Everyone should read this as a reminder of the brutality that states may employ for political ends, whether Ethiopia (1935), Chechnya (1995), Iraq (1998) or Syria (2017). Chemical weapons such as sarin or mustard gas leave horrific injuries, but any deliberate targeting of civilians — such as bombing of hospitals and residential neighborhoods — should IMO be treated as a war crime.
Luke O’Brien is a U.S. Army officer assigned to Aberdeen Proving Ground and is currently a Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Graduate Fellow at National Defense University:
…..Perhaps the most notorious example of this from recent memory, however, was the Iraqi chemical attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988, as part of the Anfal Campaign at the end of the Iran-Iraq War. This attack struck the small Kurdish village with both conventional and chemical bombs, including sarin, just as Assad’s forces would nearly 30 years later. The first attacks used normal high-explosive bombs, which both drove civilians into basement shelters as well as broke open the villages windows and doors. These initials attacks were then followed up with chemical munitions, which quickly filled the basement shelters and killed their occupants.
Such brutality was intentional. The attacks were intended to break the back of the Kurdish peshmerga militia by depopulating its support. Commenting on the matter at the time, Iraqi Gen. Ali Hassan al-Majid bragged that he would “kill [all the Kurds] with chemical weapons.” The chemical bombardment of Halabja had its desired effect, with a stream of surviving civilians abandoning the town and fleeing to nearby Iran. This use of chemical weapons, moreover, had another added benefit: driving away civilians and insurgents who had become numb to the effects of conventional weapons…..
While we, as well as the few bearish peers we have, have warned of a pending “credit event” in China for some time now – admittedly incorrectly (China has proved much more resilient than expected) – the more recent red flags are among the most profound we’ve seen in years – in short, we agree with fresh observations made by some of the world’s most famous iron ore bears. Thus, while it is nearly impossible to pinpoint exactly when the credit bubble will definitively pop in China, a number of recent events, in our view, suggest the threat level is currently at red/severe.
WHERE IS CHINA AT TODAY VS. WHERE THE US WAS AT AHEAD OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS? At the peak of the US subprime bubble (before the failure of Bear Stearns in Mar. ‘08, and subsequently Lehman Brothers in Sep. ’08, troubles in the US credit system emerged as early as Feb. ’07), the asset/liability mismatch was 2% when compared to the total banking system. However, in China, currently, there is a massive duration mismatch in wealth management products (“WMPs”). And, at $4tn in total WMPs outstanding, the asset/liability mismatch in China is now above 10% – China’s entire banking system is ~$34tn, which is a scary scenario. In our view, this is a very important dynamic to track given it foretells where a country is at in the credit cycle.
WHAT ARE THE SIGNS WE ARE SEEING? In short, we see a number of signs that point to what could be the beginning of the “popping” of the credit bubble in China. More specifically: (1) interbank rates in China are spiking, meaning banks, increasingly, don’t trust each other – this is how any banking crisis begins (Exhibit 1), (2) China’s Minsheng Bank recently issued a ghost/fraudulent WMP (they raised $436mn in funds for a CDO-like asset that had no assets backing it [yes, you heard that right] – link), (2) Anbang, the Chinese conglomerate who has used WMP issuance as a means to buy a number of assets globally (including the Waldorf Astoria here in the US), is now having issues gaining approval for incremental asset purchases (link), suggesting global investors may be getting weary of the way in which Anbang has “beefed up” its balance sheet, (3) China’s top insurance regulator, Xiang Junbo, chairman of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, is currently under investigation for “severe” disciplinary violations (link), implying some/many of the “shadow” forms of transacting in China could become a bit harder to maneuver (which would manifest itself in higher rates, which his exactly what we are seeing today), and (4) as would be expected from all of this, as was revealed overnight in China, bank WMP issuance crashed 15% m/m in April to 10,038 from 11,823 in March, a strong indicator that faith in these products is indeed waning.
Exhibit 1: Interbank Rates in China
Source: Bloomberg.
