Empirically, a long period of deleveraging nearly always follows a major financial crisis. Deleveraging episodes are painful, lasting six to seven years on average and reducing the ratio of debt to GDP by 25 percent. GDP typically contracts during the first several years and then recovers.
Mark Carney: Growth in the age of deleveraging
Today, American aggregate non-financial debt is at levels similar to those last seen in the midst of the Great Depression. At 250 per cent of GDP, that debt burden is equivalent to almost US$120,000 for every American (Chart 1).
…..backsliding on financial reform is not a solution to current problems. The challenge for the crisis economies is the paucity of credit demand rather than the scarcity of its supply. Relaxing prudential regulations would run the risk of maintaining dangerously high leverage – the situation that got us into this mess in the first place.
As a result of deleveraging, the global economy risks entering a prolonged period of deficient demand. If mishandled, it could lead to debt deflation and disorderly defaults, potentially triggering large transfers of wealth and social unrest.
Managing the deleveraging process
Austerity is a necessary condition for rebalancing, but it is seldom sufficient. There are really only three options to reduce debt: restructuring, inflation and growth. Whether we like it or not, debt restructuring may happen. If it is to be done, it is best done quickly. Policy-makers need to be careful about delaying the inevitable and merely funding the private exit.
……Some have suggested that higher inflation may be a way out from the burden of excessive debt. This is a siren call. Moving opportunistically to a higher inflation target would risk unmooring inflation expectations and destroying the hard-won gains of price stability.
…..With no easy way out, the basic challenge for central banks is to maintain price stability in order to help sustain nominal aggregate demand during the period of real adjustment. In the Bank’s view, that is best accomplished through a flexible inflation-targeting framework, applied symmetrically, to guard against both higher inflation and the possibility of deflation.
The most palatable strategy to reduce debt is to increase growth. In today’s reality, the hurdles are significant. Once leverage is high in one sector or region, it is very hard to reduce it without at least temporarily increasing it elsewhere.
In recent years, large fiscal expansions in the crisis economies have helped to sustain aggregate demand in the face of private deleveraging. However, the window for such Augustinian policy is rapidly closing. Few except the United States, by dint of its reserve currency status, can maintain it for much longer.
…..The route to restoring competitiveness [in the euro-zone] is through fiscal and structural reforms. These real adjustments are the responsibility of citizens, firms and governments within the affected countries, not central banks. A sustained process of relative wage adjustment will be necessary, implying large declines in living standards for a period in up to one-third of the euro area.
…..With deleveraging economies under pressure, global growth will require global rebalancing. Creditor nations, mainly emerging markets that have benefited from the debt-fuelled demand boom in advanced economies, must now pick up the baton. This will be hard to accomplish without co-operation. Major advanced economies with deficient demand cannot consolidate their fiscal positions and boost household savings without support from increased foreign demand. Meanwhile, emerging markets, seeing their growth decelerate because of sagging demand in advanced countries, are reluctant to abandon a strategy that has served them so well in the past, and are refusing to let their exchange rates materially adjust. Both sides are doubling down on losing strategies. As the Bank has outlined before, relative to a co-operative solution embodied in the G-20’s Action Plan, the foregone output could be enormous: lower world GDP by more than US$7 trillion within five years. Canada has a big stake in avoiding this outcome.
Mark Carney: Growth in the age of deleveraging.
Comment: ~ One of the most important papers I have read this year. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board — established by the G-20 in 2009 to further global economic governance — maps out the hard road to recovery from the current financial crisis.
Bulk trouble – macrobusiness.com.au
These three commodities [thermal coal, coking coal and iron ore] make up half of Australia’s terms of trade. The first few months of next year are not going to be kind to the TOT. Not kind at all.
via Bulk trouble – macrobusiness.com.au | macrobusiness.com.au.
Thermal coal:
Coking coal:
Iron ore:
Private sector debt growth warns of anemic recovery
The cause of current anemic GDP growth is evident from the recently-released Z1 Flow of Funds report. GDP recovery from 2008/2009 is accompanied by only a modest rise in Domestic (Non-Financial) Debt — which is now constraining further growth.
Domestic (Non-Financial) Debt is made up of Government Debt and Private (Non-Financial) Debt — which can be further broken down into Household and Corporate debt. The Financial sector is excluded as it mainly acts as a conduit, channeling debt to other sectors of the economy. We can see below that Private (Non-Financial) Debt contraction was far greater than overall Domestic (Non-Financial) Debt. What saved the economy was a sharp spike in Government Debt in 2009, offsetting the fall. The massive fiscal deficit may have left a public debt hangover, but failure to offset the contraction in private borrowing would have had more serious consequences: a GDP collapse similar to the 1930s.
Resumption of corporate borrowing has dragged Private (Non-Financial) Debt growth into positive territory but growth remains anemic and households continue to de-leverage. Cessation of government borrowing would cause a fall in overall Domestic (Non-Financial) Debt growth to near zero and a sharp fall in GDP. The economy needs to be gradually weaned off stimulus spending in order to minimize disruption to growth. And not before Private sector borrowing recovers. We need a clear deficit-reduction plan, over 5 to 10 years, in order to restore corporate sector confidence and encourage new capital investment.
The only alternative is further quantitative easing (QE3), where continuous deficits are funded by borrowing from the Fed. But that poses a whole new set of problems — and could lead us back to square #1.
FRBSF Economic Letter: Asset Price Booms and Current Account Deficits
Just as the United States was not the only country posting a large current account deficit, so too it was not the only country that experienced asset price booms. Figure 2 shows that countries with large current account deficits in 2006 also tended to have larger house price increases. Of course, there are exceptions. For example, China has experienced rapid house price appreciation despite its enormous current account surplus. But, in general, house price appreciation and current account deficits appear to have been positively associated across many countries.
via FRBSF Economic Letter: Asset Price Booms and Current Account Deficits (2011-37, 12/5/2011).
