S&P 500 and the trade war

We are now headed for a full-blown trade war. Donald Trump may have highlighted the issue but this is not a conflict between him and Xi — it should have been addressed years ago — nor even between China and the West. Accusations of racism are misguided. This is a conflict between totalitarianism and the rule of law. Between the CCP (with Putin, Erdogan, and the Ayatollahs in their corner) and Western democracy.

Australia will be forced to take sides. China may be Australia’s largest trading partner but the US & UK are it’s ideological partners. I cannot see the remotest possibility of Australia selling out its principles for profits, no matter how tempting the short-term rewards (or threatened hardships). We have a proud history of standing up against oppression and exploitation.

Disruptions to supply chains and supply contracts in the US (and China) are going to be significant and are likely to impact on earnings. The S&P 500 reaction is so far muted, with retracement testing medium-term support at 2800. There is also no indication of selling pressure on the Trend Index. Nevertheless, a breach of 2800 is likely and would warn of a test of primary support at 2400.

S&P 500

Falling Treasury yields highlight the outflow from equities and into bonds. Stock buybacks are becoming the primary inflow into stocks.

10-Year Treasury Yields

However, corporate bond spreads — lowest investment grade (Baa) yields minus the equivalent Treasury yield — are still well below the 3.0% level associated with elevated risk.

S&P 500

Profits may fall due to supply disruption (similar to 2015 on the chart below) but the Fed is unlikely to cut interest rates unless employment follows (as in 2007). Inflation is likely to rise as supply chains are disrupted but chances of a rate rise are negligible. Fed Chairman Jay Powell’s eyes are going to be firmly fixed on Total Non-farm Payrolls. If annual growth falls below 1.0% (RHS), expect a rate cut.

S&P 500

This excerpt from a newsletter I wrote in April 2018 (Playing hardball with China) is illuminating: “In 2010, Paul Krugman wrote:

Some still argue that we must reason gently with China, not confront it. But we’ve been reasoning with China for years, as its surplus ballooned, and gotten nowhere: on Sunday Wen Jiabao, the Chinese prime minister, declared — absurdly — that his nation’s currency is not undervalued. (The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that the renminbi is undervalued by between 20 and 40 percent.) And Mr. Wen accused other nations of doing what China actually does, seeking to weaken their currencies “just for the purposes of increasing their own exports.”

But if sweet reason won’t work, what’s the alternative? In 1971 the United States dealt with a similar but much less severe problem of foreign undervaluation by imposing a temporary 10 percent surcharge on imports, which was removed a few months later after Germany, Japan and other nations raised the dollar value of their currencies. At this point, it’s hard to see China changing its policies unless faced with the threat of similar action — except that this time the surcharge would have to be much larger, say 25 percent.

I don’t propose this turn to policy hardball lightly. But Chinese currency policy is adding materially to the world’s economic problems at a time when those problems are already very severe. It’s time to take a stand.

Krugman (no surprise) now seems more opposed to trade tariffs but observes:

….I think it’s worth noting that even if we are headed for a full-scale trade war, conventional estimates of the costs of such a war don’t come anywhere near to 10 percent of GDP, or even 6 percent. In fact, it’s one of the dirty little secrets of international economics that standard estimates of the cost of protectionism, while not trivial, aren’t usually earthshaking either.”

Trump has to show that he is prepared to endure the hardships of a trade war and not kowtow to Beijing. But the chances of a reasonable response are unlikely.

Men naturally despise those who court them, but respect those who do not give way to them.

~ Thucydides (circa 400 BC)

China’s export dilemna

Growth in value of exports from China has slowed to single figures since 2012. It will be difficult sustain current GDP growth if this trend continues.

China Exports

The Harper Petersen index of shipping rates for container vessels, the Harpex, remains near its 2010 low, reflecting continued weakness in Asian manufactured goods exports (a rise in exports from Europe or North America would be absorbed by the high percentage of containers returned empty to Asia on the round trip).

US Imports from China

Rising Australian bulk commodity exports reflect the disconnect between Chinese imports and exports, with vast investment in infrastructure and rising stockpiles of raw materials used to sustain economic growth. But diminishing marginal returns on further infrastructure and housing investment mean failed recovery of manufactured goods exports would lead to a hard landing.

