Retail sales (excluding motor vehicles and fuel) jumped to a 2.96% year-on-year increase for April 2016, climbing back above Core CPI to reflect a real increase.
We are still waiting on light vehicle sales for April. An upturn would indicate reviving consumer confidence in the economy.
An upturn in business sales is also needed, to spur new investment.
Let us start with Warren Buffet’s favorite market valuation ratio: stock market capitalization to GDP. I have modified this slightly, replacing GDP with GNP, because the former excludes offshore earnings — a significant factor for multinationals.
The ratio of stock market capitalization to GNP now exceeds the highs of 2005/2006, suggesting that stocks are over-valued — approaching the heady days of the Dotcom era.
If we dig a bit deeper, however, while the ratio of market cap to sales is also high, market cap to corporate profits remains low.
Clearly profit margins have widened, with corporate profits increasing at a faster rate than sales. The critical question: is this sustainable?
At some point profit margins must narrow in response to rising costs. Increases in aggregate demand may lift employment and sales, but also drive up labor costs.
The brown line above depicts labor costs as a percentage of net value added, compared to corporate profits (blue) as a percentage of net value added. There is a clear inverse relationship: when labor costs rise, profit margins fall (and vice versa). At first the effect of narrower margins is masked by rising sales, but eventually aggregate profits contract when sales growth slows (gray stripes indicate past recessions).
Other contributing factors to high corporate profits are interest rates and taxes. Corporate profits (% of GNP) have soared over the last 30 years as bond yields have fallen. The benefit is two-fold, with lower interest rates reducing the cost of corporate debt and lower finance costs boosting sales of consumer durables.
Lower effective corporate tax rates (gray) have also contributed to the surge in profits as a percentage of GNP.
The most enduring of these three factors (labor costs, interest rates, and tax rates) is likely to be taxes. Corporate tax rates have fallen in most jurisdictions and US rates are high by comparison. Even if a long-overdue overhaul of corporate taxation is achieved in the next decade (don’t hold your breath), the overall tax rate is likely to remain low.
The other two factors (labor costs and interest rates) may not be sustainable in the long-term but it will take time for them to normalize.
Treasury yields are rising, with the 10-year at 2.37 percent. Breakout above 3.0 percent still appears some way off, but would confirm the end of the 35-year secular down-trend.
Interest rates are likely to remain low until rising labor costs force the Fed to adopt a restrictive stance.
Labor markets have tightened to some extent, as indicated by the higher trough on the right of the above graph. But this is likely to be slowed by the low participation rate, with potential employees returning to the workforce, and a strong dollar enhancing the attraction of cheap labor in emerging markets.
Hourly earnings growth in the manufacturing sector remains comfortably below the Fed’s 2.0 percent inflation target. Any breakout above this level, however, would be cause for concern. Not only would the Fed be likely to raise interest rates, but profit margins are likely to shrink.
None of the macroeconomic and volatility filters that we monitor indicate elevated market risk. I expect them to rise over the next two to three years as the labor market tightens and interest rates increase, but for the present we maintain full exposure to equities.
Let us start with Warren Buffet’s favorite market valuation ratio: stock market capitalization to GDP. I have modified this slightly, replacing GDP with GNP, because the former excludes offshore earnings — a significant factor for multinationals.
The ratio of stock market capitalization to GNP now exceeds the highs of 2005/2006, suggesting that stocks are over-valued — approaching the heady days of the Dotcom era.
If we dig a bit deeper, however, while the ratio of market cap to sales is also high, market cap to corporate profits remains low.
Clearly profit margins have widened, with corporate profits increasing at a faster rate than sales. The critical question: is this sustainable?
At some point profit margins must narrow in response to rising costs. Increases in aggregate demand may lift employment and sales, but also drive up labor costs.
The brown line above depicts labor costs as a percentage of net value added, compared to corporate profits (blue) as a percentage of net value added. There is a clear inverse relationship: when labor costs rise, profit margins fall (and vice versa). At first the effect of narrower margins is masked by rising sales, but eventually aggregate profits contract when sales growth slows (gray stripes indicate past recessions).
