What’s wrong with inequality?

Robert Douglas summarizes the argument against inequality presented by Andrew Leigh, economist and (Labour) parliamentarian, in his book Battlers and Billionaires:

Leigh sees inequality as a socially corrosive force undermining the egalitarian spirit that has been one of the positive defining characteristics of Australian society. He argues that unequal wealth demands attention from our political system and that there are a variety of ways in which it can be addressed.

There has been much hand-wringing from the left about rising inequality, but I believe this is an attempt to frame the political debate along class lines — the rich against the rest — as Barack Obama succeeded in doing, with the able assistance of Mitt Romney, in 2012. Framing the debate in relative terms is shrewd politics. An attempt to distract voters from the real issues:

  • Is poverty rising or falling?
  • Is general health, as reflected by life expectancy, improving or deteriorating?

Poverty is a subjective concept, as Thomas Sowell points out:

Most Americans with incomes below the official poverty level have air-conditioning, television, own a motor vehicle and, far from being hungry, are more likely than other Americans to be overweight.

Life expectancy, however, is difficult to fudge.

Inequality, as I said earlier, is relative: we can have declining poverty and rising life expectancy while inequality is growing. In fact when the economy is booming and employment rising, inequality is also likely to be growing. Do we really want to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs? Raising taxes to discourage new entrepreneurs? That is what targeting inequality can succeed in doing: harming the welfare of all rather than improving the welfare of the poor at the expense of the rich.

Instead we should focus on job creation and health improvements. And if that means creating incentives to encourage entrepreneurs, so be it, provided we all benefit.

The fact that inequality rose after the GFC is an anomaly that is unlikely to persist in the long term. The wealth of the masses are predominantly represented by real estate, while the rich hold a far higher percentage of their wealth in financial assets: stocks and bonds. Housing was hardest hit by the GFC and has taken longest to recover, causing a surge in inequality readings. That is not the fault of the rich — apart from a few investment bankers — and in fact we should learn from their experience. Real estate investment may have served us well in the past, but that is likely to change with the end of the credit super-cycle. We will need to concentrate a far higher percentage of our investment in stocks and bonds.

Read more at Inequality, health and well-being: time for a national debate.

Surprise as BOE, ECB Give Forward Guidance | WSJ

New [BOE] governor Mark Carney has already made changes. In a statement accompanying the widely-expected decision to leave both rates and asset purchases unchanged, the BoE said that rising market rates had shifted expectations for the Bank Rate above levels that were justified by the economic situation.

The fact that there was a statement at all indicated a change in policy. The old BOE just announced its decision and left interpretation to the markets.

This was a clear attempt to talk the markets down and it worked.

Read more at Recap: Surprise as BOE, ECB Give Forward Guidance – MoneyBeat – WSJ.

Australian banks: Who’s been swimming naked?

Margot Patrick at WSJ reports that the Bank of England is enforcing a new “leverage ratio” rule:

Top U.K. banks regulator Andrew Bailey told lawmakers that the requirement for banks to hold at least 3% equity against total assets “is a sensible minimum,” and that those who fall short must act quickly, but without cutting their lending to households and businesses.

The Bank of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority on June 20 said Barclays and mutual lender Nationwide Building Society don’t meet the standard and gave them 10 days to submit plans for achieving it.

I hope that their Australian counterpart APRA are following developments closely. Both UK and Australian banks are particularly vulnerable because of their over-priced housing markets. And while the big four Australian banks’ capital ratios appear comfortably above 10 percent, these rely on risk-weightings of 15% to 20% for residential mortgages.

Only when the tide goes out do you discover who’s been swimming naked. ~ Warren Buffett

Read more at BOE: Barclays, Nationwide Must Boost Capital – WSJ.com.

Rudd? Gillard? Australians have bigger problems | IOL Business

“Australia is a leveraged time bomb waiting to blow,” Albert Edwards, Société Générale’s London-based global strategist, said. “It is not just a CDO, but a CDO squared. All we have in Australia is, at its simplest, a credit bubble built upon a commodity boom dependent for its sustenance on an even greater credit bubble in China.”

From William Pesek at Rudd? Gillard? Australians have bigger problems – Columnists | IOL Business | IOL.co.za.

Bankers’ political influence cause for concern

I am not sure of the background to this, but it certainly looks as if the big UK banks were able to exert enough political pressure to remove Robert Jenkins from the Financial Policy Committee, the UK’s new stability regulator. Anne-Sylvaine Chassany at FT writes:

An outspoken advocate of tough bank regulation who has worked in banking and asset management, Robert Jenkins left the committee earlier this year after not being reappointed by George Osborne, chancellor.

If bankers’ influence was the cause, it certainly is cause for concern.

via Barclays’ threat on lending under fire – FT.com.

Barclays’ threat on lending under fire | FT.com

Anne-Sylvaine Chassany at FT writes of the UK’s Prudential Regulation Authority:

The PRA irked banks when it included a 3 per cent leverage ratio target in its assessment of UK lenders’ capital health. It identified shortfalls at Barclays and Nationwide, the UK’s largest building society, which have projected leverage ratios of 2.5 per cent and 2 per cent respectively under PRA tests.

