Economy Archives - Page 127 of 133 - the patient investor

December 6, 2011

Asset prices, financial and monetary stability

If financial imbalances can build up in an environment of low inflation it stands to reason that a monetary policy reaction function that does not respond to these imbalances when they occur can unwittingly accommodate an unsustainable and disruptive boom in the real economy. The result need not take the form of inflation, although latent inflationary pressures would normally exist. Rather, it would be a contraction in economic activity, possibly accompanied by outright deflation, amplified by widespread financial strains. Accordingly, one could argue that the more serious “bubble” was in the real economy itself.

In this scenario, the consequences of failing to act early enough can be serious. If the contraction in economic activity is deep enough and prices actually decline, they can cripple the effectiveness of monetary policy tools and undermine the credibility of institutions. The Japanese experience is very instructive here. Moreover, reaction functions that are seen to imply asymmetric responses, lowering rates or providing ample liquidity when problems materialise but not raising rates as imbalances build up, can be rather insidious in the longer run. They promote a form of moral hazard that can sow the seeds of instability and of costly fluctuations in the real economy.

This paradigm sees the financial imbalances as contributing to, but, more importantly, as signaling distortions in the real economy that will at some point have to be unwound. In other words, the behaviour of prices of goods and services is not a sufficient statistic for those distortions. This runs contrary to the standard macroeconomic models used nowadays.

Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus
by Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe
July 2002

Colin Twiggs: ~ Extract from BIS Working Paper No.114, co-authored in 2002 by Dr Philip Lowe, who has been appointed as the new RBA deputy governor. Looks like a good choice.

December 5, 2011

The Black Swan of Cairo: How suppressing volatility makes the world less predictable and more dangerous

Complex systems that have artificially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting fluctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artificially constrained systems become prone to “Black Swans” — that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers.

….Preventing small forest fires can cause large forest fires to become devastating. This property is shared by all complex systems. In the realm of economics, price controls are designed to constrain volatility on the grounds that stable prices are a good thing. But although these controls might work in some rare situations, the long-term effect of any such system is an eventual and costly blowup whose cleanup costs can far exceed the benefits accrued.

….Humans simultaneously inhabit two systems: the linear and the complex. The linear domain is characterized by its predictability and the low degree of interaction among its components which allows the use of mathematical methods that make forecasts reliable. In complex systems, there is an absence of visible causal links between the elements, masking a high degree of interdependence and extremely low predictability. Nonlinear elements are also present, such as those commonly known, and generally misunderstood, as “tipping points.” Imagine someone who keeps adding sand to a sand pile without any visible consequence, until suddenly the entire pile crumbles. It would be foolish to blame the collapse on the last grain of sand rather than the structure of the pile, but that is what people do consistently, and that is the policy error.

The Black Swan of Cairo: How suppressing volatility makes the world less predictable and more dangerous
By Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Mark Blyth

Colin Twiggs: ~ This is a must read for those who want a deeper understanding of why complex systems fail and why we are continually blind-sided by unforeseen political and economic events.

December 5, 2011

Romer: Expectations Wallop Needed to Avert 40-Year Recovery

The Federal Reserve should set a “nominal target” for growth in the nation’s gross domestic product that is well above its current low rate for coming out of a recession, said Christina Romer, now an economics professor at the University Of California, Berkeley.“One thing I think it would do is pack a really big expectations wallop,’’ said Romer, speaking at the Super Bowl of Indexing wealth management conference here. “A new operating strategy is something that could really break through and affect people’s behavior.” Such a “new operating strategy” is needed to get the economy on the kind of course normally seen after a recession. In the first nine quarters after the 1982 version, the economy grew at an annual rate of 6.3 percent. In the first nine quarters of this edition, the rate has been 2.4 percent, barely at the nation’s historical rate of growth. And if a new approach is not taken, it could be decades before the nation is back at full employment.

via Romer: Expectations Wallop Needed to Avert 40-Year Recovery.

November 30, 2011

Did A Large European Bank Almost Fail Last Night? | ZeroHedge

Need a reason to explain the massive central bank intervention from China, to Japan, Switzerland, the ECB, England and all the way to the US? Forbes may have one explanation: “It appears that a big European bank got close to failure last night. European banks, especially French banks, rely heavily on funding in the wholesale money markets. It appears that a major bank was having difficulty funding its immediate liquidity needs. The cavalry was called in and has come to the successful rescue.”

via Did A Large European Bank Almost Fail Last Night? | ZeroHedge.

November 30, 2011

Central Banks Take Coordinated Action – WSJ.com

WASHINGTON — The world’s major central banks launched a joint action to provide cheap, emergency U.S. dollar loans to banks in Europe and elsewhere, a sign of growing alarm among policy makers about stresses in Europe and in the global financial system. The Fed, ECB and other central banks took coordinated action to support the global financial system as Europe’s rolling debt crisis continues to trouble markets. The coordinated action doesn’t directly address Europe’s government-debt and budget woes. Instead, it is aimed at alleviating the impact of those troubles on global markets. Moreover, it raises the prospect of other steps by central bankers to prevent a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis.

via Central Banks Take Coordinated Action – WSJ.com.