Colin Twiggs: ~ There appears to be a general rule that large current account deficits lead to asset price booms. But to prove the rule researchers need to address why Japan experienced a massive asset price boom in the 1980s, and why China experienced a similar boom over the last decade, when both were running current account surpluses.
Asset prices, financial and monetary stability
If financial imbalances can build up in an environment of low inflation it stands to reason that a monetary policy reaction function that does not respond to these imbalances when they occur can unwittingly accommodate an unsustainable and disruptive boom in the real economy. The result need not take the form of inflation, although latent inflationary pressures would normally exist. Rather, it would be a contraction in economic activity, possibly accompanied by outright deflation, amplified by widespread financial strains. Accordingly, one could argue that the more serious “bubble” was in the real economy itself.
In this scenario, the consequences of failing to act early enough can be serious. If the contraction in economic activity is deep enough and prices actually decline, they can cripple the effectiveness of monetary policy tools and undermine the credibility of institutions. The Japanese experience is very instructive here. Moreover, reaction functions that are seen to imply asymmetric responses, lowering rates or providing ample liquidity when problems materialise but not raising rates as imbalances build up, can be rather insidious in the longer run. They promote a form of moral hazard that can sow the seeds of instability and of costly fluctuations in the real economy.
This paradigm sees the financial imbalances as contributing to, but, more importantly, as signaling distortions in the real economy that will at some point have to be unwound. In other words, the behaviour of prices of goods and services is not a sufficient statistic for those distortions. This runs contrary to the standard macroeconomic models used nowadays.
Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus
by Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe
July 2002
Colin Twiggs: ~ Extract from BIS Working Paper No.114, co-authored in 2002 by Dr Philip Lowe, who has been appointed as the new RBA deputy governor. Looks like a good choice.
The Black Swan of Cairo: How suppressing volatility makes the world less predictable and more dangerous
Complex systems that have artificially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting fluctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artificially constrained systems become prone to “Black Swans” — that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers.
….Preventing small forest fires can cause large forest fires to become devastating. This property is shared by all complex systems. In the realm of economics, price controls are designed to constrain volatility on the grounds that stable prices are a good thing. But although these controls might work in some rare situations, the long-term effect of any such system is an eventual and costly blowup whose cleanup costs can far exceed the benefits accrued.
….Humans simultaneously inhabit two systems: the linear and the complex. The linear domain is characterized by its predictability and the low degree of interaction among its components which allows the use of mathematical methods that make forecasts reliable. In complex systems, there is an absence of visible causal links between the elements, masking a high degree of interdependence and extremely low predictability. Nonlinear elements are also present, such as those commonly known, and generally misunderstood, as “tipping points.” Imagine someone who keeps adding sand to a sand pile without any visible consequence, until suddenly the entire pile crumbles. It would be foolish to blame the collapse on the last grain of sand rather than the structure of the pile, but that is what people do consistently, and that is the policy error.
The Black Swan of Cairo: How suppressing volatility makes the world less predictable and more dangerous
By Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Mark Blyth
Colin Twiggs: ~ This is a must read for those who want a deeper understanding of why complex systems fail and why we are continually blind-sided by unforeseen political and economic events.
Romer: Expectations Wallop Needed to Avert 40-Year Recovery
The Federal Reserve should set a “nominal target” for growth in the nation’s gross domestic product that is well above its current low rate for coming out of a recession, said Christina Romer, now an economics professor at the University Of California, Berkeley.“One thing I think it would do is pack a really big expectations wallop,’’ said Romer, speaking at the Super Bowl of Indexing wealth management conference here. “A new operating strategy is something that could really break through and affect people’s behavior.” Such a “new operating strategy” is needed to get the economy on the kind of course normally seen after a recession. In the first nine quarters after the 1982 version, the economy grew at an annual rate of 6.3 percent. In the first nine quarters of this edition, the rate has been 2.4 percent, barely at the nation’s historical rate of growth. And if a new approach is not taken, it could be decades before the nation is back at full employment.
via Romer: Expectations Wallop Needed to Avert 40-Year Recovery.
Free trade’s not free, bring back the tariff – On Line Opinion
The idea of free trade is of course based primarily on David Ricardo’s 1817 theory of ‘comparative advantage’. Comparative advantage is a lovely little mathematical proof that even if one party is better at producing everything, the greatest efficiency in production can be attained, and all parties can benefit, if each trading party focuses on producing what they are relatively best at, and they trade freely with one another for the rest of what they need.
….comparative advantage does not take into account the costs associated with shifting a regions productive infrastructure from where it is now to producing what it is relatively best at producing.
Neither does comparative advantage take into account the costs of trade; the ports, the ships, the rail lines, the petrol. As well as the economic costs, we can also look at social and environmental costs in relation to both this and the above point.
….Considering these problems, I think it is fair to say that all that the mathematical proof of comparative advantage tells us is that it is possible for all parties to benefit from free trade, not that they necessarily will.
via Free trade's not free, bring back the tariff – On Line Opinion – 1/12/2011.
Did A Large European Bank Almost Fail Last Night? | ZeroHedge
Need a reason to explain the massive central bank intervention from China, to Japan, Switzerland, the ECB, England and all the way to the US? Forbes may have one explanation: “It appears that a big European bank got close to failure last night. European banks, especially French banks, rely heavily on funding in the wholesale money markets. It appears that a major bank was having difficulty funding its immediate liquidity needs. The cavalry was called in and has come to the successful rescue.”
via Did A Large European Bank Almost Fail Last Night? | ZeroHedge.