Emperors of Banking Have No Clothes | Bloomberg

The too-big-to-fail problem for banks is greater today than it was in 2008. Since then, the largest U.S. banks have become much larger. On March 31, 2012, the debt of JPMorgan Chase was valued at $2.13 trillion and that of Bank of America Corp. at $1.95 trillion, more than three times the debt of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. The debt of the five largest U.S. banks totals about $8 trillion. These figures would be even larger under European accounting rules.

By Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig

Read more at Emperors of Banking Have No Clothes – Bloomberg.

Vickers calls for doubling of bank capital levels | FT.com

“It is not very sensible to run a market economy on the basis of a banking system that is 33 times leveraged, let alone 40 or 50 times leveraged,” Sir John [Sir John Vickers, Oxford academic who chaired the Independent Commission on Banking] told the Financial Times. He believes the right number is closer to 10 times, equivalent to a 10 per cent ratio.

That is a lot higher than the 3 per cent (33 times leverage) required by Basel III and the 4.1% (CBA) to 4.5% (WBC) of the big four Australian banks.

Read more at Vickers calls for doubling of bank capital levels – FT.com.

US banks face tougher capital requirements

Yalman Onaran and Jesse Hamilton at Bloomberg report on a new joint proposal by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Federal Reserve and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency:

The biggest U.S. banks, after years of building equity, may continue hoarding profits instead of boosting dividends as they face stricter capital rules than foreign competitors.

The eight largest firms, including JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) and Morgan Stanley (MS), would need to retain capital equal to at least 5 percent of assets, while their banking units would have to hold a minimum of 6 percent, U.S. regulators proposed yesterday. The international equivalent, ignoring the riskiness of assets, is 3 percent. The banks have until 2018 to fully comply.

The U.S. plan goes beyond rules approved by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to prevent a repeat of the 2008 crisis, which almost destroyed the financial system. The changes would make lenders fund more assets with capital that can absorb losses instead of using borrowed money. Bankers say this could trigger asset sales and hurt their ability to lend, hamstringing the nation’s economic recovery.

While the authors term the new regulations “harsh” on bankers and likely to freeze bank lending, existing lax capital requirements give bankers a free ride at the expense of the taxpayer. Their claims are baseless:

  • existing bank leverage is way too high for a stable financial system;
  • US banks are flush with funds, holding more than $1.8 trillion in excess reserves on deposit with the Fed and $2.6 trillion invested in Treasuries and quasi-government mortgage-backed securities, so talk of a lending freeze is farcical;
  • banks can function just as well with equity funding as with deposit funding;
  • higher capital ratios will make it cheaper for banks to raise additional capital as lower leverage will reduce the risk premium.

So why are bankers squealing so loudly? In a nutshell: bonuses. Higher capital requirements and no free ride at taxpayers’ expense would mean that shareholders claim a bigger slice of the pie, with less left over for management bonuses.

For a detailed rebuttal of bankers’ claims see Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig.

The big four Australian banks should take note. They currently maintain between 4.1% (CBA) and 4.5% (WBC) of capital against lending exposure. Raising the ratio to 6.0% would require 33% to 50% new capital.

Read more at U.S. Banks Seen Freezing Payouts Under Harsh Leverage Rule – Bloomberg.

Basel committee willing to rethink complex bank rules | FT.com

Brooke Masters reports:

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision said in a discussion paper released on Monday that it shares the concern of critics who believe the main measure of bank safety – the core tier one capital ratio – is too complicated and makes it difficult to compare banks.

Its own research shows banks are using wildly different models to calculate the risk-weighted assets that make up the denominator of the ratio, resulting in some institutions holding 40 per cent less capital against the same kinds of banking assets as their peers.

Read more at Basel committee willing to rethink complex bank rules – FT.com.

Australian banks: Who’s been swimming naked?

Margot Patrick at WSJ reports that the Bank of England is enforcing a new “leverage ratio” rule:

Top U.K. banks regulator Andrew Bailey told lawmakers that the requirement for banks to hold at least 3% equity against total assets “is a sensible minimum,” and that those who fall short must act quickly, but without cutting their lending to households and businesses.

The Bank of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority on June 20 said Barclays and mutual lender Nationwide Building Society don’t meet the standard and gave them 10 days to submit plans for achieving it.

I hope that their Australian counterpart APRA are following developments closely. Both UK and Australian banks are particularly vulnerable because of their over-priced housing markets. And while the big four Australian banks’ capital ratios appear comfortably above 10 percent, these rely on risk-weightings of 15% to 20% for residential mortgages.

Only when the tide goes out do you discover who’s been swimming naked. ~ Warren Buffett

Read more at BOE: Barclays, Nationwide Must Boost Capital – WSJ.com.

