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July 23, 2013

EconoMonitor » Beijing’s New Leaders Are Right to Hold Back

Michael Pettis argues that China cannot stimulate its economy out of trouble:

There are still bulls out there who insist that China is out of the woods and making a strong recovery, for example former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Stephen Grenville, who argues in his article strangely titled China doomsayers run out of arguments:

“The missing element from the low growth narrative is that unemployment would rise, provoking a stimulatory policy response. China would extend the transition and put up with low-return investment recall that when unemployment was the issue, Keynes was prepared to put people to work digging holes and filling them in rather than have unemployment rise sharply. To be convincing, the low-growth scenario needs to explain why this policy response will not be effective.”

It seems to me that the reason why simply “provoking a stimulatory policy response” won’t help China has been explained many times, even recently by former China bulls. Of course more stimulus will indeed cause GDP growth to pick up, as Grenville notes, but it will do so by exacerbating the gap between the growth in debt and the growth in debt-servicing capacity. Because too much debt and a huge amount of overvalued assets is precisely the problem facing China, it is hard to believe that spending more borrowed money on increasing already excessive capacity can possibly be a useful resolution of slower Chinese growth.

May 6, 2013

Beware China’s civilian-military relationship | The Japan Times

Masahiro Matsumura, professor of international politics at St. Andrew’s University (Momoyama Gakuin Daigaku) in Osaka, writes

…….the Chinese state apparatus is largely detached from the military, while the party’s top civilian leaders have only a loose grip on the generals.

Worse still, the current fifth generation of civilian leaders is made up of veritable dwarfs in military affairs. By contrast, the PLA’s leaders have become increasingly professionalized, but without the tempering influence of effective civilian control, which might well collapse entirely if China’s leaders continue to accept unauthorized military actions, particularly in the East or South China Sea, as faits accomplis. Line commanders could take advantage of the equivocality of civilian policy, particularly given the military’s growing political clout and the CCP’s dependence on popular nationalist sentiment.

May 4, 2013

China: A Billion Strong but Short on Workers | WSJ.com

KATHY CHU at WSJ reports:

This year, service-related positions — such as those in retail, travel and leisure — for the first time will account for more of the country’s gross domestic product than industrial-sector jobs, J.P. Morgan Chase predicts.

Government figures show the service sector created 37 million new jobs in the past five years, compared with 29 million in the industrial sector, which includes manufacturing, construction and mining.

April 16, 2013

Dramatic fall on S&P 500 – April 16th

Apologies. I deleted this April 16th post by accident.

The S&P 500 fell 220 basis points (2.2%) on Monday, blamed variously on disappointing growth figures from China, the fall in gold, and the Boston Marathon tragedy. I still suspect that the primary cause is the tectonic shift last week by the Bank of Japan.

“Where is the fall?” you may ask, when viewing the chart below. That is what I enjoy about monthly charts: they place daily moves in perspective. Breach of support at 1540 would indicate a small secondary correction, while breakout below 1490 would signal a correction back to the primary trendline. But the primary trend remains up. Only a fall through 1350 would suggest a reversal.

S&P 500 Index

April 4, 2013

One Soviet Leader China Could Emulate…and it’s not Gorbachev | The Diplomat

Professor Minxin Pei analyzes the options facing the Chinese Communist Party:

…it appears that what informs the political thinking of China’s new leadership is the experience of the late-Soviet regime. In particular, three different leaders and their policies apparently weigh heavily on the minds of the new occupants of Zhongnanhai. Having endured a decade of political stagnation amid rapid economic growth, China’s new leaders are obviously not in a mood to try another version of the Brezhnev model, the essence of which is pretending to govern while doing nothing in reality. Yet, aware of the enormous risks of introducing democratic reforms into a sclerotic political system, they abhor the radical Gorbachev model even more.

Their problem is that the other roads lead to nowhere and eventually they will be forced to embrace democratic reform. Rather than rejecting the Gorbachev option, the CCP should analyze the process and look for ways to minimize the disruption. Gradual transition to a central governing council of 7 to 9 elected officials representing all major political parties, with the CCP initially holding the majority of seats, seems the lowest risk alternative.

March 28, 2013

Will the Chinese Be Supreme? | Ian Johnson | The New York Review of Books

Ian Johnson highlights how China’s strategic blunders have painted it into a corner:

Just as [Pre WW I] Wilhelminian Germany should surely have seen that building a blue-water navy would cause Britain to form alliances against it, so too should China understand that demanding control over islands far from its shores but close to its neighbors’ would cause a backlash. (Here one thinks not so much of the Senkaku/Diaoyus but of the shoals, reefs, and islets in the South China Sea.) Even the battle for the Senkaku/Diaoyus seems to have no satisfactory endgame for China except a permanent state of tension with its most important neighbor.

……..today the country’s tactics have left it surrounded by suspicious and increasingly hostile countries; indeed, it’s probably no exaggeration to say that China has no real allies.

March 28, 2013

China’s Glass Ceiling | Geoff Dyer | Foreign Policy

Geoff Dyer points out why China’s Remnibi cannot compete on the international stage with the dollar, even if China’s economy grows larger than the US:

For the renminbi to assume a central role, China would also have to make massive reforms to its own economy. The key to Chinese state capitalism is control over a relatively closed financial system, which allows the Communist Party to funnel huge volumes of cheap credit to select projects, industries, and companies. But to have a truly international currency, one that the world’s central banks want to hold, China would have to let investors from around the world buy and sell large volumes of Chinese financial assets. As a result, Beijing would have to dismantle that system of controls. It would need to permit capital to flow freely in and out of the country, let the market set interest rates and allow the currency to float. An independent legal system and transparent economic policy-making would also be useful. China has a choice. It can have an international currency that might challenge the U.S. dollar or it can keep its brand of state capitalism that has driven the economy and kept the Communist Party in power. But it cannot have both.

March 1, 2013

US & Asia: Contrasting economic activity

While Fedex broke through long-term resistance at $100, signaling rising activity in North America….
Fedex
The Harpex index of container shipping (charter) rates, primarily for movement of finished goods, is close to its 2009 low. There is no indication of a resurgence in exports between Asia and the West.
Harpex Container Index

February 13, 2013

Time for U.S. to Disengage from North Korea Crisis | Cato Institute

Doug Bandow suggests:

Washington should begin contemplating, within earshot of Beijing, getting out of the way of its allies if the North continues to develop nuclear weapons. The message to China should be: if your client state continues its present course, you may face a nuclear-armed Japan. If that happens, blame your buddies in Pyongyang.

February 5, 2013

Chinese Firms Shrug at Rising Debt | WSJ.com

DINNY MCMAHON And COLUM MURPHY at WSJ write:

Analysts at Standard Chartered PLC estimate that Chinese corporate debt was equivalent to 128% of gross domestic product by the end of 2012, up from 101% at the end of 2009. In a 2011 research paper, economists at the Bank for International Settlements found that when a country’s corporate debt exceeds 90%, it becomes a drag on growth.