risk-weighting Archives - Page 2 of 2

May 6, 2013

Are Australian banks really sound?

In a statement APRA chairman John Laker said that, in implementing the Basel III liquidity reforms, the authority’s objectives were to improve its ability to assess and monitor ADIs’ liquidity risk and strengthen the resilience of the Australian banking system.

“APRA believes ADIs are well-placed to meet the new liquidity requirements on the original timetable and doing so will send a strong message about the soundness of the Australian banking system,” he said.

If you repeat misinformation often enough, people will believe it is true. Australian banks face two risks: liquidity risk and solvency risk. Addressing liquidity risk does not address solvency risk. Australian banks report risk-weighted capital ratios which are misleading if not downright dangerous. Risk-weighting encourages banks to concentrate exposure in areas historically perceived as low risk, such as residential mortgages. When all banks are over-weight the same asset, the risk profile changes — as Eurozone banks discovered with government bonds.

If we remove risk-weighting, as proposed in the US Brown-Vitter bill, the four majors in Australia would have capital ratios of 3 to 4 percent. Not much of a capital buffer in these uncertain times.

April 28, 2013

Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual? | Martin Hellwig

This abstract from a 2010 paper by Martin Hellwig sums up the debate about overhauling the financial system:

Whereas the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision seems to go for marginal changes here and there, the paper calls for a thorough overhaul, moving away from risk calibration and raising capital requirements very substantially. The argument is based on the observation that the current system of risk-calibrated capital requirements, in particular under the model-based approach, played a key role in allowing banks to be undercapitalized prior to the crisis, with strong systemic effects for deleveraging multipliers and for the functioning of interbank markets. The argument is also based on the observation that the current system has no theoretical foundation, its objectives are ill-specified, and its effects have not been thought through, either for the individual bank or for the system as a whole. Objections to substantial increases in capital requirements rest on arguments that run counter to economic logic or are themselves evidence of moral hazard and a need for regulation.

The bipartisan bill, Terminating Bailouts for Taxpayer Fairness Act, sponsored by senators Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democrat, and David Vitter, a Louisiana Republican, is a courageous attempt to address the undercapitalization that led to the global financial crisis. Abruptly raising bank capital requirements would lead to a credit contraction if introduced in isolation, but the Fed is quite capable of adjusting monetary policy to offset this and a suitable phase-in period would give banks time to adjust. What is important is that we get to the point where banks are properly capitalized to deal with any future instability.

Read the full paper at Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual? | Martin Hellwig, July 2010.

April 7, 2013

Lessons for Australian banks: Why Risk Managers Should Be Spymasters | ProPublica

Jesse Eisinger’s interview with risk specialist John Breit highlights an issue facing Australian banks. Residential mortgages are allocated a low risk weighting — 15% to 17% because of historic performance — compared to 50% for US banks. The big four banks piled into this area because of the perceived low risk, leveraging up to 50 times capital. Risk-weighted capital ratios (around 10%) still appear healthy, but they conceal a hidden danger from the resulting housing bubble.

[Breit] despises the concept of “risk-weighted assets,” where banks put up capital based on the perceived riskiness of the assets. Inevitably, he argues, banks will “pile into” the same types of supposedly safe investments, creating bubbles that make the risks far more severe than the initial perceptions. Paradoxically, risk-weighting can leave banks setting aside the least capital to cover the biggest dangers.

“I could not be more disappointed,” he said. “The cynic in me thinks this is all in the interests of senior management and regulators to avoid blame. They may not think they can prevent the next crisis, but they then can blame the statistics.”