Other contributing factors to high corporate profits are interest rates and taxes. Corporate profits (% of GNP) have soared over the last 30 years as bond yields have fallen. The benefit is two-fold, with lower interest rates reducing the cost of corporate debt and lower finance costs boosting sales of consumer durables.
Lower effective corporate tax rates (gray) have also contributed to the surge in profits as a percentage of GNP.
The most enduring of these three factors (labor costs, interest rates, and tax rates) is likely to be taxes. Corporate tax rates have fallen in most jurisdictions and US rates are high by comparison. Even if a long-overdue overhaul of corporate taxation is achieved in the next decade (don’t hold your breath), the overall tax rate is likely to remain low.
The other two factors (labor costs and interest rates) may not be sustainable in the long-term but it will take time for them to normalize.
Treasury yields are rising, with the 10-year at 2.37 percent. Breakout above 3.0 percent still appears some way off, but would confirm the end of the 35-year secular down-trend.
Interest rates are likely to remain low until rising labor costs force the Fed to adopt a restrictive stance.
Labor markets have tightened to some extent, as indicated by the higher trough on the right of the above graph. But this is likely to be slowed by the low participation rate, with potential employees returning to the workforce, and a strong dollar enhancing the attraction of cheap labor in emerging markets.
Hourly earnings growth in the manufacturing sector remains comfortably below the Fed’s 2.0 percent inflation target. Any breakout above this level, however, would be cause for concern. Not only would the Fed be likely to raise interest rates, but profit margins are likely to shrink.
None of the macroeconomic and volatility filters that we monitor indicate elevated market risk. I expect them to rise over the next two to three years as the labor market tightens and interest rates increase, but for the present we maintain full exposure to equities.
US employment is topical after two months of poor jobs figures. Employers added 113,000 new jobs, against an expected 185,000, last month and a low 75,000 in December. Rather than focus on monthly data, let’s take a long-term view.
The number of full-time employed as a percentage of total population [red line below] fell dramatically during the GFC, with about 1 in 10 employees losing their jobs. Since then, roughly 1 out of 4 full-time jobs lost has been restored, while the other 3 are still missing (population growth fell from 1.0% to around 0.7% post-GFC, limiting the distortion).
Comparing employment levels to the 1980s is little consolation because this is skewed by the rising participation rate of women in the work-force. The pink line below shows how the number of women employed grew from under 14% of total population in the late 1960s to more than 22% prior to the GFC. The effect on total employment [green line] was dramatic, while employment of men [blue line] oscillated between 24% and 26%.
Part-time employment — the difference between total employment [green] and full-time employed [red] below — has leveled off since 2000 at roughly 6% of the total population. So loss of full-time positions has not been compensated by a rise in casual work. Both have been affected.
The “good news” is that a soft labor market will lead to low wages growth for a considerable period, boosting corporate profits.
The bad news is that low employment levels will depress sales growth [green line]….
And discourage new investment…..
Which would harm future growth.
US employment is topical after two months of poor jobs figures. Employers added 113,000 new jobs, against an expected 185,000, last month and a low 75,000 in December. Rather than focus on monthly data, let’s take a long-term view.
The number of full-time employed as a percentage of total population [red line below] fell dramatically during the GFC, with about 1 in 10 employees losing their jobs. Since then, roughly 1 out of 4 full-time jobs lost has been restored, while the other 3 are still missing (population growth fell from 1.0% to around 0.7% post-GFC, limiting the distortion).
Comparing employment levels to the 1980s is little consolation because this is skewed by the rising participation rate of women in the work-force. The pink line below shows how the number of women employed grew from under 14% of total population in the late 1960s to more than 22% prior to the GFC. The effect on total employment [green line] was dramatic, while employment of men [blue line] oscillated between 24% and 26%.
Part-time employment — the difference between total employment [green] and full-time employed [red] below — has leveled off since 2000 at roughly 6% of the total population. So loss of full-time positions has not been compensated by a rise in casual work. Both have been affected.
The “good news” is that a soft labor market will lead to low wages growth for a considerable period, boosting corporate profits.
The bad news is that low employment levels will depress sales growth [green line]….
And discourage new investment…..
Which would harm future growth.
