UK & Europe Archives - Page 23 of 89

September 9, 2014

Richard Koo: Revitalizing the Eurozone without Fiscal Union, April 2012

Richard Koo in a 2012 paper identifies 3 challenges facing the eurozone:

The current crisis in the eurozone consists essentially of two macroeconomic problems and one capital flow problem. The first macro problem is profligate government spending, as exemplified by Greece. In such cases austerity is required: the government must cut spending and raise taxes to regain its financial health and credibility.The second macro problem is massive private sector deleveraging in spite of record low interest rates observed in countries such as Spain, Ireland and Portugal following the bursting of their real estate bubbles.

The problem with capital flows is specific to sharing a common currency in the eurozone:

When presented with a deleveraging private sector, fund managers in non-eurozone countries can place their money only in their own government’s bonds if constraints prevent them from taking on more currency risk or principle risk. Consequently, a large portion of excess private savings must be invested in JGBs in Japan, Gilts in the UK, and Treasuries in the US. In contrast, eurozone fund managers who are not allowed to take on more principle risk or currency risk are not required to buy their own country’s bonds: they can also buy bonds issued by other eurozone governments because they all share the same currency. Thus, fund managers at French and German banks were busily moving funds into Spanish and Greek bonds a number of years ago in search of higher yields, and Spanish and Portuguese fund managers are now buying German and Dutch government bonds for added safety, all without incurring foreign exchange risk. The former capital flow aggravated real estate bubbles in many peripheral countries prior to 2008, while the latter flow triggered a sovereign debt crisis in the same countries after 2008.

His solution:

There is a simple and straightforward solution to the two macro problems and one capital flow problem described above: eurozone governments should limit the sale of their government bonds to their own citizens. In other words, only German citizens should be allowed to purchase Bunds, and only Spanish citizens should be able to buy Spanish government bonds. If this rule had been in place from the outset of the euro, none of the problems affecting the single currency today would have happened.

September 8, 2014

David Cameron can’t help the No campaign…. | The Guardian

Charle Brooker on David Cameron and Scotland’s independence referendum:

Cameron can’t help here, of course. In Scotland, David Cameron is less popular than Windows 8. He’s the physical embodiment of everything a fair percentage of Scottish people hate: a ruddy-faced old Etonian walking around like he just inherited the place, sporting a permanently shiny chin as though he’s just enjoyed a buttery crumpet in front of the cricket….

September 7, 2014

Financial reform: Call to arms | FT.com

Martin Wolf on how much capital banks should be required to hold:

The new regulatory regime is an astonishingly complex response to the failures of this model. But “keep it simple, stupid” is as good a rule in regulation as it is in life. The sensible solution seems clear: force banks to fund themselves with equity to a far greater extent than they do today.

So how much capital would do? A great deal more than the 3 per cent ratio being discussed in Basel is the answer. As Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig argue in their important book, The Bankers’ New Clothes, significantly higher capital – with true leverage certainly no greater than 10 to one and, ideally, lower still – would bring important advantages: it would limit the implicit subsidy to banks, particularly “too big to fail” ones; it would reduce the need for such intrusive and complex regulation; and it would lower the likelihood of panics.

An important feature of higher capital requirements is that these should not be based on risk-weighting. In the event, the risk weights used before the crisis proved extraordinarily fallible, indeed grossly misleading…..

There is no magic in the number of 10 times leverage (or 10% Tier 1 Capital to Total Assets) but the larger the buffer, the greater the protection against fluctuations in asset values. The Basel III minimum leverage ratio of 3% is too low to offer adequate protection, even with the highest quality assets, and while 10% is not readily attainable in the short-term, it makes a suitable long-term target.

