Richard Koo explains how cutting government deficits too early in Japan prolonged the de-leveraging cycle by almost 10 years.
INET interview with Richard Koo, Chief Economist of Nomura Research
Richard Koo explains how cutting government deficits too early in Japan prolonged the de-leveraging cycle by almost 10 years.
INET interview with Richard Koo, Chief Economist of Nomura Research
Prof. James Galbraith on fiscal stimulus and public debt:
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Agree:
Disagree:
Strongly disagree:
Ever since John Maynard Keynes popularized the Paradox of Thrift, economists, central bankers and politicians have labored under the misapprehension that high levels of savings are bad for the economy and inhibit growth. The Paradox of Thrift:
Keynes was correct in his observation that high level of savings caused a shortfall in national income, but we need to remember that he was writing in the 1930s — in the middle of the Great Depression. His General Theory was published in 1936. What Keynes observed was an anomaly caused by the financial crisis. Falling asset prices threatened the solvency of both individuals and corporations, forcing them to increase their level of savings and — most importantly — use their savings to repay debt.
Not only will national income fall when savings are used to repay debt, but it falls rapidly. The shortfall between saving and new investment (or spending and income) may be small but, like a punctured car tire, the result is disastrous. At each point in the supply chain the leakage is repeated: A receives an income of $1.00 and use 5 cents to repay debt, only spending $0.95. B will receive $0.95 from A, where previously they received $1.00, and will use 5% to repay debt, only spending $0.9025. C will only receive $0.9025 from B but still uses 5% to repay debt, only spending $0.857……… The pattern continues until incomes shrink to the point that parties are forced to consume all of their income and can no longer afford to repay debt. The impact on national income — as evident from the 1930s — can be devastating.
Keynes pointed out that government can break the cycle and make up the shortfall, by spending more than it collects by way of taxes — so that the aggregate level of spending is unchanged. But fiscal stimulus is fraught with dangers, not least of which is the massive public debt hangover faced by the US, Japan and many European economies. I will cover these dangers in more depth in a later post.
Under normal conditions, however, the paradox of thrift does not apply:
National income is, in fact, likely to rise. New capital investment will boost productivity and accelerate growth.
Consider the simple example of a farmer who saves and buys a tractor. His overall spending is unaffected. He merely consumes less and spends the proceeds on something else — in this case a tractor. The income of the store that supplies him with consumer goods will decrease, but the income of the dealer that sells him the tractor will rise; the net effect on national income is so far zero. But the farmer now produces more food with his new tractor; so his income — and the national income — increases.
This misconception that the paradox of thrift applies in normal markets has done immense harm to the economy and eroded the savings of the middle-class and retirees. For three generations, central bankers attacked savers by artificially reducing interest rates — in the belief that lower savings would boost demand and stimulate the economy. Low interest rates simply forced savers to assume more risk, in order to earn a return on their investment, and encouraged speculation. The traditional work hard and save ethic that is the backbone of the capitalist system has been supplanted by the consume, borrow and speculate profligacy that got us into such a mess. High levels of public and private debt, inflation, volatile investment returns and rising income inequality are all consequences of the low-interest policy pursued by the Fed. Today’s giant casino is a far cry from the cautious, prudent investment outlook of our grandparents’ generation.
I will conclude by reminding you that savings channeled into new capital investment actually boost growth.
….the never-ending circle of life.
It wasn’t until the 1940s that economists realized that a balanced-budget stimulus could be effective, too. As I’ve discussed in earlier columns, economists starting with Walter S. Salant and Paul A. Samuelson realized that during a depression or in near-depression conditions, any government expenditure fully funded by taxes will increase national income approximately one for one, without raising national debt. This is known as the balanced-budget multiplier.
The public improvements suggested in the president’s proposal would have been fully paid for by the bill’s tax surcharge. And any new legislation we now consider could also pay for such improvements with tax increases, so as not to raise the national debt even temporarily. This idea should still have common-sense appeal to Americans in this time of high unemployment, just as the idea of winter work does on the farm.
via A Proven Principle Behind Obama’s Jobs Plan – NYTimes.com.
American economists, central bankers and fiscal policy makers have reinterpreted British economist John Maynard Keynes’s clever idea that government spending is the best way to counteract a serious economic downturn — and have turned it into a permanent prescription. In their version of the Keynesian theory, declining growth or tumbling stock prices should prompt central banks to lower interest rates and governments to come to the rescue with economic stimulus programs. US economists call this “kick-starting” the economy.
….The only problem is that this method of encouraging growth has not stimulated the US economy in recent years, but in fact has put it on a crash course. From the Asian economic crisis to the Internet and subprime mortgage bubbles, economic stimulus programs by monetary and fiscal policy makers have regularly laid the groundwork for the next crash instead of encouraging sustainable growth. In the last decade, the volume of lending in the United States grew five times as fast as the real economy.
With thanks to Barry Ritholz