A Century of Policy Mistakes | Niels Jensen

In A Century of Policy Mistakes Neils Jensen describes the demise of Argentina over the last 100 years.

A century ago Argentina ranked as one of the wealthiest countries in world, behind the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia but ahead of countries such as France, Germany and Italy. Its per capita income was 92% of the G16 average; it is 43% today. Life in Argentina was good. It enjoyed the benefits of one of the highest growth rates in the world and attracted immigrants left, right and centre. Boom times galore.

Argentina’s wealth was based on agriculture, but also on its strong ties with the UK, the pre-World War I global powerhouse. Equally importantly, it understood the importance of free trade and took advantage of the relatively open markets which prevailed in the years leading to the Great War. Most importantly, though, it benefitted from, but also relied upon, enormous inflows of capital from the rest of the world. All of this is well documented in a recent piece in The Economist which you can find here.

Neils identifies three main causes:

  1. An over-reliance on commodities;
  2. Failure to invest in education; and
  3. An increasingly closed, inward-looking economy.
  4. It occurred to me that, apart from education, Australia has made the same mistakes.

    Read more at A Century of Policy Mistakes | Niels Jensen – Absolute Return Partners | PRAGMATIC CAPITALISM.

Deflating Australia’s land bubble

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Great post by Leith van Onselen
Reproduced with kind permission from Macrobusiness.com.au
.

Prosper Australia has provided a submission to the Senate Inquiry into Housing Affordability, which is well worth a look. The submission first provides nine metrics illustrating Australia’s residential property bubble, which include the following:

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It took forty years from 1950 to 1990 for housing prices to double, but only fifteen years between 1996 and 2010 to double again. The surge in housing prices is driven by the tremendous growth in household debt, as owner-occupiers and investors take out ever larger mortgages to speculate on housing. The household debt to GDP ratio reached a record high of 98 per cent in 2010, the same year real housing prices peaked. In 2013, the mortgage and personal debt ratios were 86 and 9 per cent, respectively, for a combined household debt ratio of 95 per cent.

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As mortgage debt escalated, investors’ net rental losses increased rapidly from 2001 onwards. In that year, net rental income losses were just over $1 billion, rising to $9.7 billion in 2008 as the cash rate peaked at 7.2 per cent. By 2010, when mortgage debt reached its historical peak relative to GDP, investor losses eased to $5.1 billion as the cash rate fell to a then historic low of 3 per cent in 2009 following the global financial crisis (GFC). The latest data shows income losses rose to $8.2 billion in 2011, the second largest absolute loss on record…

The housing market meets economist Hyman Minsky’s definition of a Ponzi scheme, as gross rental incomes minus expenses are clearly insufficient to meet principal and interest repayments. As 67 per cent of property investors are negatively-geared as of 2011, investment decisions are predicated upon expected rises in land values, not rents. This strategy will inevitably fail, as the escalation in real housing prices can only be sustained by a continual acceleration or exponential rise in mortgage debt.

The price to income (P/I) ratio, otherwise known as the median multiple, is another measure of residential property valuation…

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From the mid-1990s onwards, housing prices outpaced household incomes, and the P/I ratio increased from 4 to 7 nationwide. It is impossible for household incomes to match the rise in housing prices during the boom phase of a property bubble, as wages grow more slowly, usually just above the rate of inflation…

Land is the largest tangible market in Australia… Our housing bubble is actually a residential land bubble, as the total land values to GDP ratio doubled between 1996 and 2010, when it reached a record high of 298 per cent ($4.1 trillion). In real terms, residential land values rose from $895 billion in 1996 to a peak of $3.2 trillion in 2010, a relative increase of 262 per cent. This ratio is closely matched by a similar rise in the value of the residential housing stock. The rise in residential land values, rather than structures, is responsible for almost all of the increase in the value of the housing stock…

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Prosper then places the blame for Australia’s expensive housing on convergence of factors, with Australia’s inefficient tax system front-and-centre:

A convergence of factors are responsible: a large cohort of irrational investors gambling on housing prices, a FIRE sector willing and able to facilitate a credit boom, and low property and land taxes attracting speculators to this asset class…

A positive feedback loop has emerged between housing prices and mortgage debt, with rising prices prompting the take-up of more debt in an upwards spiral…

An inefficient taxation system, comprised of low property and land taxes, allows landowners to expropriate ‘geo-rent’ (economic rent derived from land) by capturing the uplift in land values generated by taxpayer-funded infrastructure and rising economic productivity… Government willingness to tax wages and business ahead of land has elevated its privileged status, resulting in larger capital sums being paid by owner-occupiers and investors.

