Impact of QE (or lack thereof) is reflected by excess reserves

JKH at Monetary Realism writes:

….there is a systematic tendency in the blogosphere and elsewhere to misrepresent the impact of QE in a particular way in terms of the related macroeconomic flow of funds…… Most descriptions will erroneously treat the macro flow as if banks were the original portfolio source of the bonds that are being sold to the Fed, obtaining reserves in exchange. This is not the case. A cursory scan of Fed flow of funds statistics will confirm that commercial banks are relatively small holders of bonds in their portfolios, especially Treasury bonds. The vast proportion of bonds that are sold to the Fed in QE originate from non-bank portfolios……. Many descriptions of QE instead erroneously suggest the strong presence of a bank principal function in which bonds from bank portfolios are simply exchanged for reserves. In fact, for the most part, while the banking system has received reserve credit for bonds sold to the Fed, it has also passed on credits to the accounts of non-bank customers who have sold their bonds to the banks. This is integral to the overall QE flow of bonds.

There is a simpler explanation of what happens when the Fed purchases bonds under QE. Bank balance sheets expand as sellers deposit the sale proceeds with their bank. In addition to the deposit liability the bank also receives an asset, being a credit to its account with the Fed. Unless the bank is able to make better use of its asset by making loans to credit-worthy borrowers, the funds are likely to remain on deposit at the Fed as excess reserves — earning interest at 0.25% per year. Excess reserves on deposit at the Fed currently stand at close to $1.8 trillion, reflecting the dearth of (reasonably secure) lending/investment opportunities in the broader economy.

Read more at The Accounting Quest of Steve Keen | Monetary Realism.

Sir Mervyn King: Public are right to be angry at banks | BBC News

From BBC News:

People have “every right to be angry” with banks for the UK’s financial crisis, the outgoing Bank of England (BoE) governor Sir Mervyn King says…..”But this crisis wasn’t caused by a few individuals, it was a crisis of the system of banking we had allowed to grow up. “It’s very important we don’t demonise the individuals but we do keep cracking on with changing the system.”

Read more at BBC News – Sir Mervyn King: Public are right to be angry at banks.

Too-big-to-fail Q&A. Get the facts | Sober Look

Interesting pro-bank piece by Sober Look. I have added my comments in italics.

The debate around “too big to fail” of the US banking system is often infused with political rhetoric and media hype. Let’s go through some Q&A on the subject and discuss the facts.

Q: Did large banks take disproportionate amounts of real-estate related risk vs. smaller banks prior to the crisis?

A: No. That’s a myth. Smaller banks were much more exposed to real estate (see discussion).

The issue is not real estate lending, but risky lending.

Q: Who had their snouts in the sub-prime trough, big banks or small banks?

A: Big banks.

Q: Which “too big to fail” banks were directly bailed out by the US federal authorities during the 2008 crisis?

A: While hundreds of banks were forced to take TARP funds, only Citigroup (among US banks) received an explicit bailout to keep it afloat. Note that Bear Stearns (and Lehman), AIG, GM/GMAC, Chrysler, Fannie and Freddie were not banks. Neither was GE Capital and other corporations who relied on commercial paper funding and needed the Fed’s help to keep them afloat. Wachovia may have become the second such large bank if it wasn’t purchased by Wells.

Q: Which “too big to fail” banks were indirectly bailed out by the US federal authorities during the 2008 crisis?

A: All of them

Q: Why did Citi fail in 2008?

A: Citi ran into trouble because of a massive off-balance-sheet portfolio the firm funded with commercial paper. In late 2007, when the commercial paper market dried up, Citi was forced to take these assets onto its balance sheet. The bank was not sufficiently capitalized to absorb the losses resulting from these assets being written down.

Citi was not the only TBTF bank that was inadequately capitalized to deal with losses.

Q: What were the assets Citi was “warehousing” off-balance-sheet?

A: A great deal of that portfolio was the “AAA” and other senior tranches of CDOs that Citi often helped originate (including mortgage related assets). Rating agencies were instrumental in helping banks like Citi structure these assets and keep them off balance sheet in CP conduits.

Q: Who paid the rating agencies?

A: The TBTF banks.

Q: Why did Citi (as well as many other banks) hold so much off-balance sheet?

A: Because they received a significantly more favorable capital treatment by doing so (the so-called “regulatory capital arbitrage” – see discussion from 2009).

Q: Did Citi break any state or federal laws by doing what it did?

A: No. All of this was perfectly legal and federal authorities were aware of these structures.

We need to fix the law so this cannot happen again.

Q: Did derivatives positions play a major role in Citi’s failure? Were other large US banks at risk of failure due to derivatives positions?

