Two Senators Try to Slam the Door on Bank Bailouts – NYTimes.com

This is a show-down between Wall Street and the voting public. Gretchen Morgenson at NY Times writes:

THERE’S a lot to like, if you’re a taxpayer, in the new bipartisan bill from two concerned senators hoping to end the peril of big bank bailouts. But if you’re a large and powerful financial institution that’s too big to fail, you won’t like this bill one bit.

The legislation, called the Terminating Bailouts for Taxpayer Fairness Act, emerged last Wednesday; its co-sponsors are Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democrat, and David Vitter, a Louisiana Republican. It is a smart, simple and tough piece of work that would protect taxpayers from costly rescues in the future.

This means that the bill will come under fierce attack from the big banks that almost wrecked our economy and stand to lose the most if it becomes law.

For starters, the bill would create an entirely new, transparent and ungameable set of capital rules for the nation’s banks — in other words, a meaningful rainy-day fund. Enormous institutions, like JPMorgan Chase and Citibank, would have to hold common stockholder equity of at least 15 percent of their consolidated assets to protect against large losses. That’s almost double the 8 percent of risk-weighted assets required under the capital rules established by Basel III, the latest version of the byzantine international system created by regulators and central bankers.

This change, by itself, would eliminate a raft of problems posed by the risk-weighted Basel approach……

The outcome is far from clear. The financial muscle of Wall Street can buy a lot of influence on the Hill. But my guess is that they are too smart to incense voters by meeting the bill head-on. Instead they will attempt to delay with amendments and eventually turn it into an unwieldy 1000-page unenforcable monstrosity that no one understands. Much as they did with Dodd-Frank.

If they win, the country as a whole will suffer. Maybe not today, but in the inevitable next financial crisis if this bill does not pass.

April 26, 2013

What Europe could learn from Scandinavia in the 1920s | Lars Christensen

Danish and Norwegian monetary policy failure in 1920s – lessons for today

Reproduced with kind permission from Lars Christensen at The Market Monetarist:

History is fully of examples of massive monetary policy failure and today’s policy makers can learn a lot from studying these events and no one is better to learn from than Swedish monetary guru Gustav Cassel. In the 1920s Cassel tried – unfortunately without luck – to advise Danish and Norwegian policy makers from making a massive monetary policy mistake.

After the First World War policy makers across Europe wanted to return to the gold standard and in many countries it became official policy to return to the pre-war gold parity despite massive inflation during the war. This was also the case in Denmark and Norway where policy makers decided to return the Norwegian and the Danish krone to the pre-war parity.

The decision to bring back the currencies to the pre-war gold-parity brought massive economic and social hardship to Denmark and Norway in the 1920s and probably also killed of the traditionally strong support for laissez faire capitalism in the two countries. Paradoxically one can say that government failure opened the door for a massive expansion of the role of government in both countries’ economies. No one understood the political dangers of monetary policy failure better than Gustav Cassel.

Here you see the impact of the Price Level (Index 1924=100) of the deflation policies in Denmark and Norway. Sweden did not go back to pre-war gold-parity.

While most of the world was enjoying relatively high growth in the second half of the 1920s the Danish and the Norwegian authorities brought hardship to their nations through a deliberate policy of deflation. As a result both nations saw a sharp rise in unemployment and a steep decline in economic activity. So when anybody tells you about how a country can go through “internal devaluation” please remind them of the Denmark and Norway in the 1920s. The polices were hardly successful, but despite the clear negative consequences policy makers and many economists in the Denmark and Norway insisted that it was the right policy to return to the pre-war gold-parity.

Here is what happened to unemployment (%).

Nobody listened to Cassel. As a result both the Danish and the Norwegian economies went into depression in the second half of the 1920s and unemployment skyrocketed. At the same time Finland and Sweden – which did not return to the pre-war gold-partiy – enjoyed strong post-war growth and low unemployment.

