Too-big-to-fail is here to stay

Lehman Brothers’ collapse in 2008 was intended to intended to teach financial markets that they could not rely on an implicit government guarantee for too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks. What bondholders learned was the opposite: never again would an institution of that size be allowed to collapse because of the de-stabilizing effect on the entire financial system.

Rescue of Dexia by French, Belgium and Luxembourg governments is the latest example. Bond-holders received 100 cents in the dollar/euro. Markets are just too fragile to consider giving bondholders a haircut. Denmark earlier had to back down from forcing haircuts on bondholders when Danish banks found themselves shut out of funding markets. [WSJ]

Frequent calls for TBTF institutions to be broken up have proved ineffective. Instead the problem has grown even larger with post 2008 rescue/take-overs of Countrywide and Merrill Lynch (BofA), Bear Stearns and WaMu (JPM), Lehman (Barclays), and Wachovia (Wells Fargo) reinforcing Willem Buiters’ survival of the fattest observation.

Proposals to reduce systemic risk through adoption of the Volcker Rule, which would prevent banks form trading for their own account, are proving difficult to implement. The 298-page first draft offers few clear definitions of restricted activities, instead calling for suggestions or feedback.[Bloomberg] Drafters should consider turning the rule around, offering a list of approved activities that banks can pursue, rather than attempting to define what they cannot. I have great respect for banks’ ability to find loopholes in any restrictive list.

The Rule on its own, however, cannot protect taxpayers from future bailouts. It does not prevent banks from over-lending if there is another bubble. There is only one solution: increase capital ratios — and apply similar ratios to securitized assets. Increases would have to be gradual, as some banks could respond by shrinking assets rather than raising capital — which would have a deflationary effect on the economy. Changes would also have to be sensitive to the economic cycle. The easiest way may be to set a long-term target (e.g. 20% Tier 1 + 2 capital by 2030) and leave implementation to the central bank as part of its monetary policy.

Together with the Volcker Rule, increased capital ratios are our best defense against a recurrence of the GFC.

How did Europe’s bank stress tests give Dexia a clean bill of health? | Business | guardian.co.uk

It may seem like a lifetime away, but it is only in July that the European Banking Authority published the result of “stress tests” on 90 banks across 21 countries in the EU, covering around 65% of the banking industry.

Eight failed. Sixteen were border line with core tier one capital ratios – a key measure of financial strength – of between 5% and 6%.

So presumably, Dexia, the Franco-Belgian bank on which markets are currently fixated, was in one of the danger-zone categories?

Well no. Its statement issued on the day proclaimed “no need for Dexia to raise additional capital”.

…….The tests have proved to be meaningless even quicker than they were in 2010 when Ireland’s banks were given a clean bill of health, only to be bailed out four months later. In July, 2011 the EBA had been reckoning that the capital shortfall of the banks that failed was just €2.5bn. Now the markets reckon that the hole is more like €300bn.

via How did Europe’s bank stress tests give Dexia a clean bill of health? | Business | guardian.co.uk.

Europe Races to Stem Debt Crisis Amid Rescue Plan for Dexia – WSJ.com

Euro-zone governments suffered a blow Tuesday in their efforts to contain a deepening sovereign debt crisis as one of the Continent’s biggest banks, dogged by fears about its exposure to Greek and Italian debt, was on the verge of a government-backed breakup. Bank executives and government officials zeroed in on a drastic plan to break up Dexia SA, a Belgian-French bank that is one of Europe’s 20 largest in assets.

via Europe Races to Stem Debt Crisis Amid Rescue Plan for Dexia – WSJ.com.