It also advocates land tax reform, which it claims would significantly improve incomes, affordability, and productivity:

Counter-intuitively, reducing wage and business taxation and increasing land tax would not necessarily lower fundamental land prices, given the offsetting boost to disposable wages, profits and hence rents, but it would certainly lower bubble-inflated land prices. Land tax reform – urged on government by every independent tax review in living memory – would firmly correct the price to rent and income ratios. If Australia wishes to escape or ameliorate the profound financial destruction of a bursting land bubble, the solution lies in this equation…

Prosper also slams housing-related tax expenditures, which undermine the integrity of the tax system:

The generous scope of tax expenditures relating to the housing market has served to further increase prices. Tax expenditures are defined as a deviation from the commonly accepted tax structure, whether it is a tax exemption, concession, deduction, preferential rate, allowance, rebate, offset, credit or deferral. Australia has the highest rate of tax expenditures among our OECD peers, at more than 8 per cent of GDP. Tax expenditures are vulnerable to lobbying, and often compromise the fairness and efficiency of the tax system. Lavish tax expenditures for both owner-occupied and investment property has significantly worsened housing affordability because they allow landowners to capture greater amounts of geo-rent and prioritise unearned wealth and income over what is earned. Existing home owners capture the most benefit, ahead of first home buyers, investors and tenants.

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These tax expenditures provide a strong incentive to speculate on housing prices, and are reinforced by already low property taxes. Investors perceive rental income as secondary to expected rises in capital prices, while first home buyers over-leverage themselves to enter a bubble-inflated market…

Tax expenditures, combined with the ongoing deregulation of the banking and financial system, has transformed the housing market into a casino. Residential property is commonly viewed as a speculative asset to flip, rather than shelter to raise a family in…

Finally, Prosper provides two recommendations to the Senate Inquiry:

Recommendation 1: Reform Land Value Tax. The ideal tool to moderate land bubbles and properly fund infrastructure already exists in the hands of state and territory governments: state land tax (SLT). Unfortunately, this tax has been so riddled with exemptions and concessional treatments it must be considered dormant…

We suggest the current government introduce a nationwide one per cent federal land tax (FLT) – fully rebatable on SLT paid – to oblige the states and territories to use their taxing powers properly. State governments could adjust their tax rules and keep every dollar the FLT raises, to the benefit of all Australians. The Commonwealth Parliament would be entitled to argue this intervention is for sound economic reasons and dissipate the political fallout. Placing state and territory finances on sound bases would vastly improve the federal system mandated by Australia’s Constitution. Transitional arrangements would need to be considered. Rebating all stamp duty paid against a hypothetical past SLT obligation would address concerns of fairness and equity…

Recommendation 2: Macroprudential Regulation. A range of macro-prudential tools are needed to moderate housing price inflation and subdue credit growth in a pro-cyclical financial system, such as those affecting the loan to value, (LVR), debt servicing (DSR) and debt servicing to income (DSTI) ratios.26 Quantitative restrictions should be placed on the share of new mortgages with moderately high LVRs…

To reduce systemic risk, a large rise in capital and liquidity ratios (buffers) is required to ensure banks can withstand a future economic downturn, bank run or large fall in the value of collateral. Research suggests the probability of a banking crisis can be reduced to a 1 in 100 year event by raising core equity (Tier 1) capital ratios to 11 per cent in isolation or raising core equity to 10 per cent with an addition rise in liquid assets of 12.5 per cent (the rise in liquid assets over total assets). For the Big Four banks, this would represent a rise of around 3 per cent in core equity…

The full submission is available here.

China faces challenges

I have kept Michael Pettis January summary of the four challenges facing China:

  1. China is over-reliant on credit to generate growth;
  2. Attempts to boost consumption will reverse the long-standing subsidy of new investment;
  3. Attempts to resolve excess capacity also slow growth; and
  4. Unrecognized bad debt on bank balance sheets means that growth is overstated.

China’s Shanghai Composite Index is again testing support around 2000. Follow-through below 1990 would signal a primary decline to 1850*. Reversal of 21-day Twiggs Money Flow below zero would warn of medium-term selling pressure. Respect of support is less likely, but would suggest another attempt at 2150/2250.

Shanghai Composite Index

* Target calculation: 2000 – ( 2150 – 2000 ) = 1850

Declining US commercial bank loans?

Sober Look highlights the sharply declining ratio of commercial bank loans and leases to bank deposits.

Ratio of commercial bank loans and leases to bank deposits

Its only when we examine the detail, however, that we note cash reserves have ballooned in the last 10 years. And most of those cash reserves are deposits at the Fed which now (post-GFC) earn interest. Adjust total deposits at commercial banks, for the excess reserves deposited back with the Fed, and the current ratio of 1:1 looks a lot healthier.