Australian Bulk Commodity Exports

A key factor will be the strength of the RMB against the US Dollar. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard suggests that China will meet strong resistance in its attempts to export its deflation to the West. Treasury’s forex report to Congress (April 2014) highlight’s sensitivity toward further exchange rate manipulation:

In China, the RMB appreciated during 2013 on a trade-weighted basis, but not as fast or by as much as is needed, and large-scale intervention resumed. The RMB appreciated by 2.9 percent
against the dollar in 2013. However, as a result of the depreciation of the yen and many emerging market currencies, the RMB strengthened more on a trade-weighted basis, with the RMB’s nominal and real effective exchange rates rising 7.2 and 7.9 percent, respectively. For most of 2013 the RMB exchange rate was at, or very near, the most appreciated edge of the daily trading band, suggesting continuous pressure for greater RMB appreciation. During 2014, however, the exchange rate has reversed direction, depreciating by a marked 2.68 percent year to date.

There are a number of continuing signs that the exchange rate adjustment process remains incomplete and the currency has further to appreciate before reaching its equilibrium value. China continues to generate large current account surpluses and attracts large net inflows of foreign direct investment; China’s current account surplus plus inward foreign direct investment in 2013 exceeded $446 billion. The reduction in the current account surplus as a share of China’s GDP has largely been the reflection of the unsustainably rapid pace of investment growth. Finally, China has continued to see rapid productivity growth, which suggests that continuing appreciation is necessary over time to prevent the exchange rate from becoming more undervalued. All of these factors indicate a RMB exchange rate that remains significantly undervalued. Further exchange rate appreciation would help to smoothly rebalance the Chinese economy away from investment toward consumption.

The Chinese authorities have been unwilling to allow an appreciation large enough to bring the currency to market equilibrium, opting instead for a gradual adjustment which has now been partially reversed . The expectation that the RMB would continue to appreciate over time resulted in large and increasing capital inflows in 2013. The PBOC’s policy of gradual adjustment triggered expectations of continued appreciation, and resulted in large-scale foreign exchange intervention. China’s foreign exchange reserves increased sharply in 2013, by $509.7 billion, which was a record for a single year. China has continued large-scale purchases of foreign exchange in the first quarter of this year, despite having accumulated $3.8 trillion in reserves, which are excessive by any measure. This suggests continued actions to impede market determination.

In short, China has been buying US Treasurys as a form of vendor financing, allowing them to export to the US while preventing the RMB from appreciating to its natural, market-clearing level against the Dollar. The fact that they are attempting to disguise this manipulation, using third parties, means that Congress is unlikely to tolerate further suppression of the RMB against the Dollar and will be forced to take action.

Is China hiding its FX reserves in...Belgium?

Feared sales of US Treasury investments by China, leading to a collapse of the Dollar, are most unlikely and would be a death knell for Chinese exports. Reversal of capital flows would cause rapid appreciation of the RMB against the Dollar, up-ending China’s former competitive advantage and boosting US exports.

Even without a reduction of existing Treasury holdings, appreciation of the RMB against the Dollar and Euro appears inevitable. This would be disastrous for China, causing them to forfeit their competitive advantage in export markets. And without access to the level of technology and global branding enjoyed by their Western counterparts, Chinese exporters are likely to struggle to hold existing markets, let alone achieve further growth. With diminishing returns on infrastructure and housing investment, China could soon run out of options to stimulate its economy. And its path as a global economic powerhouse may well follow that of its predecessor, Japan.

China’s export dilemna

Growth in value of exports from China has slowed to single figures since 2012. It will be difficult sustain current GDP growth if this trend continues.

China Exports

The Harper Petersen index of shipping rates for container vessels, the Harpex, remains near its 2010 low, reflecting continued weakness in Asian manufactured goods exports (a rise in exports from Europe or North America would be absorbed by the high percentage of containers returned empty to Asia on the round trip).

US Imports from China

Rising Australian bulk commodity exports reflect the disconnect between Chinese imports and exports, with vast investment in infrastructure and rising stockpiles of raw materials used to sustain economic growth. But diminishing marginal returns on further infrastructure and housing investment mean failed recovery of manufactured goods exports would lead to a hard landing.