Outrageous isn’t it? That banks should be asked to maintain a minimum share capital of three percent against their lending exposure — to protect the British taxpayer from future bailouts. My view is that the bar should be set at 5 percent, although this would have to be phased-in over an extended period to prevent disruption.

I hope that APRA is following developments closely. The big four Australian banks are also likely to be caught a little short.

Read more at Barclays’ threat on lending under fire – FT.com.

Lurking beneath Australia’s AAA economy… | On Line Opinion

Kellie Tranter highlights the unstable position of the big Australian banks:

Australia has had a current account deficit since the 1980s. That means we are spending more than we are earning. We’ve had to sell public assets to balance the current account deficit. Put simply, the surplus on the capital account is flogging off the sideboard to buy the fruit.

Our net international financial position is not strong and our gross foreign liabilities are alarming. Banks are the intermediaries between foreign lenders and Australia’s big spenders. The banks have mediated the private household debt and as a result if there is a worldwide recession, banks could be called to pay up.

Our banks have borrowed short (internationally) and lent long (domestically, for mortgages etc.)…….

I have been sounding off about the inadequate capital reserves of the big four banks — because of low risk-weightings attached to residential mortgages — but Kellie also raises the question of their $13.8 trillion derivatives exposure. She concludes:

If the banks are hunky dory why is it necessary [for the RBA] to set up a $380 billion emergency fund and, more importantly, is it enough in light of possible derivatives exposure?

Read more at Lurking beneath Australia's AAA economy… – On Line Opinion – 25/6/2013.

Regulatory blight — or finally seeing the light?

This comment by Tim Congdon (International Monetary Research Ltd) on the UK shadow Monetary Policy Committee refers to the “regulatory blight” on banking systems as regulators switch from risk-weighted capital ratio requirements to a straight-forward, unweighted leverage ratio which requires some banks to raise more capital. What he fails to consider is that risk-weighting has contributed to the current parlous state of our banking system. Under risk-weighting, banks concentrated their assets in classes with low risk-weighting, such as residential mortgages and sovereign government bonds, where they were required to hold less capital and could achieve higher leveraged returns. The combined effect of all banks acting in a similar manner achieved a vast concentration of investment exposure in these asset classes, with the undesirable consequence that the underlying risk associated with these asset classes soared, leading to widespread instability across the banking system and fueling both the sub-prime and Euro zone sovereign debt crisis.

My last note for the SMPC opened with the sentence, ‘The regulatory blight on banking systems continues in all the world’s so-called “advanced” economies, which means for these purposes all nations that belong to the Bank for International Settlements.’ As I explained in the next sentence, the growth of banks’ risk assets is constrained by official demands for more capital relative to assets, for more liquid and low-risk assets in asset totals, and for less reliance on supposedly unstable funding (i.e., wholesale/inter-bank funding). The slow growth of bank assets has inevitably meant, on the other side of the balance sheet, slow growth of the bank deposits that constitute most of the quantity of money, broadly-defined. Indeed, there have even been periods of a few quarters in more than one country since 2007 in which the assets of banks, and hence the quantity of money, have contracted.

The equilibrium levels of national income and wealth are functions of the quantity of money. The regulatory blight in banking systems has therefore been the dominant cause of the sluggish growth rates of nominal gross domestic products, across the advanced-country world, that have characterised the Great Recession and the immediately subsequent years. Indeed, the five years to the end of 2012 saw the lowest increases – and in the Japanese and Italian cases actual decreases – in nominal GDP in the G-7 leading industrialised countries for any half-decade since the 1930s.

It is almost beyond imagination that – after the experience of recent years – officialdom should still be experimenting with different approaches to bank regulation and indeed contemplating an intensification of such regulation. Nevertheless, that is what is happening. The source of the trouble seems to be a paper given at the Jackson Hole conference of central bankers, in August 2012, by Andy Haldane, executive director for financial stability at the Bank of England. The paper, called The Dog and the Frisbee, argued that a simple leverage ratio (i.e., the ratio of banks’ assets to capital, without any adjustment for the different risks of different assets) had been a better pointer to bank failure than risk-weighted capital calculations of the kind blessed by the Basle rules. The suggestion is therefore that the Basle methods of calculating capital adequacy should be replaced by, or complemented by, a simple leverage ratio.

For banks that have spent the last five years increasing the ratio of safe assets to total assets, or that have always had a high proportion of safe assets to total assets, the potential introduction of a leverage ratio is infuriating. A number of banks have been told in recent weeks that they must raise yet more capital. Because it is subject to the new leverage ratio, Nationwide Building Society has been deemed to be £2 billion short of capital. That has upset its corporate plans, to say the least of the matter, and put the kibosh on significant expansion of its mortgage assets. And what does one say about George Osborne’s ‘Help to Buy’ scheme, announced with such fanfare in the last Budget and supposed to turbocharge the UK housing finance market?

