with the growth in complexity, with many products designed to avoid regulation and lower costs. The ability to build firebreaks to stop the spread of contagion in unregulated or lightly regulated areas of the financial system is severely limited. And that is where the fires tend to start.

In 1907 the fire started with poorly regulated trust companies that dominated the financial landscape: making loans, receiving deposits, and operating as an effective shadow-banking system. A run on trust companies threatened to engulf the entire financial system.

In 2020 it started with hedge funds leveraged to the hilt through repo markets but soon threatened to spread to other unregulated (or lightly regulated) areas of our shadow banking system:

  • Leveraged hedge funds
  • Risk parity funds
  • International banks lending and taking deposits in the unregulated $6.5 trillion Eurodollar market (these banks are offshore and outside the Fed’s jurisdiction).
  • Money market funds
  • Muni funds
  • Commercial paper markets
  • Leveraged credit
  • Bond ETFs

Many of these offer the attraction of low costs and higher returns, often enhanced through leverage, but what investors are blind to (or choose to ignore) are the risks from lack of proper supervision and the lack of liquidity when money is tight.

Maturity mis-match is often used to boost returns. Short-term investors are channeled into long-term securities such as Treasuries, corporate bonds, munis or credit instruments, with the promise of easy sale or redemption when they require their funds. But this tends to fail when there is a liquidity squeeze, forcing a sell-off in the underlying securities and steeply falling prices.

Rapid Growth

We all welcome strong economic growth but should beware of the attendant risks, especially when financial markets are administered more stimulants than a Russian weightlifter for purely political ends.

Excessive use of Debt

Corporate borrowings are far higher today and rising debt has warned of a coming recession for some time.

Corporate Debt/Profits Before Tax

Public debt is growing even faster, with US federal debt at 98.6% of GDP.

Public Debt/GDP

Adverse Leadership

In the early 1900s, President Teddy Roosevelt led a populist drive to break the big money corporations through Anti-Trust prosecutions. This cast a shadow of uncertainty that fueled the sudden reversal in investor sentiment.

President Theodor Roosevelt

In 2020, we have another populist in the White House. Frequent changes in direction, spats with allies, imposition of trade tariffs, impeachment efforts by Congress, and a heavy-handed approach to trade negotiations have all elevated the level of uncertainty.

Donald Trump

Economic Shock

The great San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906 created an economic shock that was felt across the Atlantic. The earthquake ruptured gas mains, setting off fires, while fractured water mains hampered firefighting. Over 80% of the city was destroyed. Much of the insurance was carried in London and Europe and led to a sell-off of securities in order to meet claims. The Bank of England became increasingly concerned about the outflow of gold from the UK and hiked its benchmark interest rate from 3.5% to 6.0%. London was then the hub of global financial markets and money became tight.

In 2020 we have the coronavirus impact on global manufacturing, services and financial systems: the mother of all demand and supply shocks.

JHU - CV Confirmed Cases

Undue Fear and Greed

Collapse of highly leveraged ventures in 1907 — with an attempted short squeeze on United Copper shares by connected corporations, banks and broking houses — stirred fears that a leading Trust company was going to fail. The panic soon spread and started a run on a number of trust companies.

A spike in the repo rate in September last year revealed that hedge funds had used repo to leverage their relatively meager capital into a rumored $650 billion exposure to US Treasuries. The Fed had to dive in with liquidity to settle the repo markets, lifeblood of short-term funding by primary dealers. But financial markets were on edge and concerns about funding difficulties in the unregulated $6.5 trillion offshore Eurodollar market and leveraged credit in the US started to grow.  But the coronavirus outbreak in Europe and North America was the eventual spark that set off the conflagration.

Failure of Collective Action

Tust companies failed to organize an effective defense in 1907 against a run on their largest member, The Knickerbocker Trust Company, fueling a panic that threatened to engulf other trusts. Responding to appeals for help, J.P. Morgan intervened and marshaled the banking industry and surviving trusts to mount an effective defense.

Today that role falls to the Federal Reserve. Chairman Jay Powell moved quickly and purposefully to flood financial markets with liquidity, but the Fed was forced to reach far outside their normal ambit — increasing dollar swap lines with foreign central banks (to supply liquidity to international banks operating in the Eurodollar market) and providing liquidity to money market funds, muni funds, commercial paper markets, bond funds, hedge funds (through repo markets) and more. In effect, the Fed had to bail out the shadow banking system.