Gustav Cassel strongly warned against this policy as he today would have warned against the calls for “internal devaluation” in the euro zone. In 1924 Cassel at a speech in the Student Union in Copenhagen strongly advocated a devaluation of the Danish krone. The Danish central bank was not exactly pleased with Cassel’s message. However, the Danish central bank really had little to fear. Cassel’s message was overshadowed by the popular demand for what was called “Our old, honest krone”.

To force the policy of revaluation and return to the old gold-parity the Danish central bank tightened monetary policy dramatically and the bank’s discount rate was hiked to 7% (this is more or less today’s level for Spanish bond yields). From 1924 to 1924 to 1927 both the Norwegian and the Danish krone were basically doubled in value against gold by deliberate actions of the two Scandinavian nation’s central bank.

The gold-insanity was as widespread in Norway as in Denmark and also here Cassel was a lone voice of sanity. In a speech in Christiania (today’s Oslo) Cassel in November 1923 warned against the foolish idea of returning the Norwegian krone to the pre-war parity. The speech deeply upset Norwegian central bank governor Nicolai Rygg who was present at Cassel’s speech.

After Cassel’s speech Rygg rose and told the audience that the Norwegian krone had been brought back to parity a 100 years before and that it could and should be done again. He said: “We must and we will go back and we will not give up”. Next day the Norwegian Prime Minister Abraham Berge in an public interview gave his full support to Rygg’s statement. It was clear the Norwegian central bank and the Norwegian government were determined to return to the pre-war gold-parity.

This is the impact on the real GDP level of the gold-insanity in Denmark and Norway. Sweden did not suffer from gold-insanity and grew nicely in the 1920s.

The lack of reason among Danish and Norwegian central bankers in the 1920s is a reminder what happens once the “project” – whether the euro or the gold standard – becomes more important than economic reason and it shows that countries will suffer dire economic, social and political consequences when they are forced through “internal devaluation”. In both Denmark and Norway the deflation of the 1920s strengthened the Socialists parties and both the Norwegian and the Danish economies as a consequence moved away from the otherwise successful laissez faire model. That should be a reminder to any free market oriented commentators, policy makers and economists that a deliberate attempt of forcing countries through internal devaluation is likely to bring more socialism and less free markets. Gustav Cassel knew that – as do the Market Monetarists today.

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My account of these events is based on Richard Lester’s paper “Gold-Parity Depression in Denmark and Norway, 1925-1928″ (Journal of Political Economy, August 1937)

April 24, 2013

The Grave Evil of Unemployment, Bryan Caplan | EconLog | Library of Economics and Liberty

Bryan Caplan makes the case for a fresh approach from free-market economists:

At the level of high theory, free-market economists love market-clearing models. If there’s surplus wheat, the price of wheat will fall to clear the market. If there’s surplus labor, similarly, the wage will fall to eliminate unemployment. What about nominal wage rigidity? Most free-market economists concede that nominal wage rigidity exists to some degree, but think the problem is mild and short-lived……..The high theory’s wrong: Nominal wage rigidity is both strong and durable.

Rather than treat unemployment as a necessary but temporary affliction, Caplan suggests that free-market economists should be attacking the “vast array of employment-destroying regulations” imposed by government — and tight monetary policy by central banks, where they should be advocating nominal GDP targeting as an alternative.

April 24, 2013

TheMoneyIllusion

TheMoneyIllusion highlights this common mistake by central banks:

Despite the fact that our mainstream textbooks tell us that low rates don’t mean easy money, most central bankers cannot shake the suspicion that low rates do mean easy money, and that the current relatively low rates are a danger to the economy. This irrational bias is driving policy failure in much of the world. Even central banks at the zero bound (like the Fed) are inhibited in their push for unconventional stimulus by this cognitive illusion.

Debunking austerity claims makes no difference to Europe’s monks and zealots | Telegraph Blogs

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard attacks euro-zone austerity:

Britain’s public debt was 260pc of GDP in 1816 at the end of near perma-wars: Seven Years War, American War of Independence, and the Napoleonic Wars. This was whittled down to 24pc over the next century by the magical compound effects of economic growth. The debt reached 220pc in 1945, the price for defeating fascism. This was certainly a drag on the post-War recovery, but it did not stop debt falling to 36pc by the mid-1990s.