The leverage ratio has been called Mervyn King’s ‘last hurrah’, since there can be little doubt that King has been the prime mover in the regulatory tightening that has hit British banking since mid-2007. He is soon to be replaced by Mark Carney, who may or may not have a different attitude. Carney has been publicly critical of Haldane and his ‘Dog and Frisbee’ paper, but that does not guarantee an early shift in the official stance. Indeed, it is striking that – of the bank’s top team under King – only Paul Tucker, generally (and correctly) regarded as more bank-friendly than King or Haldane, has announced that he is leaving the Bank once Carney has taken over.

My verdict is that the regulatory blight on UK banking is very much still at work. Further, without QE, the quantity of money would be more or less static. As before, I am in favour of no change in sterling interest rates and the continuation of QE at a sufficiently high level to ensure that broad money growth (on the M4ex measures) runs at an annual rate of between 3% and 5%. My bias – at least for the next three months – is for ‘no change’. It is plausible that I will be advocating higher interest rates in 2014. However, much depends on a realisation in official quarters that overregulation of the banks is, almost everywhere in the advanced world, the dominant explanation for the sluggishness of money supply growth and, hence, the key factor holding back a stronger recovery. Major changes in personnel may be in prospect at the Bank of England now that Mervyn King is leaving, but the Treasury – which I understand from private information will be glad to see the back of him – has failed to prevent the growth of a regulatory bureaucracy led by King appointees.

If having a well-capitalized banking system requires some “regulatory blight” then lets have more of it. Three cheers for Mervyn King and the (un-weighted) leverage ratio. Let’s hope that Mark Carney follows a similar path.
via David Smith’s EconomicsUK.com: IEA’s shadow MPC votes 5-4 for quarter-point rate hike.

The history of Australian land prices | Leith van Onselen | Macrobusiness.com.au

Re-blogged with kind permission from Macrobusiness.com.au

Posted by Unconventional Economist in Australian Property on June 4, 2013

Australian Housing

By Leith van Onselen

As argued previously, the sharp escalation of Australian home prices since the mid-1990s has been caused primarily by a surge in land values, which roughly doubled in size relative to the size of the economy, as measured by GDP (see next chart).

Housing Values to GDP

The explosion of land values is also reflected by the below chart showing the growth of house values (including both structures and land) far outstripping the growth of the ABS project homes index, which measures the cost of building new dwellings (excluding the land):

House Prices v. Construction Costs

On Friday night, Prosper Australia released a brand new long-run dataset on Australian land values, which has been painstakingly developed by Philip Soos, who is a research Masters candidate at Deakin University as well as a researcher for Prosper Australia. The data has been pulled together from a variety of public and private sources, including from economists Robert Scott, Doug Herps, Alan Taylor, Terry Dwyer and Nigel Stapledon.

While there is lots of useful data in the series, my favourite dataset is illustrated by the below chart showing the ratio of Australian land prices (residential, commercial and rural) to GDP:

Land v. GDP

As you can see, land prices relative to GDP doubled between 1996 and 2010. And while land values have deflated somewhat, it would appear they have much further to fall.

My long held view is that residential land prices (and by extension house prices) will experience a “slow melt” whereby values relative to GDP deflate back to their mid-1990s (pre-boom) level. The big question is whether this deflation will occur via prices falling outright or by GDP growth outstripping price growth. With any luck (from a financial stability perspective), the adjustment will take place more through real price reductions than nominal price falls. But the process could take a long time.

Soos’ land price dataset can be downloaded from here.

Impact of QE (or lack thereof) is reflected by excess reserves

JKH at Monetary Realism writes:

….there is a systematic tendency in the blogosphere and elsewhere to misrepresent the impact of QE in a particular way in terms of the related macroeconomic flow of funds…… Most descriptions will erroneously treat the macro flow as if banks were the original portfolio source of the bonds that are being sold to the Fed, obtaining reserves in exchange. This is not the case. A cursory scan of Fed flow of funds statistics will confirm that commercial banks are relatively small holders of bonds in their portfolios, especially Treasury bonds. The vast proportion of bonds that are sold to the Fed in QE originate from non-bank portfolios……. Many descriptions of QE instead erroneously suggest the strong presence of a bank principal function in which bonds from bank portfolios are simply exchanged for reserves. In fact, for the most part, while the banking system has received reserve credit for bonds sold to the Fed, it has also passed on credits to the accounts of non-bank customers who have sold their bonds to the banks. This is integral to the overall QE flow of bonds.

There is a simpler explanation of what happens when the Fed purchases bonds under QE. Bank balance sheets expand as sellers deposit the sale proceeds with their bank. In addition to the deposit liability the bank also receives an asset, being a credit to its account with the Fed. Unless the bank is able to make better use of its asset by making loans to credit-worthy borrowers, the funds are likely to remain on deposit at the Fed as excess reserves — earning interest at 0.25% per year. Excess reserves on deposit at the Fed currently stand at close to $1.8 trillion, reflecting the dearth of (reasonably secure) lending/investment opportunities in the broader economy.

Read more at The Accounting Quest of Steve Keen | Monetary Realism.