DOES CHINESE PRESIDENT XI JINPING HAVE ALL OF THIS UNDER CONTROL? In a word, increasingly, it seems the answer is no. What’s the evidence? Well, in March, interbank rates spiked WAY past the upper corridor of 3.45% to ~11% (Exhibit 2), a strong indicator that the PBoC is losing its ability to “maintain order”. And, admittedly, while there are levers the PBoC can pull, FX reserves are at scary low levels (discussed below), suggesting the PBoC is quickly running out of bullets. Furthermore, corporate bond issuance in China was negative in C1Q, which means M2 is going to be VERY hard to grow (when MO is negative); at risk of stating the obvious, without M2 growth in China, economic growth (i.e., GDP) will undoubtedly slow – this is not the current Consensus among market prognosticators who think things are quite rosy right now in China; yet, while global stock markets are soaring, the ChiNext Composite index is down -7.5% YTD vs. the Nasdaq Composite Index being up +12.8% YTD. In our view, given China’s importance to the global commodity backdrop, we see this as a key leading indicator (the folks on the ground in China are betting with their wallets, while global investors continue to place their hopes on: [a.] a reflationary tailwind that we do not believe is ever coming [China is now destocking], and [b.] hope that President Trump will deliver everything he’s promised [which, in this political environment, we see is virtually impossible]).
Exhibit 2: Overnight Reverse Repo Rate
Source: Bloomberg.
CHINA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE (“FX”) RESERVES ARE DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO LOW LEVELS THAT WILL LIKELY CAUSE AN INFLECTION LOWER IN THE CURRENCY. Based on a fine-tuning of its formula to calculate “reserve-adequacy” over the years, the International Monetary Funds’ (“IMF”) approach can be best summed up as follows: Minimum FX Reserves = 10% of Exports + 30% of Short-term FX Debt + 10% of M2 + 15% of Other Liabilities. Thus, for China, the equation is as follows: 10% * $2.2tn + 30% * $680bn + 10% * (RMB 139.3tn ÷ 6.6) + 15% * $1.0tn = $2.7tn of required minimum reserves. Furthermore, when considering China’s FX reserve balance was roughly $4tn just 2 years ago, we find it concerning that experts now peg China’s unofficial FX reserve balance somewhere in the $1.6-$1.7tn range. Why does this differ from China’s $3.0tn in reported FX reserves as of Feb. 2017? Well, according to our contacts, when adjusting for China’s investment in its own sovereign wealth fund (i.e., the CIC) of roughly $600bn, as well as bank injections from: (a) China Development Bank (“CDB”) of roughly $975bn, (b) The Export-Import Bank of China (“EXIM”) of roughly $30bn, (c) the Agricultural Development Bank of China (“ADBC”) of roughly $10bn, as well as capital commitments from, (d) the BRICs Bank of roughly $50bn, (e) the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (“AIIB”) of $50bn, (f) open short RMB forwards by agent banks of $300bn, (g) the China Africa Fund of roughly $50bn, and (h) Oil-Currency Swaps with Russia of roughly $50bn, the actual FX reserve balance in China is closer to $1.69tn (Exhibit 3).
Stated differently, based on the IMFs formula, sharply contrasting the Consensus view that China has years of reserves to burn through, China is already below the critical level of minimum reserve adequacy. However, using expert estimates that $1.0tn-$1.5tn in reserves is the “critical level”, and also considering that China is burning $25bn-$75bn in reserves each month, the point at which the country will no longer be able to support the renminbi via FX reserves appears to be a 2017 event. At that point, there would be considerable devaluation in China’s currency, sending a deflationary shock through the world’s commodity markets; in short, we feel this would be bad for the steel/iron ore stocks we cover, yet is being completely un-discounted in stocks today (no one ever expects this event to occur).
The early 2007 analogy is a good one. This is coming at some point in the next few years. I remain on guard but skeptical at this point given China does have other levers it can pull to keep the credit running and is indeed pulling them in fiscal policy. As well, the problem can always be made worse before it’s made better. Authorities are, after all, bringing this on.
It’s a fascinating question. Could China endure a “sudden stop” in credit if counter-party risk exploded, much like happened to Wall St in 2008? The usual analysis reckons that China’s publicly owned banks can always be ordered to lend more but what if they lose faith in each other? It’s probably true that Chinese authorities could still force feed credit into the economy but, equally, it’s difficult to see how an interbank crash in confidence would not slow the injection, at minimum via choked off-balance sheet vehicles like WMPs.
There is no doubt, at least, about what happens when it does arrive:
the final washout of commodity prices;
Australian house price crash;
multiple sovereign downgrades, and
an Aussie dollar at 40 cents or below.
It’s the great reset event for Australia’s bloated living standards. That is why we say to you get your money offshore today. We can help you do that when the MB Fund launches in the next month with 70% international allocation.
Comment from Colin:
I share Macrobusiness’ skepticism over the timing of a possible Chinese crash, especially because they have in the past shown a preparedness to kick the can down the road rather than address thorny issues – making their problems worse in the long run. But I do see China’s stability as a long-term threat to the global financial system which could precipitate a major down-turn on global stock markets.