A: No. That’s a myth. The bulk of structured credit positions (tranches) that brought down Citi were not derivatives (just to be clear, CDOs are not derivatives).

Q: What has been done since 2008 to make sure the Citi situation doesn’t happen again?

A: The US regulators now have the ability to take over and manage an orderly unwind of any large US chartered bank. Banks are required to create a “living will” to guide the regulators in the unwind process. The goal is to force losses on creditors in an orderly fashion without significant disruptions to the financial system and without utilizing taxpayer money.

Large banking institutions are now required to have more punitive capital ratios than smaller banks.

Capital loopholes related to off-balance-sheet positions have been closed.

Stress testing conducted by the Fed takes into account on- and off-balance sheet assets, forcing banks to maintain sufficient capital to be able to take a hit. US banks more than doubled the weighted average tier one common equity ratio since the crisis (see attached).

Dodd-Frank has been “nobbled” by Wall Street lobbyists. Stress tests by captive regulators are not to be trusted. Increase transparency by supporting the Brown-Vitter bill.

Q: Do large US banks have a funding advantage relative to small banks?

A: Not any longer. According to notes from the meeting of the Federal Advisory Council

and the Board of Governors (attached – h/t Colin Wiles ‏@forteology), “Studies point to a significant decrease in any funding advantage that large U.S. financial institutions may have had in the past relative to smaller financial institutions and also relative to nonfinancial institutions at comparable ratings levels. Increased capital and liquidity, in addition to meeting the demands of many regulatory bodies, has largely, if not entirely, eroded any cost-of-funding advantage that large banks may have had.”

And we should believe them?

Q: Why do TBTF banks dominate the financial landscape?

A: Because of their taxpayer-subsidised funding advantage.

Q: What is the downside of breaking up banks like JPMorgan?

A: Large US corporations need large banks to provide credit and capital markets access/services (Boeing is not going to use Queens County Savings Bank). Without large US banks, US companies will turn to foreign banks and will be at the mercy of those institutions’ capital availability and regulatory frameworks. Foreign banks will also begin dominating US capital markets primary activities (bond issuance, IPOs, debt syndications, etc.) And in an event of a credit crisis foreign banks (who are to some extent controlled by foreign governments) will give priority to their domestic corporations, putting US firms at risk.

Agreed. Large corporations need large banks — or at least syndicates of mid-sized banks. Brown-Vitter does not propose breaking up any TBTF banks, merely requires them to clean up their balance sheets and carry adequate capital against risk exposure.

Q: How large are US largest banks relative to the US total economic output? How does it compare to other countries?

A: See chart below (the chart contrasts bank size as percentage of GDP of Swiss and UK banks to US banks)

Swiss and UK banks have global reach so rather compare absolute size rather than relative to GDP where the bank is headquartered.

So before jumping on the “too big to fail” bandwagon, get the facts.

via Sober Look: Too-big-to-fail Q&A. Get the facts.

I had to smile at the From our Sponsors Google ad at the end of the article, suggesting I open a business account with one of the major banks.

Trust: Easy to Break, Hard to Repair | WSJ

Excellent interview of renowned short-seller Jim Chanos by Jason Zweig. Chanos list three reasons why the average investor is right not to trust the integrity of the financial markets…

First, in recent years financial fraud has rarely been detected and exposed by the people the public might reasonably expect to do so: accountants, regulators and law-enforcement authorities, whom Chanos calls “the normal guardians of the marketplace.” Instead, frauds more often have been rooted out by whistleblowers, short-sellers and journalists.

Second, prosecutions of financial crimes are essential in the minds of investors, but are discretionary in the eyes of government officials….. the so-called too big to jail rationale.

Third, individual investors will never trust the market until these issues are addressed.

To me the list is too short.

Chanos fails to mention the revolving door between Washington and Wall Street where regulators frequently swap sides — working for government the one day and in high-paying jobs on Wall Street the next — and have one eye on their career path rather than focusing on their current job.

Fifth, the massive financial leverage that Wall Street has on Capitol Hill where Congressmen, dependent on fundraisers sponsored by Wall Street lobbyists, allow same lobbyists to write some of the legislation that passes through the house.

Read more at Trust: Easy to Break, Hard to Repair – Total Return – WSJ.

