…..recent economic policies in China appear to have overlooked “productivity” – the essence of economic growth – entirely and focused instead on encouraging the sale of more houses and apartments at steadily rising prices.
Australia has finally exported its economic “growth” model 😉
Source: Can ‘New’ Keynesianism Save the Chinese Economy? | The Diplomat
From Michael Pettis’ OpEd in the Wall St Journal:
History suggests that developing countries that have experienced growth “miracles” tend to develop risky financial systems and unstable national balance sheets. The longer the miracle, the greater the tendency. That’s because in periods of rapid growth, riskier institutions do well. Soon balance sheets across the economy incorporate similar types of risk.
….Over time, this means the entire financial system is built around the same set of optimistic expectations. But when growth slows, balance sheets that did well during expansionary phases will now systematically fall short of expectations, and their disappointing performance will further reinforce the economic deceleration. This is when it suddenly becomes costlier to refinance the gap, and the practice of mismatching assets and liabilities causes debt, not profits, to rise.
China's conundrum: Selling FX reserves to support the yuan threatens deflation. But falling yuan fuels capital flight http://t.co/XGz6S4HPz6
— Colin Twiggs (@Colin_Twiggs) August 29, 2015
AND capital flight causes collapsing stock and real estate prices, which could lead to…… deflation.
Extract from a speech by Narayana Kocherlakota, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, in Seoul, South Korea on August 19, 2015:
There has been a significant decline in the long-run neutral real interest rate in the United States over the past few years.
This decline in the long-run neutral real interest rate increases the future likelihood that the FOMC will be unable to achieve its objectives because of financial instability or because of a binding lower bound on the nominal interest rate. Plausible economic models imply that the fiscal authority can mitigate this problem by issuing more public debt, although such issuance is not without cost. It is, of course, the province of the fiscal authority to determine whether those costs are worth the benefits that I’ve emphasized…
There are two critically important price signals in the economy — the interest rate and the exchange rate. Tampering with them encourages distortions, leading to instability.
None of these (in my view) sensible guidelines have been adhered to for the last half-century. Financial markets are in a real mess and Austrian “hands-off” policies are now insufficient to get us out of it. The only real alternative is to employ “hair of the dog” remedies advocated by Keynes: run fiscal deficits, increase public debt and distort real interest rates. Remember that Keynes published his General Theory in 1936 when financial markets were in an even bigger mess. Even a broken clock is right twice a day (or twice a century in Keynes case).
As for the Monetarists, Market Monetarists present the best opportunity to get us out of this “Keynesian hell” and set us on the path to Austrian (and Monetarist) utopia.
Read more of Narayana Kocherlakota’s speech at Public Debt and the Long-Run Neutral Real Interest Rate | Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
The Shanghai Composite today found support at 3500 today after plunging more than 8% on Monday. The large divergence on 13-week Twiggs Money Flow continues to warn of selling pressure.
* Target calculation: 4000 – ( 5000 – 4000 ) = 3000
From Wikipedia:
The Japanese asset price bubble….. was an economic bubble in Japan from 1986 to 1991 in which real estate and stock market prices were greatly inflated. The bubble was characterized by rapid acceleration of asset prices and overheated economic activity, as well as an uncontrolled money supply and credit expansion. More specifically, over-confidence and speculation regarding asset and stock prices had been closely associated with excessive monetary easing policy at the time.
By August 1990, the Nikkei stock index had plummeted to half its peak by the time of the fifth monetary tightening by the Bank of Japan (BOJ)…..the economy’s decline continued for more than a decade. This decline resulted in a huge accumulation of non-performing assets loans (NPL), causing difficulties for many financial institutions. The bursting of the Japanese asset price bubble contributed to what many call the Lost Decade.
“…uncontrolled money supply and credit expansion….overheated stock market and real estate bubble.” Sound familiar? It should. We are witnessing a re-run but this time in China. Wait, there’s more…..
…..At the end of August 1987, the BOJ signaled the possibility of tightening the monetary policy, but decided to delay the decision in view of economic uncertainty related to Black Monday (October 19, 1987) in the US.
…..BOJ reluctance to tighten the monetary policy was in spite of the fact that the economy went into expansion in the second half of 1987. The Japanese economy had just recovered from the “endaka recession” ….. closely linked to the Plaza Accord of September 1985, which led to the strong appreciation of the Japanese yen.
…..in order to overcome the “endaka” recession and stimulate the local economy, an aggressive fiscal policy was adopted, mainly through expansion of public investment. Simultaneously, the BOJ declared that curbing the yen’s appreciation was a “national priority”……
Global stock market crash leads to prolonged monetary easing…… aggressive expansion of public investment to stimulate the domestic economy…..central bank efforts to curb appreciation of the currency. We all know how this ends. We’ve seen the movie before.