Britain twice recovered from massive debt through a combination of growth and inflation — not necessarily in that order — but they had control of their own currency. The states of Europe are strait-jacketed by a currency dominated by the austerity-minded Bundesbank.

April 24, 2013

Paul Krugman: Hot Money Blues | NYTimes.com

Paul Krugman argues for a return of capital controls:

In the last decade America, too, experienced a huge housing bubble fed by foreign money, followed by a nasty hangover after the bubble burst. The damage was mitigated by the fact that we borrowed in our own currency, but it’s still our worst crisis since the 1930s.

Japan and China amassed more than $2 trillion in US Treasuries in their attempt to halt, or at least slow, appreciation of their currencies against the Dollar. US manufacturers suffered, both in domestic and export markets, laboring at a huge competitive disadvantage because of the artificial exchange rate.

Trade agreements should cap capital flows between countries, setting a limit on the net capital in/outflow in any one year and offsetting measures to be taken if the cap is exceeded.

Read more at Hot Money Blues – NYTimes.com.

April 24, 2013April 16, 2018

PIMCO’s Gross: Investing may be more difficult in years ahead

Charles Stein and Alexis Leondis at Bloomberg quote Bill Gross, co-chief investment officer at PIMCO (Pacific Investment Management Co) about the outlook for the next decade:

Recently, Gross has become more reflective in his monthly online commentaries. In the April outlook, called “A Man in the Mirror,” he suggested that the careers of the great investors of the past three or four decades were fueled by an expansion of credit that may be coming to an end, and that investing may become more difficult in years ahead.

“All of us, even the old guys like Buffett, Soros, Fuss, yeah — me too, have cut our teeth during perhaps a most advantageous period of time, the most attractive epoch, that an investor could experience,” he wrote. “Perhaps it was the epoch that made the man.”

Central banks have at last awoken to the dangers of rapid credit expansion and are unlikely to allow a repeat of the credit-fueled growth of the last thirty years. Bull markets of the future are therefore likely to be a lot more sedate.
Read more at Pimco’s Rising Stars Pull in Money for Future After Gross – Bloomberg.

April 22, 2013

Fed Watch: Monetary Policy and Financial Stability

Tim Duty quotes Minneapolis Federal Reserve President Narayana Kocherlakota, speaking at the 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky conference:

….unusually low real interest rates should be expected to be linked with inflated asset prices, high asset return volatility and heightened merger activity. All of these financial market outcomes are often interpreted as signifying financial market instability. And this observation brings me to a key conclusion. I’ve suggested that it is likely that, for a number of years to come, the FOMC will only achieve its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability if it keeps real interest rates unusually low. I’ve also argued that when real interest rates are low, we are likely to see financial market outcomes that signify instability. It follows that, for a considerable period of time, the FOMC may only be to achieve its macroeconomic objectives in association with signs of instability in financial markets.

Unusually low interest rates will only cause an asset price bubble when they encourage excessive borrowing by consumers. In the current environment where increased savings are being channeled into repaying debt, the risks of excessive credit growth are low. But the Fed has to maintain a fine balancing act, reacting quickly to any increase in asset prices which would encourage speculative demand for credit — and raising interest rates in order to discourage this.

April 21, 2013

Richard Koo: Quantitative and Qualitative Easing

Richard Koo in his latest report makes that the point that central banks in the US and UK have not cured their economies of deflationary pressures, they have merely kicked the can down the road:

Central bank officials in the US and the UK claim quantitative easing has been a success because it prevented a Japan-like deflation. But as I noted in my last report (2 April 2013), the rate of Japanese wage growth four to five years after the bubble collapsed was roughly equal to the levels now being observed in the US. Deflation took root in Japan only after 1997, when the nation fell off the fiscal cliff following the Hashimoto administration’s ill-fated experiment with fiscal consolidation. That was seven to eight years after the bubble burst.