One thing that strikes me about financial crises is that each one is different, but some things never change:

  • artificially low interest rates;
  • rampant speculation;
  • excessive use of debt;
  • unregulated and highly leveraged shadow-banking with hidden linkages through the financial system;
  • financial engineering (the latest examples are leveraged credit and covenant-lite loans, hedge funds running leveraged arbitrage, risk parity funds with targeted volatility, and management using stock buybacks to enhance earnings per share, support prices and boost their stock-based compensation);
  • misuse of fiscal stimulus (to fund corporate tax cuts while running a $1.4 trillion fiscal deficit);
  • misuse of monetary policy (cutting interest rates when unemployment was at record lows);
  • yield curve inversion; and
  • misallocation of investment (to fund unproductive assets)

Jim Grant (Grant’s Interest Rate Observer) sums up the problem:

“The Fed has intervened at ever-closer intervals to suppress the symptoms of misallocation of resources and the mis-pricing of credit. These radical interventions have become ever-more drastic and the ‘doctor-feel-goods’ of our central banks have worked to destroy the pricing mechanism in credit.

….[credit and equity markets] have become administered government-set indicators, rather than sensitive- and information-rich prices… and we are paying the price for that through the misallocation of resources…..

Is there no salutary role for recessions and bear markets? …..they separate the sound from the unsound, they separate the well-financed from the over-leveraged and if we never have these episodes of economic pain, we will be much the worse for it.”

We haven’t learned much at all in the last 100 years.

Irrational Exuberance

I believe this warrants a separate post:

The market is running on more stimulants than a Russian weight-lifter. Unemployment is near record lows but the US Treasury is still running trillion dollar deficits.

Federal Deficit & Unemployment

While the Fed is cutting interest rates.

Fed Funds Rate & Unemployment

And again expanding its balance sheet. More than twelve years after the GFC. The blue line reflects total assets on the Fed’s balance sheet, mainly Treasuries and MBS, while the orange line (right-hand scale) shows how shrinking excess reserves on deposit at the Fed have helped to create a $2 trillion surge in liquidity in financial markets since 2009. Even when the Fed was supposedly tightening, with a shrinking balance sheet, in 2018 to 2019.

Fed Totals Assets & Net of Excess Reserves on Deposit

The triple boost has lifted stock valuations to precarious highs. The chart below compares stock market capitalization to profits after tax over the past 60 years.

Market Cap/Profits After Tax

Ratios above 15 flag that stocks are over-priced and likely to correct. Peaks in 1987 and 2007, shortly before the GFC, are typical of an over-heated market. The Dotcom bubble reflected “irrational exuberance” — a phrase coined by then Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan — and I believe we are entering a second such era.

Recovery of the economy under President Trump is no economic miracle, it is simply the triumph of monetary and fiscal stimulus over rational judgement. Trump knows that he has to keep the party going until November to win the upcoming election, so expect further excess. Whether he succeeds or not is unsure but one thing is certain: the longer the party goes on, the bigger the hangover.

William McChesney Martin Jr., the longest-serving Fed Chairman (1951 to 1970), famously described the role of the Fed as “to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going.” Unfortunately Jerome Powell seems to have been sufficiently cowed by Trump’s threats (to replace him) and failed to follow that precedent. We are all likely to suffer the consequences.

Bull Markets & Irrational Exuberance

Bob Doll from Nuveen Investments is more bullish on stocks than I am but sets out his thoughts on what could cause the current run to end:

“Stock valuations are starting to look full, and technical factors are beginning to appear stretched. As stock prices have risen since last summer, bond yields have crept higher. Should this trend persist, it could eventually cause a headwind for stocks. Credit spreads are signaling some risks, as non-energy high yield corporate bond spreads have dropped to multi-decade lows.

As such, we think stocks may be due for a near-term correction or consolidation phase. Nevertheless, we expect any such phase to be mild and brief as long as monetary conditions remain accommodative and economic and earnings growth holds up. In other words, although we see some near-term risks, we don’t think this current bull market is ending.