The 7 Reasons Why People Hate QE | Eric Parnell

Excellent article by Eric Parnell sets out the negative impacts of quantitative easing (QE):

  1. …the Fed has dramatically expanded its policy scope into areas that are normally the territory of fiscal policy. This has included specifically targeting selected areas of the economy such as the U.S. housing market including the aggressive purchase of mortgage backed securities (MBS)…
  2. ….the Federal Reserve has elected to provide direct and generous support to financial institutions and risk takers, some of which directly contributed to the cause of the crisis. Unfortunately, this subsidy is being funded by effectively taxing the income generating capability of the millions of Americans who are either retired or living on a fixed income…
  3. [QE] has forced Americans who had planned their lives and retirements around the ability to generate high quality and safe rates of return to now take on extraordinary risks to achieve these same goals.
  4. By flooding financial markets with liquidity, it has completely distorted the true price setting mechanism across all asset classes.
  5. It has forced many investors across all different philosophies and disciplines to significantly shorten their time horizons and holding periods associated with their investments.
  6. The daily direction of financial markets is no longer driven by economic or market fundamentals…..Instead, investment markets are now almost entirely at the mercy of what Chairman Bernanke or his associates on the Federal Reserve might say or not say on any given trading day.
  7. Lastly and even more broadly than investment market forces, QE has the detrimental effect of not allowing the economy to cleanse itself…… misses the very important point that recessions are actually good for an economy. This is due to the fact that it forces an economy that has become sloppy with the excesses from the previous expansion to work these excesses off and reallocate capital more efficiently.
  8. But writing an article such as this is the same as writing 7 Good Reasons Why People Hate Chemotherapy. We all dislike QE. QE is not something that central banks apply through choice. QE is something — like chemotherapy — they apply when they have no choice. QE is the lesser of two evils — the greater evil being a deflationary spiral like the Great Depression of the 1930s.

    The important lesson to take from this is: How to Avoid QE. Manage credit growth and the monetary base more conservatively during the good times. Remove the punch bowl just as the party gets going — so we don’t end up with a massive hangover when it’s over.

    Read more at The 7 Reasons Why People Hate QE – Seeking Alpha.

Central Banks’ Central Bank Warns About Rehypothecation Threats | Zero Hedge

Tyler Durden writes:

…….none other than the TBAC warned that the US is suddenly facing a $10+ trillion high quality collateral shortage in the next decade. As we have also explained, this is a major problem for the Fed which at current rates of QEeing, will monetize all Treasury duration exposure in roughly 5 years – at that point there will be virtually no collateral left and the Fed will be finally out of both tools and ammo.

I suspect that fiscal deficits will add sufficient new Treasury bonds to the pile, so that the Fed never has to run out of decent collateral.

Read more at Central Banks’ Central Bank Warns About Rehypothecation Threats | Zero Hedge.

Two cheers for higher Japanese bond yields in the spirit of Milton Friedman | The Market Monetarist

Market monetarist Lars Christensen gives an insight into rising Japanese (JGB) bond yields:

…..the markets do not think that the Japanese government is about to go bankrupt. In fact completely in parallel with the increase in inflation expectations the markets’ perception of the Japanese government’s default risk have decreased significantly. Hence, the 5-year Credit Default Swap on Japan has dropped from around 225bp in October last year just after Mr. Abe was elected Prime Minister to around 70bp today!

Read more at Two cheers for higher Japanese bond yields in the spirit of Milton Friedman | The Market Monetarist.

Market Insight: Central bankers turn deaf ear on balance sheets – FT.com

John Plender at FT observes:

The sheer size of the move in US Treasuries is striking. From the beginning of May to the end of last week, yields on the 30-year Treasury bond rose by nearly 40 basis points while the 10-year yield rose around 30bp. That is a measure of the market’s sensitivity to assumptions about an exit from the era of central bank balance sheet expansion. It is also an indication of how far we are from a return to normality.

Read more at Market Insight: Central bankers turn deaf ear on balance sheets – FT.com.

Carney Warns Europe Faces Decade of Stagnation Without Key Reforms | WSJ

Nirmala Menon at WSJ quotes Mark Carney, incoming governor of the Bank of England:

Mr. Carney, currently Canada’s top central banker, said Europe can draw lessons from Japan on the dangers of taking half measures……..“Deep challenges persist in its financial system. Without sustained and significant reforms, a decade of stagnation threatens,” Mr. Carney said in his final public address as governor of the Bank of Canada.

Read more at Carney Warns Europe Faces Decade of Stagnation Without Key Reforms – Real Time Economics – WSJ.

Can two senators end ‘too big to fail’? | The Big Picture

Barry Ritholz writes:

The idea that two senators from opposite sides of the ideological spectrum can find common ground to attack a problem with a simple solution is novel in the Senate these days. If Brown and Vitter manage to end the subsidies to banks deemed “too big to fail,” they will have accomplished more than “merely” preventing the next financial crisis. They will have helped to create a blueprint for how to get things done in an era of partisan strife.

Read more about the progress of the Brown-Vitter (TBTF) bill at Can two senators end ‘too big to fail’? | The Big Picture.