November 30, 2011

Deleveraging is over — it’s time to cut the deficit

US commercial bank loans and leases bottomed in April 2011, after shrinking more than $1 trillion in the previous two years. The annual rate-of-change has now recovered to positive territory, relieving downward pressure on asset prices, including stocks and real estate. Deleveraging has come to an end and is only likely to resume if the economy suffers further financial shocks.

US Commercial Bank Loans and Leases (incl. Securitized Loans)

You would expect the gap between savings and investment to close when net debt repayments cease, but a significant shortfall between Gross Private Savings and Domestic Investment warns of continued instability.

Gross Domestic Private Investment and Savings

The Investment – Savings gap is reflected by strong, negative Net Private Investment on the chart below. If it were not for the fiscal deficit, the US would risk a significant contraction in national income.

Net Domestic Private Investment and Fiscal Deficit

For the benefit of those who may have missed my earlier coverage of this issue:

Debt repayment after a financial crisis/balance-sheet recession creates a gap between savings and investment that has serious implications for the economy. The resultant shortfall between spending and income risks a sharp contraction in national income. The gap may be relatively small but, like a puncture in a car tire, the impact can be huge. It only takes each of us to withhold 2% of what we earn (e.g. to repay debt) for a gap to appear between spending and income. A for example may earn $1.00 but now only pays 98 cents to B, who will pay 96.04 cents to C, who will pay 94.12 cents to D, and so on through the entire supply chain. By the time we get to L, they will only earn 80 cents where they previously earned $1.00.

The solution, as Keynes pointed out, is for government to offset the shortfall by running a fiscal deficit. The chart above shows that Treasury has been doing exactly that — spending more than they collect by way of taxes — in order to prevent a contraction. The problem is that continual deficits have two serious side-effects. The first is a loss of investor confidence as the ratio of public debt to GDP rises. The second is inflation — if private investment recovers and starts competing with government for ever-scarcer resources. By inflation I do not just mean an increase in the CPI, but also rising asset prices as experienced in the 2004 to 2008 housing bubble, when government ran a deficit while net private investment was positive.

As the chart shows, the fiscal deficit is being funded by net savings (plus a little help from China). So what would happen if we cut the deficit?

An optimistic view would be that cutting the deficit would restore confidence and encourage more private investment, shrinking the savings – investment shortfall.
Pessimists, however, would warn that private sector balance sheets have been impaired by falling asset prices and investors are reluctant to borrow even at current low interest rates. A shrinking deficit without a counter-balancing rise in investment would send the US back into recession.

The truth lies somewhere in between. Corporate balance sheets are generally in good shape while small-to-medium business and home-owners have suffered significant impairment. And one of the major factors inhibiting investment is the uncertain political/economic environment.

Deleveraging has ended and the time has come to start cutting back the government deficit — but cautiously. Cutting the entire deficit in one hit would be more of a shock than the economy could bear, but setting out a four-year plan to cut the deficit by say 2 percent a year would do a lot to restore confidence and set the economy on a path to recovery.

November 27, 2011

Steve Keen on Hard Talk

Steve Keen on how we can safely deflate the debt bubble. There may be alternative, less radical measures that could be taken to help the de-leveraging process but his basic message is right: deleveraging could cause 10 years or more of pain if we do not take measures to address the problem.

November 26, 2011

NY Fed Issues Mea Culpa That Nobody Saw at 6PM on Black Friday | ZeroHedge

The 3 big reasons the Fed had gotten it wrong:

Misunderstanding of the housing boom. Staff analysis of the increase in house prices did not find convincing evidence of overvaluation (see, for example, McCarthy and Peach [2004] and Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai [2005]). Thus, we downplayed the risk of a substantial fall in house prices. A robust approach would have put the bar much lower than convincing evidence.
A lack of analysis of the rapid growth of new forms of mortgage finance. Here the reliance on the assumption of efficient markets appears to have dulled our awareness of many of the risks building in financial markets in 2005-07. However, a March 2008 New York Fed staff report by Ashcraft and Schuermann provided a detailed analysis of how incentives were misaligned throughout the securitization process of subprime mortgages–meaning that the market was not functioning efficiently.
Insufficient weight given to the powerful adverse feedback loops between the financial system and the real economy. Despite a good understanding of the risk of a financial crisis from mid-2007 onward, we were unable to fully connect the dots to real activity until 2008. Eventually, by building on the insights of Adrian and Shin (2008), we gained a better grasp of the power of these feedback loops.

[The author of the NY Fed report] then added that perhaps the biggest reason for the failure was “complacency,” with which I heartily concur, but to which I would also add hubris and stupidity.

via NY Fed Issues Mea Culpa That Nobody Saw at 6PM on Black Friday | ZeroHedge.

November 20, 2011

Praise for good regulation – macrobusiness.com.au

[Economist Stephen King] is generally quick to remind us that regulation creates markets. Without property law and contract law, markets, as we know them, won’t be able function at all. The framework in which to understand regulation is that good regulation creates functional markets and balances benefits between market players and society at large. Bad regulation creates dysfunctional markets, or none at all, and can impede production by market agents by creating new risks, and costly hurdles.

via Praise for good regulation – macrobusiness.com.au | macrobusiness.com.au.