That raises the question of what might eventually cause the current cycle to end. We see three possibilities. First, recession prospects could increase significantly. We see little chance of that happening any time soon, given solid economic fundamentals. Second, a political disruption like a resurgence in trade protectionism could occur. We also don’t think that is likely to happen, especially in an election year. Third, bond yields and interest rates could move higher as economic conditions improve, creating problems for stocks. This one seems like a higher probability, and we’ll keep an eye on it.”

Economy

The upsurge in retail sales and housing starts may have strengthened Bob’s view of the economy but manufacturing is in a slump and slowing employment growth could hurt consumption. The inverted yield curve is a long-term indicator and I don’t yet see any indicators confirming an imminent collapse.

Treasury 10 Year-3 Month Yield Differential

I rate economic risk as medium at present.

Political Disruption

US-China trade risks have eased but I continue to rate political disruption as a risk. This could come from any of a number of sources. US-Iran is not over, the Iranians are simply biding their time. Putin’s attempted constitutional coup in Russia. China-Taiwan. Libya. North Korea. Brexit is not yet over. Huawei and 5G are likely to disrupt relations between China, the US and European allies, with China threatening German automakers. Europe also continues to wrestle with fallout from the euro monetary union, a system that is likely to eventually fail despite widespread political support. Impeachment of Trump may not succeed because of the Republican majority in the senate but could produce even more erratic behavior with an eye on the upcoming election. Who can we bomb next to win more votes?

Bonds & Interest Rates

I don’t see inflation as a major threat — oil prices are low and wages growth is slowing — and the Fed is unlikely to raise interest rates ahead of the November election. Bond yields may rise if China buys less Treasuries, allowing the Yuan to strengthen against the Dollar, but the Fed is likely to plug any hole in demand by further expanding its balance sheet.

Market Risk: Irrational Exuberance

The market is running on more stimulants than a Russian weight-lifter. Unemployment is near record lows but Treasury is still running trillion dollar deficits.

Federal Deficit & Unemployment

While the Fed is cutting interest rates.

Fed Funds Rate & Unemployment

And again expanding its balance sheet. More than twelve years after the GFC. The blue line reflects total assets on the Fed’s balance sheet, mainly Treasuries and MBS, while the orange line (right-hand scale) shows how shrinking excess reserves on deposit at the Fed have helped to create a $2 trillion surge in liquidity in financial markets since 2009. Even when the Fed was supposedly tightening, with a shrinking balance sheet, in 2018 to 2019.

Fed Totals Assets & Net of Excess Reserves on Deposit

The triple boost has lifted stock valuations to precarious highs. The chart below compares stock market capitalization to profits after tax over the past 60 years.

Market Cap/Profits After Tax

Ratios above 15 flag that stocks are over-priced and likely to correct. Peaks in 1987 and 2007, shortly before the GFC, are typical of an over-heated market. The Dotcom bubble reflected “irrational exuberance” — a phrase coined by then Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan — and I believe we are entering a second such era.

Recovery of the economy under President Trump is no economic miracle, it is simply the triumph of monetary and fiscal stimulus over rational judgement. Trump knows that he has to keep the party going until November to win the upcoming election, so expect further excess. Whether he succeeds or not is unsure but one thing is certain: the longer the party goes on, the bigger the hangover.

William McChesney Martin Jr., the longest-serving Fed Chairman (1951 to 1970), famously described the role of the Fed as “to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going.” Unfortunately Jerome Powell seems to have been sufficiently cowed by Trump’s threats (to replace him) and failed to follow that precedent. We are all likely to suffer the consequences.

US Stocks: Bull or Bear?

I have read several commentators proclaiming that the crisis is over and the stock market and US economy are back on track for solid growth. Let’s examine some of the evidence.

The Yield Curve (Bearish)

While the US yield curve has uninverted in the past and yet a recession has still come along, the uninversion seen in recent months coming after such a shallow and short-lived inversion provides confidence that the inversion seen last year gave a false signal…. (Shane Oliver at AMP)

Treasury 10 Year-3 Month Yield Differential

Yield curve inversions seldom last long. For one simple reason: the Fed fires up the printing press to reduce short-term interest rates and boost the economy. The yield curve uninverted before the last three recessions and this time looks no different.

Consumer Confidence (Bullish)

Retail sales kicked up in December, a sign of growing consumer confidence.

Retail excluding Auto

Auto sales are still flat but housing starts have also jumped.

