Analysis of the global economy
From Mark Shenk:
Oil dropped from a seven-month high as the US dollar surged after the Federal Reserve published minutes of its latest monetary policy meeting suggesting a June hike is possible. Commodities fell as the Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index, which tracks the US currency against 10 others, surged. The April minutes showed that policy makers saw an interest-rate hike appropriate in June if labour markets and economic growth continued to strengthen…..
The consumer price index (CPI) ticked up 1.14% (year-on-year) for April 2016, on the back of higher oil prices. Core CPI (excluding energy and food) eased slightly to 2.15%.
Inflation is muted, but a sharp rise in hourly manufacturing (production and nonsupervisory employees) earnings growth (2.98% for 12 months to April 2016) points to further increases.
Despite this, long-term interest rates remain weak, with 10-year Treasury yields testing support at 1.65 percent. Breach would signal another test of the record low at 1.50% in 2012. The dovish Fed is a contributing factor, but so could safe-haven demand from investors wary of stocks….
The US Dollar Index rallied off long-term support at 93 but this looks more a pause in the primary down-trend (signaled by decline of 13-week Momentum below zero) than a reversal.
Explanation for the Dollar rally is evident on the chart of China’s foreign reserves: a pause in the sharp decline of the last 2 years. China has embarked on another massive stimulus program in an attempt to shock their economy out of its present slump.
But this hair of the dog remedy is unlikely to solve their problems, merely postpone the inevitable reckoning. The Yuan is once again weakening against the Dollar. Decline in China’s reserves — and the US Dollar as a consequence — is likely to continue.
Retail sales (excluding motor vehicles and fuel) jumped to a 2.96% year-on-year increase for April 2016, climbing back above Core CPI to reflect a real increase.
We are still waiting on light vehicle sales for April. An upturn would indicate reviving consumer confidence in the economy.
An upturn in business sales is also needed, to spur new investment.
Hedge fund legend Stan Druckenmiller, founder of Duquesne, addressing the Sohn Conference:
….The Fed has no end game. The Fed’s objective seems to be getting by another 6 months without a 20% decline in the S&P and avoiding a recession over the near term. In doing so, they are enabling the opposite of needed reform and increasing, not lowering, the odds of the economic tail risk they are trying to avoid. At the government level, the impeding of market signals has allowed politicians to continue to ignore badly needed entitlement and tax reform.
Look at the slide behind me. The doves keep asking where is the evidence of mal-investment? As you can see, the growth in operating cash flow peaked 5 years ago and turned negative year over year recently even as net debt continues to grow at an incredibly high pace. Never in the post-World War II period has this happened. Until the cycle preceding the great recession, the peaks had been pretty much coincident. Even during that cycle, they only diverged for 2 years, and by the time EBITDA turned negative year over year, as it has today, growth in net debt had been declining for over 2 years. Again, the current 5-year divergence is unprecedented in financial history!
And if this wasn’t disturbing enough, take a look at the use of that debt in this cycle. While the debt in the 1990’s financed the construction of the internet, most of the debt today has been used for financial engineering, not productive investments….
Source: For Stan Druckenmiller This Is “The Endgame” – His Full ‘Apocalyptic’ Presentation | Zero Hedge
Hat tip to Houses & Holes at Macrobusiness.
Also from Michael Pettis:
This is the great irony of the global financial crisis. China, Russia, and France want to lead the charge to strip the US of its exorbitant privilege, and the US resists. And yet if the US were to take steps to prevent foreigners from accumulating US assets, the result would be a sharp contraction in international trade. Surplus countries, like Europe and China, would be devastated, but the US current account deficit would fall with the reduction in net capital inflows. As it did, by definition the excess of US investment over US savings would have to contract. Because US investment wouldn’t fall, and in fact would most likely rise, US savings would automatically rise as lower US unemployment caused GDP to grow faster than the rise in consumption.
But what about the extremely low savings rates in the US. Don’t they prove, as Yale University’s Stephen Roach has often pointed out, that the US is savings-deficient and relies on Chinese and European savings to fund US investment, or at least the US fiscal deficit, because the US consumes beyond its means?
“What the candidates won’t tell the American people is that the trade deficit and the pressures it places on hard-pressed middle-class workers stem from problems made at home. In fact, the real reason the US has such a massive multilateral trade deficit is that Americans don’t save.”