September 7, 2014

A Prominent Financial Columnist Is Calling For Radical Reforms To The Global Economy | Business Insider

From The Economist review of Martin Wolf’s new book “The Shifts and the Shocks: What We’ve Learned–and Have Still to Learn–from the Financial Crisis”:

To make finance safer, Mr Wolf suggests replacing a fractional reserve banking system, which takes in deposits and lends most of them out in longer-term loans, with a system of “narrow banking”, where deposits must be backed by government bonds. To sustain demand without relying on dangerous asset bubbles, he proposes permanent “helicopter money”, where governments run deficits that are financed by the central bank. For a man of the mainstream, this is brave stuff.

Fractional reserve banking is inherently unstable and responsible for many of the problems in our economic system, but abandoning it completely in favor of “narrow banking”, where deposits are fully-backed by government bonds, seems unnecessary. Increasing Tier 1 capital requirements to 10 percent of total exposure, from the current 3 to 5 percent, should provide a sufficient buffer to withstand most financial shocks. Rapid expansion of credit during an asset bubble would be difficult, with high capital requirements forcing banks to be more selective in their lending. Even more so if supplemented by central bank monetary policy to counteract rapid deposit growth.

September 5, 2014

European ceasefire

Neil MacFarquhar reports in The New York Times:

After five months of intensifying combat that threatened to rip Ukraine apart and to reignite the Cold War, the Ukrainian government and separatist forces signed a cease-fire agreement on Friday that analysts considered highly tenuous in a country that remains a tinderbox…..

The agreement resembles, almost verbatim, a proposal for a truce issued by President Petro O. Poroshenko in June.

It includes amnesty for those who disarm and who did not commit serious crimes, and the exchange of all prisoners. Militias will be disbanded, and a 10-kilometer buffer zone — about six miles — will be established along the Russian-Ukrainian border. The area will be subject to joint patrols. The separatists have agreed to leave the administrative buildings they control and to allow broadcasts from Ukraine to resume on local television….

There appears plenty of skepticism as to whether the ceasefire will hold… and whether Russian forces will withdraw, but markets welcomed the announcement.

Germany’s DAX is testing resistance at 9700/9800. Breakout would indicate a fresh advance, while follow-through above 10000 would confirm a target of 11000. Recovery of 13-week Twiggs Money Flow above zero suggests selling pressure is easing. Retreat below 9250, however, would warn of another test of primary support at 9000.

DAX

* Target calculation: 10000 + ( 10000 – 9000 ) = 11000

The S&P 500 rallied above 2000. Follow-through above 2010 would confirm an advance to 2100*. Sideways movement on 21-day Twiggs Money Flow, however, suggests further consolidation. Reversal below 1990 is unlikely, but would warn of another correction.

S&P 500

* Target calculation: 2000 + ( 2000 – 1900 ) = 2100

CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) remains low, typical of a bull market.

S&P 500 VIX

Shanghai Composite Index, responding to PBOC stimulus, broke resistance at 2250 to signal a primary up-trend. Rising 13-week Twiggs Money Flow indicates accelerating buying pressure. Target for the advance is 2500*. Reversal below 2250 is unlikely, but would suggest further consolidation between 2000 and 2250.

Shanghai Composite Index

* Target calculation: 2250 + ( 2250 – 2000 ) = 2500

The ASX 200 broke short-term support at 5620, but with both US and Chinese markets entering a bull phase retracement is likely to be short-lived. Breakout above 5680 would confirm an advance to 5850*. Bearish divergence on 21-day Twiggs Money Flow warns of medium-term selling pressure, but a trough above zero would indicate that buyers are back in control. Reversal below 5540 is unlikely, but would warn of a test of primary support.

ASX 200

* Target calculation: 5650 + ( 5650 – 5450 ) = 5850

September 3, 2014

Footsie resilient while Euro, DAX falter

The Euro is in a primary down-trend, having broken support at $1.35. Declining 13-week Twiggs Momentum (below zero) confirms. Expect short-term support at $1.31 on the weekly chart, with long-term support at $1.27/$1.28.

Euro

Germany’s DAX encountered resistance below 9700/9800 and 13-week Twiggs Money Flow below zero warns of selling pressure. Reversal below 9300 would warn of another test of primary support at 9000.