Barclays’ threat on lending under fire | FT.com

Anne-Sylvaine Chassany at FT writes of the UK’s Prudential Regulation Authority:

The PRA irked banks when it included a 3 per cent leverage ratio target in its assessment of UK lenders’ capital health. It identified shortfalls at Barclays and Nationwide, the UK’s largest building society, which have projected leverage ratios of 2.5 per cent and 2 per cent respectively under PRA tests.

Outrageous isn’t it? That banks should be asked to maintain a minimum share capital of three percent against their lending exposure — to protect the British taxpayer from future bailouts. My view is that the bar should be set at 5 percent, although this would have to be phased-in over an extended period to prevent disruption.

I hope that APRA is following developments closely. The big four Australian banks are also likely to be caught a little short.

Read more at Barclays’ threat on lending under fire – FT.com.

Lurking beneath Australia’s AAA economy… | On Line Opinion

Kellie Tranter highlights the unstable position of the big Australian banks:

Australia has had a current account deficit since the 1980s. That means we are spending more than we are earning. We’ve had to sell public assets to balance the current account deficit. Put simply, the surplus on the capital account is flogging off the sideboard to buy the fruit.

Our net international financial position is not strong and our gross foreign liabilities are alarming. Banks are the intermediaries between foreign lenders and Australia’s big spenders. The banks have mediated the private household debt and as a result if there is a worldwide recession, banks could be called to pay up.

Our banks have borrowed short (internationally) and lent long (domestically, for mortgages etc.)…….

I have been sounding off about the inadequate capital reserves of the big four banks — because of low risk-weightings attached to residential mortgages — but Kellie also raises the question of their $13.8 trillion derivatives exposure. She concludes:

If the banks are hunky dory why is it necessary [for the RBA] to set up a $380 billion emergency fund and, more importantly, is it enough in light of possible derivatives exposure?

Read more at Lurking beneath Australia's AAA economy… – On Line Opinion – 25/6/2013.

Regulatory blight — or finally seeing the light?

This comment by Tim Congdon (International Monetary Research Ltd) on the UK shadow Monetary Policy Committee refers to the “regulatory blight” on banking systems as regulators switch from risk-weighted capital ratio requirements to a straight-forward, unweighted leverage ratio which requires some banks to raise more capital. What he fails to consider is that risk-weighting has contributed to the current parlous state of our banking system. Under risk-weighting, banks concentrated their assets in classes with low risk-weighting, such as residential mortgages and sovereign government bonds, where they were required to hold less capital and could achieve higher leveraged returns. The combined effect of all banks acting in a similar manner achieved a vast concentration of investment exposure in these asset classes, with the undesirable consequence that the underlying risk associated with these asset classes soared, leading to widespread instability across the banking system and fueling both the sub-prime and Euro zone sovereign debt crisis.

My last note for the SMPC opened with the sentence, ‘The regulatory blight on banking systems continues in all the world’s so-called “advanced” economies, which means for these purposes all nations that belong to the Bank for International Settlements.’ As I explained in the next sentence, the growth of banks’ risk assets is constrained by official demands for more capital relative to assets, for more liquid and low-risk assets in asset totals, and for less reliance on supposedly unstable funding (i.e., wholesale/inter-bank funding). The slow growth of bank assets has inevitably meant, on the other side of the balance sheet, slow growth of the bank deposits that constitute most of the quantity of money, broadly-defined. Indeed, there have even been periods of a few quarters in more than one country since 2007 in which the assets of banks, and hence the quantity of money, have contracted.

The equilibrium levels of national income and wealth are functions of the quantity of money. The regulatory blight in banking systems has therefore been the dominant cause of the sluggish growth rates of nominal gross domestic products, across the advanced-country world, that have characterised the Great Recession and the immediately subsequent years. Indeed, the five years to the end of 2012 saw the lowest increases – and in the Japanese and Italian cases actual decreases – in nominal GDP in the G-7 leading industrialised countries for any half-decade since the 1930s.

It is almost beyond imagination that – after the experience of recent years – officialdom should still be experimenting with different approaches to bank regulation and indeed contemplating an intensification of such regulation. Nevertheless, that is what is happening. The source of the trouble seems to be a paper given at the Jackson Hole conference of central bankers, in August 2012, by Andy Haldane, executive director for financial stability at the Bank of England. The paper, called The Dog and the Frisbee, argued that a simple leverage ratio (i.e., the ratio of banks’ assets to capital, without any adjustment for the different risks of different assets) had been a better pointer to bank failure than risk-weighted capital calculations of the kind blessed by the Basle rules. The suggestion is therefore that the Basle methods of calculating capital adequacy should be replaced by, or complemented by, a simple leverage ratio.