This is one of the most fundamental errors that arise from a failure to understand the balance of payments mechanisms. As I explained four years ago in an article for Foreign Policy, “it may be correct to say that the role of the dollar allows Americans to consume beyond their means, but it is just as correct, and probably more so, to say that foreign accumulations of dollars force Americans to consume beyond their means.” As counter-intuitive as it may seem at first, the US does not need foreign capital because the US savings rate is low. The US savings rate is low because it must counterbalance foreign capital inflows, and this is true out of arithmetical necessity……
Michael Pettis explains why the US dollar as reserve currency is a burden rather than a privilege for the US:
Historically, neither Europe nor Japan, and certainly not China, have been willing to permit foreigners to purchase significant amounts of government bonds for reserve purposes. When the PBoC tried to accumulate yen three years ago, for example, rather than welcome the friendly Chinese gesture granting the Bank of Japan some of the exorbitant privilege enjoyed by the Fed, the Japanese government demanded that the PBoC stop buying. The reason is because PBoC buying would force up the value of the yen by just enough to reduce Japan’s current account surplus by an amount exactly equal to PBoC purchases. This, after all, is the way the balance of payments works: it must balance.
What is more, because the current account surplus is by definition equal to the excess of Japanese savings over Japanese investment, the gap would have to narrow by an amount exactly equal to PBoC purchases. Here is where the exorbitant privilege collapses. If Japan needs foreign capital because it has many productive investments at home that it cannot finance for lack of access to savings, it would welcome Chinese purchases. PBoC purchases of yen bonds would indirectly cause productive Japanese investment to rise by exactly the amount of the PBoC purchase, and because the current account surplus is equal to the excess of savings over investment, the reduction in Japan’s current account surplus would occur in the form of higher productive investment at home. Both China and Japan would be better off in that case.But like other advanced economies Japan does not need foreign capital to fund productive domestic investment projects. These can easily be funded anyway. In that case PBoC purchases of yen bonds must cause Japanese savings to decline, so that its current account surplus can decline (if the gap between savings and investment must decline, and investment does not rise, then savings must decline). There are only two ways Japanese savings can decline: first, the Japanese debt burden can rise, which Tokyo clearly doesn’t want, and second, Japanese unemployment can rise, which Tokyo even more clearly doesn’t want.
There is no way, in short, that Japan can benefit from PBoC purchases of its yen bonds, which is why Japan has always opposed substantial purchases by foreign central banks. It is why European countries also strongly opposed the same thing before the euro was created, and it is why China restricts foreign inflows, except in the past year when it has been overwhelmed by capital outflows. The US and, to a lesser extent, the UK, are the only countries that permit unlimited purchases of their government bonds by foreign central banks, but the calculus is no different.
It turns out that foreign investment is only good for an economy if it brings needed technological or managerial innovation, or if the recipient country has productive investment needs that cannot otherwise be funded. If neither of these two conditions hold, foreign investment must always lead either to a higher debt burden or to higher unemployment. Put differently, foreign investment must result in some combination of only three things: higher productive investment, a higher debt burden, or higher unemployment, and if it does not cause a rise in productive investment, it must cause one of the other two.
The two conditions under which foreign investment is positive for the economy – i.e. it leads to higher productive investment – are conditions that characterize developing economies only, and not advanced countries like Japan and the US. These conditions also do not characterize developing countries that have forced up their domestic savings rates to levels that exceed domestic investment, like China.
David Llewellyn-Smith sums up Australian Treasurer Scott Morrison’s Budget with one chart:
According to Treasury, Australia’s terms of trade are going to settle at a gentlemanly plateau far higher than they have even been in history outside of the China boom.
Source: Welcome to the Banana Republic Budget – MacroBusiness
From FT (via the Coppo Report at Bell Potter):
China’s leaders need to look beyond the current solutions being floated to tackle the country’s mounting corporate debt problems and come up with a bigger plan to do so, the International Monetary Fund’s top China expert has warned. The IMF has been expressing growing concern about China’s debt issues and pushing for an urgent response by Beijing to what the fund sees as a serious problem for the Chinese economy. It warned in a report earlier this month that $1.3tn in corporate debt — or almost one in six of the business loans on Chinese banks’ books — was owed by companies who brought in less in revenues than they owed in interest payments alone. In a paper published on Tuesday, James Daniel, the fund’s China mission chief, and two coauthors, went further and warned that Beijing needed a comprehensive strategy to tackle the problem. They warned that the two main responses Beijing was planning to the problem — debt-for-equity swaps and the securitization of nonperforming loans — could in fact make the problem worse if underlying issues were not dealt with. The plan for debt for equity swaps could end up offering a temporary lifeline to unviable state owned companies, they warned. It could also leave them managed by state owned banks or other officials with little experience in doing so.