DAX

Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 found similar resistance at 3200. A 13-week Twiggs Money Flow trough above zero, however, would indicate buying pressure, while a fall below zero would warn that sellers dominate. Reversal below 3100 would warn of another test of primary support at 3000.

Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50

The Footsie shows more resilience, testing long-term resistance at 6850/6900. 13-Week Twiggs Money Flow oscillating above zero indicates long-term buying pressure, but there is a major psychological barrier at 6900/7000 (the 1999 high) that has to be overcome. Breach of support at 6500 is unlikely, but would warn of a reversal.

FTSE 100

* Target calculation: 7000 + ( 7000 – 6000 ) = 8000

August 30, 2014

Luc Vancraen: Can the EU still prevent an open war between Ukraine and Russia?

Interesting proposal from Luc Vancraen, an entrepreneur in Kyiv who holds a masters degree from Boston University:

If there is no Novorussia today it is because of the ferocious fighting of the Ukrainian armed forces. If the EU wants the Ukrainians to stop fighting after Donbas is liberated it will have to come up with a plan that convinces even the volunteer battalions that it is just a matter of time before Crimea returns to Ukraine.

The only way I can see this happen is through a Crimean Occupation Tax on all energy imported from Russia into the EU and all other countries that want to participate. President Putin will not like this tax at all but strangely enough it might be enough for him to belief that this could stop the Ukrainian army. It buys him time and he can speculate on convincing the EU to drop it later through good behaviour even though this won’t be easy with a name like this.

The tax will be paid on all Russian gas, oil and coal sold in the EU. Who pays this tax? Initially it will be EU citizens through their energy bills. This allows Putin through the Russian propaganda to trivialise these sanctions and to laugh with the stupidity of the EU that sanctions itself. But don’t underestimate the creativity of the energy companies. They will find other suppliers and this helps the EU to reduce dependency from a supplier they can no longer trust. Russia will be faced very fast with a serious dilemma. Lowering energy prices to include the tax so that it remains competitive with suppliers that don’t need to pay this or totally losing the biggest customer on earth. Simulations show that after just two years it is Russia that is paying this tax to avoid totally losing the EU as a customer.

August 30, 2014

Garry Kasparov: It’s a War, Stupid! | TIME

From Gary Kasparov:

As always when it comes to stopping dictators, with every delay the price goes up. Western leaders have protested over the potential costs of action Ukraine at every turn only to be faced with the well-established historical fact that the real costs of inaction are always higher. Now the only options left are risky and difficult, and yet they must be tried. The best reason for acting to stop Putin today is brutally simple: It will only get harder tomorrow.

August 30, 2014

The Great Myth: World War I Was No Accident | The Diplomat

From Zachary Keck:

…As the wise philosopher Rob Farley once cautioned in these pages, “accidental wars rarely happen,” and instead are usually the result of deliberate state policy. And in this regard, WWI is no exception, at least according to Dale C. Copeland.

In his instant classic, Origins of Major Wars, Copeland developed a theory he called “dynamic differentials theory” to explain the causes of great power conflicts. To slightly oversimplify, dynamic differentials theory argues that declining states initiate wars when they are still clearly militarily superior but they believe they are in deep and irreversible decline relative to the rising state.

In such a situation, the leaders of the declining state come to see war as the only way to prevent the rising state from overtaking it as the most powerful nation in the system, thereby becoming a major security threat. Dynamic differentials theory posits that these leaders are most likely to initiate war when they believe they have maximized their relative power– that is, when they believe their relative military power is peaking and delaying war will only allow the rising nation to grow relatively stronger….

August 30, 2014

EU moves to ramp up Russia sanctions | Al Jazeera

From AlJazeera:

French President Francois Hollande stressed that a failure by Russia to reverse a flow of weapons and troops into eastern Ukraine would force the bloc to impose new economic measures.”Are we going to let the situation worsen, until it leads to war?” Hollande said at a news conference. “Because that’s the risk today. There is no time to waste.”