Dow Jones Industrial Average is testing resistance at 21000 after a shallow correction. Rising troughs above zero on Twiggs Money Flow signal strong buying pressure. Breakout is likely and would signal a fresh advance, with an immediate target of 22000.
Small Cap stocks are also advancing, with the Russell 2000 Index testing resistance at 14.00. Breakout is likely and would offer an immediate target of 15.00.
A broad advance across large and small caps, suggests low market risk. Advance of only large caps would indicate that investors are risk averse. Advance of only small caps normally occurs towards the frothy end of stage III of a bull market — when the smart money is taking profits while the dumb money has lost all fear.
Shanghai’s Composite Index is testing support at 3100. Twiggs Money Flow recovered above zero but buying pressure remains weak. Breach of 3100 would warn of a primary down-trend.
* Target medium-term: May 2016 low of 2800
Hong Kong is faring better, with the Hang Seng index recovering above 24000 to signal a fresh advance.
India’s Sensex is testing major resistance at 30000. Rising Twiggs Money Flow indicates medium-term buying pressure. Breakout is likely and would offer a target of 32000*.
Spurred by a favorable result in the first round of French elections, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 broke resistance at 3500 and is likely to test the 2015 high of 3800. Rising troughs on Twiggs Money Flow indicate strong buying pressure.
Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 represents 50 of the largest, mainly industrial, stocks in the Euro monetary area.
Pound Sterling is strengthening against the US Dollar as well as the Euro (mentioned last week). Recovery of the Pound above 1.27 (GBPUSD) completes a triple bottom, suggesting that a base is forming. Crossover of 13-week Momentum above zero indicates a primary up-trend.
Breakout above 1.20 against the Euro (GBPEUR) would strengthen the signal.
The FTSE 100 continues to test support at 7100. Declining Twiggs Money Flow indicates medium-term selling pressure. A rising Pound is likely to result in a Footsie test of primary support at 6700.
The Dollar Index broke support at 100 despite strengthening interest rates, warning of a down-trend. Target for a decline would be the May 2016 low of 93.
China has burned through a trillion dollars of foreign reserves in the last 3 years, attempting to support the yuan. I believe the sell-off is unlikely to abate and plays a major part in the Dollar’s weakness.
A falling Dollar would strengthen demand for gold. Spot Gold is retracing from resistance at $1300/ounce and is likely to find support at $1240/$1250. Respect of support would suggest another advance; confirmed if gold breaks $1300.
Spot Silver displays a more bearish medium-term outlook, however, with a stronger correction testing support at $17.00/ounce. Breach of support would test the primary level at $15.65 and warn of further gold weakness.
The yield differential between 10-year US and Australian government bonds has shrunk to less than 30 basis points, the tightest in about 15 years, as the US engages in monetary tightening while the RBA appears set to keep rates steady at 1.5 per cent.
….This should be a serious concern for Australian policymakers, TD Securities’ chief Asia-Pacific macro strategist Annette Beacher told The Australian Financial Review, as many foreign investors are primarily attracted to the high-yield status of the local currency.
The Aussie Dollar has attracted investors over the last decade primarily because good fortune in avoiding a post-GFC recession enhanced Australia’s reputation as a stable economy. But the Aussie is still a commodity currency prone to boom-bust cycles. Dodging the 2008/2009 bullet was more a matter of luck than of skillful management of the economy. Without China’s massive post-GFC stimulus the Australian economy would have been smashed — along with the housing bubble — and the big four banks would have gone to the wall (or more likely been rescued by a government bailout). And the Aussie would be trading close to 50 cents, which ironically, despite the massive shock, may have put the economy in a stronger (and more realistic) position than it is today.
Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50, reflecting the top 50 stocks in the Euro monetary area, appears unfazed by the upcoming French elections. The index has undergone a shallow retracement over the last 3 weeks, while rising Twiggs Money Flow indicates long-term buying pressure.
Polls have proved notoriously unreliable in the last year and I will not venture to comment on the election outcome. But breakout above 3500 is likely if Le Pen fails in her bid and would signal another advance.
Pound Sterling strengthened this week on news of an early election. Despite Brexit fears the Cable, as it is commonly referred to by traders, has been strengthening for several months. Crossover of 13-week Momentum above zero suggests a primary up-trend. Breakout above 1.20 against the Euro would confirm the signal.
The FTSE 100 retreated from resistance at 7400. Rising troughs on Twiggs Money Flow indicate long-term buying pressure but reversal below 7100 would warn of a correction.