It’s like deja-vu, all over again. ~ Yogi Berra
From Ye Xie and Belinda Cao at Bloomberg:
While China’s economic expansion beat analysts’ forecasts in the second quarter, the country’s debt levels increased at an even faster pace.
Outstanding loans for companies and households stood at a record 207 percent of gross domestic product at the end of June, up from 125 percent in 2008, data compiled by Bloomberg show.
Read more at China's Debt-to-GDP Ratio Just Climbed to a Record High – Bloomberg Business.
Great insight from Alicia García-Herrero:
….The need for Chinese corporations and banks to avail themselves of fresh equity cannot be underestimated. On the one hand, corporate debt has grown sixfold from 2005 levels. On the other hand, Chinese banks are not only heavily exposed to these corporates, being still their main source of financing, but also to local governments whose huge borrowing from banks is starting to be restructured. To make a long story short, China’s governments needed a bull stock market to transfer part of the cost of cleaning up its corporates’ and banks’ balance sheets from the state to private investors, including foreigners. The PBoC danced to the Government’s tune, easing monetary policy since November last year. This was done through several interest rate cuts and by lowering the liquidity ratio requirements. The problem with all of this liquidity is that it only fueled additional leveraging, including for gambling on the stock market…..
The sudden collapse of the Chinese stock market had two triggers. First, the was a wave of profit taking after the Shanghai benchmark index broke through 5 000 in early June and doubts emerged about further easing from the PBoC. At that very same moment, China’s securities regulator announced measures to cool down the market, which amounted to banning brokerage firms from providing unregulated margin funding to investors. This was more of a shock to the system than one might imagine, as margin financing in China is much larger than in other stock markets.
Japan had zombie banks, looks like China could end up with a zombie stock market.
Read more at China's stock market falling off a cliff: Why, and why care? | Alicia García-Herrero at Bruegel.org.
The most worrying aspect of rising Australian debt is that most of it is coming from offshore.
Domestic borrowing is fairly benign, but an increase in international liabilities suggests the country is living beyond its means. Has been for a while.
This is just plain wrong.
The Australian economy is sitting atop an enormous housing bubble caused by credit expansion from 1995 to 2007. To counter the end of the mining boom, the RBA lowered interest rates to stimulate the economy. While this may be necessary to relieve pressure on borrowers, what we don’t need is another credit expansion. That would simply make the economy more unstable and increase the risk of a crash. Banks are moving to curb lending to speculators, with lower LVRs, but not fast enough in my view. We can’t afford a credit contraction, but the RBA needs to impose sufficient discipline to keep credit growth at/below the inflation rate — so that it gradually declines in real terms as the economy grows.
Chris Joye (AFR) on the budget deficit:
There are two critical differences in 2015 that make Australia’s current debt burden [42.2% of GDP] much more troubling than that serviced by previous generations. Back in the 1977 and 1983 recessions, the household debt-to-income ratio was only 34 per cent and 37 per cent, respectively. Even in the 1991 recession, it was just 48 per cent, which is one reason why home loan arrears were so benign. Yet by 2015, the household debt-to-income ratio had jumped 3.2 times to an incredible 154 per cent, which is above its pre-GFC climax because families haven’t deleveraged….
Public and private debt levels are important to our economic health, but where the money is borrowed domestically it is far less serious than when it is borrowed offshore. In the former case, net debt in the economy is effectively zero — one sector runs a surplus while the other runs a deficit — but where money is borrowed offshore, the nation as a whole becomes a net debtor. Which is why short-term borrowing in international markets by Australian banks — used to fund the housing bubble in the run up to the GFC — was so dangerous.
From Greg McKenna (House & Holes) at Macrobusiness:
“….The funding gap is estimated to be $600 billion. In a speech on Friday, Westpac deputy chief executive Phil Coffey cited research from PwC which estimated the gap could grow to $1.325 trillion if there was a pick-up in credit growth.”
Here is the latest chart from the RBA showing the rising borrowing, it’s quarterly and likely lagging:
Notice how the article is focused entirely upon the “funding gap” as a tactical challenge in which the banks are innocent players. In reality there is no “funding gap”. Rather, our financial system is addicted to unproductive mortgage-lending and that crowds out the kind of business lending that would generate income growth and local savings. The “funding gap” is created by the banks not serviced by them.
International borrowing to fund a domestic property bubble is double trouble.
Read more at Federal budget 2015: worst cumulative deficits in 60 years | afr.com.
And at Macrobusiness: Australia ramps the risk as banks borrow abroad