Ratio of commercial bank loans and leases to bank deposits Adjusted for Excess Reserves

As I pointed out in November, most new money created by the Fed QE program is being deposited straight back with the Fed as excess reserves. We need to adjust bank deposits for this effect to obtain a true reflection of bank lending activity.

The hole in US employment

US employment is topical after two months of poor jobs figures. Employers added 113,000 new jobs, against an expected 185,000, last month and a low 75,000 in December. Rather than focus on monthly data, let’s take a long-term view.

The number of full-time employed as a percentage of total population [red line below] fell dramatically during the GFC, with about 1 in 10 employees losing their jobs. Since then, roughly 1 out of 4 full-time jobs lost has been restored, while the other 3 are still missing (population growth fell from 1.0% to around 0.7% post-GFC, limiting the distortion).

Employed Normally Full-time as Percentage of Population

Comparing employment levels to the 1980s is little consolation because this is skewed by the rising participation rate of women in the work-force. The pink line below shows how the number of women employed grew from under 14% of total population in the late 1960s to more than 22% prior to the GFC. The effect on total employment [green line] was dramatic, while employment of men [blue line] oscillated between 24% and 26%.

US Men & Women Employment Levels as Percentage of Population

Part-time employment — the difference between total employment [green] and full-time employed [red] below — has leveled off since 2000 at roughly 6% of the total population. So loss of full-time positions has not been compensated by a rise in casual work. Both have been affected.

US Full-time and Total Employment as Percentage of Population

The “good news” is that a soft labor market will lead to low wages growth for a considerable period, boosting corporate profits.

The bad news is that low employment levels will depress sales growth [green line]….

Total US Business Sales Percentage Growth and over GDP

And discourage new investment…..

Private NonResidential Fixed Investment

Which would harm future growth.

Wages and corporate profits

Employee Compensation as a percentage of Net Value Added (by US Corporate Business) has fallen sharply since the GFC, boosting corporate profits. Again we can observe an inverse relationship, with corporate profits spiking when compensation rates fall, and vice versa.

Employee Compensation compared to Net Value Added

A sharp fall in unemployment would send wage rates soaring, as employers bid for scarce labor. But that is not yet on the horizon and we are likely to experience soft wage rates until the economy recovers.

Interest rates and corporate profits

Low interest rates clearly boost corporate profits. The inverse relationship is evident from the strong profits recorded in the 1950s, when corporate bond rates were lower than at present, and also the big hole in profits in the 1980s, when interest rates spiked dramatically during Paul Volcker’s reign at the Fed.

Corporate Profits and AAA Bond Yields

The outlook for inflation is muted and the rise in interest rates likely to be gradual over several years, rather than a sharp spike, if the Fed has its way.

Commodity prices effect on corporate profits

Sharp spikes in the US Industrial Commodities PPI (producer price index) often precede a drop in Corporate Profits (expressed below as a ratio to GDP). And sharp falls in the PPI tend to precipitate a surge in profits.

US Corporate Profits/GDP compared to Industrial Commodities PPI - 5 Years

The 5-year chart above shows PPI growth close to zero since 2012. With wages, raw material costs and interest rates near long-term lows, there is little wonder that corporate profits have surged. The question is: how long will the three remain low? That depends on how fast the global economy recovers. And how long rising demand (from the recovery) is able to withstand rising input costs.

For the chartists: A Long-term View

A long-term view of Corporate Profits/GDP compared to Industrial Commodities PPI shows the relationship is not a perfect inverse, but profits clearly tend to run counter to the rate of PPI growth.

US Corporate Profits/GDP compared to Industrial Commodities PPI

A Mis-Leading Labor Market Indicator | Liberty Street Economics

From a paper by Samuel Kapon and Joseph Tracy at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York:

As the economy recovered and growth resumed, the unemployment rate has fallen to 6.7 percent. …..The employment-population (E/P) ratio frequently is used as an additional labor market measure. The E/P ratio is defined as the number of employed divided by the size of the working-age, noninstitutionalized population. An advantage of the E/P ratio over the unemployment rate is that it is not impacted by discouraged workers who stop looking for employment.

Employment-population (E/P) ratio

Since the end of the recession, the E/P ratio has largely remained constant—that is, virtually none of the decline in the E/P ratio from the Great Recession has been recovered to date. An implication is that the 7.6 million jobs added since the trough of employment in February 2010 has essentially just kept pace with growth in the working-age population. In its failure to recover, the E/P ratio would seem to depict a much weaker labor market than indicated by the unemployment rate. An important question is whether this is a correct or a misleading characterization of the degree of the labor market recovery…….

Read more at A Mis-Leading Labor Market Indicator – Liberty Street Economics.


Hat tip to Barry Ritholz.