Housing Starts & Permits

Economic Activity (Bearish)

When it comes to economic activity, Cass freight shipments are falling.

Cass Index

Rail freight indicators also point to declining activity levels.

Rail Freight

Employment (Neutral)

Leading employment indicators, such as temporary jobs and job openings, warn that labor market growth is slowing.

Temporary Jobs

Job Openings

But overall payroll growth, albeit subdued is still stable, with the 3-month TMO of non-farm payroll growth respecting the 0.5% amber warning level.

Payroll TMO

Valuations (Bearish)

Last week we compared market cap to profits before tax. This week, we compare to profits after tax. Recent levels above 20 have only previously been exceeded, in the past 60 years, during the Dotcom bubble.

Market Cap/Corporate Profits after Tax

Dallas Fed president Robert Kaplan conceded that expansion of the Fed balance sheet is helping to lift asset prices.

Commenting on the Fed’s massive liquidity response to the repo crisis, Kaplan said that “my own view is it’s having some effect on risk assets……It’s a derivative of QE when we buy bills and we inject more liquidity; it affects all risk assets. This is why I say growth in the balance sheet is not free. There is a cost to it. And we need to be very disciplined about it and sensitive to it.”

This is a clear warning to investors to stay on the defensive. We maintain our view that stocks are over-valued and will remain under-weight equities (over-weight cash) until normal earnings multiples are restored.

Warren Buffett is not infallible but the level of cash on Berkshire’s balance sheet seems to indicate a similar view regarding stock valuations.

Berkshire Hathaway Cash Holdings

S&P 500: Stocks lift but jobs and profits a red flag

The S&P 500 has advanced steadily since breaking resistance at 3000.

S&P 500

Lifted by Fed liquidity injections in the repo market.

S&P 500 and Fed Assets

Optimism over improved global trade has spread, with the DJ Euro Stoxx 600 breaking resistance at 400.

DJ Euro Stoxx 600

South Korea’s KOSPI completed a double-bottom reversal to signal an up-trend.

KOSPI

And India’s Nifty Index broke resistance at 12,000.

Nifty

Commodity prices remain low but rising Trend Index troughs on the DJ-UBS Commodity Index suggest that a bottom is forming.

DJ-UBS Commodity Index

Crude spiked up with rising US-Iran tensions but is expected to re-test support at 50 as supply threats fade.

Nymex Light Crude

Fedex recovered above primary support at 150, but the outlook for economic activity remains bearish.

Fedex

Falling US wages growth warns of slowing job creation.

Average Hourly Wages

Declining employment growth highlights similar weakness.

Employment Growth

Initial jobless claims, while not alarming, are now starting to rise.

Initial Claims

Growth in weekly hours worked has slowed, with real GDP expected to follow.

Real GDP and Weekly Hours Worked

While GDP growth is slowing, corporate profits (before tax) are also declining as a percentage of GDP.

Corporate profits Before Tax/GDP

Market Capitalization of equities has spiked to a ratio of 20 times Corporate Profits (before tax), an extreme only previously seen in the Dotcom bubble.

Market Cap/Corporate Profits before Tax

The market can remain irrational for longer than you or I can stay solvent, but this is a clear warning to investors to stay on the defensive.

We maintain our view that stocks are over-valued and will remain under-weight equities (over-weight cash) until normal earnings multiples are restored.

Australia: Bearish apart from mining

Household disposable income lifted in response to the recent tax cuts but households remain risk-averse, with consumption still falling and extra income going straight to debt repayment — reflected by a jump in the Saving ratio below.
Australia Household Saving

Housing prices are recovering despite high levels of mortgage stress in the outer suburbs but building approvals for new housing continue to fall. Construction expenditure is likely to follow.

Australia Building Approvals

GDP growth is falling, while corporate profits (% of GDP) remain in the doldrums apart from the mining sector.

Australia Corporate Profits

Low household disposable income and corporate profit growth in turn lead to low business investment (% of GDP).

Australia Business Investment

Low investment leads to low job creation. Job vacancies and job ads both warn of declining employment growth.

Australia Job Ads

Cyclical employment growth is expected to slow in line with the fall in the Leading Indicator over the past year.

Australia Leading Employment Indicator

We maintain a bearish outlook for the Australian economy, though Mining continues to surprise to the upside.