Australian Bulk Commodity Exports

A key factor will be the strength of the RMB against the US Dollar. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard suggests that China will meet strong resistance in its attempts to export its deflation to the West. Treasury’s forex report to Congress (April 2014) highlight’s sensitivity toward further exchange rate manipulation:

In China, the RMB appreciated during 2013 on a trade-weighted basis, but not as fast or by as much as is needed, and large-scale intervention resumed. The RMB appreciated by 2.9 percent
against the dollar in 2013. However, as a result of the depreciation of the yen and many emerging market currencies, the RMB strengthened more on a trade-weighted basis, with the RMB’s nominal and real effective exchange rates rising 7.2 and 7.9 percent, respectively. For most of 2013 the RMB exchange rate was at, or very near, the most appreciated edge of the daily trading band, suggesting continuous pressure for greater RMB appreciation. During 2014, however, the exchange rate has reversed direction, depreciating by a marked 2.68 percent year to date.

There are a number of continuing signs that the exchange rate adjustment process remains incomplete and the currency has further to appreciate before reaching its equilibrium value. China continues to generate large current account surpluses and attracts large net inflows of foreign direct investment; China’s current account surplus plus inward foreign direct investment in 2013 exceeded $446 billion. The reduction in the current account surplus as a share of China’s GDP has largely been the reflection of the unsustainably rapid pace of investment growth. Finally, China has continued to see rapid productivity growth, which suggests that continuing appreciation is necessary over time to prevent the exchange rate from becoming more undervalued. All of these factors indicate a RMB exchange rate that remains significantly undervalued. Further exchange rate appreciation would help to smoothly rebalance the Chinese economy away from investment toward consumption.

The Chinese authorities have been unwilling to allow an appreciation large enough to bring the currency to market equilibrium, opting instead for a gradual adjustment which has now been partially reversed . The expectation that the RMB would continue to appreciate over time resulted in large and increasing capital inflows in 2013. The PBOC’s policy of gradual adjustment triggered expectations of continued appreciation, and resulted in large-scale foreign exchange intervention. China’s foreign exchange reserves increased sharply in 2013, by $509.7 billion, which was a record for a single year. China has continued large-scale purchases of foreign exchange in the first quarter of this year, despite having accumulated $3.8 trillion in reserves, which are excessive by any measure. This suggests continued actions to impede market determination.

In short, China has been buying US Treasurys as a form of vendor financing, allowing them to export to the US while preventing the RMB from appreciating to its natural, market-clearing level against the Dollar. The fact that they are attempting to disguise this manipulation, using third parties, means that Congress is unlikely to tolerate further suppression of the RMB against the Dollar and will be forced to take action.

Feared sales of US Treasury investments by China, leading to a collapse of the Dollar, are most unlikely and would be a death knell for Chinese exports. Reversal of capital flows would cause rapid appreciation of the RMB against the Dollar, up-ending China’s former competitive advantage and boosting US exports.

Even without a reduction of existing Treasury holdings, appreciation of the RMB against the Dollar and Euro appears inevitable. This would be disastrous for China, causing them to forfeit their competitive advantage in export markets. And without access to the level of technology and global branding enjoyed by their Western counterparts, Chinese exporters are likely to struggle to hold existing markets, let alone achieve further growth. With diminishing returns on infrastructure and housing investment, China could soon run out of options to stimulate its economy. And its path as a global economic powerhouse may well follow that of its predecessor, Japan.

The Numbers Racket at Steven Landsburg | The Big Questions

Steve Landsberg points out the flaw in the often-quoted statistic that the median US worker has enjoyed hardly any income gain over the past few decades, with median wages growing from $25,000 in 1980 to $25,700 in 2005:

Each demographic group has progressed, but at the same time, there’s been a great influx of lower income groups — women and nonwhites — into the workforce. This creates the illusion that nobody’s progressing when in fact everybody’s progressing.