Bad debt is bad debt …… and nonproductive assets are nonproductive assets. Financial window-dressing like securitization or debt-for-equity swaps will not change this. The assets are still unproductive. Effectively, China has to stump up $1.3 trillion to re-capitalize its banks. And that may be the tip of the iceberg.
Reuters:
Billionaire activist investor Carl Icahn ….. said he was “still very cautious” on the US stock market and there would be a “day of reckoning” unless there was some sort of fiscal stimulus.
…..Icahn, who owned 45.8 million Apple shares at the end of last year, said China’s economic slowdown and worries about how China could become more prohibitive in doing business triggered his decision to exit his position entirely.
Icahn is right about fiscal stimulus. Easy money policies implemented by central banks around the globe are an effective tool to stem the flow when financial markets are hemorrhaging but they are not a long-term solution. The only effective means of halting the long-term, downward spiral is fiscal stimulus.
The biggest obstacle to fiscal stimulus is resistance to increasing public debt. There is good reason for this as wasteful deficit spending in the past has left taxpayers with a massive debt burden and nothing to show for it. Governments ran deficits to cover a shortfall in tax revenue or an increase in expenditure without thought as to how the debt would be repaid.
But if debt is used to fund investment in productive infrastructure, revenue from the asset can be used to pay off the debt over time, or the asset can be sold to repay the loan. There is an immediate double benefit to government, with increased wages — directly from infrastructure projects and indirectly from suppliers of goods and services — boosting tax revenues while also saving on unemployment benefits. The long-term benefit is retaining and developing skills in the economy that would otherwise be lost through long-term unemployment.
Politicians have a poor track record, however, when it comes to selecting productive infrastructure projects. Instead favoring projects that will garner the most votes. This can be improved by setting up a non-partisan planning and selection process with a long time horizon. Also partnership with the private sector would eliminate projects with weak or unpredictable revenue streams.
Partnerships with the private sector also help to leverage funds raised through public debt, limit cost overruns and contain on-going running costs. But both sides must have skin in the game.
To be effective, infrastructure programs must address the long-term needs of the economy and should be carried out on a broad, even global, scale to re-invigorate the faltering global economy.
Source: Carl Icahn sells entire Apple stake on China worries, warns Wall Street of ‘day of reckoning’
The Fed quit quantitative easing more than a year ago, limiting total assets on its balance sheet to $4.5 trillion. But more than $2.5 trillion of cash injected into the financial system had been deposited straight back into the Federal Reserve system by banks as excess reserves, earning 0.25% p.a.
Fresh money continued to leak into the financial system as banks drew down their excess reserves, highlighted above by the widening gap between Total Assets and Excess Reserves. In December 2015 the Fed doubled the rate payable on excess reserves to 0.50% p.a. The intention is clearly to attract more excess reserves and narrow the gap, or at least slow the rate at which excess reserves are being withdrawn to prevent further widening.
Easy money policies followed by central banks around the world are not achieving the desired result of reviving business investment. If we examine the Fed’s track record over the last two decades, sharp surges in business credit were accompanied by speculative bubbles — stocks ahead of the Dotcom crash and housing ahead of the GFC — with disastrous results. GDP failed to respond.
The latest rally in global markets is also driven by monetary easing, this time in China, with a massive surge in the money supply signaling PBOC intentions to print their way out of trouble (and into an even bigger hole).
Ineffectiveness of monetary policy in solving structural problems has often been described as “like pushing on a string”. But recent experience shows it is more like lighting a fuse.
This is a nightmare, which will pass away with the morning. For the resources of nature and men’s devices are just as fertile and productive as they were. The rate of our progress towards solving the material problems of life is not less rapid. We are as capable as before of affording for everyone a high standard of life …. and will soon learn to afford a standard higher still. We were not previously deceived. But to-day we have involved ourselves in a colossal muddle, having blundered in the control of a delicate machine, the working of which we do not understand. The result is that our possibilities of wealth may run to waste for a time – perhaps for a long time.
~ John Maynard Keynes: The Great Slump of 1930