For banks that have spent the last five years increasing the ratio of safe assets to total assets, or that have always had a high proportion of safe assets to total assets, the potential introduction of a leverage ratio is infuriating. A number of banks have been told in recent weeks that they must raise yet more capital. Because it is subject to the new leverage ratio, Nationwide Building Society has been deemed to be £2 billion short of capital. That has upset its corporate plans, to say the least of the matter, and put the kibosh on significant expansion of its mortgage assets. And what does one say about George Osborne’s ‘Help to Buy’ scheme, announced with such fanfare in the last Budget and supposed to turbocharge the UK housing finance market?

The leverage ratio has been called Mervyn King’s ‘last hurrah’, since there can be little doubt that King has been the prime mover in the regulatory tightening that has hit British banking since mid-2007. He is soon to be replaced by Mark Carney, who may or may not have a different attitude. Carney has been publicly critical of Haldane and his ‘Dog and Frisbee’ paper, but that does not guarantee an early shift in the official stance. Indeed, it is striking that – of the bank’s top team under King – only Paul Tucker, generally (and correctly) regarded as more bank-friendly than King or Haldane, has announced that he is leaving the Bank once Carney has taken over.

My verdict is that the regulatory blight on UK banking is very much still at work. Further, without QE, the quantity of money would be more or less static. As before, I am in favour of no change in sterling interest rates and the continuation of QE at a sufficiently high level to ensure that broad money growth (on the M4ex measures) runs at an annual rate of between 3% and 5%. My bias – at least for the next three months – is for ‘no change’. It is plausible that I will be advocating higher interest rates in 2014. However, much depends on a realisation in official quarters that overregulation of the banks is, almost everywhere in the advanced world, the dominant explanation for the sluggishness of money supply growth and, hence, the key factor holding back a stronger recovery. Major changes in personnel may be in prospect at the Bank of England now that Mervyn King is leaving, but the Treasury – which I understand from private information will be glad to see the back of him – has failed to prevent the growth of a regulatory bureaucracy led by King appointees.

If having a well-capitalized banking system requires some “regulatory blight” then lets have more of it. Three cheers for Mervyn King and the (un-weighted) leverage ratio. Let’s hope that Mark Carney follows a similar path.
via David Smith’s EconomicsUK.com: IEA’s shadow MPC votes 5-4 for quarter-point rate hike.

Are Australian banks really sound?

Business Spectator reports:

In a statement APRA chairman John Laker said that, in implementing the Basel III liquidity reforms, the authority’s objectives were to improve its ability to assess and monitor ADIs’ liquidity risk and strengthen the resilience of the Australian banking system.

“APRA believes ADIs are well-placed to meet the new liquidity requirements on the original timetable and doing so will send a strong message about the soundness of the Australian banking system,” he said.

If you repeat misinformation often enough, people will believe it is true. Australian banks face two risks: liquidity risk and solvency risk. Addressing liquidity risk does not address solvency risk. Australian banks report risk-weighted capital ratios which are misleading if not downright dangerous. Risk-weighting encourages banks to concentrate exposure in areas historically perceived as low risk, such as residential mortgages. When all banks are over-weight the same asset, the risk profile changes — as Eurozone banks discovered with government bonds.

If we remove risk-weighting, as proposed in the US Brown-Vitter bill, the four majors in Australia would have capital ratios of 3 to 4 percent. Not much of a capital buffer in these uncertain times.

Deutsche Bank Plans Capital Boost | WSJ.com

A welcome development reported by LAURA STEVENS , DAVID ENRICH and ULRIKE DAUER at the Wall Street Journal:

FRANKFURT–Deutsche Bank AG [DBK.XE] said Monday it will raise €2.8 billion ($3.65 billion) in fresh capital in a dramatic about-face for the bank, which has repeatedly said it won’t turn to shareholders for help boosting its capital cushion.

The bank, Europe’s second-largest by assets, has long faced doubts from investors and analysts about whether it has enough capital to absorb potential future losses and to meet increasingly stringent regulatory requirements……

Deutsche Bank has long been considered thinly capitalized but have always countered with the argument that the leverage is justified by the quality of the assets on their balance sheet. Low risk-weightings provided a false sense of security, with Greek and other PIIGS government bonds rated as zero-risk in the past, encouraging banks to leverage up on precisely the wrong kind of assets. It is time for risk weightings to be removed from bank capital ratios. The bipartisan bill sponsored by US senators Sherrod Brown and David Vitter is a step in the right direction.

Read more at Deutsche Bank Plans Capital Boost – WSJ.com.