Actual growth rates are as high as 75% for white women and 62% for nonwhite women.

via The Numbers Racket at Steven Landsburg | The Big Questions: Tackling the Problems of Philosophy with Ideas from Mathematics, Economics, and Physics.

Jan Hatzius Connects All the Dots | Business Insider

Important insight from Jan Hatzius at Goldman Sachs, reported by Cullen Roche:

The US private sector continues to run a large financial surplus of 5.5% of GDP, more than 3 percentage points above the historical average. This is the flip side of the deleveraging of private sector balance sheet. We expect a normalization in this surplus over the next few years to provide a boost to real GDP growth. This is the key reason why we see US economic growth picking up gradually in the course of 2013 and into 2014, despite the near-term downside risks from the increase in fiscal restraint……..

via Jan Hatzius Connects All the Dots – Business Insider.

How Obama and Biden Buried the Middle Class

By EDWARD MORRISSEY

Is this a political inconvenient truth? Has the middle class been “buried” the last four years? By any measure, the middle class has certainly lost ground. Median household income has declined each of the last four years, a decline which has accelerated during the Obama “recovery” that started in June 2009. Median household income dropped 2.6 percent during the Great Recession, but has dropped 4.8 percent in the three years since.

via How Obama and Biden Buried the Middle Class.

Compromises Are Needed to Boost Growth – WSJ.com

Gerald Seib: Most sensible people in Washington know exactly what kinds of compromises on the deficit, taxes, trade and entitlement programs are within reach to change the economic trajectory.

What’s needed is simply for both parties to accept that neither is likely to be in full command of the government after the fall election and perhaps for some time to come, and to move on to the compromises needed to end a policy paralysis that is exacting a real economic price….

This imperative is well embodied in a new study, titled “The Bargain,” soon to be released by Third Way, a centrist think tank. It lays out a series of seven big policy bargains the two parties could strike to address economic malaise….

via Compromises Are Needed to Boost Growth – WSJ.com.

The Threat From a Recession | ECRI

The Economic Cycle Research Institute, which claims a perfect recession-forecasting record, says an economic contraction is imminent. “We have not seen a slowdown where year-over-year payroll job growth has dropped this low without a recession,” ECRI states in a May report.

If, or when, the U.S. (and/or the global) economy does start to contract, commodity prices will tumble because of three factors…..

via The Threat From a Recession | News | News and Events | ECRI.

EconoMonitor » U.S.-China Trade War in the Offing?

China wants to develop what it sees as key industries by giving Chinese companies a leg up in both the Chinese and global market. Its trading partners don’t want to see their firms placed at a disadvantage, and in several cases have challenged Chinese policies. China is challenging them right back, arguing that those countries do the same thing, and that people who live in protectionist glass houses shouldn’t throw stones. If they do, China can match them “tit for tat.” (A similar battle involving cross-accusations and threats between the EU and China began unfolding this week — you can read about it here).

There’s a critical difference, though, between China and its trade partners. They all may both have policies that can be called protectionist, but they come from different starting points. In the U.S., trade restrictions and subsidies tend to be the exception to the rule, and when they do occur, are usually transparent. There’s a public approval process and an overt policy that can be challenged at WTO. In China, restrictions and subsidies are pervasive, due to the large state role in the economy, and often hard to pin down.

via EconoMonitor : EconoMonitor » U.S.-China Trade War in the Offing?.

Buiter: no politically feasible route to sustained growth for many years to come | Credit Writedowns

Citigroup chief economist Willem Buiter:

There really is no politically feasible route back to sustained economic growth through monetary and/or demand stimulating policies for the EA, the UK, the US and Japan, for many years to come. As regards demand stimulus, expansionary fiscal policy will not be punished by the markets to the point of being self-defeating for all EA member states except for Germany (which will not do it on any significant scale for domestic political reasons). The US also may be technically able to use fiscal expansion to stimulate demand, but even if markets continue to be tolerant, political gridlock makes it impossible. Expansionary monetary policy is at the end of its rope in the US and Japan. The UK could cut the official policy rate by 50 bps and the ECB by 125 bps, and then they too are restricted to quantitative easing (QE), which I consider to be ineffective.

via Buiter: no politically feasible route to sustained growth for many years to come | Credit Writedowns.